Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2008. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 117 p. : ill (some col.), col. map. Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 110-113).

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Economia, Administração, Contabilidade e Ciência da Informação e Documentação, Departamento de Economia, 2014. / Submitted by Ana Cristina Barbosa da Silva (annabds@hotmail.com) on 2014-10-20T16:49:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AlvaroDutraHenriques.pdf: 593713 bytes, checksum: 2ae6923993df5a1ce7135a15fde75268 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Tania Milca Carvalho Malheiros(tania@bce.unb.br) on 2014-10-20T17:59:08Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AlvaroDutraHenriques.pdf: 593713 bytes, checksum: 2ae6923993df5a1ce7135a15fde75268 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-10-20T17:59:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_AlvaroDutraHenriques.pdf: 593713 bytes, checksum: 2ae6923993df5a1ce7135a15fde75268 (MD5) / O rent seeking é o processo no qual firmas alocam recursos na redistribuição de renda ao invés da produção. Este pode ocorrer de múltiplas formas, com ou sem a presença do governo, como também manifestar seus efeitos por diversos meios de extração e distribuição de renda econômica que resultam na perda da competitividade na economia dado que a possibilidade lucrativa de se extrair renda contrapõe e desincentiva investimentos produtivos, porém arriscados, feitos pelas firmas. Este trabalho procura estimar as consequências do rent seeking no desempenho inovador das firmas e na busca por eficiência econômica por meio da adoção de novos processos produtivos. Busca-se evidências de que as barreiras ao comércio internacional, a concessão discricionária de crédito subsidiado, a instituição de inúmeras normas regulamentares sobre a produção, a política de incentivos fiscais e demais frutos do rent seeking exercido sobre o governo se tornam contra incentivo sao esforço inovativo das empresas já que, obtendo estas rendas econômicas, não há razão para se incorrer no risco inerente às atividades inovativas. É utilizada a base de dados em inovação da PINTEC para construir um painel por meio do qual é possível separar os diversos setores da economia e mensurar o impacto dos fatores relacionados ao rent seeking apontados acima na busca por novos processos produtivos e adoção de novos produtos pelas firmas. Os resultados encontrados indicam que as altas tarifas de importação e agrande presença de financiamentos públicos subsidiados, em grande parte decorrentes da ação de grupos de interesse, levam as firmas a uma menor busca por eficiência econômica e competitividade. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The rent seeking is a process in which companies allocate resources in redistributing incomeinstead of productive activities. This can occur in multiple ways, with or without thepresence of government, as well as manifest their effects by various means of extractionand distribution of economic rent that result in loss of competitiveness in the economysince the lucrative possibility to extract income opposes and discourages productive investments,though risky, made by firms. This paper seeks to estimate the consequences ofrent seeking in the innovative performance of firms and their search for economic efficiencythrough the adoption of new production processes. We search for evidence that the barriersto international trade, the discretionary grant of subsidized credit, the institution ofnumerous regulations on production, the policy of tax incentives and other consequencesof rent seeking exerted on the government turns to be disincentives to innovative effortsof companies since, as a firm get these rents, there is no reason to incur the risk inherentin innovative activities. This paper uses the database available on PINTEC’s survey tobuild a panel through which you can separate the different sectors of the brazilian economyand measure the impact of the factors related to rent seeking noted above in thefirms’s efforts for new production processes and adoption of new products in the market.The results indicate that high import tariffs and the large presence of public funding subsidized,largely resulting from the action of special interest groups, lead firms to a smallersearch for economic efficiency and competitiveness.

Why did a gradualist transition approach achieve different performances among socialist economies in the 1980s? Why did some socialist economies never try a gradualist approach to economic liberalization? This paper develops a model to show that the liberalization of a socialist economy has two opposite effects on the rent captured by government. The initial economic condition determines the relative strength of the two effects, and consequently the transition path and performance. In addition, a gradualist reform strategy adopted by a rent-seeking government cannot finish the transition toward a complete market economy. To achieve that goal, a new constitutional order and the rule of law are necessary.

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Diss. rer. oec. Bern. / Im Verkauf: Berlin : dissertation.de - Verlag im Internet. Literaturverz.

