Samtidigt som traditionella religioner är på tillbakagång vänder sig allt fler människor till den magi och mysticism som kännetecknar new age. Forskningen har hittills närmat sig detta fenomen genom korrelationsstudier, demografiska kartläggningar och analyser av vad new age-anhängare tror på. I denna explorativa, induktiva studie berättade i stället fem kvinnor i halvstrukturerade intervjuer om vad deras new age-tro betytt för dem. Koncentrering av bärande utsagor i dimensionerna betydelse, tro relaterad till icke-tro, kunskapskällor och ontologi genererade fyra faktorer: existentiell trygghet som skyddar mot osäkerhet under livets gång och hämmar ångest inför livets oundvikliga slut; upphöjdhet genom insikter och medvetenhet som icke-troende saknar; antiintellektualism som betonar känslor och intuition på bekostnad av förnuft och logik; relativism som stipulerar att var och en har sin egen sanning. En funktionell modell som tydliggör hur faktorerna relaterar till varandra diskuteras, liksom resultatets integrering i ett teoretiskt ramverk och riktlinjer för framtida forskning. / In a time when traditional religions are declining, contemporary man increasingly turns to New Age magic and mysticism. So far, research has approached this phenomenon in correlational studies, demographic surveys, and analyses of experience narratives. In this explorative, inductive study, five women described the gains of their New Age faith. Concentrating leading statements in the dimensions value, belief related to non-belief, sources of knowledge, and ontology generated four factors: existential safety that protects against uncertainty through life and inhibits anxiety regarding life’s inevitable end; loftiness through insights and awareness that non-believers lack; anti-intellectualism emphasizing emotion and intuition at the expense of reason and logic; relativism that stipulates that truth is a matter of individual choice. A functional model illustrating how the factors relate to each other is discussed, as well as theoretical integration and suggestions for future research.

This study investigates the challenges to the legitimacy and authority of scientific research in late modern philosophy of science. The author suggests that the different challenges to the legitimacy of science have led to relativism and amount to a crisis. Keeping in mind the positivist background, he illustrates the legitimacy crisis of science in the period from Popper to the present. In particular his analysis focuses on the "historical school" (Kuhn, Feyerabend etc.) in philosophy of science. The main question of this study is: what are the causes and the nature of the legitimacy crisis emerging in the contemporary philosophical assessment of science? To answer this question, a few specific challenges to the legitimacy of science emerging in particular areas are analysed: for example the difficulties of anchoring scientific certitude to its proper object of study, the loss of objectivity, growing scepticism about the possibility of communication and scientific progress. After substantiating the gradual emergence of relativist and sceptical approaches in the abovementioned areas, this study provides a "diagnosis" aiming at identifying the causes of the crisis. The humanist ground motive of nature and freedom and the choice of anchoring scientific certainty either in the subject or in the object of knowledge are considered the main sources of the crisis. They lead to arbitrary absolutisations of particular aspects of the scientific enterprise and (in the case of subjectivist approaches) to sceptical approaches to the possibility of scientific objectivity, communication and progress. This study also indicates a few possible resources, available in the reformational tradition, to counteract the legitimacy crisis of science. The main resource indicated in this study is the recognition of the structural order for reality, which is accessible to scientific analysis, "constrains" scientific research but also constitutes a common ground for researchers. Other important resources are the recognition of the link between scientific and pre-scientific knowledge and the acknowledgment that universality and individuality are traits of everything that exists. / Thesis (Ph.D. (Philosophy))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2007.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-180).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 1993. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 197-220).

The early twentieth century witnessed the emergence of "objective relativism," a distinctly American school of metaphysical realism inspired by the works of John Dewey and A.N. Whitehead. Largely forgotten, objective relativism provided a metaphysical framework, based upon an ontology of events and relations rather than substances and discrete properties, that has continued relevance for contemporary metaphysical discussions. In this thesis, I attempt to chart the boundaries and pathways of this ontology, outlining what Dewey calls the "ground-map of the province of criticism." In particular, the ground-map of objective relativism is invoked to situate and analyze the model of psycho-physical emergence outlined in Dewey's Experience and Nature. Because it is a relational ontology, objective relativism avoids problems with emergence common to substantival models. Additional analyses of its ontological premises, both in Dewey's writings and elsewhere, demonstrate how compelling accounts of causation, consciousness, and meaning may be formulated within this model.

