The goal of my thesis is to describe futures commodity contract e-mini Russell 2000 and the application of automatic trading system on this contract. Developed trading strategy is tested with technical analysis indicators using Money management for optimization. The conclusion of the thesis answers the question if modeled trading system is profitable and practically used for real trading.

In this thesis I examine three models of justification for the epistemic authority of the principle of contradiction. Aristotle has deemed the principle "that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect" the most certain and most prior of all principles, both in the order of nature and in the order of knowledge, and as such it is indemonstrable. The principle of contradiction is involved in any act of rational discourse, and to deny it would be to reduce ourselves to a vegetative state, being incapable of uttering anything with meaning. The way we reach the principle of contradiction is by intuitive grasping (epagoge) from the experience of the particulars, by recognizing the universals in the particulars encountered, and it is different from simple induction, which, in Mill's view, is the process through which we construct a general statement on the basis of a limited sample of observed particulars. Hence, the principle of contradiction, being a mere generalization from experience, through induction, loses its certainty and necessity. Even though it has a high degree of confirmation from experience, it is in principle possible to come across a counter-example which would refute it. Mill's account opens the path to the modern view of the principle of contradiction. In Principia Mathematica, Russell and Whitehead contend that the principle of contradiction is still a tautology, always true, but it is derived from other propositions, set forth as axioms. Its formulation, "~ (p & ~p)" is quite different from Aristotle's, and this is why we are faced with the bizarre situation of being able to derive the law of contradiction in a formal system which could not have been built without the very principle of which the law is an expression of. This is perhaps because the principle of contradiction, as a principle, has a much larger range of application and is consequently more fundamental than what we call today the law of contradiction, with its formal function.

Developed out of a need for a reliable methodology of documenting historic landscapes, the National Park Service uses Cultural Landscape Reports to determine the significance and integrity of historic landscapes. Treatment recommendations developed from an analysis of site history and existing conditions guide the management decisions of cultural landscapes. Russell Cave National Monument, located in Bridgeport, Alabama, contains one of the oldest continuous archeological records in North America. A cultural landscape report for the park had not yet been completed. This research consists of a historical narrative covering the 10,000 years of human occupation in the cave, a documentation of existing conditions, an analysis of historic integrity, and recommendations for management, preservation, and restoration of the landscape.

From 1962 to 1975, General Features Corporation distributed a column by traditional conservative Russell Kirk. The column appeared on the political page of newspapers across the country under the title “To The Point”.1 The column provided social commentary on a wide variety of topics ranging from foreign policy, to civil rights, to feminism. Papers that carried the column included Los Angeles Times (1962-early 1968), New Orleans Time-Picayune (late 1962-late 1971), Detroit News (early 1970-1975).2 The research for this thesis included both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources included articles housed at the Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal, Mecosta, Michigan, the University of Tennessee library, and the Sherrod library at East Tennessee State University.

This thesis is an examination of Bertrand Russell's realist "bundle theory of particulars". In Russell's earlier work, the need to explain the unity and individuality of objects compelled him to accept particulars as well as universals as ultimate kinds of reality. Nevertheless, in carrying out his efforts to economize his ontology, he discovered he could not reduce properties to particulars, because there are some relations that resist nominalistic explanation, but particulars could be reduced to bundles of qualities. In this thesis, I show that the realist 'bundle theory' not only reduces the kinds of ultimate reality to one, i.e., to universal qualities, but also serves all of the purposes for which bare particulars were originally required. Specifically. I examine what I take to be the major criticisms leveled against the realist 'bundle theory': the problem of individuation, the problem of necessity, and the problem of analyticity. I defend the strength and consistency of Russell's theory and argue that it can answer to the objections. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