Bakgrund: Resursförbannelsen innebär att det finns ett negativt samband mellan mängden naturtillgångar och ekonomisk tillväxt. På grund av detta är det få resursrika länder som nått sin fulla potential. Tidigare forskning har mestadels bestått av ekonometriska modeller som bevisar detta negativa samband mellan naturresurser och ekonomisk tillväxt, vilket motiverat oss till att genomföra en kvalitativ analys.  Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att genom en jämförelse av två likvärdiga länder analysera och förklara varför DR Kongo drabbats av resursförbannelsen medan Botswana undkom den. Uppsatsen syftar vidare till att jämföra utifrån tre ekonomiska teorier: holländska sjukan, rent seeking samt institutionell teori. Metod: För att uppnå syftet med uppsatsen används en komparativ metod. Länderna har valts utifrån deras likheter då både Botswana och DR Kongo befinner sig i Sub-Sahara Afrika, har en historia av kolonisering och är rika på mineraler. Metoden är lämplig vid jämförelse av länder. Därför är metoden motiverad att använda när vi jämför hur ett överflöd av naturresurser påverkar Botswanas och DR Kongos ekonomiska utveckling.  Slutsats: De i uppsatsen framkomna bevisen tyder på att DR Kongo har drabbats av resursförbannelsen eftersom vi kan se att holländska sjukan, rent seeking och svaga institutioner förekommer i landet. Alla dessa faktorer bidrar till resursförbannelsen. Till skillnad från Botswana som varken har drabbats av holländska sjukan eller rent seeking. Botswana har även haft stabila institutioner under lång tid. Slutsatsen vi drar är att institutioner är den viktigaste faktorn när det kommer till hur ett land kan undvika resursförbannelsen. / Background: The Resource Curse implies that there is a negative relation between the amount of natural resources and economic growth. Because of this few resource rich countries have reached their full potential. Previous research has mostly consisted of econometric models that prove this negative relation, which has pursued us to conduct a qualitative analysis.  Purpose: The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to compare two equivalent countries to analyze and explain why DR Congo has suffered from the Resource Curse while Botswana escaped it. The thesis further aims to compare based on three economic theories: Dutch disease, rent seeking and institutional theory.  Method: To achieve the purpose a comparative method is used. The countries have been chosen based on their similarities. Both Botswana and DR Congo are located in Sub-Saharan Africa, have a history of colonization and are rich in minerals. This method is appropriate for comparison of countries. Therefore this method is motivated to use when we compare how an abundance of natural resources affect Botswana’s and DR Congo’s economic growth.  Conclusion: The results from the thesis imply that DR Congo has suffered from the Resource Curse since Dutch disease, rent seeking and weak institutions exist in the country. All of these factors contribute to the Resource Curse. In comparison to Botswana who has not suffered from Dutch disease or rent seeking. Botswana has had strong institutions for a long time. Our conclusion is that institutions are the main element when it comes to escaping the Resource Curse.

<p>This thesis analyzes the relationship between trade restrictiveness and corruption levels in Europe and tests the robustness of the results using two different measures of corruption; Corruption Perceptions Index constructed by Transparency International and World Governance Indicators; Control of Corruption constructed by the World Bank. The results show that the outcome differs among the two indices and that previous results found in studies may be subject to data choice and measurement errors. A majority of previous studies have used trade openness in the form of imports share in GDP, or trade openness indices as variables that explain corruption levels. This thesis focuses on trade restrictiveness. It also investigates the differences between restrictiveness and openness in their impacts on corruption. The author of this thesis finds a weak relation between trade restrictiveness and corruption on one hand and an even weaker relation between trade openness and corruption on the other hand when controlling for other variables that may have an impact on corruption. The limited time-frame could be an explanation for this result, i.e. trade policy effects. A longer time-frame would have probably resulted in a bigger difference between variables for trade openness and trade restrictiveness. It is found that the variables showing to have the largest impact on corruption levels in Europe are those associated with historical dimensions such as whether the country has had a tradition of the church being separated from the state or whether being a previously planned economy. Most importantly, the thesis presents suggestive evidence on the fact that not all government involvement increases corruption. Rather, it is regulations that limit internal competition have a large impact on corruption levels in Europe. It has also been found that not all government involvement in the economy implies higher corruption levels. The findings outlined are in line with the common perception that corruption is highly dependent on previous values of corruption and that radical policy interventions are needed to curb corruption.</p>

