If one can do a good thing, ought one do it? In this paper, I argue that capability is a strong source of moral obligation that can, in proper doses, override things like property rights. I will build a hypothetical case based on a fictional invention called the Replicator with enormous potential for use as a humanitarian tool and I’ll use it to display the way that capability to aid imposes powerful moral obligations on both individuals and organizations. Ultimately, I will use the model that I will develop to demonstrate that some real-world entities are not satisfying their moral responsibilities with regards to aiding the global poor, and will suggests ways in which they can fulfill those obligations.

We show that replicator equations follow naturally from the exponential affine structure of the simplex known from information geometry. It is then natural to call replicator equations linear if their fitness function is affine. For such linear replicator equations an explicit solution can be found. The approach is also demonstrated for the example of Eigen’s hypercycle, where some new analytic results are obtained using the explicit solution.

It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here, we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness. (authors' abstract)

O estudo de Teoria de Jogos tem se expandido para diversas áreas, tendo sua aplicação inicial na economia, hoje é utilizado na psicologia, na filosofia e tem um papel importantíssimo na biologia evolutiva. O seu sucesso está ligado ao fato de que os jogos têm o poder de prever interações usando conceitos simples como a cooperação e a competição. Dentre os jogos há o famoso de Dilema do Prisioneiro (PD), em que indivíduos completamente racionais devem optar entre cooperar ou trair (desertar) seu companheiro de jogo. A estratégia dominante e o equilíbrio de Nash, para o PD, é a deserção mútua visto que os indivíduos são sempre tentados a não cooperar. O dilema é que eles obteriam um ganho melhor se cooperassem mutuamente. Na vida real os indivíduos se encontram em várias situações nas quais eles devem optar entre ser egoístas ou altruístas e, frequentemente, acabam optando pelo altruísmo. Mesmo com a previsão da deserção na teoria clássica dos jogos, em 1992 Nowak e May (NOWAK; MAY, 1992) mostraram que cooperação é mantida em jogos com interação espacial e evolutivos A partir dessa descoberta, estudos de jogos em diversos tipos de rede foram propostos, entre eles as redes diluídas (que possuem sítios vacantes). Nesse tipo de rede foi observado que certas densidades favorecem a cooperação, particularmente próximo ao limiar de percolação para regras de atualização estocásticas (com ruído). Porém a probabilidade de troca do Replicador, mesmo sendo estocástica, não se encaixa nesse padrão observado. Descobrimos que esse comportamento anômalo está relacionado com estruturas formadas entre buracos e desertores que impedem alguns indivíduos de ter acesso ao ruído, assim a informação não flui livremente na rede. Consequentemente o sistema fica preso em um estado congelado, que pode ser quebrado com algum tipo de perturbação. Também abordamos a relação entre o limiar de percolação por sítio e a cooperação de uma forma mais quantitativa do que já foi apresentada até então, acompanhamos o desenvolvimento da cooperação dentro dos clusters e mostramos como o limiar de percolação afeta as estruturas básicas da rede. / The study of Game Theory, having its initial application in economics, has expanded to several areas and is now used in psychology, philosophy and plays a major role in evolutionary biology. Its success is related to the fact that games have the power to predict and study interactions using simple concepts such as cooperation and competition. Among the games there is the famous Prisoner Dilemma (PD), where completely rational individuals have to choose between cooperating or betraying their game partner. The dominant strategy and the Nash equilibrium for PD is mutual desertion as individuals are always tempted to not cooperate. The dilemma is that they would get a higher payoff if they mutually cooperated. In real life, individuals find themselves in various situations where they must choose to be selfish or altruistic, and often they choose altruism. Even with the prediction of defection in classical game theory, in 1992, Nowak and May (NOWAK; MAY, 1992) showed that cooperation is maintained in evolutionary spatial games. With this discovery, the study of games on several types of networks was proposed, among them the diluted networks (which have vacant sites) In this type of lattice, it was observed that at certain densities cooperation is promoted, particularly close to the percolation threshold for stochastic updating rules. However, the exchange probability of the Replicator dynamics, despite being stochastic, does not obey this observed pattern. We found that this anomalous behavior is related to structures formed between holes and defectors that prevent some individuals from having access to noise, so information does not flow freely in the network. Consequently the system becomes trapped in a frozen state, but this state can be broken by perturbing the system. We also address the relationship between the percolation threshold and cooperation in a more quantitative way than has been presented lately, by following the development of cooperation within clusters and showing how the percolation threshold affects the basic structures of the lattice.

