Within the civil war literature, state-rebel relationships are traditionally understood as strictly contentious. However, empirical observations suggest that the two contending parties are not always in a state of total war and their collaboration is possible. Conceived in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, this study contributes to a greater understanding of state-rebel interactions during crises and seeks to explain why some rebel groups cooperate with state-led crisis response operations while the others obstruct. I propose that the nature of rebels’ political goals determine their behaviour vis-à-vis the state. The period of time after a disaster presents a window for rebels to strategically calculate and balance the costs and benefits of collaboration with the state. More specifically, I argue that the more transformative the rebel group’s goals are, the less likely the group will collaborate with the state for crisis relief. A structured comparative case study of the Taliban and Boko Haram lends preliminary support to the hypothesis. As one of the first to examine state-rebel relationships during the Covid-19 pandemic, the study invites future research to rethink how to accurately conceptualise and explain the diverse and puzzling interactions between states and rebels.

When and why do rebels hire private military actors? I argue that rebels are more likely to hire private military actors under the conditions of power asymmetry, rebel competition, the presence of lootable resources and when rebel groups have effective leadership and organizational structures. I test three hypotheses empirically using the PSED dataset which identifies that rebel hired private military actors account for nearly 10% of all PMSC/mercenary employers in Africa, Latin America, and Asia from 1990-2012. I find strong empirical support that power imbalances between rebel groups and government, and the presence of lootable resources increases the likelihood of employment. Counter to my expectations, I find that rebel competition reduces hiring. A qualitative analysis shows that rebel groups with parent organizations are more likely to hire private military actors.

The transformation of Marxist rebel groups into political parties represents a complex and interesting phenomenon, still, the determinants of their success or failure in this transition remain poorly understood. The aim of the study is to investigate why some Marxist rebel groups successfully transition from rebel groups into a political party while some do not. Through a comparative study of the rebel groups Revolutionary Armed Forces Colombia (FARC) and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) in Colombia, this paper will analyze the relationship between internal cohesion and its impact on the rebel-to party transition. The hypothesis that is being tested is that rebel groups with low internal cohesion (vertical or horizontal) among members will have a harder time transitioning into a political party, while rebel groups with high internal cohesion will easier transition into a political party. The findings of this study provide strong indications that internal cohesion influences the successful transition from rebel group to a political party. However, the study also provides indications that other factors need to be considered.

The fragmentation of rebel groups has received extensive attention from scholars and policy-makers alike. Fragmentation has been linked to an increase in civilian deaths, prolonged conflicts, and difficult peace negotiations. Despite the deliberation given to this field, this study argues that rebel governance serves as an explanatory variable that has been overlooked in the literature. This study aims to close this research gap by examining the influence of rebel governance on rebel fragmentation. The thesis suggests that rebel governance intervenes with the opportunity for rebel lieutenants to find the support of networks to create a splinter, and is successful in preventing rebel lieutenants from forming potential splinters. Therefore, it is hypothesized that rebel governance reduces the likelihood of rebel fragmentation. Using data on rebel groups active between 1946-2012, this thesis finds quantitative evidence in support of the hypothesis across all models. Furthermore, support is found that suggests that the more rebel institutions are present, the less likely it is that the rebel group fragments. Additionally, this study employs a survival model of which the results suggest that rebel groups who employ governance take longer to fragment compared to rebel groups without governance.

Non-state armed groups are often countered by military means but non-state armed groups have in many cases proven their resilience and endurance, and they continue to challenge central governments in their efforts to build a peaceful and stable society in many post-conflict societies. We fail to understand why non-state armed actors may supersede central governments in their ability to provide effective governance structures and enjoy legitimacy. This thesis builds on the existing literature on rebel and insurgency governance and aims to explore the drivers that legitimize non-state armed actors from the perspective of the civilian population. Exploring the factors that contribute to the legitimacy of non-state armed groups reveals the local dynamics that underpin the relationship between non-state armed groups and civilians living in the areas under their control. I argue that non-state armed groups, by capitalizing on the failed expectations that civilians have towards the state, and subsequently meeting these expectations by providing essential security and public services, can achieve public legitimacy. Using the method of structured focused comparison, South-West State and Galmudug State in Somalia are compared to test the hypotheses. Fieldwork was conducted to collect data and document analysis was used. The main finding of this study is that the ability of an actor to provide services and security plays an important role when explaining variation in levels of perceived legitimacy.

