The thesis examines European legitimacy and regulatory governance. The research analyzes the link between regulatory governance and legitimacy in EU regulation and evaluates whether governance tools in the form of qualitative administrative criteria can contribute to European regulatory legitimacy. Governance here refers to the exercise of delegated regulatory powers by the European Commission. The question of whether the adoption of qualitative regulatory governance practices can enhance the supranational regulatory legitimacy of the European Commission has been underexamined in the literature typically without distinguishing the analysis from the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU. Using a case study from the telecommunications sector, the thesis conducts such an examination using a documentary method. To create the analytical context, the thesis distinguishes the theoretical concept of legitimacy for a transnational regulator from that of a national regulator of a sovereign state. The choice is made to use a form of normative regulatory legitimacy drawn from the scholarship on regulatory governance theory. An analytical model is constructed that reflects criteria and values that bear upon legitimacy so as to constitute a meaningful alternative to democratic forms of regulatory accountability. Regulation was defined in the research to cover policy instruments, in the form of measures of positive and negative integration, adopted for the EU single market under Article 106(3) and Article 114 TFEU. The analysis evaluates the regulatory governance used by the European Commission over a twenty-three year time period in which the telecommunications sector was entirely liberalized and harmonized. Analysis revealed that, while the Commission has improved the quality of its regulatory governance in principle, its use of normative regulatory governance in practice requires further attention, notably in respect of improving the evidence base for policy proposals and in creating a meaningful form of empirical feedback in evaluating regulatory outcomes, corresponding to an ex post accountability mechanism. On the other hand, the research validated the premise that a transnational regulator could purposively use regulatory governance as a tool with which to construct a defensible form of regulatory legitimacy.

Esta dissertação compreende um estudo acerca da estrutura de governança regulatória do Brasil, a partir da análise dos setores de telecomunicação e eletricidade. Tal estudo é feito à luz do modelo teórico desenvolvido por Pablo Spiller e Mariano Tommasi que define os meios pelos quais as instituições de um país afetam a habilidade dos atores políticos de sustentar políticas ao longo do tempo e, conseqüentemente, de garantir a credibilidade regulatória do país. Guiada pelo modelo teórico em questão, a análise das características mais marcantes da dotação político-institucional do país, bem como dos processos políticos que deram origem às estruturas regulatórias dos dois setores permite identificar, entre outros aspectos, que o papel de destaque ocupado pelo Executivo no sistema politico brasileiro se confirma também nas arenas das políticas regulatórias dos setores regulados. A análise do desenho das estruturas de governança regulatória desses setores evidencia que, apesar da preocupação em instituir uma regulação de caráter técnico e imune a pressões políticas, nem sempre o desenho escolhido se adapta eficientemente às peculiaridades e características da dotação institucional do País, coibindo o comportamento oportunista dos atores políticos nos setores estudados. A inferência descritiva realizada permite a avaliação do modelo teórico em questão e evidencia a importância de que ao mesmo sejam incorporadas outras variáveis, como as preferências dos atores e os atores com poder de veto. Feito isso, o modelo poderá explicar e avaliar com mais precisão os diversos desenhos de estruturas de governança regulatória. / This thesis consists of a study of Brazils regulatory governance structure, through an analysis of the telecommunications and electricity sectors. The analytical efforts are guided by the theoretical model - developed by Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi that defines the means through which a countrys institutions can affect the ability of politicians to engage in intra-temporal exchanges and, as a consequence, determines the countrys regulatory credibility. Guided by this theoretical model, the analysis of Brazils institutional endowment and of the processes that led to the creation of the regulatory institutions in each sector allows the conclusion that the broad role played by the Executive in the Brazilian political system was also reflected in the specific arenas where the regulatory bodies were shaped. The analysis of the design of the regulatory governance structures demonstrates that, despite initial concerns about the implementation of technical and nonpolitical regulation, these structures are yet to be completely and effectively adapted to the peculiarities and characteristics of Brazils institutional endowment. In addition, the descriptive inference highlights the importance of including the preferences of actors, and the influence of veto players, within the models variables, in order to refine its explanatory power.