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<p>Bertrand Russell is one of the grandmasters of 20^th Century Analytic Philosophy. It is surprising, then, that his work fell out of fashion later in his career. As a result, very little has been discussed concerning Russell’s work from the period of 1927 – 59. This thesis provides an analysis of Russell’s philosophical work from this era. Our attention here is on Russell’s theory of perception and the underlying metaphysical structure that is developed as a result of his scientific outlook. Russell’s philosophy during this time focused almost exclusively on perception, knowledge, and the epistemic relationship humans have with the world according to science. It is these topics that are engaged with and explicated. We discover that, due to Russell's outright acceptance of that conclusion found in physics, metaphysically he defends a four-dimensional neutral monist event ontology; perceptually he defends a causal theory where one's perceptions must be understood as only being of one's brain; and epistemically he is a fallibilist, wherein justification can be found in a coherent set of beliefs founded on intrinsically credible individual propositions, but knowledge itself is ultimately a vexed and imprecise concept.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

<p>This thesis is divided into two parts: the Theory of Items, and the Theory of Contexts. The latter is a further elaboration of the former.</p> <p>In the first chapter I argue against the classical doctrine of ontological-referential theory. This classical position may be represented by Russell's and by Quine's position on nonexistent objects.</p> <p>The first position that I propose to reject is the view that in order to say anything true about an object its name or description must have an actual reference. This view is represented by Russell's proposition *14.21: t-:Ψ (rx)(øx) .->. E!(rX)(øx) on which Russell writes: "This proposition shows that if any true statement can be made about (1x)(øx), then (1x)(øx) must exist". (Principia Mathematica)</p> <p>The Theory of Items rejects this view and states that whether a statement about a certain object is true or is false does not depend on the ontic status of that object. Thus, consequently, a true statement about nonexistent objects can be made (without making a distinction between a secondary and a primary occurrence as Russell did).</p> <p>The second position that is to be rejected is the view that nonexistent objects are mere nothings. This is represented by one of Quine's theorems that nonexistent objects are simply empty sets. *197 t- r -(Eβ) (α) (α=β. ≡ ø) ->. (1α)ø = 9¬</p> <p>(Mathematical Logic). For the Theory of Items, nonexistent objects are not nothings, they are somethings for they can be said to have any property whatsoever. Thus if we may have a set that contains existent objects, then we may also have a set that contains nonexistent objects. Nonexistent objects are just as much 'items' as existent ones; this is the reason why I call the theory being proposed here the 'Theory of Items' and not the Theory of Objects. The word 'item' is used instead of 'objects' to indicate the ontic neutrality of the matter that we are talking about.</p> <p>In the second chapter I will present various examples of the classical view and I will try reply to their arguments in the light of the Theory of Items explained previously.</p> <p>In the third chapter I will discuss the Theory of Contexts. I will argue that semantical features (truth and falsity) should be assigned to various statements about various items (existent or nonexistent). I maintain that the assignment of a truth value is very much context-dependent. The characteristics of contexts and various rules that iv. govern them will be discussed. More attention will be given to the fictional items and fictional contexts for no doubt they present some peculiar problems. For example if a fictional item x in a story C1 has a feature that-p, and the same item in a different story C2 has a feature that--~p, then can we validly conclude that the fictional item x is both p and ~p? My argument is based on the analysis of contexts. Only by presenting a satisfactory theory of contexts can that problem (and many other paradoxes) be solved.</p> <p>This thesis is far from being complete. There are some important topics that I do not discuss (due to page and time limitation). For example the problems of: significance and nonsignificance; whether we should take a three value logic (by incorporating significance as the third value) instead of the classical two value system; consistencies; and a possible formal theory for the Theory of Contexts. The last two of these problems are stated very briefly in the Appendix.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

The aim of the present study is to demonstrate the nature of the relation of Russell's political philosophy to the other areas of his work, both popular and professional. The nature of the relation can be demonstrated, however, only if two premises are accepted: (1) that Russell has a political philosophy, and (2) that his political theory is related to the other branches of his philosophy. [...]

Univ., Diss.--Oldenburg, 2007.