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1	From the viewpoint of The New Institutional Economics A study on Government Purchase Institutional Change Chiu, Chan-Fu 08 August 2002 (has links) Abstract Based on the latest concepts of economics, this study is aimed at the evolution of purchase system. At the same time, it analyzes the purchase system of the government on the basis of the theories of transaction costs and principle agency. In the purchase system of the government, there exist uncertainties in bureaucracy and firm. Due to these uncertainties as well as imperfect information and boundary rational policy-deciders, in the process of purchase, the dealers and buyers entertain the mind of opportunism. With the enactment of purchase system of the government, which specifies all kinds of procedures in order to reduce the uncertainties of dealings, and to lower cost price of dealings. The procedure of the government purchase, from the beginning of budget list to the completion of contract, has to go through the close check of councilors, public officials, bureaucratic organization and manufacturing companies. This study, depending on the theory of principle agency in a new institutional economic system, tries to understand the connection between the councilors, public officials, bureaucratic organization and manufacturing companies in the government purchase. The government purchase has to serve both political and economic purposes; therefore, while making the purchase, the government has to consider two main principles---the political fair principle and economic profit principle. That¡¦s the reason why the government will get into two dilemmas while working out a system of purchase. One dilemma that the government purchase system faces is that any purchase system cannot surely serve both political and economic purposes. Because of this, some unpreventable corrupt practices in the process of the government purchase will appear. Thus, to balance the political fair principle and the economic profit principle, the government can¡¦t help but turn a blind eye to corrupt practices. The other dilemma is that, with an eye to attaining these two purposes, the government purchase system will unavoidably cause some troubles to the society, that is, the government purchase system will tempt participants to have the motivation of seeking for renters. This study will apply some newspaper reports, court decision and official document as its data and cases of analysis. The efficiency of the government purchase has a great influence on the image of the government the enactment of the law of the government purchase can largely decrease the number of participants who seek for renters. However, the duplex purposes of politics and economy will cut down the efficiency of the government purchase system. Rent seeking Transaction cost Principle agent purchase law
2	What determines Chief Executives compensation? : An empirical study of the compensation to Chief Executive Officers in Swedish listed firms during 2007 to 2010 Lundqvist, Olivia, Michael, Erazo January 2014 (has links) Chief Executive Officers (CEO) remuneration has been a hot topic the last couple of years and has brought a great amount of attention in the media, when some companies have increased the CEO’s compensation even though the firm have been reporting lower earnings. Bonus systems have recently become more frequent to increase CEOs incentives, but have also been a disputed subject since the financial crisis in 2008. The aim of this thesis is to study the relation between CEO compensation and companies’ size as well as performance. The study extends over a four-year period, from 2007 to 2010, comprising the companies within the finance and real estate industry listed under large-, mid and small cap on NASDAQ OMX Stockholm. A four-year period from 2000 to 2003 and a three-year period after the financial crisis from 2011 to 2013 is analyzed and taken into account in the study to get a deeper understanding of how the compensation has varied over time. The study takes a quantitative approach using secondary data from the companies’ annual reports. A pooled regression analysis is used as the statistical method where we are able to take multiple companies into account over several periods. The empirical results find that there is no significant relation between CEO compensation and firm performance. The study does however show a strong positive relation with market capitalization, suggesting that the companies’ size have a great effect on the CEO compensation. CEO compensation principle-agent theory pay-for-performance resource-based theory Sweden
