There is evidence in Steinbeck's works of anti-intellectualism which is expressed by a somewhat maudlin handling of human emotions,and by a doggedly persistent attack on various intellectual types. This attitude is further revealed in Steinbeck's personal life by his abstention from any literary coteries or universities and his adamant refusal to discuss his life and works or offer his considerable talent to any institution of higher learning.

There is an as yet unacknowledged and incomparable contribution to the philosophical debates about know-how to be found in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is sourced in his investigations into knowledge and certainty in On Certainty, though it is not limited to these late passages. Understanding the ramifications of this putative contribution (even if one does not agree with it) highlights the extent to which (i) there is now a new range of issues pertaining to know-how which no future philosophical consideration of the topic can ignore, except on pain of failing to engage comprehensively with the subject; (ii) the topic of know-how has been inappropriately marginalised by naturalized epistemology, and may well be as central to epistemology as the propositional knowledge which currently dominates epistemology’s attention; and (iii) any engagement with these potential Wittgensteinian contributions will need to be conducted in tandem with a reflection on the meta-philosophy of epistemology, since their potential impact extends to epistemology’s main methodology, i.e., naturalized reflective equilibrium. These three conclusions, together with a diagnosis of where and why all the current intellectualist accounts of know-how are either internally inconsistent, or irreconcilably flawed on their own terms, provide the motivation and the opportunity for a New Epistemology of Know-How. These conclusions established, I offer one possible Wittgensteinian-orientated version of the New Epistemology of Know-How, providing the first example of a non-naturalized philosophical approach to the topic since Gilbert Ryle.

Samtidigt som traditionella religioner är på tillbakagång vänder sig allt fler människor till den magi och mysticism som kännetecknar new age. Forskningen har hittills närmat sig detta fenomen genom korrelationsstudier, demografiska kartläggningar och analyser av vad new age-anhängare tror på. I denna explorativa, induktiva studie berättade i stället fem kvinnor i halvstrukturerade intervjuer om vad deras new age-tro betytt för dem. Koncentrering av bärande utsagor i dimensionerna betydelse, tro relaterad till icke-tro, kunskapskällor och ontologi genererade fyra faktorer: existentiell trygghet som skyddar mot osäkerhet under livets gång och hämmar ångest inför livets oundvikliga slut; upphöjdhet genom insikter och medvetenhet som icke-troende saknar; antiintellektualism som betonar känslor och intuition på bekostnad av förnuft och logik; relativism som stipulerar att var och en har sin egen sanning. En funktionell modell som tydliggör hur faktorerna relaterar till varandra diskuteras, liksom resultatets integrering i ett teoretiskt ramverk och riktlinjer för framtida forskning. / In a time when traditional religions are declining, contemporary man increasingly turns to New Age magic and mysticism. So far, research has approached this phenomenon in correlational studies, demographic surveys, and analyses of experience narratives. In this explorative, inductive study, five women described the gains of their New Age faith. Concentrating leading statements in the dimensions value, belief related to non-belief, sources of knowledge, and ontology generated four factors: existential safety that protects against uncertainty through life and inhibits anxiety regarding life’s inevitable end; loftiness through insights and awareness that non-believers lack; anti-intellectualism emphasizing emotion and intuition at the expense of reason and logic; relativism that stipulates that truth is a matter of individual choice. A functional model illustrating how the factors relate to each other is discussed, as well as theoretical integration and suggestions for future research.

Christianity is not anti-intellectual; however, there is a distinct quality of anti-intellectualism in the rhetoric of the Christian Right. This thesis explores the ways in which rhetors in the Christian Right encourage anti-intellectual sentiment without explicitly claiming to be against intellectualism. I argue that the Christian Right makes these anti-intellectual arguments by invoking the tropes and topoi of populism, anti-evolution, and common sense. I analyze how Pat Robertson, as a representative of the Christian Right, used the stock argument, or topos, of populism in his 1986 speech, in which he announced his intention to run for President. I argue that while Robertson used the generic argumentative framework of populism, which is "anti-elitist," he shifted the meaning of the word "elitist" from a wealthy person to an intellectual person. This formed a trope, or turn in argument. Next, I consider the Christian Right's argument against the teaching of evolution. I analyze William J. Bryan's argument in the Scopes Trial, a defining moment in the creation-evolution debate. I show that Bryan used the topos of creationism, which included the loci of quality and order, to condemn the teaching of evolution, arguing that it would be better to not have education at all than for students to be taught something that contradicts the Bible. Finally, I consider how both Ronald Reagan and Sarah Palin used the topos of common sense. Reagan used this topos to create a metaphorical narrative that was to be accepted as reality, or common sense. Sarah Palin, then, used the common sense narrative that Reagan had created to support her views. By calling her ideas "common sense" and frequently referencing Reagan, her rhetoric gives the illusion that good governing is simple, thus removing the space for an intellectual in public life.

