Presidents of the United States and other American policymakers have throughout history cited democracy promotion as one of the chief goals of American foreign policy, and the current administration of George W. Bush has been no exception. However, and notwithstanding the habitual endorsement of this objective by US administrations, the subject of democracy promotion has received relatively little academic attention. This study aims to correct this gap in the literature by considering two questions relating to United States democracy promotion. First, have the efforts of the US to spread democracy to other countries met with success? Second, is promoting democracy truly a priority of American policymakers, or is it rather window dressing cynically aimed at winning public and congressional support for foreign policy? I begin by defining the terms democracy and democracy promotion. I then use three recent case studies to answer the two questions outlined above, the first of which focuses on President Reagan’s policy towards Nicaragua. In the second case study I consider President Clinton’s policy towards Haiti, while the third deals with President George W. Bush’s policy towards Colombia. The evidence I present points to the conclusion that the United States has not been successful in its efforts to promote democracy in other countries, and that spreading democracy abroad is at best a secondary goal of American foreign policy. The evidence presented in the thesis also demonstrates the utility of foreign policy analysis-based approaches to the study of international relations.

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Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study is an historical analysis of the American policy of Constructive Engagement and serves as a comprehensive review of that policy, its ideological foundation, formulation, aims, and strategies. This study also serves as a detailed assessment of the policy’s ties to the South African Total National Strategy. Constructive Engagement, according to the Reagan Administration, was designed to lend American support to a controlled process of change within the Republic of South Africa. This change would be accomplished by encouraging a “process of reform” that would be accompanied by American “confidence building” with the apartheid regime. Before this process could begin, however, the region had to be stabilized, and the conflicts within southern Africa resolved. With the assistance of American diplomacy, peace could be brought to the region, and South Africa could proceed to political reform within the Republic. In reality, the most important aims of Constructive Engagement were to minimize Soviet influence within the Frontline States of southern Africa and remove the Cuban combat forces from Angola. These goals would be largely achieved by supporting and encouraging the South African policy of destabilizing its neighbours, called the Total National Strategy. This alignment inexorably led to a situation in which global policy issues eclipsed regional concerns, thereby making the United States a collaborator with the apartheid regime. Consequently, South Africa was allowed to continue its program of apartheid while enjoying American encouragement of its policy of regional destabilization, particularly its cross-border attacks into Angola and Mozambique. The U.S. support for the apartheid government offered through Constructive Engagement made the policy vulnerable to criticism that the apartheid regime’s “experiment with reform” was not a move toward liberalizing the Republic’s political system but that it was tailored to deny citizenship through the establishment of Bantustans, a point that provided ammunition to domestic opponents of Constructive Engagement. For a time, U.S.-South African cooperation was effective; the Frontline States were grudgingly forced to accept Pretoria’s regional hegemony. However, dominance of the Frontline States did not improve the security of the South African state. The African National Congress had not been defeated and was determined to make the Republic ungovernable. Furthermore, by the late-1980s, Pretoria could not dominate southern Africa and Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe, which, although crippled from years of war, appeared poised to reassert themselves in the region. For South Africa, the Total National Strategy had failed, and coexistence with its neighbours would be a necessity. Without a powerful apartheid regime with which to reduce communist influence in southern Africa, the Reagan Administration abandoned Constructive Engagement. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie is ’n historiese analise van die Amerikaanse beleid van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid en dien as ’n omvattende oorsig van dié beleid, sy ideologiese grondslag, formulering, oogmerke en strategieë. Dit dien ook as ’n gedetailleerde beoordeling van die beleid se bande met Suid-Afrika se Totale Nasionale Strategie. Volgens die Reagan-administrasie was Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid bedoel om Amerikaanse steun te verleen aan ’n beheerde proses van verandering binne die Republiek van Suid-Afrika. Hierdie verandering sou bereik word deur die aanmoediging van ’n ‘hervormingsproses’ wat met Amerikaanse ‘bou van vertroue’ met die apartheidregime gepaardgaan. Voordat dié proses kon begin moes die streek egter eers gestabiliseer en die konflikte binne Suider-Afrika opgelos word. Met behulp van Amerikaanse diplomasie kon vrede in die streek bewerkstellig word, en kon Suid-Afrika oorgaan tot binnelandse politieke hervorming. In werklikheid was die vernaamste oogmerke van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid om Sowjet-invloed binne die Frontliniestate van Suider-Afrika te minimaliseer en die Kubaanse gevegsmagte uit Angola te verwyder. Dié doelwitte sou grootliks bereik word deur die ondersteuning en aanmoediging van Suid-Afrika se beleid om sy buurstate te destabiliseer, wat as die Totale Nasionale Strategie bekend gestaan het. Hierdie ooreenstemming van belange het noodwendig gelei tot ’n situasie waar globale beleidskwessies streeksaangeleenthede oorskadu, en sodoende die Verenigde State van Amerika ’n kollaborateur van die apartheidregime gemaak. Gevolglik is Suid-Afrika toegelaat om sy apartheidprogram voort te sit terwyl hy Amerikaanse aanmoediging van sy beleid van streeksdestabilisering geniet, veral sy oorgrensaanvalle in Angola en Mosambiek. Die Amerikaanse steun vir die apartheidregering wat deur Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid gebied is, het die beleid vatbaar gemaak vir kritiek dat die apartheidregering se ‘eksperiment met hervorming’ nie ’n stap in die rigting van die liberalisering van die Republiek se politieke stelsel is nie, maar eerder toegespits is op die ontsegging van burgerskap deur die vestiging van Bantoestans, ’n punt wat ammunisie verskaf het aan teenstanders van Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid binne die VSA. Die VSA-RSA-samewerking was vir ’n tyd lank doeltreffend; die Frontliniestate moes skoorvoetend Pretoria se streekshegemonie aanvaar. Oorheersing van die Frontliniestate het egter nie die veiligheid van die Suid-Afrikaanse staat verbeter nie. Die African National Congress was nie verslaan nie en was vasbeslote om die Republiek onregeerbaar te maak. Boonop kon Pretoria teen die laat-1980s nie Suider-Afrika domineer nie en Angola, Mosambiek en Zimbabwe, hoewel verswak weens jare se oorlogvoering, het gereed gelyk om hulle weer in die streek te laat geld. Vir Suid-Afrika het die Totale Nasionale Strategie misluk, en naasbestaan met sy buurstate sou ’n noodsaaklikheid wees. Sonder ’n magtige apartheidregime waarmee kommunistiese invloed in Suider-Afrika verminder kon word, het die Reagan-administrasie Konstruktiewe Betrokkenheid laat vaar.

