"The opening chapter of the paper presents a literary biography of Tolkien, giving the facts of his life and a chronology of his writings. Following this biography is a consideration of Tolkien's five major works of fiction; in the second chapter are discussed his two books for children, The Hobbit and Farmer Giles of Ham, while in the third is described his epic trilogy for adults, The Lord of the Rings, comprising The Fellowship of the Ring, The Two Towers, and The Return of the King. For each book, a synopsis of plot is given, together with excerpts from current and retrospective critical reviews. The final chapter is divided into two parts. The first explores the effect of Tolkien's scholarly pursuits on his fiction, with particular emphasis on the influence of his study of etymology and Norse epic literature. In the second part his theories of imaginative writing, as brought out in his essay, 'On Fairy-Stories,' are outlined with reference to their successful application in his own work"--Introduction. / "August, 1957." / "Submitted to the Graduate Council of Florida State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts." / Advisor: Robert Clapp, Professor Directing Paper. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 96-102).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Ohio University, June, 2007. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Studien behandlar de motiv den amerikanske presidenten Ronald Reagan fann till att USA skulle intervenera på Grenada, samt hur denna motivbild skapades. Som teori användes John J Mearsheimers offensiva realism och metoden tog sin utgångspunkt i Ernesto Laclau och Chantal Mouffes diskursanalys. Materialet som undersöktes bestod av texter och uttalanden med Reagan som avsändare. I analysen visade sig både motiv tillhörande den realistiska och liberala diskursen. Den liberala diskursen var dock underställd den realistiska, vilket visade på en hegemoni för den senare.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 400-422).

I argue in this dissertation that U.S. rhetorics of national masculinity, while consistently present during the twentieth century, have changed shape in response to economic, social, and political crises. My research begins with the early twentieth-century Boy Scouts of America. It then moves to the late twentieth century, focusing on Ronald Reagan's inaugural speeches and the U.S. Army's campaign brochures, seeking to understand how U.S. national boundaries around masculinity have been drawn and redrawn according to political economies of the body. In these examples, the middle class struggles to define itself against realities of advancing capitalism that threaten the social capital of whiteness, manhood, and middle-class status.In chapter one, I present a literature review of masculinity, gender, and nationalism theories and an overview of my research methods.In chapter two, I present a rhetorical analysis of American masculinist nationalism at the turn of the 20th century, focusing on rhetoric that was used to develop boys and young men into masculine preservers of the nation, including training manuals from the Boy Scouts of America. I particularly concentrate on narratives of the formation and beginnings of the BSA. I connect the rhetoric of these narratives to the concurrent changes in Roosevelt's military goals. In chapter three, I examine how, beginning with President Ronald Reagan, the economy became rhetorically tied to ideals of freedom and democracy. I argue that the effect of this rhetorical shift has been that national projects that were formerly tied to national pride and service can now be executed through calls to improve the national economy or even one's individual economic status.In chapter four, I argue that this rhetorical shift has changed the rhetoric of Army recruiting. I analyze U.S. Army recruiting brochures and surveys to argue that masculinist nationalism in this context maintains elements from early-twentieth-century masculinity, but incorporates rhetoric of economic individualism that stems from Reagan's era.In chapter five, I draw from examples in the three analysis chapters of my dissertation to make observations about the nature of masculinist nationalism in the U.S., and suggest areas for further research stemming from my dissertation.

The international human rights instruments recognise the inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of the human family and that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person. The thesis explores the use of the phrase “inherent dignity” in the context of the catalogue of rights said to be derived from it. (For complete abstract open document)

Thesis (M.A.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1994. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-108). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (doctoral)--Lund University, 1988. / Bibliography: p. 202-215.