This thesis addresses the conflict traditionally found within moral philosophy between deontological and utilitarian schools of thought. Using the example of the serious moral ambivalence experienced by individuals who are deciding whether to end or continue a difficult pregnancy, it is argued that this ambivalence is the result of both absolute principles (such as the intrinsic value of human life) and outcome based considerations (such as the desire to avoid causing pain and suffering) appearing to be morally reasonable, while also being fundamentally opposed: Each course of action is at once morally defensible on the basis of its own reasonableness, and, conversely, reprehensible due to the reasonableness of the other. This lived experience of moral ambivalence is directly reflected by the tension between deontology and utilitarianism as it occurs at the moral philosophic level, where the deontological emphasis on the unconditional rightness of certain principles is seen to be at irreconcilable odds with the utilitarian emphasis on the attainment of certain ends. The thesis’ central claim is that such ambivalence strongly indicates that human morality is neither exclusively one type or the other, and that both types of moral property are in fact reasonable, and thus have moral value. It is theorised that accounting for this dual reasonableness would lead to the most accurate and helpful representation of the human moral experience – but that the philosophic ‘divide’ between the two types of principle has led to an either/or situation, which has largely prevented this sort of understanding from being developed. The thesis argues that Victorian philosopher Henry Sidgwick developed a view in which neither deontological nor utilitarian principles can be fully realised without reference to the other, precisely on the basis that both can be found to be ultimately rational. This thesis aims to revitalise that theory – represented by the term ‘Rational Benevolence’ - to show that Sidgwick reconciled the divide between absolute and end based principles in such a way that the relationship between them becomes a ‘synthesis’. In this synthesis, deontological and utilitarian concepts are both seen as essential components of morality, that combine to form a dynamic whole in which the value of each principle is both indicated and naturally limited by the value of the other, on account of their respective rationalities. It is argued that this provides a more comprehensive understanding of the reality of the human moral experience, and better moral justification for either course of action in situations of complex and sensitive ethical decision making.

Cette thèse de doctorat étudie la façon dont Nelson Goodman comprend la correction d’une projection, c’est-à-dire du passage d’un certain ensemble d’items à un ensemble plus large. Une projection est justifiée par sa conformité avec des règles générales de projections et ces règles sont justifiées par leur conformité avec des projections que nous tenons pour valides. Il suffit de décrire pour justifier : une règle est justifiée si elle peut compter comme une description des projections admises. Cette injonction à seulement décrire soulève un dilemme. Si une règle est un standard de la correction de ses cas d’application, comment peut-elle être justifiée par sa seule adéquation descriptive à l’égard de ses cas d’applications ? Si la règle n’est justifiée par rien d’autre, en quoi se distingue-t-elle d’une description de nos comportements réguliers ? Notre objet est de montrer comment Goodman pourrait surmonter ce dilemme. / This PhD dissertation examines how Nelson Goodman understands rightness of projection, i.e. the transition from a set of items to a wider one. A projection is justified by its conformity to general rules of projection and rules are justified by their conformity to some projections we consider valid. To justify, all one needs to do is to describe: a rule is justified if it can count as a description of admitted projections. Yet this call for description faces a dilemma. If a rule is a standard for rightness of its applications, how could it be justified by its sole descriptive adequacy to those cases of application? If a rule is justified by nothing else, what could distinguish it from a mere description of our regular behaviors? Our object is to show how Goodman could resolve this dilemma.