This thesis characterizes how a mergers profitability and efficiency are affected by its size and by its scale economy factor d in a Cournot market with linear demand and quadratic costs. Our results allow us to challenge the widely believed view among economists that mergers typically are not profitable for the insiders (merged firms). In contrast to the minimum of 80% pre-merger market share required for the insiders to be profitable in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), our model shows that mergers with much less market share are also profitable. It is worth noting that in the market with diseconomies of scale (i.e., d>0), any two-firm merger could be profitable as long as its scale economy factor is greater than the critical value which is solely determined by the market size n. Our results also allow us to provide useful implications for antitrust laws especially the horizontal merger policy. In our model, mergers with economies of scale (i.e., d>-2 and d<0) and with more than 50% combined pre-merger market share are beneficial to both public interest and merging firms. This observation implies that even monopolies in this market could contribute positively to social welfare. This result is different from what Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) have obtained in their papers that only mergers with less than 50% pre-merger market share are both profitable and efficient. Although mergers generally raise price, we find that mergers can also lower price and expand output if and only if they enjoy substantial economies of scale.

This thesis characterizes how a mergers profitability and efficiency are affected by its size and by its scale economy factor d in a Cournot market with linear demand and quadratic costs. Our results allow us to challenge the widely believed view among economists that mergers typically are not profitable for the insiders (merged firms). In contrast to the minimum of 80% pre-merger market share required for the insiders to be profitable in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), our model shows that mergers with much less market share are also profitable. It is worth noting that in the market with diseconomies of scale (i.e., d>0), any two-firm merger could be profitable as long as its scale economy factor is greater than the critical value which is solely determined by the market size n. Our results also allow us to provide useful implications for antitrust laws especially the horizontal merger policy. In our model, mergers with economies of scale (i.e., d>-2 and d<0) and with more than 50% combined pre-merger market share are beneficial to both public interest and merging firms. This observation implies that even monopolies in this market could contribute positively to social welfare. This result is different from what Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) have obtained in their papers that only mergers with less than 50% pre-merger market share are both profitable and efficient. Although mergers generally raise price, we find that mergers can also lower price and expand output if and only if they enjoy substantial economies of scale.

一、本論文共計壹冊，約五萬字，計分六章，十八節。 二、內容提要： 第一章：緒論 第一節 研究動機與研究目的 第二節 研究範圍及研究程序 第三節 研究架構 第二章：規模經濟理論之探討 第一節 規模經濟文獻之檢討 第二節 規模經濟之來源 第三節 規模不經濟之來源 第四節 規模經濟之測度方法 第三章：產業介紹及問題發掘、研究方向 第一節 產業介紹 第二節 問題發掘 第三節 研究方向 第四章：實際生產成本法理論之介紹 第一節 實際生產成本法之介紹 第二節 排隊理論 第三節 存貨理論 第五章：分析模式的建立與研究限制 第一節 分析模式的建立 第二節 資料之分析 第三節 研究限制 第六章：研究結果及建議 第一節 研究結果 第二節 研究建議

彈性製造系統（FMS ）的目的，在使得以往高成本、低生產力之小量批次生產方式， 得以變得更經濟、更有效率。它包含了自動搬運系統、機械臂、數值控制機器及橧級 式的電腦控制系統等，因此就公司立場而言，彈性製造系統的構建，不僅是一項重大 的資本支出，同時也有其策略性涵意，因為它使得在不損及產品品質的情況下，低成 本的競爭方式變得更有可能。因此本研究乃由規模經濟的觀點探討彈性製造系統的引 進時機，並以模擬的方式做為衡量彈性製造系統產出積效的基礎。全文共分五章：第 一章緒論：包含有研究問題、研究意義及其限制。 第二章文獻探討：對以往有關規模經濟及彈性製造系統之研究，作一系統式的回顧。 第三章研究方法：以過去之研究做為理基礎，據以提出本研究之架構。包括有輸入、 輸出變項，及其間之處理原則與假設。 第四章模式使用範例：以一假想公司情況，代入模擬模式評估其績效，並以等候線理 論求得其規模經濟量，做為公司決策時之參考依據。 第五章：結論與建議：對於本研究之重要發現提出綜合說明，並對後續研究方向提出 建議。