De senaste decennierna har det i samhällsvetenskapliga och humanistiska discipliner funnits stark tendens till relativism. Wikforss skriver att "de senaste decennierna har en form av skepticism vad det gäller möjligheten att uppnå objektiv kunskap fått fäste, både inom delar av universitetsvärlden och samhället i stort". Relativism innebär ungefär att uppfattningen om sanning och falskhet, rätt och fel samt hur man resonerar och motiverar sin uppfattning är produkter av olika konventioner som utgör ramar för hur man bedömer studieobjekt. Detta innebär att uppfattningens auktoritet är begränsad till de sammanhang som gett upphov till den.  Vi har inte alltid sett empirisk bevisning som avgörande för kunskap. Eftersom samhällen konstruerat olika fakta speglar de vår konvention och våra intressen. En kunskapsteoretisk relativist vill poängtera att det finns flera system för att hantera kunskap. De bevis vi använder idag har inte nödvändigtvis använts historiskt, utan andra kunskapskällor har varit lika giltiga. Boghossian inleder med en nyhet från The New York Times, om en konflikt mellan den arkeologiska teorin och Sebastian LeBeau, företrädare för en indianstam i South Dakota. Arkeologerna blev kluvna, deras respekt för indianernas kultur var stor, men samtidigt var de engagerade i sin arkeologiska metod. Arkeologerna hade kommit närmare en kunskapsrelativism i sin förståelse för indianernas kultur och vetenskap. Relativisten ser inte från början något rationellt och icke rationellt som två skilda klasser med olika kvalitet. Ingenting är kontextfritt, menar relativisten. Egenskaperna kan därför inte vara rationella utan blir relativistiska antaganden. Boghossians tes är att undersöka relativismens roll i vad som i förhållande till konstruktion till vad som berättigar vad, och poängtera sociala faktorers roll för det vi tror oss tro. När vi bedrivit vetenskap finns har vi alltid haft bakomliggande intressen till vår verksamhet. Dessa intressen är centrala i Boghossians resonemang. Hans teser är det han huvudsakligen behandlar både med kritik och med försvar, och det är konsekvenserna från teserna jag följer i min frågeställning. Hans teser berör vilka fakta vi är berättigade att tro på, vilka fakta vi bör tro på, och vilka fakta vi faktiskt tror på. [1]   Carlshamre, Staffan. Recension Fear of Knowledge s. 1. Filosofisk tidskrift. No 1 (2013) [2]   Wikforss Åsa; Rädsla för kunskap s. 13,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, 2016 [3]     Boghossian Paul; Rädsla för kunskap s. 23-24,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, 2016 [4]   Boghossian (2016) s. 28,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, [5]   Boghossian(2016) s. 21,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press, [6]   Wikforss (2016) s. 17,  Fri Tanke förlag, Oxford University Press,

Esta dissertação investiga, por meio de uma leitura imanente da filosofia de Nietzsche, a relação problemática entre perspectivismo e relativismo em sua obra. Inscrito na efetividade, concebida como vontades de potência que se exercem de modo perspectivístico e interpretante, o perspectivismo propõe a ideia de que não existem fatos, mas apenas interpretações perspectivísticas. Cumpre então perguntar se tal perspectivismo incorreria num relativismo radical, segundo o qual todas as interpretações seriam equivalentes. Procuraremos mostrar que não é possível responder a esse problema de modo unilateral, com um simples e taxativo sim ou não. Por um lado, o exame de seus escritos indica que Nietzsche não pretenderia assumir a posição de um relativista radical na medida em que hierarquiza as interpretações e reivindica a superioridade de sua própria interpretação de mundo. Mais do que isso, sua filosofia aponta até mesmo para a inviabilização daquele relativismo: ao associar os conceitos de perspectiva e interpretação ao de valor, indica que toda perspectiva e toda interpretação avaliam e hierarquizam, de modo que inexistiriam perspectivas e interpretações que efetivamente considerassem as demais como dotadas de mesmo valor. Por outro lado, se admitida a concepção de uma efetividade perspectivística e interpretativa, então todo e qualquer critério estabelecido para hierarquizar as interpretações teria de ser relativo a uma perspectiva e a uma interpretação determinadas, não consistindo num critério incondicionado e objetivo. Assim, uma vez considerada a relatividade de todo critério, ressurge o problema do relativismo. / This dissertation researches, through an immanent reading of Nietzsches philosophy, the problematic relationship between perspectivism and relativism in his work. Intrinsic in the reality, conceived as wills to power that express themselves in a perspectivist and interpretive way, the perspectivism argues that there are no facts, but only perspectivist interpretations. So it is necessary to ask whether such a perspectivism incur a radical relativism, according to which all interpretations would be equivalent. We shall try to show that it is not possible to answer this problem unilaterally, with a simple yes or no. On the one hand, the examination of his writings indicates that Nietzsche would not intend to take the position of a radical relativist, for he ranks the interpretations and claims the superiority of his own interpretation of the world. More than that, his philosophy would point to the impossibility of that relativism: since Nietzsche associates the concepts of perspective and interpretation with the concept of value, he indicates that every perspective and every interpretation evaluate and rank, so that there would not be perspectives and interpretations that effectively could consider the others as equivalent. On the other hand, if we accept the conception of a perspectivist and interpretive reality, so any criterion fixed in order to rank the interpretations would depend on a certain perspective and interpretation, and thus it would not be an unconditional and objective one. Hence, since we consider that any criterion is relative, the problem concerning relativism resurfaces.