Some contemporary anarchist scholarship has rejected the Enlightenment-inspired reliance on reason that was supposedly central to classical anarchist thought and expanded the anarchist critique to address issues ignored by their classical predecessors. In making reason the object of critique, some contemporary anarchists expanded the anarchist framework to include critiques of domination residing outside the traditional power centers of the state, the capitalist firm, and the church thereby shedding light on the authoritarian tendencies inherent in the intellect itself. Though contemporary anarchist scholarship has sought to apply this anti-authoritarian ethos to the realms of epistemology and ontology (by employing Michel Foucault’s analysis of power and other postfoundational thinkers), their own framework of analysis is glaringly susceptible to what Habermas called a “performative contradiction.” In questioning the authority of aspects of even our own intellect (and the epistemological and ontological presuppositions that accompany it) we call into question even the authority of our own argumentation. I answer this “contradiction” by interrogating two intellectual traditions. Firstly, I question a key postfoundational anarchist premise. Namely, I assess whether an understanding of classical anarchist thinkers as quintessential children of the Enlightenment is justified. Secondly, I offer an alternative path to reconciliation between the anti-authoritarian values of the anarchists and the anti-metaphysical values of the postfoundationalists (that I think mirrors anarchist anti-authoritarian concerns) by suggesting we are better served to think of an anti-authoritarianism of the intellect by employing three key twentieth century thinkers: Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. I do so while anchoring Rorty’s, Feyerabend’s, and Wittgenstein’s philosophies in the 19th century anti-metaphysical thought of Friedrich Nietzsche and the philosophical anarchism of Max Stirner.

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Dwight D. Eisenhower has been criticized as an anti-intellectual by scholars such as Richard Hofstadter. Eisenhower’s tenure as president of Columbia University was one segment of his career he was particularly criticized for because of his non-traditional approach to education there. This paper examines Eisenhower’s time at Columbia to explain how anti-intellectualism played into his university administration. It explains how his personality and general outlook came to clash with the intellectual environment of Columbia especially in the wake of the faculty revolt against former Columbia President Nicholas Murray Butler. It argues that Eisenhower utilized the Columbia institution to promote a Cold War educational agenda, which often belittled Columbia intellectuals and their scholarly pursuits. However, this paper also counter-argues that Eisenhower, despite accusations of anti-intellectualism, was an academically interested man who never engaged in true suppression of free thought despite pressure from McCarthyite influences in American government, media and business.

[pt] O protestantismo brasileiro, de uma forma geral, orgulha-se de ser contracultural. Orgulha-se de estar dentro de um cativeiro cultural impossibilitado de dialogar com outras áreas do saber e principalmente com a ciência moderna. Este trabalho quer mostrar as raízes e o desenvolvimento de um discurso anti-intelectual marcante no protestantismo brasileiro que o impede de ser relevante diante das demandas do tempo presente. Ao olhar para a antiga modernidade, pode-se identificar o mergulho que a humanidade fez em direção ao racionalismo, ao cientificismo exagerado, que guiado pelo viés positivista fez com que o homem se enxergasse totalmente separado de tudo e de todos. No meio religioso se evidencia a briga entre Fé e razão. Porém um dos contornos nítidos do paradigma atual é que a briga entre a religião e a ciência, entre a Fé e a Razão merece morrer. Infelizmente, dentro do protestantismo brasileiro ainda se escuta ecos fortes desse conflito que a modernidade fez explodir. E dentro do protestantismo, no lugar da denúncia do indevido uso da Razão, aconteceu a exclusão completa da mesma. No Brasil, um protestantismo guiado por um emocionalismo puro e por uma espiritualidade que não enxerga o mundo e suas mudanças, persiste em fazer morada dentro das diversas igrejas protestantes. Um olhar para o passado tentando entender as origens e o desenvolvimento desse problema é essencial para a superação do mesmo. É exatamente nisto que esta pesquisa propõe-se a ajudar. / [en] Brazilian Protestantism, in general, prides itself on being countercultural. It prides itself on being in a cultural captivity unable to dialogue with other areas of knowledge and especially with modern science. This work intends to show the roots and the development of a striking anti-intellectual discourse in Brazilian Protestantism that prevents it from being relevant in face of the demands of the present time. When looking at the ancient modernity, one can identify the plunge that humanity made towards rationalism, to exaggerated scientism, which, guided by the positivist bias, made man see himself totally separated from everything and everyone. In the religious milieu, the fight between Faith and reason is evident. However, one of the clear contours of the current paradigm is that the fight between religion and science, between Faith and Reason, deserves to die. Unfortunately, within Brazilian Protestantism, one can still hear strong echoes of this conflict that modernity has caused to explode. And within Protestantism, instead of denouncing the misuse of Reason, it was completely excluded. In Brazil, a Protestantism guided by pure emotionalism and a spirituality that does not see the world and its changes, persists in making a home within the various Protestant churches. A look at the past trying to understand the origins and development of this problem is essential to overcome it. This is exactly where this research is intended to help.

This study explores the role of learning and education in American historical fiction written in the 1820s. The United States has been, and still is, commonly considered to be hostile to scholarly learning. In novels and short stories of the 1820s, however, learning and education are recurrent themes, and this dissertation shows that the attitudes to these issues are more ambivalent than hitherto acknowledged. The 1820s was a period characterized by a political struggle, expressed as a battle between intellectuals, represented by the sitting president, John Quincy Adams, a Harvard professor, and anti-intellectuals, headed by the war hero Andrew Jackson. The battle over the place of scholarly learning in the U.S. was played out not only on the political scene but also in historical fiction, where the themes of learning and education become vehicles for exploring national identity. In these texts, whose aim is often to establish an impressive national history, scholarly learning carries negative connotations as it is linked to the former colonizer Britain and also symbolizes social stratification. However, it also stands for civilization and progress, qualities felt to be necessary for the nation to come into its own. The conflicting views and anxieties surrounding the issues of learning and education tend to center on a recurrent character in these texts, the learned person. After providing an overview of how the themes of learning and education are treated in historical narratives from the 1820s, this dissertation focuses on works of three writers: Hobomok (1824) and The Rebels (1825) by Lydia Maria Child, The Prairie (1827) by James Fenimore Cooper, and Hope Leslie (1827) by Catharine Maria Sedgwick.