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The intervention in Libya is the best example to date to judge the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. In 2011, public demonstrations started in Libya seeking political and economic reforms in the country. In return, the Libyan President Maummar Al-Qaddafi threatened mass atrocities in Libya. This allowed the UNSC to sanction the use of force against Qaddafi’s regime in order to protect civilians. First, under resolution 1970 (2011), the UNSC referred the case to the International Criminal Court and applied sanctions. Second, via resolution 1973 (2011), the application of force was approved for the express purpose of “protecting civilians.” This thesis assess whether the military intervention in Libya in 2011 was R2P case. This question is answered by an analysis based upon the UNSC’s Resolutions, Council’s proceedings, and other official documents. / May 2016

Este trabalho tem dois grandes objetivos: analisar a intervenção internacional ocorrida na Líbia em 2011 pelas perspectivas do direito internacional e das relações internacionais, e tratar da atual conjuntura do país no pós-intervenção. Quanto ao primeiro objetivo, aborda-se toda a evolução do uso da força no sistema internacional até o desenvolvimento do conceito de Responsabilidade de Proteger, que constitui o ponto de confluência da longa tradição de guerra justa, do adensamento normativo do direito internacional (sobretudo do jus ad bellum e do jus in bello), da ampliação das atribuições do Conselho de Segurança da ONU e das transformações dos conflitos armados. Após, verificam-se as resoluções aprovadas entre fevereiro e outubro de 2011, sobretudo a Resolução 1973, que autorizou o uso da força para a proteção de civis. Passa-se a estabelecer os limites jurídicos do mandato interventor, visando a determinar se as ações dos Estados mandatados se coadunaram com os parâmetros jurídicos existentes. Nesse sentido, recorre-se ao contexto político no Conselho de Segurança da ONU existente na aprovação da Resolução 1973 e no decorrer da intervenção. Conclui-se que a coalition of the willing violou a Resolução 1973 e o direito internacional ao promover mudança de regime, ao fornecer aos rebeldes armamentos ofensivos e treinamento militar, bem como ao coordenar-se com eles, ao bombardear civis, ao rejeitar propostas de paz da União Africana após a proteção a Benghazi e ao procurar derrotar militarmente o regime de Kadafi. Em seguida, estudam-se as políticas externas dos Estados-membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU em 2011, tanto suas diretrizes gerais quanto os objetivos específicos para o Oriente Médio e a Líbia. São analisadas as razões por que Estados Unidos, França e Reino Unido decidiram intervir e por que não houve vetos de Rússia e China. Quanto ao segundo objetivo, estuda-se a atual situação da Líbia, a fim de verificar as principais causas de sua presente instabilidade, bem como os fatores por que Estados mandatados pouco se comprometeram com a reconstrução do país após a intervenção. Apontam-se como fatores de instabilidade a proliferação de grupos armados fora de efetivo controle estatal, fronteiras porosas aliadas a crescimento de tráficos e contrabando, vazio institucional desde a independência, hesitante identidade nacional e constante dicotomia centro-periferia. Iniciativas de reconstrução pós-conflito tampouco constituíram norma jurídica a obrigar os Estados. Alto custo financeiro e político de missões de paz/estabilização (capacetes azuis), a exemplo daquelas no Afeganistão e Iraque, em contexto de crise econômica, falta de apoio popular nos principais Estados mandatados e entre as novas lideranças líbias contribuíram para missão da ONU de baixo perfil. Eventos na Líbia de 2011 indicam que intervenções para proteção de civis seguem lógica de maximizar benefícios pretendidos e minimizar custos (Rationality to Protect). Spillover regional da instabilidade e novas intervenções internacionais na Líbia pós-2011 seguido de Mea culpa das principais lideranças dos Estados mandatados. / This research has two objectives: to analyse the 2011 international intervention in Libya through the lenses of both international law and international relations, and to discuss Libya\'s post-intervention political process. Regarding the first objective, the historic evolution of the use of force in international law until the development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect is discussed. Responsibility to Protect is the point into which the long tradition of just war, the development of international law (especially the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello), the growing responsibilities of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of world peace and security, and the changing nature of armed conflicts converge. Also, all the resolutions passed by the UN Security Council between February and October 2011 are examined in detail, especially Resolution 1973, which authorised the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, in order to verify if the actions of the states that took part in the intervention were consistent with the existing legal parameters. In this regard, the political context of the UN Security Council when Resolution 1973 was passed and during the intervention is taken into consideration. It is therefore concluded that the coalition of the willing violated Resolution 1973 and international law by promoting regime change, by sending weapons to the rebels, by training and coordinating with them, by bombing civilians, by rejecting the African Union peace overtures after Benghazi was secured, and by pursuing the military defeat of Gaddafi\'s forces. Moreover, the foreign policies of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are analysed, including the strategies concerning the Middle East and North Africa, as well as those concerning Libya in 2011. Thus, the motives that led the United States, France, and Great Britain to push for intervention, as well as those that drove Russia and China to abstain, are explained. As for the second objective, the current political situation of Libya is analysed, especially the reasons for its post-intervention instability, as well as the causes of the intervening states\' lack of commitment to post-conflict reconstruction. Libya\'s political instability derives mostly from the proliferation of armed groups that are not placed under effective government control, from porous borders, from the growth of human and drug trafficking as well as smuggling routes, from the inexistence of strong state institutions since independence, from a hesitant national identity, and from a constant dichotomy between centre and periphery. Post-conflict reconstruction does not constitute a binding legal obligation. High financial and political costs of peace/stabilisation operations, like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, economic crisis, lack of popular support in the leading members of the coalition of the willing and among new Libyan leaders contributed to a low-key UN mission. Interventions to protect civilians are influenced by political calculations of minimising risks and maximising benefits (Rationality to Protect). Libya\'s instability has spread to its neighbours and new international interventions have taken place in the country, as the leaders of the 2011 intervening states have recognised their mistakes.

