Taking the title of this page literally, I wish to say the following: In this thesis I attempt to resolve some of the metaphilosophical problems concerning the logic of philosophy (i.e. its definition, structural principles, historiography, etc.) in view of the general theory that all of philosophy is but the expression of a single idea--that of the relationship between Reason and Experience. Towards this end, and from within a Kantian framework, I undertake to examine the history of philosophy in order to demonstrate how these basic metaphilosophical problems are generated and how it is that they cannot be solved. The one original claim being made in all of this, then, is simply that philosophy only ever has one thing to say and that this thing cannot be said. If I am right about this, then I have made no contribution to human knowledge, except in the Socratic sense that we now know something which cannot be known. I draw no moral from this except to note in passing that philosophy was first defined as the love of wisdom. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

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<p>It is the aim of this thesis to begin to sort out the relation between reason (as a "higher" mental faculty) and the moral system that Kant develops. This is done through an investigation of the Kantian conception of reason and an investigation of Kant's moral system itself. The idea of the unconditioned, as a necessary condition for the possibility of morality, is identified as being that which connects the two terms.</p> <p>The first part of this thesis deals with Kant's conception of the faculty or function of reason (as opposed to the faculty of the understanding), and this· is centered around two main elements: syllogistic thinking and the subjective maxim to find the condition for all conditioned cognitions. From this, and given what I call the "ambiguous" nature of the pure concepts of the understanding, I begin to trace the development of the idea of the unconditioned. This idea of the unconditioned, I claim, belongs solely to pure reason.</p> <p>In the second part of my thesis, starting from what I take to be Kant's basic presuppositions about morality, the most basic being universality of moral rules, and from the Kantian notion of the will, I attempt to reconstruct, in a systematic way an argument leading to the formation of iii particular moral laws or categorical imperatives. Along the way, the various notions of the unconditioned are noted (e.g., the unconditionally good will, the unconditionally good object), and these are linked to the idea of the causally unconditioned, viz., freedom.</p> <p>In the third and final part I make explicit, though in no comprehensive way, the relation between the idea of the unconditioned (and thus pure reason) and morality.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

Nietzsche's view of Socrates has been studied at length by a number of scholars, and yet the accounts resulting from these studies, even when descriptively correct, have not given a full explanation of the relationship between the two philosophers. More specifically, they fail to clarify the proper connection between Nietzsche and Socrates in terms of fundamental aspects of Nietzsche's thought, especially in terms of his view of reason. The most influential interpretation of Nietzsche's relationship to Socrates comes from Kaufmann, who claims that Nietzsche's view of Socrates is one of pure admiration. More recently, scholars such as Nehamas have corrected Kaufmann's flawed interpretation. Although Nehamas has properly understood Nietzsche's view of Socrates to be one of ambivalence, his interpretation is wanting in that it provides only a partial explanation of this ambivalence. My argument will take the following form. I will first establish in Chapters 2-5 (A) Nietzsche's ambivalence toward Socrates. Then, independently of that discussion, I will reveal in Chapter 6 (B) his ambivalence toward reason. The strict parallelism between these two manifestations of ambivalence in Nietzsche will permit me to make the claim that (B) explains (A). By this analysis I will demonstrate that Nietzsche is not only positive and negative in his assessments of both Socrates and reason, but that he is ambivalent to both for the same reasons. More specifically, for Nietzsche, Socrates' emphasis upon dialectical reason as the one and only medium for attaining eudaimonia is ultimately nihilistic. It stands as a singular example of the variety of nihilistic practices that emphasize one perspective over all others; and to deny perspective, is, for Nietzsche, to deny life itself. Thus Nietzsche understands such practices, among which he includes Christianity, ethical objectivism, and Plato's metaphysics, as a misuse of reason. However, the appropriate use of reason involves experimenting with other modes of expression such as aphorisms, the performing arts, and poetry, which grant the individual as much moral and intellectual freedom as necessary so that they may affirm life in the manner they find most satisfying and rewarding. Hence, it is only through a thorough investigation of Nietzsche's view of reason that his ambivalence toward Socrates can be fully understood, namely, as a manifestation of his ambivalence to reason. / Master of Arts