Esta dissertação compreende um estudo acerca da estrutura de governança regulatória do Brasil, a partir da análise dos setores de telecomunicação e eletricidade. Tal estudo é feito à luz do modelo teórico desenvolvido por Pablo Spiller e Mariano Tommasi que define os meios pelos quais as instituições de um país afetam a habilidade dos atores políticos de sustentar políticas ao longo do tempo e, conseqüentemente, de garantir a credibilidade regulatória do país. Guiada pelo modelo teórico em questão, a análise das características mais marcantes da dotação político-institucional do país, bem como dos processos políticos que deram origem às estruturas regulatórias dos dois setores permite identificar, entre outros aspectos, que o papel de destaque ocupado pelo Executivo no sistema politico brasileiro se confirma também nas arenas das políticas regulatórias dos setores regulados. A análise do desenho das estruturas de governança regulatória desses setores evidencia que, apesar da preocupação em instituir uma regulação de caráter técnico e imune a pressões políticas, nem sempre o desenho escolhido se adapta eficientemente às peculiaridades e características da dotação institucional do País, coibindo o comportamento oportunista dos atores políticos nos setores estudados. A inferência descritiva realizada permite a avaliação do modelo teórico em questão e evidencia a importância de que ao mesmo sejam incorporadas outras variáveis, como as preferências dos atores e os atores com poder de veto. Feito isso, o modelo poderá explicar e avaliar com mais precisão os diversos desenhos de estruturas de governança regulatória. / This thesis consists of a study of Brazils regulatory governance structure, through an analysis of the telecommunications and electricity sectors. The analytical efforts are guided by the theoretical model - developed by Pablo Spiller and Mariano Tommasi that defines the means through which a countrys institutions can affect the ability of politicians to engage in intra-temporal exchanges and, as a consequence, determines the countrys regulatory credibility. Guided by this theoretical model, the analysis of Brazils institutional endowment and of the processes that led to the creation of the regulatory institutions in each sector allows the conclusion that the broad role played by the Executive in the Brazilian political system was also reflected in the specific arenas where the regulatory bodies were shaped. The analysis of the design of the regulatory governance structures demonstrates that, despite initial concerns about the implementation of technical and nonpolitical regulation, these structures are yet to be completely and effectively adapted to the peculiarities and characteristics of Brazils institutional endowment. In addition, the descriptive inference highlights the importance of including the preferences of actors, and the influence of veto players, within the models variables, in order to refine its explanatory power.

This thesis contributes to the research literature by reporting the results of an investigation that explores whether regulatory governance practices in Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector are fit for purpose. The rationale for the study originated from issues relating to the management of Nigeria’s downstream petroleum sector that were identified in the extant literature. These issues were of such significance that their resolution could impact positively and materially on Nigeria’s economy and at the same time the research would fill a gap in the relevant literature. The data for this empirical research were collected using questionnaire and interview instruments and the findings were analysed against a backdrop of the Public Interest Theory of Regulation. The results obtained revealed perceptions of major weaknesses in the regulatory governance practices adopted by Nigeria’s downstream regulatory agencies namely: the regulatory independence of Nigeria’s downstream regulators has declined over time; there are flaws in the accountability practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators; and there are other related factors such as the absence of openness, poor consultation and a lack of public sensitisation that affect the transparency practices of Nigeria’s downstream regulators. Interestingly, the results also revealed that although Nigeria’s downstream regulators appear to possess the required skills to regulate the sector, their talents are not being fully utilised. Recommendations to resolve the weaknesses identified are made which, if properly and effectively implemented, should have a significant positive impact on the Nigerian economy. Such recommendations may also be applicable to those countries with similar regulatory governance challenges.

