This thesis uses the recently decided R v NS to assess the contours of the freedom to wear the niqab, as part of religious freedom, in Canada. By criticizing the majority and concurring opinions I argue that, properly understood, a witness’s religious freedom should protect her from an order to unveil when she is testifying in court. I show that the concurring opinion holds the witness to an illiberal, unfair standard of personal behaviour that fails to respect the witness’s religious freedom. I show that the majority’s decision, though following a justified liberal process of balancing rights, failed to protect NS’s meaningful choice to practice her religion, a standard set by the court in Hutterian Brethren. I then assess the broader implications of R v NS. I argue that in theoretical terms R v NS reaffirms Canada’s commitment to a liberal system of reciprocal rights and rejects a perfectionist approach according to which societal values can override rights. These theoretical lessons are then applied to other policies regulating the veil. I argue that despite its shortcomings, R v NS should generate optimism that perfectionist policies will be rejected and that the veil will only be limited minimally and only when the limit is necessary to uphold other legitimate aims. / Thesis (Master, Law) -- Queen's University, 2013-09-29 20:00:52.439

Refusing to participate in war does not only mean refusing to serve in the military. For many conscientious objectors, it means refusing to pay taxes that directly support the military industrial complex. Conscientious tax objectors risk many punishments by withholding tax money that supports war. Politico-social conflicts exist between a citizen's legal obligation to pay taxes and the personal obligation to her/his moral beliefs. My research suggests that the Religious Freedom Peace Tax Fund Act (RFPTFA) may be one transformative agent for this conflict. Through examination of relevant case law, statutes, conflict transformation literature, and interviews with conscientious tax objectors, my investigation concludes that members of the conscientious tax objector movement disagree on the merits of RFPTFA. My research suggests that until these various intermovement factions enter into consensus-building dialogue, conscientious tax objection will remain a mere symbolic method of pacifism rather than a powerful tool in the art of peacebuilding.

In certain contemporary Muslim majority states apostasy and blasphemy are not merely religious sins; they are acts which potentially have legal, or extra-legal, consequences. Although apostasy has not been criminalised in many such states, extrajudicial killings of apostates are carried out by some extremist groups and individuals. Such groups always justify these murders of fellow Muslims and non-Muslims on the grounds of apostasy and blasphemy. The concept and use of takfir (excommunication) is also a serious issue in Muslim majority states. Groups such as Daesh (also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) rely on takfir to attack fellow Muslims, despite there being no legal basis in Shari’a for the use of takfir or for criminalising apostasy. Although the concept was developed by people, not God, takfir are now being used to bypass rational human judgement. Their use plays a major role in many of the religious issues confronting Muslim majority states, such as the criminalisation of apostasy and blasphemy. This thesis analyses the central issues of apostasy, blasphemy and takfir collectively, as their history and their contemporary use and misuse by extremist groups are inextricably entwined. The key finding is that the right to punish apostasy and blasphemy and to issue declarations of excommunication (takfir), all originally reserved in Islam for God only, have been appropriated by man. Through developments in the understandings of these concepts, all three have come to be seen by some scholars and ordinary believers as a ‘right of man’. This evolution in interpretation and in application is inconsistent with Shari’a law.

The role of secularism in government is an important question following the events of the Arab Spring. This report aims to look at how Turkey and India's political systems evolved in the 20th and 21st century against the backdrop of constitutional secularism. Moreover, this report explores some of the consequences of secular principles on economic and societal progress. Turkey, with a stance that separates religion and state, has had numerous problems between secular and religious groups. This strife has led to multiple coups and cycles of progress and political turmoil. The military sees its duty as guarding the secular principles of Turkey -- a problem for politicians perceived as overly religious. In India, which has a concept of secularism that requires government consideration and protection for all religions, what has evolved is a political system that pits a party devoted to secularism against a party that advocates a more Hindu national identity. In both Turkey and India, some social and economic interests are drowned out by more vocal religious political groups. While both these countries have different interpretations of secularism, the current atmosphere in both countries fosters civil unrest and, at times, violence. On a societal level the rhetoric only serves to divide people. So long as this rhetoric and atmosphere exists, there is a limit to economic progress, societal stability, and international influence. This last aspect is especially important for these two countries, which have broad historical reach. In Turkey, previous restrictions on religion have been repealed by the current government in order to follow more democratic principles, however, many also see this as the first step towards a politically Islamic Turkey. In India, the religious rhetoric concerns the religious minority groups. India is a country with relatively high governmental restriction and very high societal hostility towards religion. Much of this hostility manifests as public violence. The emergence and predicted victory of a more Hindu political party only fuels the public debate over secularism. The challenge is to balance secularism with freedom of religion, and perhaps accept an evolving stance that reflects each policy's limit. / text

