Societies have established various forms of governance to protect the natural environment from the adverse effects of human activity. While direct “command and control” regulation has achieved significant improvements in environmental protection, concerns for its efficiency have led governments to seek alternative approaches to achieve environmental policy objectives. Commentators describe a shift from “government” to “governance” as policy makers and regulators seek to harness wider social forces beyond government, while risk-based regulation is pursued to target constrained regulatory resources for maximum effect. However, robust evidence for the effectiveness of different forms of regulation is lacking. This thesis addresses this gap, providing an evidence base for instrument selection and a data-informed critique of regulatory reform practice. Research followed a case study strategy, gathering qualitative data through 58 in-depth semi-structured interviews, analysed using the NVIVO™ Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis System (CAQDAS), with senior policy makers at the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, England (Defra) and senior executives in businesses and trade associations in 5 UK sectors. (1) A new typology of regulatory instruments has been compiled, validated with sector experts, refined for policy end-users, and published as part of Defra’s guidance on instrument selection. (2) The critical case of instrument selection in practice at Defra has been examined for the first time, revealing factors affecting choice, the use of coregulation to develop evidence and the importance of retaining policy maker skills for new forms of regulation. (3) A multiple-case study of senior business representatives found five strongly preferred voluntary regulation, seven expressed significant doubts about its effectiveness, and 19 expressed no general preference. While voluntary approaches were valued for flexibility and lower burdens, direct regulation offered stability and a level playing field. They sought inter alia coherent, evidence based regulatory frameworks, delivered through positive regulatory relationships. This research progresses the better and smarter regulation debate on the use of alternatives to direct regulation and has already been used to inform policy making in practice.

Tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade are measures that are put in place in a country to which an exporter wants to export to. These barriers make it difficult for a new manufacturer to export their products. These measures may be considered undesirable in the context of world trade, because they restrict the flow of goods and are detrimental to the consumer because they drive prices up. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations significantly reduced tariff barriers to trade. During the same round, the World Trade Organisation Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade was negotiated with a view to ensure that countries use technical regulations (non- tariff barriers) for no other purpose than to protect the health and safety of the public and the environment. Many of the developing countries have not yet been able to take full advantage of this agreement. It is often difficult and costly for exporters from developing countries to meet the technical requirements of standards and technical regulations and to provide evidence of compliance. This stems from a lack of resources available to developing countries to participate and influence the work of international standards-setting bodies serving as a basis for technical regulation. The absence of internationally recognised national infrastructure for standardisation, accreditation and metrology also prevents acceptance of African products in export markets. Various regions such as Asia and Europe have initiated technical regulatory reforms to align their technical regulations with the requirements of the World Trade Organisation requirements and to establish appropriate technical institutions. These reforms are also expected to assist member countries to gain a competitive edge in global trade ensuring increased gains from trade liberalisation initiatives which provide fair market access for goods and services. Africa appears to be lagging behind the abovementioned regions. The current technical regulatory system in Africa is still too inefficient and ineffective to position African countries competitively. The technical institutions are underdeveloped and under funded and can not support market assess and thus economic development. It is in this context that this study is conducted to explore the technical regulatory framework in Africa against the background of reforms in Asia and Europe with a view of providing public policy recommendations for the establishment of an African technical regulatory system supported by appropriate institutional capacity that may expedite economic recovery for the continent. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / School of Public Management and Administration (SPMA) / Unrestricted

Among the tools available to enhance the rationality of policy formulation, Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) has captured the attention of many scholars for its potential to enhance the accountability and transparency of regulatory governance. Although almost all EU and OECD member states have adopted RIA, only a sub- set of small-n case comparative studies on institutional, political and administrative impact have been conducted. By filling this gap in the literature and proposing the rigorous operationalisation of concepts such as adoption, extent of implementation, and learning, this thesis ascertains the extent of interdependency among governments in their choices concerning an innovation of regulatory governance. Methodologically, the dissertation draws on a multi-method approach, consisting of qualitative analysis to track the process of institutionalisation, as well as event history analysis, based on a dataset covering thirty-eight countries from 1968 to 2006. The empirical findings show that diffusion is a multifaceted process. In the decision to adopt RIA, the role of the OECD in translating, packaging, and promoting such administrative innovation coexists with previous innovations and other administrative variables. Yet the impact of interdependency is marginal in the successive phases of implementation and evaluation. Earliness of adoption is the major predictor of the extent of implementation. There is little evidence of interaction and communication among adopters on the subject of their learning experience. On balance, this regulatory governance innovation is a domain of symbolic and rhetorical meanings that is not adequately supported by administrative capacity.

The Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies The thesis is concentrated on the regulation of credit rating agencies and aims to contribute to a current discussion regarding the future of credit rating agencies. A primary focus of the work was to explore whether a negative role of credit rating agencies in current crisis was caused by their insufficient, unnecessary or unsuitable regulation. An evaluation of sufficiency of newly adopted regulation with respect to the effective functioning of the rating market was chosen as an additional purpose of research. For the fulfillment of the stated aim analytical and comparative methods and synthesis were used. The style of the thesis falls within the Law and Economics approach. The research is based on EU and US legal norms, legislative documents of the European Commission and legal jurisprudence. Part I describes the emergence, development and the functioning of credit rating agencies, structure of rating market and legal meaning of the rating. Part II analyzes the ratio for regulation of credit rating agencies from the perspective of economic analysis of law. Mainly, whether agencies fulfill their function, what could potentially restrain them and how can be regulation helpful in this field. Part III compares and examines current regulatory reform of credit...

Based on a database of 368 merger cases scrutinized by the European Commission (EC) between 1990 and 2007, we evaluate the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation in 2004. We propose a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness, focusing on four different policy dimensions: 1) predictability, 2) decision errors, 3) reversion of anti-competitive rents, and 4) deterrence. We compare the results before and after the reform, finding that the "more economic approach" resulted in improved ex-ante predictability of decisions and a reduction of the frequency of type I errors. Merger policy enforcement deters anti-competitive mergers without over-deterring pro-competitive transactions. Yet, the policy shift away from prohibitions, which are effective as a policy tool and as a deterrence mechanism, does not seem to be well grounded. (authors' abstract)

No description available.

It is widely recognized that coal is and will continue to be a crucial element in a modern, balanced energy portfolio, providing a bridge to the future as an important low-cost and secure energy solution to sustainability challenges. The designer of coal mining operations needs to simultaneously consider legal, environmental, and sustainability goals, along with traditional mining engineering parameters, as integral parts of the design process. However, traditional coal mining planning seldom considers key “sustainability factors” such as societal impacts; dislocation of towns and residences; physical and economic impact on neighboring communities and individuals; infrastructure concerns; post-mining land use habitat disruption and reconstruction; and long-term community benefit. This work demonstrates the advantage of using a systems engineering approach based on the premise that systems can only be optimized if all factors are considered at one time. Utilizing systems engineering and optimization approaches allows for the incorporation of regulatory and sustainability factors into coal mine design. Graphical approaches, based on the use of GIS tools, are shown as examples of the development of models for the positive and negative impacts of coal mining operations. However, this work also revealed that there are significant challenges inherent in optimizing the design of large-scale surface coal mining operations in Appalachia. Regulatory and permitting programs in the United States, which give conflicting and ill-defined responsibilities to a variety of federal and state agencies, often focus on single parameters, rather than the full suite of desirable outcomes for sustainability, and serve as barriers to innovation. Sustainable development requires a delicate balance between competing economic, environmental and social interests. In the context of coal mining in the U.S., the current regulatory frameworks and policy-guidance vehicles impede this balance. To address this problem, and thus effectively and efficiently provide energy resources while protecting the communities and environments, the U.S. will likely need to fundamentally restructure regulatory programs. Ideally, revisions should be based upon the key concepts of public ecology and allow for a systems engineering approach to coal mine design. / Ph. D.

This dissertation introduces a new theory of practice for land planning in America based on behavioralism. It is called culture based incentive planning, or CBIP. The CBIP model and techniques are based on four pillars: cultural snesitivity, behavior analysis, engineered incentive regimes, and the tools of persuasion. CBIP is designed to provide an adaptable framework from which to approch regulatory reform in planning. The framework is applicable to the full range of planning implementation strategies from commond and control to market-based approaches. CBIP, as a systems model, has been engineered to create a cooperative rather than adversarial relationship between government and the regulated community by recognizing issues of cultural sensitivity, market response, and behavioral motivations. Under the model, effective implementation of planning objectives is directly tied to the role that incentives play in human behavior. Based on the foundation of incentive theory, CBIP integrates a variety of principles and techniques from applied behavior analysis and behavioral economics to align incentives that drive personal behavior with public planning objectives. CBIP utiliizes a variety of incentives in planning practice including economic, process, lifestyle, social, behavioral, and technical assistance inducements. / Ph. D.

Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht das Potential und die Bedingungen alternativer Regulierungsformen vor dem Hintergrund von Better Regulation in Deutschland. Nahezu alle EU- und OECD-Staaten betreiben heute umfassende politische Reformprogramme zur Modernisierung der Regulierungsarchitekturen, die unter dem Label Better Regulation subsumiert werden. Die Zielsetzung dieser Programme besteht zum einen in der wirtschaftsfreundlichen Reduktion von Regulierungskosten und zum anderen in der Effektivitätssteigerung von Regulierung durch Vermeidung unintendierter Nebeneffekte. Better Regulation ist ein Toolkit verschiedener metaregulativer Policy-Instrumente, deren programmatische Zusammensetzung vom nationalen politischen Kontext abhängt. Im Rahmen der parallel verlaufenden Reformagenden werden überdies alternative Regulierungsformen von verschiedenen Advokaten besserer Regulierung thematisiert, und als Alternative zur rein staatlichen, hierarchischen Command-and-Control-Regulierung (CaC-Regulierung) promotet, jedoch weder näher auf deren Bedingungen noch deren Konsequenzen einzugehen. Den optimistischen Vorstellungen eines evidenzbasierten Regulatory Managements folgend, erfolgt die Prüfung und Analyse alternativer Regelungsformen im Zuge der Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung (GFA; Regulatory Impact Assessment RIA). Bisher fristen alternative Regulierungsformen allerdings ein Dasein im Schatten von Standardkosten-Modell, RIA und Co. und werden von den Policy-Makern nicht systematisch in Betracht gezogen oder eingesetzt. CaC-Regulierung ist und bleibt das dominante Steuerungsinstrument des Staates. Es existieren jedoch zahlreiche diskursive Anknüpfungspunkte einschließlich zahlreicher Kritiken an der hierarchisch-regulativen Steuerung, welche die Auseinandersetzung mit alternativen Regulierungsformen begründen. Ziel dieses Papieres ist es daher, die in der Kritik stehende CaC-Regulierung Modellen alternativer Regulierungsformen entgegenzustellen, wobei alternative Regulierung mit den Konzepten Selbstregulierung, Koregulierung und regulierter Selbstregulierung eng definiert wird, und nur jene Konstellationen betrachtet werden, die kooperativ zwischen Regierung und Wirtschaft operieren. Ebenso wird der Versuch unternommen, die mannigfaltigen Konzepte und Erscheinungsformen alternativer Regulierung zu definieren und zu kategorisieren. Im Anschluss an den theoretischen Part erfolgt im nächsten Schritt die Identifikation der Einsatz- und Erfolgsbedingungen alternativer Regulierung. Dies geschieht anhand zweier empirischer Fallbeispiele aus den Politikfeldern Berufsbildungspolitik („der Ausbildungspakt der deutschen Wirtschaft“) sowie Umweltpolitik („die Mehrwegquotenverpflichtung“), wobei gezielt ein erfolgreiches und gescheitertes Beispiel alternativer Regulierung verglichen werden und Erfolgsfaktoren abgeleitet werden. Das Ergebnis ist, dass alternative Regulierung gewisse Potentiale und Anreize für staatliche wie privatwirtschaftliche Akteure bietet, aber der Einsatz dieser Steuerungsformen höchst voraussetzungsvoll ist und nur in wenigen Politikfeldern möglich und zu empfehlen ist. So besteht das Potential alternativer Regulierungsformen vor allem in der ganzheitlichen Senkung von Regulierungskosten (Befolgungs- und Vollzugskosten) und in der Erhöhung der Steuerbarkeit der Adressaten. Allerdings sind die korporativen Akteure auf beiden Seiten zum einen nicht immer hinreichend auf diese Form indirekter Steuerung vorbereitet. Zum anderen wird alternative Regulierung durch die Fragmentierung und Schwäche von Wirtschaftsverbänden sowie durch Interessengegensätze unter den Regelungsadressaten gehindert, die in Trittbrettfahrertum und dem letztlichen Scheitern selbstregulativer Verpflichtungen münden. Als entscheidende, aber anspruchsvolle Erfolgskomponente erweisen sich die politische Kommunikation und die Durchsetzbarkeit staatlicher Sanktionen sowie die Erfolgskontrolle, um die Regelungseinhaltung durch die Wirtschaft zu gewährleisten. Generell ist zu konstatieren, dass alternative Regulierungsformen dort zustande kommen, wo sich konzentrierter Widerstand auf Seiten der Adressaten gegen geplante, autoritative Steuerung abzeichnet, eine gewisse Pfadabhängigkeit bzw. eine Historie sektoraler Selbstregulierung vorliegt und eine Win-Win-Situation bei der Kooperation für Politik und Wirtschaft ersichtlich ist. In der Konsequenz zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass alternative Regulierung nicht nach einem synoptisch-rationalen Modell politischer Prozesse entsteht, sondern ein ursprünglich nicht intendiertes Produkt Garbage Can-artiger Verhandlungen mit einem hohen Konfliktniveau darstellt. Folglich ist das Resultat für die Vorstellung einer „Rational Regulatory Choice“ induzierenden Better Regulation-Agenda desillusionierend. / This paper analyses the potentials and the preconditions of alternative forms of regulation against the background of Better Regulation in Germany. Today, almost every OECD- and EU-country runs extensive regulatory reform programs to modernize its regulatory governance structures, which are summarized under the label Better