In constructing and evaluating a theory of justice, it is crucial to determine the scope of justice---that is, the range of cases to which considerations of justice are appropriately applied. One important strand of contemporary political thought, best exemplified by John Rawls, argues that the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, i.e., its major political and social institutions. Rawls' position has not, however, been without its share of critics. An alternative to institutional egalitarianism begins by emphasizing that the structure of institutions alone is of uncertain benefit when it comes to meeting the demands of justice. If we are truly concerned with social justice, we should be sensitive to the fact that individual choices can go a long way towards upsetting the balance of equality that justice requires. This thesis defends Rawls' focus on the basic structure against this challenge.

This thesis aims at defending John Rawls from the communitarian critique by Michael Sandel and Alasdair Maclntyre. The main focus of the thesis is to investigate how cogent their criticism of Rawls's conception of the person is. In chapter one I summarise Rawls's theory of justice. I look at the two principles of justice and what they entail. These principles determine the rights of the citizens as well as how material goods in society should be distributed. He formulates what he calls 'justice as fairness'. Deeply embedded in establishing the notion of justice as fairness are two inseparable ideas. These are the idea of the original position and the idea of the veil of ignorance. The original position presents a thought experiment in which individuals are brought together to come up with an ideal society that they would want to live in. The ideas they have to discuss ultimately include individual rights and freedoms as well as how material goods are to be shared in that society. The individuals, however, are deprived of certain crucial information about how they would appear in the resulting society. This is what Rawls calls the veil of ignorance. The individuals do not know who or what they are going to be in their society. In other words, they do not know if they are going to be male or female, rich or poor, rulers or the oppressed or what their personality traits/character type or talents and disabilities will be. In chapter two I will look at the communitarian objection to Rawls's project. As a crucial part of his characterisation of the veil of ignorance and the original position he claims that these individuals do not know of their own conception of the good. This means that they are not aware of what they will choose as worthwhile and what they will consider to be a wasted life. Thus, these individuals, in considering principles that must govern them, that is principles of justice, will not discriminate between those who pursue a life of enlightenment and those who pursue a life of drugs and heavy parties. This has caused problems with communitarians who insist that one cannot be indifferent to what she considers to be worthwhile. They argue that an individual will defend what she considers to be worthwhile in the face of what she considers to be base, she will discriminate what is worthwhile from what is not worthwhile. Any interpretation that does not conform to this understanding is a distorted understanding of the nature of individuals. The work of communitarians is very broad. My main concentration is going to be on the work of Michael J. Sandel and Alasdair Mclntyre in so far as they argue that Rawls's project rests on a fundamentally mistaken view of the self. I have chosen Sandel and Mclntyre because their work is similar though expressed differently. They both argue that Rawls views the individual as preceding the existence of her society. They both claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self that leaves out the essence of community and values in the make up of individuals. In chapter three I argue that the objections by both Maclntyre and Sandel fail to apply to Rawls's project. I argue that their objections have strayed from metaphysics of the person. Sandel and Maclntyre claim that Rawls is committed to a certain metaphysical view of the self. Sandel calls it an "antecedently individuated self and Maclntyre calls it an "unencumbered emotivist self. Using the example of Derek Parfit and Bernard Williams I conclude that Sandel and Maclntyre are not discussing metaphysics of the person but have brought other issues that are at odds with our traditional understanding of the metaphysics of the self. In chapter four I conclude by considering the differences between my response to the communitarian critique and Rawls's response. Rawls explicitly denies that his theory is committed to any view of the person. He argues that justice as fairness is intended as a political conception of justice. He argues that justice as fairness is a moral conception that is meant for a specific subject. The subject he has in mind refers to the economic social and political institutions that make up society. Rawls chooses to explain what his theory entails and its limitations regarding metaphysics. I show how my response differs from Rawls's and argue that my response has got certain attractions over Rawls's own response. I end by looking at possible ways of furthering the debate. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2005.

