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<p>Special interest money enters politics in a number of ways: Politicians solicit contributions that help in their election campaigns; they enrich themselves while in office by accepting bribes; or, increasingly in many countries, they go through the "revolving door" and take up lucrative post-government jobs in companies that were affected by their decisions in office. The central argument I make in this dissertation is that these different types of special interest money can act as functional substitutes and that their prevalence is a strategic choice. I examine this strategic choice theoretically and empirically, and provide insights into the consequences it has for policy and voters. I focus on two main factors: First, what consequences does the legal environment have? Second, what is the effect of the political environment? </p><p>Chapter 1 lays the theoretical groundwork. I study a formal model of political competition that determines whether and how special interest money enters politics. I show that laws criminalizing bribery or restricting campaign contributions lead to substitution effects and make other types of special interest money more common, in particular the revolving door. I also study the effect of legal restrictions on equilibrium policy and demonstrate that it only moves policy towards the median voter under certain circumstances. Higher political competitiveness leads incumbents to solicit campaign contributions, whereas the absence of competitiveness provides leeway for personal enrichment.</p><p>I test the effect of the legal and the political environment on the types of special interest money empirically, using newly assembled data from the world's two largest democracies. Chapter 2 examines the effect of the degree of political competition on the choice between personal enrichment while in office and campaign spending in India. Making use of detailed mandatory asset disclosure data of state assembly members that run in consecutive elections, I show that candidates with ties to business groups increase their wealth to a higher degree when they are electorally secure. Conversely, they hold larger cash reserves, which are crucial in campaigns, the less electorally secure they are. Using a survey experiment, I show that the way special interest money is used matters to voters.</p><p>Chapter 3 asks where tougher regulations of money in politics comes from. I argue that political entrepreneurs running on an anti-corruption platform play an important role and provide a simple formal exposition of the conditions under which voters are willing to vote for them. The implications of the model are tested for one of the most successful electoral performances of an anti-corruption party of our time: the 2013 debut of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in state elections in Delhi in India. Analyzing three rounds of pre-election surveys with a total of more than 40,000 respondents and election outcomes at the polling-booth level, I provide empirical support for the central insights of the formal model.</p><p>Finally, in Chapter 4 I study the effect of stricter regulations of bribery and campaign contributions on the revolving door, exploiting regulatory variation among the 50 state legislatures of the United States. Using a series of multilevel regression models, I show that former legislators are more likely to go through the revolving door and become lobbyists in states that make politicians less dependent on campaign contributions from special interests and that make it harder to earn money while in office. This suggests that politicians' movement into the private sector upon exiting office can act as a substitute for other types of special interest money.</p> / Dissertation

This paper examines the determinants of tax lobbying report compliance and issues lobbied. Disclosure rules under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 require lobbyists to disclose the issues on which they lobby the U.S. federal government. Despite these disclosure rules, I find substantial variation in the level of compliance with the Act related to tax issues. Using a hand-collected dataset of corporate tax lobbying reports, I find that only 68.4% of these reports are fully compliant with the Act, on average. Notably, the percentage of compliant tax lobbying reports has declined significantly over time, from almost 90% compliance in 2008 to less than 50% compliance by 2017, with some rebound to about 60% by 2019. I find greater compliance when lobbying reports are filed by in-house lobbyists, by revolving door lobbyists, for lobbying activity related to the Department of the Treasury, later in the year, and with a higher tax lobbying dollar amount, and lower compliance for larger firms. Additionally, I identify that the major tax issues lobbied relate to international taxes, investment incentives, and non-income taxes. I find that lobbying reports that mention either international taxes or investment incentives are more likely to have a higher tax lobbying dollar value, suggesting they are more valuable to corporations than non-income taxes. Overall, this paper provides detailed evidence on firms’ compliance with federal disclosure laws related to tax lobbying, the nature of tax issues being lobbied, and the role of lobbyists in advocating for those issues.