Investigamos analiticamente as propriedades estatísticas dos mínimos locais (estados metaestáveis) de vidros de spin de Ising com interações de p-spins na presença de um campo magnético h. O número médio de mínimos, assim como a sobreposição típica entre pares de mínimos idênticos são calculados para qualquer valor de p. Para p &#62 2 e h pequeno mostramos que a sobreposição típica qt é uma função descontínua da energia. O tamanho na descontinuidade em qt cresce com p e decresce com h, indo a zero para valores finitos do campo magnético [1]. Investigamos as correções ao alcance infinito para o caso em que h = 0 e encontramos que o número de estados metaestáveis aumenta quando o efeito de conectividade finita é considerado e esse aumento torna-se mais pronunciado à medida que p aumenta [2]. Ainda, estudamos a termodinâmica deste modelo utilizando o método das réplicas. Demos ênfase à análise da transição entre os regimes de simetria de réplicas e o primeiro passo de quebra de simetria de réplicas. Em particular, derivamos condições analíticas para o início da transição contínua, assim como para a localização do ponto tricrítico onde a transição entre os dois regimes torna-se descontínua [3]. Como aplicação de interações de ordem alta em sistemas de spins contínuos, estudamos analiticamente as propriedades estatísticas de um ecossistema composto de N espécies interagindo através de interações Gaussianas aleatórias de ordem p &#8805 2 e auto-interações determinísticas u &#8805 0. Para o caso u &#8800 0, o aumento na ordem das interações faz com que o sistema se torne mais cooperativo. Para p &#62 2 há um limite inferior para a concentração de espécies sobreviventes, prevenindo a existência de espécies raras e, conseqüentemente, aumentando a robustez do ecossistema contra perturbações externas [4]. / The statistical properties of the local optima (metastable states) of the infinite range Ising spin glass with p-spin interactions in the presence of an external magnetic field h are investigated analytically. The average number of optima as well as the typical overlap between pairs of identical optima are calculated for general p. For p &#62 2 and small h we show that the typical overlap qt is a discontinuous function of the energy. The size of the jump in qt increases with p and decreases with h, vanishing at finite values of the magnetic field [1]. We study the corrections to the infinite range model for h = 0 and find that the number of local optima increases as the effect of the finite connectivity is considered, and that this increase becomes more pronounced for large p [2]. Furthermore, we study analytically the thermodynamics of this model using the replica method, giving emphasis to the analysis of the transition between the replica symmetric and the one-step of replica symmetry breaking regimes. In particular, we derive analytical conditions for the onset of the continuous transition, as well as for the location of the tricritical point at which the transition between those two regimes becomes discontinuous [3]. As an application of high-order interactions in systems of continuous spins, we study the statistical properties of an ecosystem composed of N species interacting via random Gaussian interactions of order p &#8805 2, and deterministic self-interactions u &#8805 0. For nonzero u the increase of the order of the interactions makes the system more cooperative. We find that for p &#62 2 there is a threshold value which gives a lower bound to the concentration of the surviving species, preventing then the existence of rare species and, consequently, increasing the robustness of the ecosystem to external perturbations [4].

Random Forest (RF) is an ensemble classification technique that was developed by Leo Breiman over a decade ago. Compared with other ensemble techniques, it has proved its accuracy and superiority. Many researchers, however, believe that there is still room for optimizing RF further by enhancing and improving its performance accuracy. This explains why there have been many extensions of RF where each extension employed a variety of techniques and strategies to improve certain aspect(s) of RF. The main focus of this dissertation is to develop new extensions of RF using new optimization techniques that, to the best of our knowledge, have never been used before to optimize RF. These techniques are clustering, the local outlier factor, diversified weighted subspaces, and replicator dynamics. Applying these techniques on RF produced four extensions which we have termed CLUB-DRF, LOFB-DRF, DSB-RF, and RDB-DR respectively. Experimental studies on 15 real datasets showed favorable results, demonstrating the potential of the proposed methods. Performance-wise, CLUB-DRF is ranked first in terms of accuracy and classifcation speed making it ideal for real-time applications, and for machines/devices with limited memory and processing power.

