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The central objective of this interdisciplinary thesis is to articulate a theoretical, doctrinal and political justification for the reintroduction of corporate charter revocation as a remedy to enhance the accountability of corporations in modern society. Corporations were originally conceived of as public institutions granted charters to carry out specific activities in the interests of society. Where a corporation acted outside of its charter, the corporation's charter could be revoked. Over the past 150 years, corporate lawyers have silently amended corporate laws to provide corporations with rights, powers and privileges that exceed those of individuals. Internal institutional regulation through corporate charters has been replaced by external oversight through administrative regulatory mechanisms. Where incorporation was once considered a privilege, today it is a right. Despite these developments, this thesis argues that theory and doctrine still support the paramountcy of the public over the private, and the legal remedies of corporate charter revocation. The thesis contains six chapters including introduction and conclusion. Chapter one introduces the legal principle of corporate charter revocation and demonstrates why such a remedy is necessary in the context of modern corporate law. Chapter two considers the four accepted theories of the corporate structure and asserts that a revised "neo-concessionist" approach continues to inform our understanding of the corporation/state relationship. Chapter three reinforces this theoretical analysis through an historical and doctrinal account of the prerogative remedies of scire facias and quo warranto and the development of statutory charter revocation provisions. Chapter four focuses on the place of the state, specifically the Attorney General, in initiating revocation proceedings and some of the political barriers to reinstating the remedy. Through the exploration of these barriers and consideration of several recent American case studies, an effort is made to develop a strategy for the successful implementation of corporate charter revocation. The paper concludes with some thoughts about various outstanding barriers to the successful utilization of the remedy, the nature and application of corporate charter revocation generally, and calls for a continuation of a broader debate about the place of the corporation in modern society.

Univ., Diss. u.d.T.: Tortell, Lisa Ann: The monetary remedy for breach of constitutional rights in the United States, India, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom--Oxford, 2002.

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1999. / Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Philosophiae Doctor - PhD / Judicial remedies are, amongst others, a vehicle through which respect, protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights can be delivered to those who need them. A remedy is the perspective from which litigants judge either the success or failure of judicial decisions. Judicial remedies make the rights whole, they complete the justiciability of human rights because without them human rights remain statements of legal rhetoric. The nature of the remedies that the courts grant is not only based on the normative nature of the rights they seek to enforce. They are also influenced by factors such as the goals and objectives of judicial remedies as defined, amongst others, by the ethos of either corrective or distributive forms of justice. This thesis explored these factors and their impact on judicial remedies. Stress is put on the impact of the separation of powers doctrine, institutional competence concerns and on the forms of justice pursued by courts. The study is based on the judicial enforcement of the socio-economic rights protected in the South African 1996 Constitution. The research undertaken here was intended to guide scholars, legal practitioners and judicial officers who confront socio-economic rights issues as part of their daily work. / South Africa

The central objective of this interdisciplinary thesis is to articulate a theoretical, doctrinal and political justification for the reintroduction of corporate charter revocation as a remedy to enhance the accountability of corporations in modern society. Corporations were originally conceived of as public institutions granted charters to carry out specific activities in the interests of society. Where a corporation acted outside of its charter, the corporation's charter could be revoked. Over the past 150 years, corporate lawyers have silently amended corporate laws to provide corporations with rights, powers and privileges that exceed those of individuals. Internal institutional regulation through corporate charters has been replaced by external oversight through administrative regulatory mechanisms. Where incorporation was once considered a privilege, today it is a right. Despite these developments, this thesis argues that theory and doctrine still support the paramountcy of the public over the private, and the legal remedies of corporate charter revocation. The thesis contains six chapters including introduction and conclusion. Chapter one introduces the legal principle of corporate charter revocation and demonstrates why such a remedy is necessary in the context of modern corporate law. Chapter two considers the four accepted theories of the corporate structure and asserts that a revised "neo-concessionist" approach continues to inform our understanding of the corporation/state relationship. Chapter three reinforces this theoretical analysis through an historical and doctrinal account of the prerogative remedies of scire facias and quo warranto and the development of statutory charter revocation provisions. Chapter four focuses on the place of the state, specifically the Attorney General, in initiating revocation proceedings and some of the political barriers to reinstating the remedy. Through the exploration of these barriers and consideration of several recent American case studies, an effort is made to develop a strategy for the successful implementation of corporate charter revocation. The paper concludes with some thoughts about various outstanding barriers to the successful utilization of the remedy, the nature and application of corporate charter revocation generally, and calls for a continuation of a broader debate about the place of the corporation in modern society. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The various constructions of rights of pre-emption encountered in South African case law all have some merit. This is confirmed by the multiplicity of types of preference contracts encountered in German law especially. The tendency of South African courts and writers to portray one approach as the only correct one to the exclusion of all other views, results in tension and confusion, all the more because of the failure to investigate the relevant policy considerations comprehensively. The confusion is compounded by what amounts to a breakdown of the system of precedents with judgments being based on incorrect interpretations of previous decisions and with scant regard for contrary decisions. No certainty exists regarding the construction of the contractual right of pre-emption in Roman and Roman-Dutch law, nor is it clear what figure or figures were received into South African law. The Germanic concept of tiered ownership that forms the historical basis for the Oryx remedy, does not form part of our law. This accounts for the difficulty that courts and writers have in explaining this remedy in terms of Romanist terminology, and the resort to the language of fiction. German law and English law, relied upon in South African case law, do not support a uniform construction of all rights of pre-emption as creating an enforceable duty to make an offer upon manifestation of a desire to sell. The almost unanimous support of US courts for a remedy by which the holder can ultimately obtain performance of the main contract upon conclusion of a contract with a third party, challenges the hypothesis suggested by German law that the default construction of preference contracts should be the bare preference contract which only creates a negative obligation. The very cryptic way in which rights of pre-emption are normally drafted, makes it difficult to even identify the main purpose of the parties. It is therefore not easy to classify preference contracts into the different types identified in this study as notional possibilities. A default regime is therefore highly desirable in the interest of legal certainty. The choice of a default regime should be made on the basis of recognised policy considerations, particularly on the basis of an equitable balancing of typical parties' interests and in view of communal interests balanced against the demand for legal certainty. The choice of default regime cannot be based merely on historical authority or precedent (which is in any event unclear in the present context) or unsubstantiated claims that one model is more logical or commercially useful than another. When rules are chosen as the default regime, these rules must, as far as possible, be reconciled with the existing conceptual structure of our law to prevent contradictions and inconsistencies. A policy analysis reveals that three default types of preference contract should be recognised, each with a clearly delineated field of application. Firstly, where the agreement allows the grantor to contract with a third party, the holder has the right to contract with the grantor at the terms agreed with the third party. Such a preference contract can therefore be regarded as an option conditional upon conclusion of a contract with a third party. Such contracts are rare in South Africa. In other cases, the default rule should be that the grantor must first give the holder an opportunity to contract before he contracts with a third party. The default construction of this latter type of preference contracts depends on whether the preference contract itself predetermines the main contract price. If so, the holder has a right or option to contract at that price upon any manifestation of a desire to conclude the relevant type of contract. However, where the preference contract does not predetermine the price, or refers to a price that the grantor would accept from third parties, any manifestation of a desire to sell should not be sufficient to trigger the holder's right. The grantor and society have an interest in having her freedom to negotiate with third parties to obtain the best possible price curtailed as little as possible. In such cases, the default rule should be that the holder is only entitled to conclusion of the main contract upon breach in the form of a contract with or offer to a third party. The default rule should also be that such preference contracts - which will be treated as ordinary preference contracts - only terminate upon the grantor actually contracting with and performing to a third party within a reasonable time after the holder declined the opportunity to match those terms, and provided the identity of the third party was disclosed to the holder on request. The holder therefore cannot lose his preferential right by a rejection of an outrageously high offer by the grantor. Options and preference contracts are closely related and overlapping concepts. The type of preference contract that grants a conditional right to contract can often be understood as a conditional option (or at least as a conditional option subject to a resolutive condition that the grantor does not want to contract anymore). The traditional distinction between options and rights of first refusal can only be maintained in respect of some types of preference contracts. These are negative or bare preference contracts which only give rise to remedies aimed at restoring the status quo ante the breach, as well as those preference contracts creating conditional rights to contract which courts refuse to treat as conditional options because their wording implies a duty to make or accept an offer, or because the requirement of certainty precludes them from being options. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die verskillende konstruksies van voorkoopsregte aanvaar III Suid-Afrikaanse beslissings het almal meriete. Dit word bevestig deur die verskillende tipes voorkoopskontrakte wat veral in die Duitse reg erken word. Die neiging van Suid- Afrikaanse howe en skrywers om een benadering as die enigste korrekte een te tipeer veroorsaak spanning en onsekerheid, des te meer weens die versuim om die relevante beleidsoorwegings deeglik te ondersoek. Boonop is die presedentestelsel telkens verontagsaam deur verkeerde interpretasies van vorige uitsprake en deurdat teenstrydige uitsprake bloot geïgnoreer is. Geen sekerheid bestaan oor die konstruksie van die kontraktuele voorkoopsreg in die Romeinse of Romeins-Hollandse Reg nie. Dit is ook nie duidelik watter figuur of figure in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geresipieer is nie. Die Germaanse konsep van gesplitste eiendomsreg wat die historiese basis van die Oryx-meganisme daarstel, vorm nie deel van ons reg nie. Dit verduidelik hoekom howe en skrywers sukkel om dié remedie te verduidelik aan die hand van Romanistiese verbintenisreg-terminologie, en die gevolglike gebruikmaking van fiksie-taal. Die Duitse en Engelse reg waarop gesteun is in Suid-Afrikaanse regspraak, steun nie 'n uniforme konstruksie van alle voorkoopsregte as behelsende 'n afdwingbare plig om 'n aanbod te maak by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te verkoop nie. Die byna eenparige steun van Noord-Amerikaanse howe vir 'n remedie waarmee die voorkoopsreghouer uiteindelik prestasie van die substantiewe kontrak kan kry by sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde, is 'n teenvoeter vir die hipotese gesuggereer deur die Duitse reg dat die verstekkonstruksie van voorkeurkontrakte behoort te wees dat slegs 'n negatiewe verpligting geskep word. Die kriptiese wyse waarop voorkeurkontrakte normaalweg opgestel word, maak dit moeilik om selfs die hoofdoelstelling van die partye te identifiseer. Dit is daarom nie maklik om voorkeurkontrakte te klassifisieer in die verskillende tipes wat in hierdie studie geïdentifiseer is nie. 'n Verstekregime is daarom wenslik in die belang van regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime behoort gemaak te word op die basis van erkende beleidsoorwegings, spesifiek op die basis van 'n billike balansering van tipiese partybelange en in die lig van gemeenskapsbelange gebalanseer teen die vereiste van regsekerheid. Die keuse van verstekregime kan nie gebaseer word bloot op historiese gesag en vorige beslissings nie (wat in elk geval in die huidige konteks onduidelik is). Dit kan ook nie gebaseer word op ongemotiveerde aansprake dat een model meer logies of kommersieël bruikbaar as 'n ander is nie. Wanneer verstekreëls gekies word moet dit, sover moontlik, versoen word met die bestaande begrippe-struktuur van ons reg om teenstrydighede in die sisteem te vermy. 'n Beleidsanalise laat blyk dat drie verstektipes voorkeurkontrakte erken behoort te word, elk met 'n duidelik afgebakende toepassingsveld. Eerstens, waar die ooreenkoms toelaat dat die voorkeurreggewer eers met 'n derde party kontrakteer, het die voorkeurreghouer 'n opsie om te kontrakteer op die terme ooreengekom met die derde. Die voorkeurkontrak kan daarom beskou word as 'n opsie onderhewig aan die voorwaarde van sluiting van 'n kontrak met 'n derde. Sulke kontrakte is raar in Suid- Afrika. In ander gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die voorkeurreggewer eers die houer 'n geleentheid moet gee om te kontrakteer voordat sy met 'n derde 'n kontrak aangaan. Die verstekkonstruksie van hierdie laasgenoemde tipe voorkeurkontrak hang daarvan af of die voorkeurkontrak self die substantiewe kontraksprys vasstel. Indien wel het die houer die reg of opsie om te kontrakteer teen daardie prys by enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om die spesifieke soort kontrak te sluit. Maar waar die voorkeurkontrak nie die prys vasstel nie, of verwys na 'n prys wat die gewer sou aanvaar van 'n derde, behoort enige manifestasie van 'n begeerte om te kontrakteer nie genoeg te wees om die houer se reg afdwingbaar te maak nie. Die voorkeurreggewer en die gemeenskap het 'n belang daarby dat die gewer se vryheid om met derdes te onderhandel so min as moontlik beperk word sodat sy die beste moontlike prys kan kry. In sulke gevalle behoort die verstekreël te wees dat die houer slegs geregtig is op die voordeel van die substantiewe kontrak by kontrakbreuk in die vorm van 'n kontrak met of aanbod aan 'n derde. Die verstekreël behoort ook te wees dat sulke voorkeurkontrakte in beginsel slegs beëindig word wanneer die voorkeurreggewer inderdaad kontrakteer met en presteer aan 'n derde binne 'n redelike tyd nadat die voorkeurreghouer die geleentheid gegee is om daardie terme te ewenaar. Dit behoort ook vereis te word dat die identiteit van die derde aan die houer geopenbaar word op sy versoek. Die houer kan dus nie sy voorkeurreg verloor deur nie-aanvaarding van 'n belaglik hoë aanbod deur die voorkeurreggewer nie. Opsies en voorkeurkontrakte is oorvleulende konsepte. Die tipe voorkeurkontrak wat 'n voorwaardelike reg om te kontrakteer verleen kan dikwels verstaan word as 'n voorwaardelike opsie (of minstens as 'n voorwaardelike opsie onderhewig aan 'n ontbindende voorwaarde dat die gewer glad nie meer wil kontrakteer nie). Die tradisionele onderskeid tussen opsies en voorkeurregte kan slegs behou word tov sommige voorkeurkontrakte. Hulle is die "negatiewe" voorkeurkontrakte, wat slegs aanleiding gee tot remedies gemik op herstel van die status quo ante kontrakbreuk sowel as daarde voorkeurkontrakte wat voorwaardelike regte om te kontrakteer skep wat howe weier om as voorwaardelike opsies te behandelomdat hulle bewoording wys op 'n plig om 'n aanbod te maak of te aanvaar, of omdat die vereiste van sekerheid hulle verhoed om opsies te wees.