This thesis explores the role of the concept of equality in John Rawls' theory of justice. Rawls argues that the Kantian idea of the moral equality of persons translates into a primary principle of equal basic liberties, followed by a principle of fair equality of opportunity that addresses the moral arbitrariness of social and natural contingencies. Furthermore, the "difference principle" specifies that social and economic inequalities are only justified if they benefit the worst-off group. Libertarian critics such as Robert Nozick argue that Rawls' "difference principle" is inconsistent with a Kantian respect for the moral equality of persons as ends in themselves. Communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor argue that Rawls' egalitarian commitments are not supportable via a Kantian conception of the moral subject of justice as an autonomous pre-social self. This thesis defends Rawls' theory of justice against these challenges.

Este trabajo intenta caracterizar el tipo de discurso liberal desarrollado tanto en la obra del filósofo norteamericano John Rawls así como en el trabajo de Ronald Dworkin y Will Kymlicka. Esto, teniendo como centro de discusión las concepciones de individuo, comunidad y su relación, que subyacen a la teoría liberal; discusión articulada desde dos perspectivas: primero, a partir del contraste entre la Teoría de la Justicia de Rawls con los antecedentes que han configurado la matriz de la filosofía política liberal y segundo, a partir de la reconstrucción de las críticas realizadas por autores como Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor, Alasdair MacIntyre y Michael Walzer que dieron origen al denominado debate-liberal comunitario. En este sentido, el primer capítulo pone en cuestión la consistencia del liberalismo como tradición concreta y son abordadas las obras de John Locke, Benjamín Constant, Alexis de Tocqueville, Immanuel Kant como ejes del pensamiento filosófico liberal. En el capítulo segundo, en base a estos elementos es reconstruida y contrastada la teoría de la justicia de Rawls, prestando central atención al argumento de la “posición original”. El capítulo tercero, caracteriza el debate liberal-comunitario; esto es, reconstruye las diversas críticas presentadas por los autores comunitarios desarticulando sus diferentes tópicos. Frente a lo cual, se articula un tipo de respuesta liberal desde la óptica del mismo Rawls, con su obra Liberalismo político, como de Dworkin y Kymlicka. Finalmente, el capítulo cuarto a modo de conclusión sugiere que si el liberalismo puede hacer frente al mayor número de críticas comunitarias resulta cuestionable si puede dar cabida a un pluralismo real, como es su pretensión, o sólo uno que se acomode al terreno por el demarcado, lo que trazaría sus límites políticos.

Este trabajo pretende realizar un recorrido brevemente concentrado en torno a la idea de sujeto liberal que es posible descubrir en la teoría rawlsiana de la justicia. Para ello se realizará primero una contextualización general en torno a la idea de la primacía de la justicia; luego, una descripción de la polémica siempre permanente entre liberales versus comunitaristas, y finalmente una descripción de los aspectos que configuran la posición original, contemplando tanto aspectos fundacionales en los que se hace presente la herencia del constructivismo y la moral kantiana, como también otras precisiones descriptivas que el mismo Rawls hace de su teoría. En una segunda parte se propone una relectura crítica de algunos aspectos que merecen la pena ser destacados nuevamente, ya sea por su importancia al interior de la teoría, ya sea por su carácter controvertido o susceptiblemente polémico. Finalmente, en la tercera parte se propondrá una lectura enfáticamente comunitaria, destacando los aspectos más importantes, que al parecer no estarían contemplados por Rawls al momento de establecer o suponer una cierta antropología filosófica que se desprendería en torno a las restricciones y descripciones de los sujetos idóneos para el “acuerdo” original y responsables a su vez, de escoger los principios de la justicia.