The object of this investigation is to determine whether two aspects of reference group orientation, 1) multiplicity and 2) structural variation, are possible indicators of ethnocentrism. Most of the thesis is devoted to a theoretical formulation in which reference group orientation and ethnocentrism are placed in a peroeptual framework. Reference group orientation is defined as a person's use of a frame of reference that is formed through adoption of a reference group's perspective. Ethnocentrism is defined as a person's use of a frame of reference that keeps him from accepting the viability of other cultural frames of reference. The acceptance of the viability of other cultural frames of reference is defined as ethnorelativism. A flexible formation of cultural identity creates the conditions for a large number (relatively high multiplicity) and broad diversity (relatively high structural variation) of reference group orientations. It is hypothesized that those people who are aware of higher multiplicity and higher structural variation of reference group orientations will be more likely to accept the viability of other cultural frames of reference.

The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) was inaugurated in 2005. It is a regional court that serves Member States of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), an international organization that promotes regional integration in the Caribbean. In this dissertation, I conduct a doctrinal examination and analysis of the human rights jurisprudence of the CCJ, to determine the nature and extent of the Court’s use of International Human Rights Laws and Norms (IHRLN) in its adjudication. Although my main focus is the Court’s human rights decision-making, I also conduct an analysis of some of its wider work, to the extent that this wider work, coupled with the Court’s human rights decision-making, builds an understanding of the Court’s definition of itself and explains the trajectories of the Court as a regional judicial institution. I conduct my doctrinal examination and analysis against the backdrop of three theoretical underpinnings, namely - human rights universalism; transformative justice; and Caribbean political economy and human rights cultural relativism. The goal is to understand how the CCJ, as a young regional Caribbean court, has navigated the region’s historical, socio-cultural, and political contexts, in its use of what are regarded as universalist human rights norms in the law, as it adjudicates domestic human rights and constitutional law issues. I also evaluate where the Court ends up when it navigates these issues, in order to determine impact, and to assess whether the Court’s outcomes can be rationalized or justified. The study demonstrates that this new court has adopted and adapted existing international human rights norms and ideas, notwithstanding some socio-cultural and political challenges in the Caribbean to some of these norms and ideas. My major finding is that the CCJ is inclined towards a strongly universalistic perception and application of IHRLN, and relies quite heavily on these laws and norms to guide its human rights and constitutional law adjudication, although it does this sometimes in a way that indigenizes the application of these IHRLN. In some of the Court’s human rights-related decisions, it has also acted in quite transformative ways, sometimes arriving at outcomes that challenge some Caribbean’s socio-cultural and political norms or expectations, particularly on subjects such as LGBTQ+ rights, the death penalty, political corruption, and the strengthening of aspects of Caribbean Community Law. Through these transformative decisions, the CCJ has disturbed some of the expectations about the contours and boundaries of Caribbean constitutional law, and in places, has formulated new principles and doctrines which signal a clear yearning to use IHRLN to take Caribbean law to new frontiers. It does this without completely disregarding Caribbean socio-cultural and political realities, but by sometimes mediating them. This approach by the Court demonstrates independence and reflects an absence of the suspicions of some IHRL norms and ideas that are oftentimes reflected in the political economy dynamics of the wider Caribbean region. It likewise does not signify an embrace of some of the more well-known cultural reticence and relativist attitudes to some aspects of international human rights norms found in some quarters of the Caribbean. Instead, the study reveals a more nuanced positioning by the Court, in its human rights jurisprudence. The result, this dissertation has found, is a Court that has (a) accomplished critical legal reform in important areas of the law, (b) empowered CARICOM citizens in a number of ways, and (c) strengthened respect for indigenous regional institutions in the wider politique of Caribbean regional identity and integration. The Court has accomplished these goals through calculated persuasion, rationality, and normative reasoning. The contribution of this dissertation is three-fold. Firstly, it formulates and presents a rigorous analysis of how the CCJ operationalizes IHRLN in its work. This is done, drawing on the literature on human rights universalism, cultural relativism, and transformative justice, and against the backdrop of regional human rights reticences that I explore, and which are premised on certain perceptions of the hegemonic and neo-colonial tendencies and potential of some IHRLN. Secondly, the thesis offers an in-depth and critical assessment and evaluation of the CCJ’s impact on the human rights jurisprudence of the region as a whole. Finally, it offers an in-depth analysis of how the Court’s work has so far contributed to the development of Caribbean law.

Friedrich Nietzsche represents a radical departure from alroost all of the philosophical tradition which preceded him. His stylistic differences from the tradition in philosophy find their basis in his perspectivism1 a strong form of relativism. Perspectivism is the theory that there are an indefinite number of different perspectives on the world, none of which can legitimately claim to be the true definition of it. Nietzsche bases a number of interesting arguments about language, truth and logic on perspectivism. His perspectivism is problematic because it cannot be asserted as true without also encountering a paradox: if perspectivism is a definitive perspective on the world, then perspectivism is false. Nietzsche found a method of dealing with this paradox through his writing style itself, viz. through his style he exenplifies perspectivism without seriously asserting it. That means that his style constantly refers to and serves as an exanple of perspectivism, and yet he never plainly asserts that perspectivism is a true description of the world. Nietzsche's style is intended to distinguish him from the rest of the philosophical tradition because he thought that was the only way to have his ideas accepted: on his own terms standing in opposition to the rest of the tradition, especially Socrates. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)