This essay examines The Myth of Sisyphus (1942), The Plague (1947), and The Rebel (1951). I have chosen these three works in an effort to triangulate Camus' intellectual development, his persistent interest in literature, and the historical background against which these take place. Sisyphus and The Rebel are Camus' two major philosophical essays. The former belongs to Camus' "First Cycle" of writing, in which he focused on the concept of "the Absurd"; the latter belongs to Camus' "Second Cycle", in which he focused on the theme of "revolt." Camus wrote The Myth of Sisyphus during the Nazi occupation of Paris, an event which he witnessed and experienced and which also served as the inspiration for his novel The Plague. Though the two books are connected by this event, thematically The Plague belongs to Camus' Second Cycle. For this reason, it serves as an illuminating work, demonstrating the importance of fiction to Camus' intellectual process and his particular way of thinking. From Sisyphus to The Rebel, Camus' argument for fiction comes down to the opportunity it offers to describe life rather than explain it. In his opinion, the best novelists exhibit the very philosophy that should generally govern human behavior. These novelists limit themselves to what they can be sure of – namely, their personal experiences; they patiently explore what it is like to live on this earth – how human beings deal with each other, manage their environments, and cope with the often tremendous complexities of life. Not co-incidentally, Camus' fiction took special interest in death of all kinds – from murder to sickness to suicide – in order to remind his readers that life is finite. According to Camus, writing fiction is a way to keep the reader conscious of the human condition, because good fiction plainly exhibits life as it is and death as our common fate. By reflecting on good literature, readers may form their own life ethic.

The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, I will examine the influences shaping the choices of teenagers living in an affluent society during the early days of the Cold War, specifically 1950 - 1955. I will discuss the contradictions about society, the family unit, and gender roles teenagers attempted to sort out as they moved through adolescence. Secondly, I will focus on two forms of mass media, specifically comic books and movies of the 1950s. Media has always had the power to change and shape the opinion of the youth culture who consumed it. I will discuss the lengths parents, educators, law enforcement, and government officials went to in order to blame the messages media conveyed for the behavior of this youth in revolt.

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This thesis addresses an identified gap in the field of rebel governance and rebel funding, by theorizing and investigating how differences in rebel group funding sources affect a group’s engagement in rebel governance, distinguishing funding through natural resources from funding through non-natural resources. It is highlighted that these sources differ in three fundamental ways: their necessity for civilian labor and cooperation, the extent to which equipment, technology and infrastructure are required, and the expected time of pay-off. It is hypothesized that the degree to which a rebel group depends on natural resources determines the likelihood to which it engages in rebel governance - i.e. intervenes in all security, political, social, health and educational spheres of civilian life. This hypothesis is investigated through a comparative case study of two rebel groups from 2003 to 2018: the Taliban in Afghanistan, which generated its funding primarily through Afghanistan’s opium economy, and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, later known as Al-Qaeda in Maghreb, which generated its funding through ‘criminal activities’ such as kidnappings for ransom. The findings suggest some level of support for the hypothesis. Inconsistencies in the findings limiting generalizability and the need for further investigations are discussed.

Why do some individuals choose to participate in rebellion, and what recruitment tactics can rebel groups use to affect this decision? These questions are central to the study of civil war because rebel groups must raise troops in order to challenge the government and to survive as an organization. Indeed, much of the civil war literature builds on participation as a key causal mechanism, yet it is rarely specified in theoretical or empirical models. The dissertation attempts to open this black box by tackling three sets of gaps in the existing literature; these relate to the assumptions made in most studies, the theoretical bases for understanding participation and recruitment, and the record of empirical testing. Essay I examines whether a particular type of recruitment practice, ethnic mobilization, is associated with higher levels of violence. The results show that when rebel groups mobilize along ethnic lines, there is a higher risk for intensified violence. Essay II employs new data on rebel troop size to study what factors affect participation in rebellion. The findings indicate that concerns over personal security rather than economic and social incentives best explain participation. Essay III addresses coerced recruitment, positing that conflict dynamics affect whether rebel groups shift from voluntary to coerced recruitment. Using micro-level data on the conflict in Nepal, the results show that the more losses rebels suffer on the battlefield, the greater the number of individuals they subsequently abduct. Finally, the Nepal case study presented in Essay IV suggests that indoctrination as a recruitment strategy was more important to rebel leaders than other facets of the insurgency. Taken together, this dissertation indicates that there is analytical leverage to be had by examining not only the individual’s decision to participate, but also the rebel group’s recruitment strategy, and that these rebel strategies are flexible and contingent on conflict dynamics.