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This thesis examines the idea of desert as expounded in the work of John Rawls, and some of the implications of this conception of desert for moral and political philosophy. In this work, I analyse a series of arguments against retaining this particular conception of desert.I argue that none of these arguments sufficiently diminishes the force of Rawls’ argument for desert, while many of them do state, and I argue that they are correct in doing so, that this conception of desert is dangerous for political or moral philosophy to maintain. I argue that the moral, political and legal implications of accepting this account of desert severely undermine various institutions of differential treatment, and indeed, moral assessment. I regard it as obvious that societies must, on occasion, treat members of those societies differently, for moral, as well as practical reasons. The Rawlsian account of desert, and the account of responsibility on which it rests, however, will endanger the legitimacy of such procedures. I argue further that the Rawlsian account of desert requires that differences in wealth, and inheritance of wealth, influence and privilege be diminished, if not abolished, if we are to talk of any form of desert meaningfully. I argue that this is a strength of Rawls’ account, and further that any account of desert that is true to the philosophical tradition of the concept will require similar steps to be taken. The primary aim of this thesis is to show that Rawls’ arguments against desert are serious ones, both in terms of strength and scope, and that they must be addressed. I intend to show that these arguments are founded on strong moral intuitions, and that it is plausible that these intuitions may need revision. Finally,I intend to show that desert is an important moral and political concept, and that the disciplines of moral and political philosophy will be impoverished by the absence this concept. This absence, I will argue, is a natural consequence of the acceptance of the Rawlsian arguments.

Pour de nombreux architectes du libéralisme politique contemporain, la neutralité constitue une caractéristique définitionnelle du libéralisme politique. Il est pourtant clair que ces nouvelles formulations du libéralisme ne sont pas exemptes de tout présupposé substantiel. Le libéralisme politique de Rawls, par exemple, accorde de la valeur aux notions de liberté, d'égalité et d'équité. Comment la présence de tels présupposés substantiels est-elle conciliable avec la prétention à la neutralité ? Tel est le problème qui est à l'origine de ce travail de recherche. Pour le résoudre, un vaste travail d'explicitation des présupposés du libéralisme, et plus particulièrement du libéralisme politique de John Rawls, ainsi qu'une étude critique du terme « neutralité » ont été réalisés. Avec Rawls, contre une conception procédurale de la neutralité, je défends la neutralité des justifications et démontre qu'elle constitue la conception de la neutralité la plus plausible. Une justification neutre est définie comme justification fondée sur des conceptions communes, c'est-à-dire partagées. Se pose alors la question de la justification de ces présupposés substantiels tenus pour communs. J'indique comment, chez Rawls, la question de la justification reçoit une réponse conceptuelle. Rawls résout cette question en soutenant une conception cohérentiste de la justification et en développant un certain nombre de concepts innovants, au premier rang desquels l'équilibre réfléchi, dont je défends une conception extensive. Si puissants que soient ces outils conceptuels, dans la mesure où les présupposés du libéralisme sont considérés comme étant implicites dans la culture politique publique, ces présupposés semblent néanmoins appeler une autre forme de justification : une justification herméneutique. Si les présupposés du libéralisme sont le résultat d'une interprétation, il faut être capable de rendre raison de cette interprétation. La deuxième partie de ce travail se met en quête d'une telle justification herméneutique, en se fondant sur l'hypothèse qu'elle est disponible dans les travaux que Rawls consacre à l'histoire de la philosophie : les Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy et les Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. / Many supporters of political liberalism consider that neutrality is part of the definition of liberalism. Yet, it is obvious that these new forms of liberalism are not free from substantive presuppositions. Rawls's political liberalism, as an example, values freedom, equality and fairness. But how can such substantive commitments be compatible with the claim for neutrality? This problem is the starting point of this thesis. To solve it, I work to make the presuppositions of liberalism explicit, especially those of Rawls's political liberalism, and I carry out a critical study of the word “neutrality”. With Rawls and against a procedural conception of neutrality, I support a conception of neutrality as justificatory neutrality, which I consider the most believable conception of neutrality. A neutral justification is defined as a justification which is based on shared conceptions. So, the question to be answered is the question of the justification of these substantive presuppositions, which are taken for shared. I study how Rawls gives a conceptual answer to the question of justification. Rawls answers this question supporting a coherentist conception of justification and developing innovative concepts, such as the concept of reflective equilibrium, of which I support an extensive conception. However convincing these concepts may be and because Rawls considers that the liberal presuppositions are implicit in the public political culture, it seems to me that these presuppositions call for another form of justification: a hermeneutic justification. If the presuppositions are the final result of an interpretation, this interpretation has to be justified. The second part of this thesis looks for such a hermeneutic justification. Its main assumption is that such a justification can be found in Rawls's works on the history of philosophy: the Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy and the Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy.

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