The duality of the United States’ relationship with international criminal law and human rights atrocities is a fascinating theme that weaves through all of American history, but most distinctly demonstrates the contradictory nature of American foreign policy in the latter half of the 20th century. America is both protector of human rights and perpetrator of human rights atrocities, global police force and aggressor. The Cold War exacerbated the tensions caused by American military dominance. The international political and physical power of the American military allowed the United States to do as it pleased in the 20th century with few consequences, but that power also brought watchfulness from the global community and an expectation that the United States would intervene when rogue states or leaders committed crimes against humanity. The international legal community has expected the United States to act and illegally intervene in some situations, but to pursue policy changes peacefully through diplomatic channels on other occasions.

Diploma thesis Special Relationship? British-U.S. Relations, 1979-1990 examines the nature of relations between the United Kingdom and the United States, focusing predominantly on the period of parallel governance of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The aim is to study both the extent to which the relationship was genuinely special and anticipations both countries connected with it. Providing an overview of the development of the special relationship after the WWII the paper addresses foreign, political, economic and ideological bonds between the countries and their political leaders. It considers not only the basic similarities of domestic and foreign policies, but also tensions and conflicts accompanying this alliance. The paper also describes the influence of the special relationship on the relations with European states and the Soviet Union. The uniqueness of the special relationship is identified in both the nuclear, defence and intelligence cooperation and in the British Prime Minister's and American President's ideological and political comprehension.

My doctoral project investigates the impact of Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative on transatlantic relations during the period 1983-86. The dissertation focuses on the three main European powers, namely Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany, and examines their reaction to SDI both individually and comparatively. The study exploits SDI’s position at the intersection of nuclear strategy, political ideology, Cold War diplomacy, and industrial politics to offer a multifaceted, multi-national, and primary source-based analysis of US-European relations during the Reagan Presidency. The picture of the transatlantic relationship which emerges from the dissertation is a complex and nuanced one. On the one hand, the analysis argues that relations across the Atlantic during the Reagan era cannot be reduced to a scenario of accelerating ‘drift’ between the United States and Western Europe. Instead, on SDI as well as on other matters, moments of acute friction alternated with a constantly renewed search for dialogue, cooperation, and compromise on the part of the Europeans and also, if to a lesser degree, of the Americans. On the other hand, the ‘exceptionalist’ ideology and worldview underpinning SDI, the prevailing indifference in Washington to its implications for NATO, and most importantly the persistent anti-nuclear rhetoric and ambitions associated with the initiative revealed a distinct lack of sensitivity to European interest by the Reagan administration. As the dissertation shows, the anti-nuclear drive inherent in SDI, which both reflected and reinforced Reagan’s deep-seated interest in nuclear abolition, constituted the most disruptive aspect of the initiative from the viewpoint of European leaders. In these respects, the SDI controversy epitomises the unilateral tendencies and increasingly divergent priorities from those of the European allies which characterised much of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy – making the 1980s a decade of recurrent tensions in transatlantic relations.