Este trabalho tem dois grandes objetivos: analisar a intervenção internacional ocorrida na Líbia em 2011 pelas perspectivas do direito internacional e das relações internacionais, e tratar da atual conjuntura do país no pós-intervenção. Quanto ao primeiro objetivo, aborda-se toda a evolução do uso da força no sistema internacional até o desenvolvimento do conceito de Responsabilidade de Proteger, que constitui o ponto de confluência da longa tradição de guerra justa, do adensamento normativo do direito internacional (sobretudo do jus ad bellum e do jus in bello), da ampliação das atribuições do Conselho de Segurança da ONU e das transformações dos conflitos armados. Após, verificam-se as resoluções aprovadas entre fevereiro e outubro de 2011, sobretudo a Resolução 1973, que autorizou o uso da força para a proteção de civis. Passa-se a estabelecer os limites jurídicos do mandato interventor, visando a determinar se as ações dos Estados mandatados se coadunaram com os parâmetros jurídicos existentes. Nesse sentido, recorre-se ao contexto político no Conselho de Segurança da ONU existente na aprovação da Resolução 1973 e no decorrer da intervenção. Conclui-se que a coalition of the willing violou a Resolução 1973 e o direito internacional ao promover mudança de regime, ao fornecer aos rebeldes armamentos ofensivos e treinamento militar, bem como ao coordenar-se com eles, ao bombardear civis, ao rejeitar propostas de paz da União Africana após a proteção a Benghazi e ao procurar derrotar militarmente o regime de Kadafi. Em seguida, estudam-se as políticas externas dos Estados-membros permanentes do Conselho de Segurança da ONU em 2011, tanto suas diretrizes gerais quanto os objetivos específicos para o Oriente Médio e a Líbia. São analisadas as razões por que Estados Unidos, França e Reino Unido decidiram intervir e por que não houve vetos de Rússia e China. Quanto ao segundo objetivo, estuda-se a atual situação da Líbia, a fim de verificar as principais causas de sua presente instabilidade, bem como os fatores por que Estados mandatados pouco se comprometeram com a reconstrução do país após a intervenção. Apontam-se como fatores de instabilidade a proliferação de grupos armados fora de efetivo controle estatal, fronteiras porosas aliadas a crescimento de tráficos e contrabando, vazio institucional desde a independência, hesitante identidade nacional e constante dicotomia centro-periferia. Iniciativas de reconstrução pós-conflito tampouco constituíram norma jurídica a obrigar os Estados. Alto custo financeiro e político de missões de paz/estabilização (capacetes azuis), a exemplo daquelas no Afeganistão e Iraque, em contexto de crise econômica, falta de apoio popular nos principais Estados mandatados e entre as novas lideranças líbias contribuíram para missão da ONU de baixo perfil. Eventos na Líbia de 2011 indicam que intervenções para proteção de civis seguem lógica de maximizar benefícios pretendidos e minimizar custos (Rationality to Protect). Spillover regional da instabilidade e novas intervenções internacionais na Líbia pós-2011 seguido de Mea culpa das principais lideranças dos Estados mandatados. / This research has two objectives: to analyse the 2011 international intervention in Libya through the lenses of both international law and international relations, and to discuss Libya\'s post-intervention political process. Regarding the first objective, the historic evolution of the use of force in international law until the development of the concept of Responsibility to Protect is discussed. Responsibility to Protect is the point into which the long tradition of just war, the development of international law (especially the rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello), the growing responsibilities of the UN Security Council in the maintenance of world peace and security, and the changing nature of armed conflicts converge. Also, all the resolutions passed by the UN Security Council between February and October 2011 are examined in detail, especially Resolution 1973, which authorised the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, in order to verify if the actions of the states that took part in the intervention were consistent with the existing legal parameters. In this regard, the political context of the UN Security Council when Resolution 1973 was passed and during the intervention is taken into consideration. It is therefore concluded that the coalition of the willing violated Resolution 1973 and international law by promoting regime change, by sending weapons to the rebels, by training and coordinating with them, by bombing civilians, by rejecting the African Union peace overtures after Benghazi was secured, and by pursuing the military defeat of Gaddafi\'s forces. Moreover, the foreign policies of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council are analysed, including the strategies concerning the Middle East and North Africa, as well as those concerning Libya in 2011. Thus, the motives that led the United States, France, and Great Britain to push for intervention, as well as those that drove Russia and China to abstain, are explained. As for the second objective, the current political situation of Libya is analysed, especially the reasons for its post-intervention instability, as well as the causes of the intervening states\' lack of commitment to post-conflict reconstruction. Libya\'s political instability derives mostly from the proliferation of armed groups that are not placed under effective government control, from porous borders, from the growth of human and drug trafficking as well as smuggling routes, from the inexistence of strong state institutions since independence, from a hesitant national identity, and from a constant dichotomy between centre and periphery. Post-conflict reconstruction does not constitute a binding legal obligation. High financial and political costs of peace/stabilisation operations, like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, economic crisis, lack of popular support in the leading members of the coalition of the willing and among new Libyan leaders contributed to a low-key UN mission. Interventions to protect civilians are influenced by political calculations of minimising risks and maximising benefits (Rationality to Protect). Libya\'s instability has spread to its neighbours and new international interventions have taken place in the country, as the leaders of the 2011 intervening states have recognised their mistakes.