Water governance exerts an impact on the socio-politic life of Honduras. For instance, the new legal framework changes institutions. New water organisations are created, and new processes and proceedings are proposed. These times when strategies from developed countries are transferred to developing countries, such as water governance, the need for an evaluation is desirable to disentangle the problems and to look forward at opportunities and find alternatives. The journey from government to governance describes the change from the traditional government behaviour towards new governance. In countries like Honduras, as in developing countries, this change describes a complex process in which the imported strategies are conflicting with existing established socio-political patterns. The new water management approach as applied in Honduras needs to take into account the socio-political reality and the availability of resources, if the water governance process would gain relevance. Honduras is a relatively new democratic country after many years of military regime, thus the government needs also to be part of the governance process. This doctoral thesis studies and highlights the characteristics of the traditional Honduran government approach, and the effects that the new governance approach has posed in the country. The difficulties emerging from this shift of approaches are discussed, and explored. The research finds support in the exploration of Honduran political and institutional sociological history to elaborate the causes and motives for current governmental attitudes. The research relates to concepts of development strategies, institutionalism and regulation modes. This thesis argues that governance has achieved a pseudo empirical implementation in Honduras, and that new mechanisms need to be devised to balance the suggested governance mode using new notions of regulatory space, and the theoretical meta-governance approach, in order to balance between the imported measures and the reality. New governance theoretical notions are exposed to encourage and explore new alternatives for the water governance in the Honduras context. It is necessary to realise that institutional changes occur in a long-term adjustment period in order to build trust among actors and water authorities. Moreover, this thesis deems it pertinent that the government as the voter-elected entity should take the decisive lead of the governance approach. / QC 20100903

My research analyses issues in the relationships between the state and the market, including the roles of key institutions and organisations and their interactions in the policy and regulatory governance arenas. The findings, based on documentary analysis, focus group discussions, perceptions analysis and in-depth interviews with representative actors in the public policy system in Sri Lanka, focus specifically on the linkages between the country’s institutional endowments, the reform process and regulatory governance; and the role of mental models, path dependence and ideology – specifically that of the donor and local epistemic community – in influencing economic reforms and regulatory governance. The analysis set forth in this thesis draws on Douglass North’s conceptualisation of New Institutional Economics as well as on the conceptualisation of public policy by seminal scholars in the field such as Harold Lasswell, David Easton, Bill Jenkins, Michael Hill and Wayne Parsons. These theoretical constructs are particularly useful in exploring and obtaining a rich understanding of complex institutional and policy processes and relationships, as well as policy outcomes. Moreover, this framework sits well with the interpretivist research philosophy, inductive approach and qualitative research methods which I use to gather “thick” information on privatisation, competition and regulatory governance in Sri Lanka and in Sri Lanka’s telecommunications sector. An overview of the existing literature on privatisation, competition and regulatory governance in general and in the telecommunications sector in particular, points to a paucity of public policy analyses in developing countries. As such, whilst acknowledging the limitations of single case study research in relation to policy transfer, I posit that my research findings do shed light on a number of critical issues that are relevant to scholars and practitioners interested in understanding the policy process in developing countries. My research findings provide a real world illustration of the futility of dichotomising the state and markets; instead, constructs such as policy and regulatory space are more useful than those such as the regulatory state. Incorporating these constructs of policy and regulatory space also allows for a “thick” understanding of the dynamics between political and socio-economic institutions, organisations and individuals and their impact on policy outputs and outcomes. My findings also provide for a better understanding of regulatory governance in developing countries. Constructs such as responsive regulation, regulatory society and independent regulation that are typically conceived in the literature in a developed country context are critically explored in the Sri Lankan setting. Finally, my research findings extend the literature on privatisation, competition and regulatory governance by illustrating that forces of competition and contestability are more important than ownership change in terms of policy outputs and outcomes, and that – as reflected in the case of Sri Lanka’s telecommunications sector - competition and contestability can in fact transcend forces of weak regulatory governance.