This thesis examines US protectionism in the 1980s from Canadian and American perspectives, and its role in Canada’s pursuit of the historic 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. It analyzes the perceived “threat” of protectionism and evaluates the agreement’s provisions against Canada’s goal of securing access to the US market. It contends that US protectionism was crucial in the Mulroney government’s decision to negotiate a bilateral agreement and was a contentious issue for the agreement’s critics. US sources, unexamined in existing historiography, confirm the increased threat of American protectionism, but emphasize a distinction between the threat and implementation of protectionist trade law. Although the agreement did not shield Canada from US trade remedies, Canada gained important presence in the trade dispute process. These conclusions are drawn from Canadian and American media and government documents, 1980s academic and think-tank commentary, legal documents, the memoirs and diaries of major players, and select archival sources.

This thesis examines US protectionism in the 1980s from Canadian and American perspectives, and its role in Canada’s pursuit of the historic 1988 Canada-US Free Trade Agreement. It analyzes the perceived “threat” of protectionism and evaluates the agreement’s provisions against Canada’s goal of securing access to the US market. It contends that US protectionism was crucial in the Mulroney government’s decision to negotiate a bilateral agreement and was a contentious issue for the agreement’s critics. US sources, unexamined in existing historiography, confirm the increased threat of American protectionism, but emphasize a distinction between the threat and implementation of protectionist trade law. Although the agreement did not shield Canada from US trade remedies, Canada gained important presence in the trade dispute process. These conclusions are drawn from Canadian and American media and government documents, 1980s academic and think-tank commentary, legal documents, the memoirs and diaries of major players, and select archival sources.

L’examen des conceptions exposées par certains représentants politiques et institutionnels conservateurs influents dans le Colorado suite aux élections de mi-mandat en 2006 révèle l’existence d’une rhétorique fondée sur la juxtaposition de deux thèmes fondateurs : les vertus de l’économie de marché et les enseignements de la tradition, auxquels s’ajoute l’adhésion à une politique de défense vigoureuse. En réalité, cette triple thématique constitue l’essence même du discours façonné par William F. Buckley Jr. et Frank S. Meyer dans le magazine National Review à partir de 1955. Buckley et Meyer procédèrent, en effet, au renouvellement de la philosophie conservatrice par la fusion du libéralisme classique et du traditionalisme tels que ces deux courants de pensée apparurent isolément aux Etats-Unis à la fin de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale en réaction au communisme et au New Deal.L’existence d’un discours fusionniste dans le Colorado soulève des interrogations sur la validité de deux théories connexes qui animent méthodologiquement l’interprétation de l’évolution du conservatisme américain. La première théorie voit dans le message conservateur fusionniste des incohérences philosophiques et programmatiques qui annoncent l’atomisation des composantes théoriques de ce message et, consécutivement, aussi bien la disparition du conservatisme sous sa forme actuelle que la recomposition, à terme, des appartenances partisanes aux Etats-Unis. La deuxième théorie soutient que ces incompatibilités et ces risques de fracture se manifestent géographiquement à travers une opposition politico-culturelle entre le conservatisme de l’Ouest non-côtier, auquel l’analyse prête des caractéristiques individualistes, et celui du Sud, décrit comme fidèle à des valeurs traditionnelles et religieuses perçues comme une entrave aux aspirations individualistes.L’objectif de cette étude est de vérifier l’hypothèse de cette dichotomie philosophique et régionale et porte sur l’Arizona et le Colorado, les deux Etats les plus représentatifs de l’Ouest non-côtier. / Comments made by some of Colorado’s most influential conservative leaders in the wake of the 2006 mid-term elections reveal the extent to which the type of conservatism that they advocate rests on three basic principles: free enterprise, tradition, and strong national defense. It turns out that this brand of conservatism coincides with the political philosophy which William F. Buckley Jr. and Frank S. Meyer sought to formulate in National Review starting in 1955 when the magazine was first published. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Buckley and Meyer actually set out to modernize intellectual conservatism by fusing together into a coherent doctrine the principles of classical liberalism and traditionalism that separately emerged in the United States at the end of World War Two in reaction to international communism and the New Deal. The manifestation of “fusionist” conservatism in Colorado in 2006 raises serious questions about the validity of two interrelated theories which methodologically steer studies of modern conservatism in the United States. The first theory holds that American conservatism in its current expression is philosophically incoherent and will ultimately disintegrate paving the way for a major partisan realignment. The second theory contends that such internal tensions are reflected in sectional cultural and political discrepancies between the Interior West, typically described as libertarian, and the South, generally seen as solidly clinging to traditional and religious values which are purportedly at odds with more individualistic aspirations. The purpose of this study is to test the hypothesis of philosophical and sectional strains within American conservatism and focuses on Arizona and Colorado, two of the fastest-growing states in the Interior West since the end of World War Two.

The Catalina Triangle is a work of historical fiction focusing on the final weekend in the life of the actress Natalie Wood with flashbacks highlighting her rise to fame and references to Reagan-era America as well as the history of Catalina Island.