O presente trabalho é o resultado dos estudos realizados sobre a reconstrução das investigações empreendidas por Habermas acerca da gênese da crítica da razão instrumental, as quais estão contidas no quarto capítulo do primeiro tomo de sua Teoria da Ação Comunicativa. O percurso realizado parte de uma breve apresentação sobre o exercício da racionalidade na modernidade e como as mudanças histórico-sociais implicaram em mudanças teóricas acerca da leitura sobre o exercício da racionalidade. Seguidamente a isto, buscou-se recuperar a conceitualização habermasiana sobre racionalidade, a qual permitiu compreender suas críticas à teoria da racionalização social de Weber; as investigações sobre as teses weberianas ensejam proporcionar a compreensão da análise que Habermas realizou sobre a crítica da razão instrumental a partir da apropriação do marxismo ocidental de Lukács, o qual assumiu a racionalização social como um processo de reificação, visto que, de acordo com Habermas, esta foi a leitura que proporcionou a Horkheimer e Adorno elaborarem uma crítica da razão instrumental que buscou atestar a existência de um mundo totalmente administrado e sem perspectivas de emancipação. O percurso trilhado no presente trabalho recupera a discussão habermasiana de que a perspectiva discursiva assumida pela Teoria Crítica da primeira metade do século XX se enredou em aporias insolúveis por ter assumido que a crise da razão seria resultante do exercício unilateral do modelo cognitivo-instrumental de razão nas modernas sociedades capitalistas. / The current work is the result of the studies undertaken about the preambles of the investigations realized by Habermas about the root of his own critique of instrumental reason, restricted to the fourth chapter of the first volume of his Theory of Communicative Action. The main course taken over here starts with a briefly presentation about rationality and its exercises in Modernity and how the sociological-historical changes boosted into a theoretical change about the development of rationality. After that, the current work aims to recover the Habermasian conceptualization of rationality, which might allow an understanding of his criticism over Webers theory of social rationalization. Habermass investigations on Webers theses aims to provide a further understand of his analysis of his critique of instrumental reason from the Lukacss Western Marxism appropriation of Webers theory, which recognized social rationalization as a reification process. For sure it is close to Habermass thought that this theoretical course allowed Horkheimer and Adornos elaboration of their critique of instrumental reason that sought to attest the existence of an entire administered world with no prospects of emancipation. The path assumed over the current work aims to recover the Habermasian discussion which affirms that the Critical Theory of early XX Century is enclosed into insoluble aporias since it was assumed a crisis of reason in a so large scale, resulted from an unilateral exercise of the cognitive-instrumental reason in modern capitalist societies.

O estoicismo de Sêneca apresenta traços que refletem sua condição pessoal de homem novo, de ator na história do Império Romano e de um pensador bastante livre. As linhas de seu pensamento, que se pode chamar de estóico-senequiano, estão presentes em toda sua obra: de maneira explícita, nas epístolas e nos diálogos; e implícita, na tragédia Hércules no Eta. Para essa tragédia, Sêneca buscou, como modelo principal, As Traquínias de Sófocles, cujas personagens recebem um tratamento tal, que se pode ler, em suas palavras e em suas ações, a expressão das virtudes e dos vícios nos três níveis: cósmico, imperial e individual. A relação entre essas três instâncias é garantida, principalmente, pela tensão sujeito-objeto e pela analogia como processo de conhecimento. Em seu pensamento bipolar, pode-se ler a presença dos princípios que perpassam toda a Natureza: o ativo (do lado do sujeito) e o passivo (na vertente do objeto). A expressão máxima do princípio ativo é, no universo, o Logos; no Império, a razão do príncipe, que constitui sua alma; no homem, a razão diretriz. O vício é o desequilíbrio em qualquer uma das instâncias, e consiste numa inversão que deixa a Razão fora do lugar que lhe cabe segundo a perfeição da Natureza. O reequilíbrio, no âmbito do Universo, se faz pela \"conflagração universal\"; no Império, pelo comando de um príncipe virtuoso; no indivíduo, pela prática da virtude, sob o comando da razão. Como no indivíduo, a virtude, que é igual à sabedoria, à felicidade, à liberdade, é conquistada paulatinamente, o homem, em relação a ela, pode ser um stultus, um uacillans, um proficiens ou um sapiens. No Hércules de Hércules no Eta, convivem as três instâncias: a cósmica na conflagração universal, a do Império Romano, nas alusões político-históricas, e a do indivíduo, na trajetória exemplar do herói rumo à sabedoria e à apoteose. Sua trajetória, dividida entre um velho e um novo Hércules, promove, ainda, a passagem do tempo mítico para o tempo legal, do herói marcado pela hybris para o marcado pela uirtus. / Seneca\'s stoicism presents features that reflect his personal condition as new man, as an actor in the Roman Empire History and as a free thinker. His lines of thought, which can be named as estoico-senequiano, are in all of his works: explicitly, in his epistles and dialogues; and implicitly, in his tragedy Hercules on Oeta. As main source of inspiration to this tragedy, Seneca used Sophocles\' The Trachiniae, in which can be read, through its characters\' words and attitudes, the expression of vice and virtue in three levels: cosmic, imperial and individual. The relationship between these three levels is granted, mainly, by the tension subject-object and by analogy as a process of knowledge. In Seneca\'s bipolar thought, one can notice the presence of principles that go beyond all nature: the active (subject\'s side) and the passive (that concerns the object). The major expression of the active principle is, in the universe, Logos; in the Empire, the prince\'s reason, which constitutes his soul; in men, the guideline reason. Vice is the disequilibrium in any of these instances, and is defined as an inversion that takes reason out of its proper place in accordance with nature\'s perfection. The equilibrium is recovered again, in the universe\'s scope, through universal conflagration; in the Empire\'s scope, through a virtuous prince\'s command; in the individual scope, through practicing virtue under the control of reason. Since in human beings, the virtue, which is considered the same as knowledge, happiness, and freedom, is gained gradually, the men in relation to it can be a stultus, a uacillans, a proficiens, or a sapiens. In Hercules from Hercules on Oeta, the three instances are together: the cosmic through the universal conflagration, the one from Roman Empire through the historical and political allusions, and the individual one, through the hero\'s brilliant way to knowledge and apotheosis. His way, divided into an old and a new Hercules, promotes the passage from a mythical time to a legal time, from the hero marked by hybris to the one marked by uirtus.