3	自由的行政裁量與受限的法拘束力—大法官會議解釋的個案分析 / The Impossibility of Legal Constrain on Bureaucratic Discretion: A Case Study of Supreme Court Rulings 林俞君, Lin, Yu-Chun Unknown Date (has links) 本研究透過公共選擇途徑，檢視行政機關面對主管之行政命令遭大法官會議宣告違憲後的裁量行為，藉此瞭解行政機關面對司法審查的制衡監督，將表現出哪些樣態的裁量模式；並藉由公共選擇途徑關於理性自利人的假設，以「交易」的概念連結行政與法律，以補充兩者過去缺乏交集、各說各話的現象。本研究追蹤至民國97年底為止判決行政命令違憲的解釋，共66筆。依大法官解釋是否賦予行政機關修改命令的裁量，以及命令是否修改，將66筆解釋分成四大類，並統計修改所費的時間。透過統計分析以及深度訪談，本研究發現：大法官未賦予行政機關修改裁量，雖然確能提高命令修改的比例，但是對於控制行政機關在一定的年限內完成修改卻未有顯著的結果。行政機關雖然原則上會停用違憲法規，但卻不一定願意將新的作法明文化，其間的理由包括節省修正命令的成本，或是爭取更多決策商議的機會等。縱使最後依然完成修正，「依法行政」卻不是其真正的動機；減少組織成本或政策執行成本、增加組織的正當性等才是行政機關決定修改、不修改命令，或是否在期限內完成修訂的真正理由。而大法官解釋對行政機關的制衡力量，也因為大法官作成解釋之後再無有效的監督機制而打了折扣。同時，司法審查與行政之間的制衡關係必須放在整個民主授權結構中進行理解；正因兩者關係並非處於真空環境，授權結構的資訊不對稱、多重委託與多重代理的問題，同樣會發生在司法對行政的監督關係中，因此大法官在結構上就無法完整地扮演制衡、監督行政機關的角色。基於以上發現，本研究認為司法對行政的制衡，除了司法審查制度本身以外，應當依照行政機關的偏好模式設計監督機制。包括將違憲的命令交由行政院研考會統一管考、監察院可針對行政機關延遲修正命令的行為進行糾正，並要求遭判違憲的行政命令之修正、失效與廢止皆須對外公告，避免行政機關以節省成本為由，讓法規失去扮演政府與人民之間的契約的功能。 / This research intends to answer the question of “how Supreme Court Rulings have impacts on bureaucratic discretion?” As the superior judicial review authority, Supreme Court Rulings are usually thought as an authority which bureaucrats must obey. Is it really the case? In this research, both bureaucrats and Supreme Court are seen as rational actors who have preferences over different outcomes, as the Public Choice theorists usually depict. Author utilizes public choice theory to bridge the gap between the fields of public administration and public law on the issue.. Empirically, this study collects the administrative decrees which were announced unconstitutional by Supreme Court before the end of 2008 in Taiwan. Sixty-six Supreme Court Rulings are found and categorized into four groups by two dimensions: (1) whether the grand judges give the bureaucrats discretion and (2) whether the bureaucrats follow the grand judges’ will to reform the decrees. Both secondary data analysis and in-depth interviews are used in this research to figure out bureaucrats’ preference and the way they respond to the grand judges’ decisions. The statistical result shows that after been announced unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, about 15% of the administrative decrees stay the same. The reasons for this “unresponsiveness” to the Supreme Court Rulings are varied case by case. Basically speaking, bureaucrats take laws as means to fulfill their tasks. They are not motivated to follow the rule of law if there is a requirement to pay an excessive costs to achieve the policy goals. It is interesting to know that judicial review is high on its moral ground but sometimes it is a mechanism without an administrative devises to enforce their rulings. Also, the problems of information asymmetry, multi-principle and multi-agent will also be found in the relationship between Supreme Court and bureaucrats. To sum up, on the one hand, this research has shown that to follow the rule of law is not bureaucrats’ priority. As a result, an administrative mechanism is needed to enforce the Supreme Court Rulings. For example, the Research, Development and Evaluation Commission (RDEC) of Executive Yuan or the Control Yuan can be assigned to do the job. However, on the other hand, the Supreme Court always stands on the side of protecting human rights against government activities, sometimes the rulings might lead to government activities unworkable as we can see from the cases of the Rulings 400 and 440. How to balance the issue of protecting citizen’s rights and governability of the administrative agencies is one of the key problems needed to be solved in order to realize democratic governance in the future. 大法官會議解釋行政裁量權公共選擇理論代理人理論行政命令 Supreme Court Rulings administrative discretion public choice principle-agent theory administrative decree
4	前瞻性績效衡量值運用於全權委託投資業務之經濟分析 / Economics Analysis for the Application of Forward-Looking Performance Measure to the Discretion Account Business 陳燕錫, Chen,Yahn-Shir Unknown Date (has links) 全權委託投資業務(俗稱代客操作),在證券市場中提供專業投資管理服務。我國證期會於民國81年，政策性地決定將開放此項業務。雖然整個規範體系已在民國87年建立，但它忽略掉經濟層面之考量，勢必造成全權委託投資契約無效率。目前規範體系所允許之委託報酬的計算方法，稱之為「固定佣金制度」，由於此制度無法對業者提供經濟誘因，它會引發業者有嚴重之道德危險發生。因此，為解決誘因問題，應該使用「績效佣金制度」，不過在目前股市環境下，此一制度則引入過高之風險。因此，為解決兩種制度所帶來之問題，本文提出「改良式績效佣金制度」，在此制度下，委託報酬除基於傳統財務績效衡量值外，並基於非財務性績效衡量值，本文稱之為前瞻性績效衡量值（簡稱F-LPM）。本文使用兩期之「主理人-代理人」模型，推導出最適委託報酬制度以及相關之比較靜態。在基本模式之下，本文進一步探討F-LPM之相關屬性及功能。所得結果與相關文獻一致，首先是，在最適委託報酬制度下，納入F-LPM可降低業者過度地重視短期，因而犧牲了委任人之報酬，這表示F-LPM具有增額資訊內涵。其次，無成本地提高F-LPM之精確度，可增加委任人之報酬。最後，改良式績效佣金制度優於固定佣金制度與績效佣金制度，因為它可降低風險，因而帶給委任人之報酬增加。第壹章緒論第一節 / Discretion account business provides professional investment management service in the securities market. The Securities and Futures Commission decides in policy to approve the business in 1992. Althrough the regulation system of the discretion account business has been established, it will make the advisory contract inefficient with the negligence of economic consideration. The form of advisory fees permitted by the regulation system is 'constant fee system'. Under the system, advisory contract provides no incentive and serious moral harazd will occur. In order to solve the motivation problem, 'performance fee system' should be used. Under the circumstance of Taipei securities market, however, the performance fee system will bring in high risk. Hence, this paper