This work locates the historical and conceptual foundations of cognitive science in the "commonsense" psychology of the philosopher Thomas Reid. I begin with Reid's attack on his rationalist and empiricist competitors of the 17th and 18th centuries. I then present his positive theory as a sophisticated faculty psychology appealing to innateness of mental structure. Reidian psychological faculties are equally trustworthy, causally independent mental powers, and I argue that they share nine distinct properties. This distinguishes Reidian 'intentionalism' from idealist 'representationalism,' which derive cognitive content either from the inherited structure of faculties of from the occurrent structure of sensory activity. Next, I turn to consciousness and reflection for a contemporary Reidian response to traditional phenomenology. Unlike reflection, faculties of reason and remembrance are not causally mediated by consciousness. My interpretation of Reid is that 'Humean causation' of individual faculty structure accounts only for 'natural intentionality,' while 'efficient causation' of faculty interrelations accounts for cognitive 'personal intentionality.' I then proceed by adopting a form of computational description for reconstructing this view as a computational theory of mind. I contrast functional analyses in explanations of some capacities with computational and componential analyses in explanations of other, intentional capacities, in which some processes must be taken to semantically encode and govern the roles of others. This step reconstructs the Reidian notion of intentional operations as requiring an explanation of component faculties and their representation-governed interactions. I argue that properties of faculties delimiting these interactions under Reid's theory parallel those in Fodor's (1983) essay on the "modularity of mind," although the reasons given for individual criteria are often very different. Fodor also proposes a trichotomous mental structure, but I find that a third level of "central systems" is a myth engendered by causal information theory. Such an analysis cannot capture generalizations over the internal representation of semantic roles that determines the character of faculty relations. This requirement for any computational account of cognition is precisely the motivation for the reconstructed Reidian theory. Thus, it comports more favorably with the explanatory program constitutive of a computational cognitive science.

No description available.

This dissertation examines John Rawls’s doctrine of public reason in light of Thomas Reid’s Common Sense philosophy. Chapter 1 introduces the topics of public reason and common sense in order to suggest that Thomas Reid’s philosophy can provide a beneficial contribution to public policy debates. Chapter 2 examines key features of Rawls’s doctrine of public reason. Chapter 3 suggests that there are critical problems with Rawls’s doctrine of public reason. Chapter 4 examines key features of Thomas Reid’s common sense philosophy. Chapter 5 shows Reid’s common sense application in early American history as well as contemporary scholarship. It argues that common sense can provide insight into two test-cases, abortion and same-sex marriage. Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation, summarizing the arguments and providing suggestions for further research.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis argues that, in spite of his explicit denunciation of Aristotle's theory of perception and thought, Thomas Reid's own theory of perception marks a return to the central themes of Aristotle's theory. It is argued, first, that Aristotle's 'De Anima' presents an account of sensation and thought in which the functions of the object of perception play the determining role with respect to the structure, order and intelligibility of the act of perception. Thomas Aquinas' and Descartes' transformation of Aristotle's account are then discussed, showing how the "apparatus" of Aristotle's theory remains while the ground of order and intelligibility is shifted from the functions of the object of perception to those of the perceiver as subject. The theories of the British empiricists are then shown to be continuous with this transformation of Aristotle's thought. Finally, it is argued that Reid returns to an objectivism by way of his rejection of the subjectivistic transformation wrought by Descartes et al. It is argued that this rejection is not---as Reid himself believes---a rejection of the crucial aspects of Aristotle's theory, but instead constitutes a return to its primary themes and theses.

L'objet du présent mémoire est d'effectuer une comparaison historique de deux systèmes épistémologiques comportant un aspect externaliste. Les deux philosophes mis à l'étude sont Thomas Reid, Écossais ayant vécu au 18e siècle, et Alvin Goldman, professeur et chercheur américain contemporain travaillant sur l'épistémologie et la psychologie. Ce dernier a développé une analyse de la connaissance qu'on qualifie d'externaliste. Selon cette position, on considère généralement qu'une croyance vraie s'élève au titre de connaissance si elle a été causée de manière adéquate par le fait qui la rend vraie. La croyance n'est alors plus validée de l'intérieur, par la réflexion du sujet, mais bien de l'extérieur, par les faits du monde. Notre thèse est que bien qu'il ait vécu bien avant l'arrivée de ce type de position, Thomas Reid a développé une épistémologie contenant des traces bien similaires à celle de Goldman. Nous soulèverons les points de similitude et tenterons de déterminer si on peut interpréter la philosophie de Reid comme une sorte de fiabilisme, type d'externalisme postulé par Goldman. Nous affirmons que cela est possible et nous en faisons la démonstration dans ce mémoire. Ce type de lecture historique n'est pas sans problème. Il nous faudra aussi résoudre une multitude de problèmes, tant historiques, en ce qui concerne Reid, que théoriques, pour ce qui est du fiabilisme de Goldman. Le travail se fera en trois temps : l'exposition de la thèse de Reid et des traces d'externalisme s'y retrouvant; l'exposition de la thèse de Goldman et les liens possibles avec celle de Reid; enfin, l'exposition et l'évaluation d'interprétations concurrentes à la nôtre. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Épistémologie, Externalisme, Internalisme, Fiabilisme, Thomas Reid, Alvin Goldman

No description available.