The aim of the study is to investigate the presentation of Christianity in relation to the other world religions in curricula and teaching materials from 1969 and 2011, as well as to investigate what influenced the development of these from previous researches. From a comparative method and self-formulated analytical categories, the results have been analyzed. As far as the curricula are concerned, it emerged that Christianity has had and still have a special position towards other world religions. As far as the teaching materials are concerned, a clear difference emerged as to which perspective it is based on. In the teaching material from year 1969, the non-Christian religions are highlighted as something strange and odd at the same time as in the teaching medium from 2011 they are highlighted neutral. Christianity is still a starting point in both curricula and teaching materials. The reason why curricula and teaching materials look like they do can, according to the study, be a result of the increased migration in the country but also a result of the religious freedom law. The school faces a dilemma where the school on the one hand will be based on Christian traditions and on the other hand be factual and impartial. The question we ask after our analysis is what really is the most important - to ensure the best of the country and the cultural heritage or to take into consideration the different cultural heritage of the students. Conclusions from our study are that other religions have gained more space in today's curriculum and teaching materials than before. It is also more neutrally formulated, however, it is a long way to go to a non-confessional education in religious knowledge. We stand with one foot in tradition and one foot in the renewal and are about to take a step over to the last one.

One of the most dynamic relationships historically has been that of the state with religion. Having been blamed for many wars and rebellions it comes as no surprise that those states continuing to model close relationships with an individual religion come under high scrutiny, especially now religious freedom plays such an important part in today's society. Furthermore, sociological theories have developed beyond metaphysical explanations of state authority and no longer depend on spiritual or religious explanations. The UK, with two established churches, is one such state with its relationship with the Church of England especially being subjected to criticism from a number of different groups. Whether this constant criticism is justified is another story and one of the aims of this thesis is to try to unpick some of the debates that flow around the subject in order to put them into a practical context. Often, when such discussions are undertaken there are lots of arguments made as to why the Church of England should, or should not, be disestablished. Discussions on whether they retain an important place in society are made but ultimately very little said about how disestablishment may occur if this was chosen as the way forward. This thesis will aim to tackle some of these questions and will delve into the constitutional complexities in order to discover how such a procedure can be initiated, and the effect this would have on both the state and the Church of England. Future relations will also be discussed and an important consideration will be the views and effect this might have on other religions who have come to benefit from the pleural approach of the established church. Ultimately, the result will be the uncovering of the complexities of disestablishment and who, if anyone, will benefit from the process.