過去二十多年來，不論是OECD或非OECD的會員國，都致力於所謂的「管制改革」，以確保政府具有高品質的管制治理能力，然而反觀我國的情況，對於管制改革的觀念多半停留在解除管制階段，並且普遍缺乏解除管制後的專責管制機關。因此，本研究希望透過歐美經驗的比較分析，試圖釐清下列的問題： 一、管制改革真正意涵為何？與傳統的政府管制有何不同？ 二、管制治理的主要興起背景為何？當中有何特色？ 三、各國政府如何提升管制政策的治理能力？有無共同的制度設計？ 四、歐美等國所呈現的運作經驗，對於我國有何種啟示？以及學習之處？ 此外，本研究藉由檢閱相關文獻與比較分析，期望能達成以下的研究目的： 一、經由文獻分析，說明歐美各國為何要進行管制改革的原因、管制改革的實質意義，如何透過相關制度的設計，提升本身的治理能力與政策品質。 二、以歸納分析的方式說明管制治理意義，建構民主取向的良善管制治理所必須具備的要件。 三、藉由比較分析，參照英美與歐盟在此方面的運作經驗，針對我國再進行相關制度設計與實務運作，提出一些省思與建議。 總之，本研究主要是探討在管制改革風潮下，所呈現的政府治理型態轉變，以及詳述英、美與歐盟等國的運作經驗，以比較方式分析出當中的異同，並且對照我國的發展情況，提出相關的建議，並且大致上可以分為三個部分：首先、說明管制治理模式的興起背景，發現1980年代末期因財政困境所導致的政府失靈，以及人民對於政府的不信任，兩者是管制治理模式轉變的重要背景因素；其次、歐美的管制治理運作經驗分析，並且分別從發展歷程、課責機制、諮詢制度，以及影響分析等四個角度，詳述其主要內涵與可能遭遇的問題；最後、透過比較分析與經驗對照，分別說明對我國產生何種啟示，以及未來在制度設計與發展上有那些值得學習與參考之處。 經由文獻的分析、歐美等國的經驗說明，以及闡述我國的現況與問題，本章先針對前述治理模式背景與歐美運作經驗等部分，歸納整理相關的研究發現；其次，參照歐美等國的發現，就我國目前所進行的革新作法，提出一些思考方向與建議；最後，針對本研究的不足之處進行檢討，指出後續可行的研究方式與重點。

Submitted by Rafaela Moraes (rafaela.moraes@fgv.br) on 2016-09-12T13:53:36Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Eduardo Nunes - 110911.pdf: 2445774 bytes, checksum: 5a9e59fca83a6a50ff485c12ef6ce047 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rafaela Moraes (rafaela.moraes@fgv.br) on 2016-09-12T13:54:26Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Eduardo Nunes - 110911.pdf: 2445774 bytes, checksum: 5a9e59fca83a6a50ff485c12ef6ce047 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rafaela Moraes (rafaela.moraes@fgv.br) on 2016-09-12T13:55:06Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Eduardo Nunes - 110911.pdf: 2445774 bytes, checksum: 5a9e59fca83a6a50ff485c12ef6ce047 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-09-12T13:55:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação final - Eduardo Nunes - 110911.pdf: 2445774 bytes, checksum: 5a9e59fca83a6a50ff485c12ef6ce047 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / The regulatory system varies depending on the country's institutional endowment. A component of the regulatory system is regulatory governance, namely the set of safeguards that limit discretionary actions of the regulator. In Brazil, one of the safeguards is the institutional design of regulatory agencies. This design consists of a series of factors among which stands out autonomy, commonly divided into administrative, financial and political. The ultimate goal of this study is to evaluate the financial autonomy of federal regulatory agencies. The greater financial autonomy is, the more robust regulatory governance tends to be, because the institutional design plays a better role as safeguard. Strengthened governance contributes to the stability of rules, reduces regulatory risk and enhances the attraction of private investments, which ultimately leverage the country's economic development. To achieve the ultimate goal, it will be held an exploratory, descriptive and explanatory research. The means used are bibliographic, documentary and multiple cases. Each case is selected in a non-probabilistic way by typicality and accessibility, in that order, in order to reach contrasting results (theoretical replication). These criteria determine the choice of all federal regulatory agencies, with the exception of ANAC, because of the accessibility of its budgetary and financial data. Thus, from data of ANEEL, ANATEL, ANP, ANVISA, ANS, ANA, ANTAQ, ANTT and ANCINE for the years 2002 to 2010, four indicators are calculated: budget availability, budget execution, financial execution, and budget and financial overlay. The averages of these partial indicators comprise a comprehensive indicator of financial autonomy. The results are compared