suggests the 'improved performance fee system' to overcome the dilemma born by the performance fee system. In the improved system, advisory fees are based on the traditional performance measure and the fordward-looking performance measure (hereafter F-LPM). With a two-period principal-agent model, this paper develops the optimal reward system and related comparative static. Following the basic model, the paper examines the attributes and function of F-LPM. The findings are consistent with the related literature. First, the inclusion of a F-LPM in reward system can mitigate the potential for the advisor to focus excessively on the short-term at the expense of the investor. That is, F-LPM is incremental informative. Second, costless increases in precision of F-LPM will lead to increase in payoffs for the inveator. Finally, the improved performance fee system is superior to the constant fee system and the performance fee system in that it can reduce risk and results in higher payoffs to the investor. 全權委託投資業務代客操作主理人-代理人模式前瞻性績效衡量值改良式績效佣金制度 Discretion account business Principle-agent model Forward-looking performance measure Improved performance fee system
5	Development Finance Institutions’ Effect on The Fund Manager’s Investment Decisions : Balancing Financial Performance Goals and Development Impact Objectives Adolfssson, Alexander, Åström, Marie January 2016 (has links) Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have played a crucial role in moving socially responsibility considerations up on the private equity industry’s agenda. DFIs add a development impact criterion to traditional financial performance goals in the investment industry and play a catalytic role by mobilizing other investors. The gap in research regarding DFIs implications and significance in the investment community from a SRI perspective is evident. The development impact objective introduced by the DFIs is examined to understand its effects on fund managers’ decision-making and if it exists a trade-off between this objective and financial performance. An understanding of how DFIs control fund managers to act in accordance to their objective as well as how they determine compensation schemes to incentivize them to pursue high return on investments, is discussed in relation to the agency theory. Furthermore, stakeholder/shareholder consideration is examined in relation to the subject. The aim of this study is to examine how the behavior of fund managers is affected by the involvement of a DFI investor and try to add to the understanding of their significance as institutional investors in developing markets. Previous studies have been more focused on determining the financial performance of socially responsible investments by using very similar quantitative data collection methods. This thesis undertakes an in-depth approach with the purpose to understand the fund manager’s drives as well as how a DFI involvement affects the behavior and decision-making process. This thesis undertook a qualitative research strategy and semi-structured interviews were used as the tool to understand the fund managers’ personals beliefs and perceptions of how the relationship with DFIs affect them. The selection criteria for the fund managers was that they needed to work in a fund in which a DFIs has invested. We also included DFI investors in order to understand their point of view. The interview was recorded, transcribed and later divided into themes in accordance with the thematic approach, following six steps. Our findings show that Development Finance Institutions plays an important role in emerging markets and affect fund manager behavior to a certain extent. They did not perceive a trade-off between financial performance goals and development impact objectives. We conclude that DFIs increase fund manager focus on ESG/SEE elements in the investment process. DFIs requirements and reporting obligations is used as a tool to ensure that the fund manager act in accordance to DFI objective. The fund managers were neither willing to sacrifice commercial return in favor of development impact. Lastly, the interest among the DFIs and commercial investors is fairly similar, hence reducing the conflict of interest between investors. DFI Development Finance Institutions MDFI SEE SRI Socially Responsible Invesments CSR NGO SIDA DEG FM SME Multiplier Effect Agent Theory Stakeholder Theory Qualitative Subjectivism Objectivism Postitivsm Intepretivism Investment Behavior Standard Asset Pricing Model ESG Sin Industries Principle-agent Theory Positivist Agent Thoery Agent Conflict Incentives Investment Behvaior Optimal contracts Descriptive Stakeholder Thoery Convergent Stakeholder Theory Stakeholder Shareholder Financial Performance Development Impact Hands-off model Direct-involvement model Affirmative Behavior Aviodance Behavior Tripple Bottom Line Agent Principle Control Fund Manager Business Administration Företagsekonomi

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