O estudo de Teoria de Jogos tem se expandido para diversas áreas, tendo sua aplicação inicial na economia, hoje é utilizado na psicologia, na filosofia e tem um papel importantíssimo na biologia evolutiva. O seu sucesso está ligado ao fato de que os jogos têm o poder de prever interações usando conceitos simples como a cooperação e a competição. Dentre os jogos há o famoso de Dilema do Prisioneiro (PD), em que indivíduos completamente racionais devem optar entre cooperar ou trair (desertar) seu companheiro de jogo. A estratégia dominante e o equilíbrio de Nash, para o PD, é a deserção mútua visto que os indivíduos são sempre tentados a não cooperar. O dilema é que eles obteriam um ganho melhor se cooperassem mutuamente. Na vida real os indivíduos se encontram em várias situações nas quais eles devem optar entre ser egoístas ou altruístas e, frequentemente, acabam optando pelo altruísmo. Mesmo com a previsão da deserção na teoria clássica dos jogos, em 1992 Nowak e May (NOWAK; MAY, 1992) mostraram que cooperação é mantida em jogos com interação espacial e evolutivos A partir dessa descoberta, estudos de jogos em diversos tipos de rede foram propostos, entre eles as redes diluídas (que possuem sítios vacantes). Nesse tipo de rede foi observado que certas densidades favorecem a cooperação, particularmente próximo ao limiar de percolação para regras de atualização estocásticas (com ruído). Porém a probabilidade de troca do Replicador, mesmo sendo estocástica, não se encaixa nesse padrão observado. Descobrimos que esse comportamento anômalo está relacionado com estruturas formadas entre buracos e desertores que impedem alguns indivíduos de ter acesso ao ruído, assim a informação não flui livremente na rede. Consequentemente o sistema fica preso em um estado congelado, que pode ser quebrado com algum tipo de perturbação. Também abordamos a relação entre o limiar de percolação por sítio e a cooperação de uma forma mais quantitativa do que já foi apresentada até então, acompanhamos o desenvolvimento da cooperação dentro dos clusters e mostramos como o limiar de percolação afeta as estruturas básicas da rede. / The study of Game Theory, having its initial application in economics, has expanded to several areas and is now used in psychology, philosophy and plays a major role in evolutionary biology. Its success is related to the fact that games have the power to predict and study interactions using simple concepts such as cooperation and competition. Among the games there is the famous Prisoner Dilemma (PD), where completely rational individuals have to choose between cooperating or betraying their game partner. The dominant strategy and the Nash equilibrium for PD is mutual desertion as individuals are always tempted to not cooperate. The dilemma is that they would get a higher payoff if they mutually cooperated. In real life, individuals find themselves in various situations where they must choose to be selfish or altruistic, and often they choose altruism. Even with the prediction of defection in classical game theory, in 1992, Nowak and May (NOWAK; MAY, 1992) showed that cooperation is maintained in evolutionary spatial games. With this discovery, the study of games on several types of networks was proposed, among them the diluted networks (which have vacant sites) In this type of lattice, it was observed that at certain densities cooperation is promoted, particularly close to the percolation threshold for stochastic updating rules. However, the exchange probability of the Replicator dynamics, despite being stochastic, does not obey this observed pattern. We found that this anomalous behavior is related to structures formed between holes and defectors that prevent some individuals from having access to noise, so information does not flow freely in the network. Consequently the system becomes trapped in a frozen state, but this state can be broken by perturbing the system. We also address the relationship between the percolation threshold and cooperation in a more quantitative way than has been presented lately, by following the development of cooperation within clusters and showing how the percolation threshold affects the basic structures of the lattice.