中國被稱為是一個已崛起的世界大國已是不爭的事實。然而為何中國會迅速崛起，除了外在因素的配合外，最重要還是要歸功於鄧小平實施「改革開放」以來，社會知識增長，經濟蓬勃發展的緣故，其中中國政府高層對智庫及學者、專家的重視，使各項政策的出臺，在合理性、周延性、可操作性與前瞻性上大為提高應為重要成因。 毛澤東當政時期智庫幾乎不存在（尤其是文革時期）。鄧小平掌權後重建一些舊有研究機構，並陸續成立新的研究機構，是為中國現代智庫發展之濫觴。近30年來，中國官方智庫蓬勃發展，而民間智庫（尤其是政治、外交、軍事方面）卻因受政治環境的影響，出現巨大起伏變化，其後續發展值得觀察。 中國官方智庫扮演的角色頗多，與美國等西方智庫比較，其中擔任政府政策宣傳者的角色，以及作為情報機關的掩護機構，較為特殊，另外部份官方智庫已成為政府與外國「二軌」對話之主要管道。在功能上，由於中國由落後中崛起，故其發揮之功能頗為顯著，至於「旋轉門」及儲備與提供高層官員人才二項功能，由於中國遴選人才制度的關係，目前發揮有限，惟未來可望逐漸提升。 由於政治制度的不同，中國智庫相較於西方，有以下三點差異，第一、高度的壟斷性，面對民間智庫的競爭相對較少；第二、經費來源單一、量少；第三、可透過一種屬於常態卻「非正規」管道直接提供高層政策建議，發揮其影響力。 中國民間智庫因為法律註冊問題及政治信任問題，生存發展遭受挫折，針對中國特有的政治環境，吾人以為中國智庫未來可能出現以下的發展走向：一、續將部份官方研究機構改為民間（或半官方）智庫，二、調整法律註冊方式，開放民眾成立真正民間智庫。 / China, being called a rising world strong power, is an indisputable fact.Why can China rise rapidly? Apart from external factors to support its development, the most important internal factor is the social and economical grows due to the “reform and opening” policy of Deng Xiaoping. With consulting to think tanks, scholars and experts, Chinese government carry out national policy in a more rational, compre- hensive, feasible, far-sighted way. One could hardly find a think tank in Mao’s period (especially during the Cultural Revolution). After Deng came to power, he reconstructed some research institutions and established new ones, which became Chinese modern think tanks later on. China's official think tanks have acted vigorously for nearly 30 years. However, the non-official think tanks (especially in the areas of politics, diplomacy, and military) have gone through huge ups and downs with the changing of political environment. The subsequent development of the think tanks needs to be watched closely. Compared with think tanks in the West, China's official think tanks play multiple roles. They not only serve as media for government propaganda, but also act as fronts for intelligence agencies. Further- more, some of the official think tanks have served as the "dual-track" channels to communicate with foreign governments. Think tanks play important roles for China’s development in recent years. Their func- tions, however, as a “revolving door” and human power providers, are still limited. It is expected that above situation will change gradually. There are at least three differences between Chinese think tanks and the western ones. First, a high degree of monopoly- there is little competition from non-official think tanks. Second, they have a single and limited source of funding. Third, they provide policy suggestions to the government officers through normal, but "informal" channels. It is difficult to register as a “think tank” in China. Even a think tank can register legally; it’s still hard to get political trust from the government. This thesis finds that there are two possibilities for the development of Chinese think tanks in the future. First, Chinese government will transfer the government research institutes to non-official (or semi-official) think tanks. Second, Chinese government will amend the law to allow the public to set up non-official think tanks.

The word addiction is almost immediately associated with notions of drug dependency and alcoholism, and drug addiction is often referred to as a pandemic that affects individuals, families, communities and society at large. Aetiological approaches to understanding and treating addiction have changed dramatically throughout history, and currently the most contemporary approach is that of the disease model which views addiction as an illness rather than as a ‘badness’. While the underpinnings of Narcotics Anonymous’ 12 step philosophy employs non-specific drug language as it views all drugs as having the capacity to become addictive, and while it does not distinguish between the capacity for substances and certain behaviours to become addictive, activities such as overeating, having sex and gambling are yet to be classified as legitimate addictions by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR). As a result, it appears as if some confusion exists as to whether these behaviours should be classified as impulse control disorders or as genuine addictions due to the various similarities they share in common with substance based disorders. The research conducted explored how people recovering from addiction, as well as how people working with addiction understand addiction and multiple dependency, together with the factors that contribute to relapse and the ability to abstain. Various 12 Step meetings from a variety of 12 Step Fellowships were attended and members were invited to participate in the study. Ultimately seventy eight participants completed a self developed questionnaire which was utilised to assess how people recovering from addiction understood addiction and multiple dependency and the factors that contribute to relapse and the ability to abstain. Quantitative data were analysed via descriptive and inferential statistics. Furthermore twenty participants working with addiction were interviewed with the use of a semi structured interview schedule in order to explore their perceptions around addiction and the factors that contribute to relapse and sobriety. Qualitative data were analysed using thematic content analysis. Results indicated that the majority of recovering addicts and professionals working with addiction understand addiction as a disease. However, discrepancy was apparent with regards to whether or not all recovering addicts have the same disease and subsequently whether all addictions can be treated in the same manner. The above result suggested that there was no standardised, uniform way in which the disease model is understood and interpreted. Factors such as cross addiction, resistance to change and issues relating to the maintenance of change were identified as issues that contribute to relapse, while factors such as aftercare, following the 12 step programme and support were identified as the main aspects that contribute to sobriety. No statistical significance was noted between participants who had relapsed as opposed to those who had not for variables of sensation seeking, impulsivity and perceived stress (which may have been as a result of small sample size). Deeper understanding of the disease model together with broader application of it, and a focus on appropriate training and more comprehensive assessment could perhaps see a reduction in high rates of relapse and recidivism more commonly known as the ‘revolving door syndrome’.

