This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This thesis examines the motives, methods and successes of opposition to C. Julius Caesar in the period 60-50 leading to the outbreak of civil war in 49. An attempt has been made to distinguish between traditional and innovative methods of opposition. An evaluation of creativity levels and the social acceptability of actions has been conducted in an effort to understand adherence to moral standards in the pre-war period. In Chapter 2, opposition to Caesar in 60 and 59 is examined and found to be fierce, persistent and, despite Caesar ultimately achieving his aims, successful in a limited way. Chapter 3 examines the circumstances of 58-57. Caesar’s position was more firmly secured through the agency of Clodius’ tribunate, during which Cicero was exiled and Cato was removed from the political scene for both political and personal reasons. Examination of opposition to Caesar in Chapter 4 focuses on the period 56-54. It is demonstrated that prior to the conferences of Luca and Ravenna, opposition to Caesar was broadly undertaken by groups or individuals who fomented dissent between Crassus and Pompey in order to undermine the triumvirate as a whole. In 55 opposition to Caesar was nullified by a renewal of the triumvirate. In 54 opposition was resurgent and dominated the courts with limited success. In Chapter 5, opposition to Caesar in the period 53-50 is examined and is shown to be marked by anarchy, attempted reforms and the disintegration of the triumviral alliance. Given widespread impressions of pressure, corruption, violence and breakdown, especially in modern accounts of the period, it is suprising to discover that tactics used by Caesar’s opponents were traditional and socially acceptable for the most part, despite vehement political and personal disagreement. The will of the people was still respected by Caesar’s opponents; popular opinion in 59 was in fact the cause of opposition failure. While the Republic had suffered civil war in the opening decades of the first century BC, the state had resumed constitutional operation prior to 60. Traditional moral values and methods of gaining rank and prestige were still important and continued to be adhered to after 60. Methods of influence and social communication remained largely unchanged in the 50s, and ensured the continuity of political exchange without substantial innovation. From 56 to 54 opposition methods were opportunistic, a result of the renewal of the triumvirate. Caesar’s opponents continued to adhere to traditional political practice, despite dominance of the political machinary by the triumvirate. In 54 Caesar’s opponents gained control of the law courts, which resulted in numerous trials but no break with traditional or socially acceptable behaviour. Opposition between 53 and 50 remained traditional in most cases within an environment marked by anarchy and political stalemate, fueled by the intransigence of Caesar and Pompey who refused to recognise each others’ dignitas. The Civil War, then, was not caused by an extended period of constitutional instability. The Civil War was the result of political deadlock at the end of the 50s, motivated by the social and political inflexibility of a small group of Senators.

This research examines how, when and why the Romans assigned and defined the tasks of preparing and commanding fleets during the Republic. In doing so, it brings new evidence to bear on the wider debates about the nature of the prouincia and the institutional and administrative development of the Roman empire. The communis opinio is that a prouincia originally represented a functional “sphere of operation” that was allotted or assigned to a magistrate and that it only later developed a geographical meaning with territorial connotations through the process of “provincialisation.” This research challenges that view through an analysis of the evidence for the definition, assignment and practical use of the prouincia classis and other prouinciae connected with the command of fleets. Drawing upon and analysing the lists of administrative arrangements to be found in the “annalistic” sections of the surviving books of Livy’s History, it argues that prouinciae were defined in specific geographical and functional terms long before the development of permanent territorial empire. This offers a new perspective which points to and elucidates the flexible use of the prouincia as a means of separating magistrates and promagistrates in space or by function in space. It argues that the rationale for this was to limit conflicts between commanders over command and triumphal rights. By combining evidence from a wide range of sources after the loss of Livy’s History from 167, the research shows that the above rationale for demarcating prouinciae still applied in the first century B.C. However, it also demonstrates that there were significant changes with the assignment of vast Mediterranean-wide naval prouinciae in the first half of the first century B.C. It argues that the definition of these prouinciae was made possible by the development of a singular collective Mediterranean-wide ora maritima, which was brought about by the Romans’ increasing “acknowledgement of empire.” The negative political and institutional implications of these developments are also assessed. Finally, in discussing the above, this research also provides new insights into the role and auctoritas of the Senate, the function and freedom of magistrates, and the Romans’ conceptualisation of their empire.

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