Práce rozebírá dopady regulace nájemného v ČR. Nastiňuje pozitivní dopady deregulace s ohledem na regionální aspekt. Zabývá se historickými souvislostmi regulace nájemného a vývojem právních předpisů. Vysvětluje, proč se v politické sféře neprosazují ekonomicky efektivní řešení. Jsou zde charakterizovány zájmové skupiny ovlivňující politická rozhodnutí v oblasti bydlení a analyzovány výsledky jejich činnosti. Je provedeno srovnání s regulací nájemného v jiných zemích zejména z hlediska příležitostí k dobývání renty. Navrhuje vlastní řešení problémové situace.

This thesis analyzes the relationship between trade restrictiveness and corruption levels in Europe and tests the robustness of the results using two different measures of corruption; Corruption Perceptions Index constructed by Transparency International and World Governance Indicators; Control of Corruption constructed by the World Bank. The results show that the outcome differs among the two indices and that previous results found in studies may be subject to data choice and measurement errors. A majority of previous studies have used trade openness in the form of imports share in GDP, or trade openness indices as variables that explain corruption levels. This thesis focuses on trade restrictiveness. It also investigates the differences between restrictiveness and openness in their impacts on corruption. The author of this thesis finds a weak relation between trade restrictiveness and corruption on one hand and an even weaker relation between trade openness and corruption on the other hand when controlling for other variables that may have an impact on corruption. The limited time-frame could be an explanation for this result, i.e. trade policy effects. A longer time-frame would have probably resulted in a bigger difference between variables for trade openness and trade restrictiveness. It is found that the variables showing to have the largest impact on corruption levels in Europe are those associated with historical dimensions such as whether the country has had a tradition of the church being separated from the state or whether being a previously planned economy. Most importantly, the thesis presents suggestive evidence on the fact that not all government involvement increases corruption. Rather, it is regulations that limit internal competition have a large impact on corruption levels in Europe. It has also been found that not all government involvement in the economy implies higher corruption levels. The findings outlined are in line with the common perception that corruption is highly dependent on previous values of corruption and that radical policy interventions are needed to curb corruption.

Abstract Based on the latest concepts of economics, this study is aimed at the evolution of purchase system. At the same time, it analyzes the purchase system of the government on the basis of the theories of transaction costs and principle agency. In the purchase system of the government, there exist uncertainties in bureaucracy and firm. Due to these uncertainties as well as imperfect information and boundary rational policy-deciders, in the process of purchase, the dealers and buyers entertain the mind of opportunism. With the enactment of purchase system of the government, which specifies all kinds of procedures in order to reduce the uncertainties of dealings, and to lower cost price of dealings. The procedure of the government purchase, from the beginning of budget list to the completion of contract, has to go through the close check of councilors, public officials, bureaucratic organization and manufacturing companies. This study, depending on the theory of principle agency in a new institutional economic system, tries to understand the connection between the councilors, public officials, bureaucratic organization and manufacturing companies in the government purchase. The government purchase has to serve both political and economic purposes; therefore, while making the purchase, the government has to consider two main principles---the political fair principle and economic profit principle. That¡¦s the reason why the government will get into two dilemmas while working out a system of purchase. One dilemma that the government purchase system faces is that any purchase system cannot surely serve both political and economic purposes. Because of this, some unpreventable corrupt practices in the process of the government purchase will appear. Thus, to balance the political fair principle and the economic profit principle, the government can¡¦t help but turn a blind eye to corrupt practices. The other dilemma is that, with an eye to attaining these two purposes, the government purchase system will unavoidably cause some troubles to the society, that is, the government purchase system will tempt participants to have the motivation of seeking for renters. This study will apply some newspaper reports, court decision and official document as its data and cases of analysis. The efficiency of the government purchase has a great influence on the image of the government the enactment of the law of the government purchase can largely decrease the number of participants who seek for renters. However, the duplex purposes of politics and economy will cut down the efficiency of the government purchase system.