Les « sectes religieuses » en droit françaisEn général le syntagme « sectes religieuses » est peu employé en raison d'une association consubstantielle entre la « secte » et une dimension religieuse supposée. Or, il existe des « sectes » non religieuses qu'il est important de différencier des « sectes religieuses ». En effet, les « sectes religieuses » sont susceptibles de revendiquer des droits accordés aux confessions. Mais, si le droit français reconnait l'existence de « sectes religieuses », il opère par là même une distinction entre ces dernières et les Églises établies. En conséquence, outre les difficultés définitionnelles, la question se posait de savoir si le législateur français pouvait établir une telle distinction sans porter une atteinte grave et injustifiée à la liberté religieuse. La question se posait encore de savoir si cette distinction était nécessaire au regard des dérives « sectaires » dénoncées par plusieurs rapports d'enquête parlementaires et des associations antisectes. En définitive, nonobstant l'émergence d'une distinction jurisprudentielle entre les « sectes religieuses » et les Églises établies, une telle distinction ne saurait prospérer sans subir la condamnation de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme et des libertés fondamentales. De surcroît, l'efficacité du droit commun préventif et répressif conduit à conclure à l'inutilité de cette distinction. / « Religious sects » under French lawIn general the noun phrase « religious sects » is little used because of a consubstantial association between a sect and an assumed religious dimension. However, non-religious sects do exist and it is important to differentiate them from « religious sects ». Indeed, « religious sects » might claim rights granted to confessions. But if French law recognizes the existence of « religious sects » it makes at the same time a difference between these last ones and established churches. Consequently, apart from the difficulties in defining the former, the question arose, could French legislation establish such a distinction without causing serious and unjustifiable harm to religious freedom. Another question was if such a distinction was necessary because of « sectarian deviances » denounced by several parliamentary reports and anti-sects associations. Ultimately, notwithstanding the emergence of a jurisprudential distinction between religious sects and established churches, such a distinction could not prosper without being condemned by the European Court of Human Rights and Fundamental Liberties. In addition the effectiveness of preventive and repressive common law leads one to conclude that such a distinction would be of no use.

In this thesis I argue that First Amendment free speech and exercise claims do not grant religious business owners the ability to bypass statutes that prohibit discrimination on sexual orientation and gender identity grounds in areas of public accommodations. My arguments focus on the constitutional claims made in the case Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. Furthermore, I determine that Congress can rely on both the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment to pass legislation that prohibits discrimination on sexual orientation and gender identity grounds in areas of public accommodations. I argue that despite the Court’s holding in the Civil Rights Cases, Congress can regulate discrimination by private actors, not just state sponsored discrimination, through the Fourteenth Amendment. I analyze the potential avenues religious business owners can use to undermine both state and federal antidiscrimination statutes and have their discriminatory practices legally sanctioned. I conclude by arguing that religious exemptions do not belong in antidiscrimination statutes.

As the title suggests, this thesis is about the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and about development of its interpretation from its inception to present day. Over the years, the interpretation of the First Amendment has drastically changed, causing a shift from restrictive views on free expression towards almost absolute freedom. Today, freedom of expression and religious freedom, both of which are included in the First Amendment, play a significant role in preserving democracy while strengthening its core pillars not only in the United States, but in other modern nations as well. The inclusion of the First Amendment into the world's oldest written constitution has influenced the concept of free expression and religious freedom in the laws of many foreign countries. According to some scholars, the current level of constitutional protection guaranteed for free expression in United States is too high and does not correlate with what the framers of the constitution had intended on upon drafting the First Amendment. However, it comes as no surprise that higher standards of protection from governmental intervention regarding guaranteed freedom in the First Amendment consequently results in the betterment of society. Throughout the text, I will aim to answer every major question...

Many indigenous communities perceive an intimate connection between land and religion, and land has, and continues to remain, at the heart of indigenous-state relations. This dissertation examines how philosophies of land and religion in correlation with histories of dispossession and differentiation contribute to socio-political structures that threaten the religious freedom of Aboriginal peoples and the very existence of indigenous religious traditions, cultures, and sacred sites in Canada today. Through a political-philosophical approach to ethical concerns of justice as fairness, national minorities’ rights, and religious freedom, I examine court decisions, legislation, and official protocols that shape contemporary indigenous-state relations. I identify philosophical and structural issues preventing Canada from protecting the fundamental rights guaranteed to indigenous peoples and all Canadians. More specifically, I examine the historical manifestations of concepts of land and religion in philosophies of colonization, emphasizing their effects in contemporary indigenous-state relations. I analyze the impacts of secularization, socio-economic expansion, and the dispossession of Aboriginal traditional lands on the protection of indigenous cultural rights and off-reserve sacred sites. Based on this analysis, I discuss communicative democratic theory and the potential benefits and limitations of the “Duty to Consult and Accommodate”—the most recent framework for indigenous-state relations—for the protection of indigenous religious traditions and the importance of the inclusion of indigenous peoples in administrative and decision-making processes. Finally, I explore indigenous representation, religious revitalization and the politics of authenticity, authority, diversity and cultural change.