Regulation. The goal of this type of agenda can be regarded, firstly, as the business-friendly reduction of overall regulatory costs and secondly as the increase of regulatory efficiency by removing unintended side-effects. Better Regulation is a toolkit consisting of several meta-regulatory instruments, whose programmatic composition and use varies with the national political context. Moreover, within these parallel proceeding reform agendas alternative forms of regulation are constantly promoted by advocates of Better Regulation and portrayed as alternative to purely governmental command-and-control approaches (CaC), though neither responding to their preconditions nor addressing their consequences. According to the optimistic notion of an evidence-based regulatory management, the examination and analysis of regulatory alternatives is supposed to be carried out within regulatory impact assessments (RIA). However, hitherto alternative forms of regulations exist unnoted in the shadow of the standard cost model, RIA and co. and they are not systematically considered and applied by policy-makers. CaC-regulation is and remains the dominant and favoured policy-instrument of the state. Yet, there are several discursive connections including broad criticism on hierarchical-regulative steering, which give reason to the deeper analysis of alternative forms of regulation. Therefore the aim of this paper is to contrast alternative regulation with the criticized CaC-technique, whereas alternative regulation is defined narrowly as the concepts of self-regulation, co-regulation and regulated self-regulation which operate as cooperative substitutes of CaC between government and business. Moreover, this paper attempts to define and to categorize the diverse concepts and natures of alternative regulation. Subsequent to the theoretical part the preconditions and critical success factors for alternative regulation are identified in the next section. For this purpose two empirical case studies from two different policies, under which one is successful and the other has failed, are examined and compared to deduce success factors. The case studies are from vocational training policy (“The Training Pact of the German Business”) and waste policy (“refill quota for beverage containers”). The result is that alternative forms of regulation offer several potential und incentives for state and business actors, but that the use of these policy instruments is highly demanding and in addition only possible and recommendable in few policies. Undoubtedly its potential lies in the holistic reduction of regulatory costs (compliance and enforcement costs) and in the enhancement of the governability of the regulated business. However, the corporate actors on both sides are not always adequately prepared for this indirect mode of steering. Furthermore, alternative regulation is hindered by the fragmentation and weakness of business associations and opposing interests among the regulated sectors and companies, which may lead to free-riding and could result in the final failure of alternative regulation. The political communication and assertiveness of public sanctions as well as the measurement of success, which ensure self-regulatory compliance, turned out to be decisive, but very demanding constituents of success. Generally speaking, alternative forms of regulation emerge in those cases and policy areas, where concentrated resistance against planned CaC-measures becomes apparent, where a certain path dependency or history of sectoral self-regulation exists, and where a win-win-situation becomes obvious for politicians and business. To sum up, this paper argues that alternative regulations don’t emerge by a synoptic-ration model of policy process, but that they present an unintended product of garbage can like policy processes, further characterized by a high level of conflict. Consequentially, this paper’s findings disillusion the (exaggeratedly) optimistic notion of a rational regulatory choice inducing Better Regulation agenda.

The thesis is focused on content and impact of the new Basel Capital Accord, commonly known as Basel III. These rules react to recent development in global financial markets and introduce some substantial changes into regulatory approach, which include changes to the definition and required amount of regulatory capital and presents new liquidity requirements. The thesis then assesses new rules form two points of view. First, a quantitative model is constructed that predicts the impact of new rules on capital adequacy of four major Czech banks based on default rates data. In the second part of the analysis, institutional impact of new regulation is stressed, namely the question of how new rules fit within the theoretical framework of optimal regulatory architecture and what pitfalls they have. The thesis is unique in the eclectic nature of its approach, whereby two seemingly disparate approaches oppose each other and an attempt at synthesis is presented. Keywords Banking regulation, Basel II, Basel III, capital adequacy, capital accords, regulatory impact analysis, credit risk JEL classification G21, G28