between the agencies, between the generations of the agencies and between the sectors of activity of the agencies, using the technique of analysis of variance with a significance level of five percent. The evaluation of the financial autonomy of federal regulatory agencies is unexpected. Rejecting the initial hypotheses, the regulatory agencies of first generation have inferior results to those agencies from second and third generation, and infrastructure agencies have inferior results to social agencies. These results highlight the need to revise the model of budgetary and financial management designed for federal regulatory agencies. The legal provision of own sources of funds is not sufficient to ensure the financial autonomy of agencies to the extent that the central government makes use of increasingly frequent resources impoundments. / O sistema regulatório varia conforme a dotação institucional do país. Um componente do sistema regulatório é a governança regulatória, isto é, o conjunto de salvaguardas que limita ações discricionárias do regulador. No caso brasileiro, uma das salvaguardas é o desenho institucional das agências reguladoras. Este desenho é formado por uma série de elementos entre os quais se destaca a autonomia, comumente dividida em administrativa, financeira e política. O objetivo final deste estudo é avaliar a autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras federais. Quanto maior a autonomia financeira, mais robusta tende a ser a governança regulatória, pois melhor é o papel desempenhado pelo desenho institucional das agências como salvaguarda. Fortalecida, a governança contribui para a estabilidade de regras, reduz o risco regulatório e potencializa a atração de investimentos privados, o que, em última análise, alavanca o desenvolvimento econômico do país. Para alcançar o objetivo final, realiza-se pesquisa exploratória, descritiva e explicativa. Os meios utilizados são bibliográficos, documentais e estudo de múltiplos casos. Cada caso é selecionado de forma não probabilística por tipicidade e por acessibilidade, nesta ordem, a fim de se chegar a resultados contrastantes (replicação teórica). Estes critérios determinam a escolha de todas as agências reguladoras federais, com exceção da ANAC, em virtude da acessibilidade de seus dados orçamentários e financeiros. Assim, a partir dos dados da ANEEL, ANATEL, ANP, ANVISA, ANS, ANA, ANTAQ, ANTT e ANCINE referentes aos anos de 2002 a 2010, são calculados quatro indicadores: de disponibilidade orçamentária, de execução orçamentária, de execução financeira e de sobreposição orçamentária e financeira. As médias aritméticas desses indicadores parciais compõem um indicador global de autonomia financeira. Os resultados encontrados são comparados entre as agências, entre as gerações das agências e entre os setores de atuação das agências, utilizando-se a técnica da análise de variância a um nível de significância de cinco por cento. A avaliação da autonomia financeira das agências reguladoras federais é surpreendente. Rejeitando as hipóteses iniciais, as agências reguladoras de primeira geração obtêm resultados inferiores às agências de segunda e terceira geração, e as agências de infraestrutura resultados inferiores às agências sociais. Estes resultados evidenciam a necessidade de revisão do modelo de gestão orçamentária e financeira concebido para as agências reguladoras federais. A previsão legal de fontes próprias de recursos não é suficiente para assegurar a autonomia financeira das agências na medida em que o governo central faz uso cada vez mais frequente de contingenciamentos de recursos.