Both interventionist and anti-interventionist scholars have advanced the view that the 2011 Libyan conflict probes the need to establish an international organisation to settle disputes between nations with a view to maintaining international peace and security. Ironically, 67 years after the founding of the United Nations, post-colonial African states remain deeply troubled and affected by conflicts that are often exacerbated by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. The 2011 Libyan conflict was not a war for democracy; rather, it represented and demonstrated clearly the asymmetrical relations between Africa and Europe. This study therefore, is anchored on the thesis that the Western Countries—especially Britain and France—within the UNSC ignore the values that are embodied in the Treaty of Westphalia which established state sovereignty. Some Permanent five (P5) members of the UN were typically insensitive to Libya’s sovereignty and to the creed of democracy and this inevitably undermined the national security of the state in favour of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ clause. The outsourcing of the UNSC’s mission, among other things, in Libya to ensure ‘international peace and security’ to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was a critical reason for the loss of human lives and values in the 2011 Libyan pogrom. The introduction of a no-fly zone over Libya and the use of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) contained in UNSC Resolution 1973 clearly stoked the conflict in Libya in order to further the political and pecuniary interests of some of the P5 members. The involvement of NATO and the attendant bombing campaign in Libya served to undermine the militarily weak continent of Africa in its effort to broker peace under the umbrella of the African Union (AU). In order to secure these political and economic interests, the NATO jet bombers declared war against a sovereign UN member state and openly participated in the eventual overthrow and death of the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. In essence, this study underscores that the use of Responsibility to Protect in Libya was orchestrated at the highest level of international politics to justify external interference and ultimately, to secure regime change in Libya. The net effect of the outcome of the 2011 Libyan conflict is the post-war imperial control of Libya’s natural resources facilitated by the National Transition Committee established by these imperial forces. The extent of the damage caused by the UN-backed NATO intervention in Libya is also the result of the collective failure of the African Union to assert itself in the Libyan situation. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2013.

Denna uppsats har som syfte att besvara frågeställningen: Vilken roll spelade det humanitära inslaget som en motiverande faktor för Sveriges deltagande i Libyenkonflikten mellan den 2 april 2011 och den 24 oktober 2011? Fallstudie: Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:81. Detta kommer att göras genom att olika analysmetoder appliceras på de tal som finns representerade i Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:81. De analysmetoder som används är politisk diskursanalys (PDA), kvalitativ innehållsanalys, samt kritisk diskursanalys (CDA). Genom utförandet av dessa kommer uppsatsen att besvara i vilken utsträckning riksdagsledamöter använde humanitära aspekter i sin debatt om Sveriges beslut att delta i den internationella militära interventionen med namn Resolution 1973. Genom att utföra en PDA och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys kan vi finna de viktigaste argumenten samt påståendena för dessa i texten Riksdagens protokoll 2010/11:81. Därefter kommer en CDA att genomföras. Genom att göra detta kan den debatt som analyseras samt det resultat vi kom fram till genom utförandet av en PDA och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys placeras i en kontext. På så sätt kan en bedömning av politikernas argument och påståenden som de använde för att motivera Sveriges deltagande i Libyenkonflikten även granskas och jämföras med den kontext som rådde innan och under tidpunkten för debatten. Genom PDA och en kvalitativ innehållsanalys kommer uppsatsen att fastställa att de humanitära aspekterna var av stor betydelse och var den främsta motiverande faktorn i debatten om Sveriges deltagande i Libyenkonflikten. Genom implementeringen av en CDA kommer denna debatt att sättas i en kontext. En kontext där en stor mediakampanj mot den dåvarande Libyska ledaren Muammar Gaddafi skedde, och där flera framstående politiker tycktes påverka FN att implementera Skyldigheten att skydda (R2P) och interventionen mot Libyen, Resolution 1973. Baserat på debatten och den offentliga information som finns tillgänglig verkade det som att media, samt högt uppsatta politiker var en bidragande faktor till Resolution 1973. Därmed verkar det som att olika maktrelationer starkt påverkade den politiska arenan och de politiska beslut som togs i och med Libyenkonflikten 2011.