Quantification of damages for loss of amenities of life is a difficult task because there is no connection between enjoyment of life and money. The court however has to compensate the plaintiff with money because that is the only way of restitution. In compensating the plaintiff the court will award a conservative amount which is fair to both parties. The court will take into account previous awards in comparable cases but the personal circumstances of the plaintiff will form the background of the assessment. The intensity and duration of the loss of amenities of life, the plaintiff's contributory negligence, his obligation to mitigate his loss, his ability to cope with his loss and patrimonial damages tending to minimize the loss of amenities of life are all factors to be taken into account in the quantification process. / Die kwantifisering van die vergoeding vir die verlies aan lewensgenietinge is 'n moeilike taak aangesien daar geen verband tussen lewensgeluk and geld is nie. Die hof moet egter die eiser vergoed met 'n som geld aangesien dit die enigste manier van restitusie is. By kwantifisering word die doel van die vergoedingsbedrag asook billikheid en regverdigheid in gedagte gehou. Die hof sal eerder konserwatief as wispelturig te werk gaan by kwantifisering. Verder sal daar na vorige toekennings in vergelykbare gevalle gekyk word, maar uiteindelik sal die omvang van die vergoedingsbedrag bepaal word deur die persoonlike omstandighede van die eiser wat die agtergrond van die kwantifiseringsproses sal vorm. Die tydsduur en intensiteit van die verlies aan lewensgenietinge, die eiser se bydraende nalatigheid, sy verpligting om skade te beperk, sy vermoe om sy verlies te verwerk asook toekennings van 'n vermoensregtelike aard is relevant by kwantifisering. / Mercantile Law / LL.M.

Thesis (LLM)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The South African system of breach of contract recognizes several distinct forms of breach. each encompassing its own set of requirements. Before one is able to determine the outcome and accordingly the rights of each contracting party in respect of an alleged breach of contract. the factual situation must be fitted into one of the recognized forms of breach. This has resulted in a highly complex system of breach of contract and resultant remedies. The existence of a direct relationship between the form of breach present in a factual situation and the remedies available to the innocent party is a fundamental premise of South African law and one that is often accepted without much investigation. This thesis investigates the extent of this interdependence and to establish whether this intricate system is necessary from a practical and a theoretical point of view. To this end. the thesis examines the less complex system of breach of contract as embodied in the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods C·CISG'·) which has been widely adopted in international trade. and which has provided a template for the reformation of various national systems of law. This study concludes that the South African approach to breach of contract and remedies is in need of reform. and that a unitary concept of breach could provide a basis for both a simplification and modernization of our law. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg erken verskeie verskyningsvorms van kontrakbreuk, elk met sy eie besondere vereistes. Ten einde die uitkoms van probleemsituasies waarin kontrakbreuk beweer word te bepaal en derhalwe die regte van die betrokkenes uit te kristalliseer. moet die feitestelonder die een of ander vorm van kontrakbreuk tuisgebring te word. Hierdie benadering het 'n besonder komplekse stelsel van kontrakbreuk en remedies tot gevolg. 'n Fundamentele uitgangspunt van die Suid-Afrikaanse stelsel is dat daar Il direkte korrelasie bestaan tussen die tipe van kontrakbreuk wat in 'n bepaalde geval teenwoordig is en die remedies waarop die onskuldige party kan staatmaak. Hierdie siening, wat meerendeel sonder bevraagtekening aanvaar word, vorm die fokuspunt van hierdie ondersoek. Die oogmerk is om die praktiese nuttigheid en teoretiese houbaarheid van die benadering vas te stel. As 'n vergelykingspunt neem die tesis die vereenvoudigde sisteem van kontrakbreuk beliggaam in die Verenigde Nasies se Konvensie aangaande die Internasionale Koopkontrak ("CISG"). Hierdie verordening geniet wye erkenning in die Internasionale Handel en het alreeds die grondslag gevorm van verskeie inisiatiewe vir die hervonning van Il aantal nasionale regstelsels. Die gevolgtrekking is dat die Suid-A frikaanse benadering tot kontrakbreuk en die remedies daarvoor hervorming benodig en dat die opvatting van 'n sg uniforme kontrakbreuk as 'n basis kan dien vir die vereenvoudiging en modernisering van ons reg.