Chan Chun Hang Henry. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-138). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Notes on the sources of the works of Immanuel Kant and keys to abbreviations --- p.i / Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter CHAPTER ONE: --- The Supersensible in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.8 / Chapter II. --- "Brief Survey to the Scholarships on the ""Dialectic""" --- p.11 / Chapter III. --- The Supersensible in the first Critique: A Problematic / Emergence of the Transcendental Ideas --- p.16 / Bound determination and Reason --- p.17 / Antinomy and the Supersensible Totality --- p.24 / Concluding remarks --- p.34 / Chapter IV. --- The Supersensible in the second Critique: Reality of Freedom as Practical Reason --- p.36 / """Keystone “ of the critical system" --- p.37 / Pure practical reason and freedom --- p.39 / Chapter V. --- Tension between the Two Critiques --- p.44 / Chapter VI. --- Conclusion to the Chapter --- p.48 / Chapter CHAPTER TWO: --- A Transition from Nature to Freedom and the Power of Judgement / Chapter I. --- Introduction: From Urtheil to Urtheilskraft --- p.50 / Chapter II. --- Experience as a System and the Urtheilskraft --- p.55 / Chapter III. --- System of Philosophy and the Urtheilskraft --- p.59 / Chapter IV. --- Aesthetic Judgement as Reflective Power of Judgement --- p.64 / Chapter V. --- The Moments of Taste --- p.67 / First Moment: Taste as disinterested --- p.67 / Second Moment: Taste as universal --- p.69 / Third Moment: Taste as purposiveness without purpose --- p.71 / Fourth Moment: Taste as necessary liking --- p.72 / Chapter VI. --- "Imagination, Harmony, and the Deduction of Aesthetic Judgement" --- p.74 / Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.76 / Deduction of taste --- p.81 / Chapter VII. --- Concluding Remarks to the Chapter --- p.85 / Chapter CHAPTER THREE: --- Reflective Judgement and the Supersensible Substrate / Chapter I. --- Introduction --- p.86 / Chapter II. --- Analogy and Teleological Judgement --- p.88 / Analogy as reflective judgement --- p.89 / Teleological Judgement: Between mechanism and purposiveness --- p.92 / Chapter III. --- Intuitive Understanding and the Supersensible Substrate of Reality --- p.97 / The peculiarity of human cognitive power --- p.99 / Chapter CHAPTER FOUR: --- Problems and Legacy of Kant's Concepts of Reflective Judgement and Supersensible Substrate / Chapter I. --- Introduction: Recapitulation of the Systematic Problem of Kant's Philosophy --- p.108 / Chapter II. --- The Supersensible Substrate as seen through Reflective Power of Judgement --- p.113 / Chapter III. --- An Indeterminate Ground of Critical Philosophy --- p.116 / Indeterminate ground of philosophy; or the destination of human freedom? --- p.120 / Chapter IV. --- Concluding Remarks --- p.125 / Conclusion --- p.126 / Bibliography --- p.129

Kant attributes the power to awaken one from dogmatic slumber to skepticism and to the antinomy of pure reason; in his accounts of his own awakening and the origin of the critical philosophy, he credits the antinomy and his memory of David Hume. This essay suggests that Kant’s primary aim in the first Critique was to find a resolution to the antinomy; an examination of this resolution shows Kant’s memory of Hume critical to Kant’s enterprise. Kant’s resolution to the antinomy exploits metaphors of war, jurisprudence, slumber, and historical development, as well as his Transcendental Deduction and explanation of transcendental illusion, to unravel the riddle of metaphysics and provide for both the possibility of objective knowledge and the possibility of freedom.

This thesis engages in an interpretative debate over Kant’s general aims in the first Critique. I argue that a defense of the rational legitimacy of religious faith is at the very center of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Moreover, I argue that Kant’s defense of faith is inextricably bound up with his views on the legitimacy of science. On my account, Kant’s Critique not only demonstrates that science is fully consistent with religious faith, but also that science, when properly understood, actually favors religious belief over non-belief.