This thesis examined the regulation of ‚revolving doors' at European Union institutions, i.e. the fluctuation of personnel between public and private sectors, which threatens the independence of public administration. It adopts the research design of exploratory case study and the methods of doctrinal legal research and qualitative document analysis to build an overview of post-employment rules imposed on public officials of the European Commission, European Parliament, Council and European Central Bank. Contrary to common conceptions, the rules are based on 'hard law' norms. Further, the types of revolving door moves which are prohibited vary among the institutions. Majority of the institutions enjoy a wide discretion in the implementation of the rules but seem to consider them as an internal matter, leaving a lot to be desired from a transparency standpoint. Lastly, a hypothesis of prioritization of revolving door risks by institutions is derived for further inquiry.

This thesis is focused on multifunctuinal building in Frenstat pod Radhostem. The building is two-storey with basement. Multifuctional building is situated in town centre near roundabout. The surrounding area consist of family houses, supermarket building and prefab housing estate. The goal was to create building that will not disturpt surrounding area with height and size and will create mirror effect on its facede. Mirror effect will show picture of nature around the building, especially of Beskydy mountains, To show Beskydy in the mirror the building has facade rotated to face these mountains. In basement of multifunctional house there is technical background and automatical parking stack. On the first floor the restaurant and cafeteria is situated also textil shop with their own background. On the second floor are situated offices.

The purpose of this study is to investigate which types of lobbying are regulated in the legislative institutions in Sweden, Great Britain, and the European Union. The study aims to investigate whether there is any connection between the perceived corruption in the country and how regulated lobbying is. This is done by analysing documents, laws, and norms and afterward comparing the different legislations. The result of this essay is that lobbying in the European Union is regulated by laws and that lobbying in Sweden and Great Britain mostly are regulated by norms. There is also a connection between the level of perceived corruption and the regulation of lobbying. The average European attitude towards perceived corruption is higher in the EU compared to the United Kingdom and Sweden.

Entre histoire du capitalisme, sociologie des élites et sociologie de l’État, cette thèse prend pour objet le rôle de la direction du Trésor – direction phare du ministère des Finances – dans la fabrique de « mondes » à la fois hybrides et intégrés d’institutions, de réseaux et d’acteurs, aux sommets du pouvoir et au croisement entre État et affaires, administration et économie, public et privé. A partir d’une enquête mêlant entretiens biographiques, base prosopographique et fonds d’archives publics et privés, elle explore les mécanismes concrets par lesquels la direction du Trésor produit du flou, du flux et de la hiérarchie au sein de ses mondes, dans une configuration historique précise (milieu des années 1960- milieu des années 1990). La thèse est organisée selon trois niveaux d’analyse des relations entre le Trésor et ses mondes. Au niveau écologique – celui des alliances – elle montre la transformation des coalitions de soutien du Trésor pour peser dans l’État, du Plan à la « place », organisant les modalités du ralliement de la direction aux réformes libérales à partir des années 1960. Au niveau institutionnel, elle analyse les échanges qui forgent la porosité entre le Trésor et ses mondes, et les contraintes institutionnelles qui leur donnent sens et forme, et montre que la direction du Trésor fonctionne alors comme une entreprise de placement. Au niveau individuel, elle analyse la construction des carrières dominantes (de la « grandeur ») au sein des mondes du Trésor, et les liens d’obligation, de cooptation et de parrainage sur lesquelles elles s’appuient. La thèse contribue, ainsi, à documenter les formes d’indifférenciation des activités qui caractérisent les sommets de l’État. / Between history of capitalism, sociology of elites and public administration, this PhD thesis explores how the French Treasury Department brings together gravitating financial institutions, networks and actors into integrated and hybrid "worlds", situated at the "heights of power" and between administration and business, public and private interests. Drawing on biographical interviews, prosopographical data and public and private archival collections, it focuses on the concrete mechanisms through which the Treasury both blurs boundaries inside its worlds, and re-create hierarchies between the agents who circulate within them. The thesis analyzes the relationships between the Treasury and its worlds at three distinct levels. At the ecological level — that of the Treasury alliances in policy-making — it highlights the Treasury’ changing coalitions of support, from the Great planning coalition of the 1950s to the "place financière" of the 1970s, and shows how this transformation helps us account for the Treasury’ embrace of financial reforms in the 1970s. At the institutional level, it analyzes how various organizational constraints at the Treasury shape exchanges between the Department and its worlds. Finally, at the individual level, it looks at the construction of dominant careers ("grandeur") inside the worlds of the Treasury, and at the interpersonal ties and decentralized logics of co-optation, patronage and moral indebtedness they draw on.