No description available.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Jose Aparecido Pereira.pdf: 1736504 bytes, checksum: e929f4a6ef8235281a296eb73951a040 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-02-23 / Influenced by Newton and the great scientific achievements of his time, Thomas Reid believed to be possible to undertake a similar study with regard to human nature, or support it through the secure basis of observation and experimental method of reasoning. A clear outline of this project was found in the investigations in which he seeks to analyze the components involved in the perception, supported by our five senses. The main objective of this study is to analyze and reflect an important part of his thoughts, specifically, his theory of perception and his criticism of the theory of ideas, since they constitute the core of the whole philosophical enterprise established by him, holding him throughout his academic and intellectual journey. An analysis of Reid's works show us that these two issues keep between themselves a close relationship, imposing an important methodological requirement for those wishing to investigate or discuss his epistemology: the approach of one, necessarily implies a reference to another. That requirement and its implication made it necessary to circumscribe our research around these two themes. Thus, two issues are the main subject to be discussed in this work: how Reid systematized the elements of his theory of perception; How, from these elements, it is formulated his criticism of the theory of ideas. Answering these two questions is necessary to check these two interpretations we attach to Reid s thought: a) the assumption according to which his theory of perception had been the key to the construction of his theory of ideas critique, that is, when he systematized the ingredients which are the basis of his criticism about the theory of ideas, he had already made clear which elements should comprise the perceptual process. That was crucial to his objections to the ideal system so that he turned it the origin and the result of his view of perception; b) the investigation of Reid about human nature explicit strong convictions about the right conditions for the acquisition and justification of our beliefs, not by means of reasoning, but through the natural, instinctive, regulated by innate principles of mind, that means the thesis that human nature is governed by principles that do not fit the requirements of priori traditional philosophy. In this sense, Reid was determined to show that the acquisition and justification of them come to depend on principles which, although considered natural, have great importance and authority similar to those typically provided by understanding. For the methodological procedures adopted for this research, we take into account the fact that it was set predominantly in the theoretical or theorist. This naturally put upon us the need to lead it through analytical, expository, interpretive, reflective and systematic reading especially from the works of Reid. The results obtained in this investigation led us, among other conclusions, the finding that this philosopher is important because he carries a deep and interesting analysis of human cognition / Influenciado por Newton e pelas grandes realizações científicas de seu tempo, Thomas Reid acreditava ser possível empreender um estudo análogo no que diz respeito à natureza humana, ou seja, fundamentá-la através da base segura da observação e do método do raciocínio experimental. Um esboço bem definido desse projeto o encontramos em suas Investigações na qual ele procura analisar os componentes envolvidos na percepção, tendo como suporte os nossos cinco sentidos. O objetivo principal desse trabalho consiste em refletir e analisar uma parte importante do seu pensamento, especificamente, a sua teoria da percepção e a sua crítica à teoria das idéias, visto que elas constituem o cerne de todo empreendimento filosófico estabelecido por ele, ocupando-o em todo o seu itinerário acadêmico e intelectual. Uma análise das obras de Reid nos mostrará que essas duas temáticas mantêm, entre si, uma estreita relação, impondo uma exigência metodológica importante para quem queira investigar ou discorrer sobre a sua epistemologia: a abordagem sobre uma, implica, necessariamente, fazer referência à outra. Foi constatando essa exigência e implicação necessárias que circunscrevemos a nossa pesquisa em torno desses dois temas. Assim, duas questões constituem o objeto principal a ser discutido nesse trabalho: como Reid sistematizou em suas obras os elementos que compõem a sua teoria da percepção? Como, a partir desses elementos, encontra-se formulada a sua crítica à teoria das idéias? Ao responder essas duas questões pretendemos, ainda, verificar estas duas interpretações que atribuímos ao pensamento de Reid: a) a suposição segundo a qual a sua teoria da percepção fora determinante para a construção da sua crítica à teoria das idéias, ou seja, quando ele sistematizou os ingredientes que fundamentam a sua crítica à teoria das idéias, ele já tinha bem claro quais os elementos deveriam compor o processo perceptivo. E isso foi determinante para as suas objeções ao sistema ideal a ponto de torná-lo originário e decorrente da sua visão da percepção; b) as investigações de Reid sobre a natureza humana explicitam fortes convicções em torno das condições adequadas para a aquisição e a justificação de nossas crenças, não pelas vias do raciocínio, mas mediante processos naturais, instintivos, regulados por princípios inatos da mente, ou seja, a tese de que a natureza humana é regulada mediante princípios que não se enquadram nas exigências da filosofia apriorista tradicional. Nesse sentido, Reid estava empenhado em mostrar que a aquisição e justificação delas passam a depender de princípios que, embora considerados naturais, possuem peso e autoridade análogos àqueles tradicionalmente conferidos ao entendimento. Em relação aos procedimentos metodológicos adotados para essa pesquisa, levamos em conta o fato de ela estar configurada predominantemente no âmbito teórico ou teorético. Isso naturalmente nos impôs a necessidade de conduzi-la através da leitura analítica, expositiva, interpretativa, reflexiva e sistemática a partir, sobretudo, das obras de Reid. Os resultados obtidos nessa investigação nos levaram, dentre outras conclusões, à constatação de que esse filósofo é relevante porque realiza uma profunda e interessante análise sobre a cognição humana