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Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 162-170).

Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 1988. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 161-167) Also available in print.

I describe an approach to forming hypotheses about hidden mechanism configurations within devices given external observations and a vocabulary of primitive mechanisms. An implemented causal modelling system called JACK constructs explanations for why a second piece of toast comes out lighter, why the slide in a tire gauge does not slip back inside when the gauge is removed from the tire, and how in a refrigerator a single substance can serve as a heat sink for the interior and a heat source for the exterior. I report the number of hypotheses admitted for each device example, and provide empirical results which isolate the pruning power due to different constraint sources.

The central topic of the thesis is the relationship between logic and the cognitive psychology of reasoning. This topic is treated in large part through a detailed examination of the recent work of P. N. Johnson-Laird, who has elaborated a widely-read and influential theory in the field. The thesis is divided into two parts, of which the first is a more general and philosophical coverage of some of the most central issues to be faced in relating psychology to logic, while the second draws upon this as introductory material for a critique of Johnson-Laird's `Mental Model' theory, particularly as it applies to syllogistic reasoning. An approach similar to Johnson-Laird's is taken to cognitive psychology, which centrally involves the notion of computation. On this view, a cognitive model presupposes an algorithm which can be seen as specifying the behaviour of a system in ideal conditions. Such behaviour is closely related to the notion of `competence' in reasoning, and this in turn is often described in terms of logic. Insofar as a logic is taken to specify the competence of reasoners in some domain, it forms a set of conditions on the 'input-output' behaviour of the system, to be accounted for by the algorithm. Cognitive models, however, must also be subjected to empirical test, and indeed are commonly built in a highly empirical manner. A strain can therefore develop between the empirical and the logical pressures on a theory of reasoning. Cognitive theories thus become entangled in a web of recently much-discussed issues concerning the rationality of human reasoners and the justification of a logic as a normative system. There has been an increased interest in the view that logic is subject to revision and development, in which there is a recognised place for the influence of psychological investigation. It is held, in this thesis, that logic and psychology are revealed by these considerations to be interdetermining in interesting ways, under the general a priori requirement that people are in an important and particular sense rational. Johnson-Laird's theory is a paradigm case of the sort of cognitive theory dealt with here. It is especially significant in view of the strong claims he makes about its relation to logic, and the role the latter plays in its justification and in its interpretation. The theory is claimed to be revealing about fundamental issues in semantics, and the nature of rationality. These claims are examined in detail, and several crucial ones refuted. Johnson- Laird's models are found to be wanting in the level of empirical support provided, and in their ability to found the considerable structure of explanation they are required to bear. They fail, most importantly, to be distinguishable from certain other kinds of models, at a level of theory where the putative differences are critical. The conclusion to be drawn is that the difficulties in this field are not yet properly appreciated. Psychological explantion requires a complexity which is hard to reconcile with the clarity and simplicity required for logical insights.

Dissertation (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 2010. / Directed by Sarah Berenson; submitted to the Dept. of Educational Leadership and Cultural Foundations. Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Jul. 7, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 127-138).

This thesis is an investigation into the foundations of reasoning with default rules as presented by Reiter in his seminal 1980 article: `A Logic for Default Reasoning'. In being such, it opens up with a critical appraisal of the logical underpinnings of Reiter's presentation of the main elements of reasoning with default rules. More precisely, following Reiter's presentation, it discusses the concept of a default rule in comparison with that of a rule of inference, the concept of an extension in comparison with that of a theory, and the concept of `being a consequence of' for reasoning with default rules. Contrary to the commonly perceived view, the argument put forth is that such a context does not provide sensible logical foundation for reasoning with default rules. As a result, this thesis argues for an alternative interpretation to what is captured by default rules, what is captured by extensions, and what `being a consequence of' for reasoning with default rules amounts to. In particular, it proposes to treat default rules as premiss-like objects standing for assertions made tentatively, to treat extensions as interpretation structures of a syntactical kind, and to bring the concept of `being a consequence of' for reasoning with default rules into the foreground by formulating a suitable notion of an entailment relation and its ensuing logical system. Accounting for the fact that in any logical system it is important to have at hand mechanisms for formulating proofs and for structuring large theories, this thesis presents a tableaux based proof calculus for reasoning with default rules and it explores some mappings notions related to the structuring of default presentations, i.e., presentations in the context of reasoning with default rules. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This thesis is an investigation into the foundations of reasoning with default rules as presented by Reiter in his seminal 1980 article: `A Logic for Default Reasoning'. A first very general problem definition for this Ph.D. thesis is raised by the following question: Can reasoning with default rules, as presented in Reiter's seminal 1980 article: `A Logic for Default Reasoning', be understood as a logic for non-monotonic reasoning? This thesis presents a rationale for the formulation of such a question and a possible answer for it. On the more technical side, this thesis presents a proof calculus for a particular formulation of a logic for reasoning with default rules, as well as some mapping concepts for structuring presentations defined on this logic.

This study compared the accuracy for the two general approaches to criminal profiling, inductive and deductive. Participants were 213 college students who participated in a 1-hour training session. Participants in the experimental groups were trained in either the inductive or deductive approach to profiling. Participants in the control group were trained in a crime topic unrelated to profiling (rape and sexual assault prevention). Following the training session, participants were asked to review a double sexual homicide case and then profile the offender by completing the Profiling Offender characteristics Questionnaire. Participants trained in the inductive profiling approach were more accurate when profiling the offender’s physical characteristics. Furthermore, the inductive profiling approach led to higher overall accuracy scores compared to the control condition. These results suggest that training naïve profilers to use the inductive approach may improve the accuracy of offender profiles in sexual homicide cases.

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