Investigamos analiticamente as propriedades estatísticas dos mínimos locais (estados metaestáveis) de vidros de spin de Ising com interações de p-spins na presença de um campo magnético h. O número médio de mínimos, assim como a sobreposição típica entre pares de mínimos idênticos são calculados para qualquer valor de p. Para p &#62 2 e h pequeno mostramos que a sobreposição típica qt é uma função descontínua da energia. O tamanho na descontinuidade em qt cresce com p e decresce com h, indo a zero para valores finitos do campo magnético [1]. Investigamos as correções ao alcance infinito para o caso em que h = 0 e encontramos que o número de estados metaestáveis aumenta quando o efeito de conectividade finita é considerado e esse aumento torna-se mais pronunciado à medida que p aumenta [2]. Ainda, estudamos a termodinâmica deste modelo utilizando o método das réplicas. Demos ênfase à análise da transição entre os regimes de simetria de réplicas e o primeiro passo de quebra de simetria de réplicas. Em particular, derivamos condições analíticas para o início da transição contínua, assim como para a localização do ponto tricrítico onde a transição entre os dois regimes torna-se descontínua [3]. Como aplicação de interações de ordem alta em sistemas de spins contínuos, estudamos analiticamente as propriedades estatísticas de um ecossistema composto de N espécies interagindo através de interações Gaussianas aleatórias de ordem p &#8805 2 e auto-interações determinísticas u &#8805 0. Para o caso u &#8800 0, o aumento na ordem das interações faz com que o sistema se torne mais cooperativo. Para p &#62 2 há um limite inferior para a concentração de espécies sobreviventes, prevenindo a existência de espécies raras e, conseqüentemente, aumentando a robustez do ecossistema contra perturbações externas [4]. / The statistical properties of the local optima (metastable states) of the infinite range Ising spin glass with p-spin interactions in the presence of an external magnetic field h are investigated analytically. The average number of optima as well as the typical overlap between pairs of identical optima are calculated for general p. For p &#62 2 and small h we show that the typical overlap qt is a discontinuous function of the energy. The size of the jump in qt increases with p and decreases with h, vanishing at finite values of the magnetic field [1]. We study the corrections to the infinite range model for h = 0 and find that the number of local optima increases as the effect of the finite connectivity is considered, and that this increase becomes more pronounced for large p [2]. Furthermore, we study analytically the thermodynamics of this model using the replica method, giving emphasis to the analysis of the transition between the replica symmetric and the one-step of replica symmetry breaking regimes. In particular, we derive analytical conditions for the onset of the continuous transition, as well as for the location of the tricritical point at which the transition between those two regimes becomes discontinuous [3]. As an application of high-order interactions in systems of continuous spins, we study the statistical properties of an ecosystem composed of N species interacting via random Gaussian interactions of order p &#8805 2, and deterministic self-interactions u &#8805 0. For nonzero u the increase of the order of the interactions makes the system more cooperative. We find that for p &#62 2 there is a threshold value which gives a lower bound to the concentration of the surviving species, preventing then the existence of rare species and, consequently, increasing the robustness of the ecosystem to external perturbations [4].

At the beginning of my Master's thesis we define basic terms such as payoff, strategy, best reply and Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the population perspective, in which during a random meeting of a pair of players, these players interact according to their strategies and they receive payoffs. We define the criterion of evolutionary stability, which shows a link between payoffs in the game and strategy spreading among population. The most common description of this evolution is based on the replicator equations. We analyze their basic properties and examine the relationship between the stationary points of this system and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability. In the following practical part, we apply the introduced theory to model the Cournot duopoly. Its aim is to analyze the model characteristics in terms of evolutionary stability and to determine the duopolist's behavior in the long run.

A synthetic proto-organism could be self-assembled by integrating a lipid proto-container with a proto-metabolic subsystem and a proto-genetic subsystem. This three-component system can use energy and nutrients by means of either redox or photo-chemical reactions, evolve its proto-genome by means of template directed replication, and ultimately die. The evolutionary dynamics of the proto-organism depends crucially on the chemical kinetics of its sub-systems and on their interplay. In this work the template replication kinetics is investigated and it is found that the product inhibition inherent in the ligation-like replication process allows for coexistence of unrelated self-replicating proto-genes in the lipid surface layer. The combined catalytic effects from the proto-genes on the metabolic production rates determine the fate of the strain protocell.