Inaug.-Diss.: Theologische Fakultät: Trier: 1971. _ Bibliogr. p. XI-XIV.

Thesis advisor: Eileen C. Sweeney / This work aims to initiate a comprehensive and definitive account of St. Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of the principle of the individuation of substances of a common species, which adds some sort of "quantity" or "dimensions" to the Aristotelian account of matter as the principle of individuation. After laying out the interpretative problem in its entirety through a review of the Scholastic and modern traditions of commentary, I determine the first step on the path to its solution, and take that first step by offering a properly limited interpretation of the account set forth in Question 4, article 2 of the Expositio super librum Boethii De trinitate. I argue that this text presents a sapiential metaphysical account of the principle of individuation informed by a properly metaphysical understanding which it leaves implicit. St. Thomas resolves the ratio of the numerically individual composite substance of a species as apprehended by the logician to its first per se principle, defined as "matter under dimensiones interminatae." As individuating, the dimensiones interminatae do not belong to the accidental category of quantity, but are merely a dimensional continuum, a certain composite of a potency--the parts of dimensions, which can be united or divided--and the unifying act of situs, the "order of the parts in the whole," or beginning-middle-end structure, by virtue of which the dimensions possess in themselves the ratio of the numerical individual. In each of these respects, the dimensions qualify the potency of the matter subject to them. Qua potency, the dimensiones interminatae qualify matter's intrinsic potency for unity with form in the substance as a whole by restricting its scope in the real order. Qua act, they qualify this complex restricted potency in a merely rational manner, rendering its restricting potency (i.e., that of the dimensional parts for situs) actual, and thus they make the complex restricted potency of matter intelligible, possessed of the ratio of the numerical individual. Accordingly, matter under dimensiones interminatae is this (and not that) matter, one unified principle belonging to the category of substance. In the properly metaphysical understanding of individuation which underlies the explicit account given in Question 4, article 2 of the Expositio, matter is understood as the potency for the corruptibly contingent mode of the act of substantial existence. Being subjected to the restricting potency of the dimensiones interminatae renders matter thus considered a principle of contingency, in the real order, in respect of divisibility. As before, this complex restricted potency is rendered partially actual in the rational order, and thus the ground of the ratio of the numerically individual substance qua being, by the dimensiones interminatae according to the act of situs. In this way, matter is constituted as this matter, this potency for the corruptibly contingent mode of existence, and not that matter--or in other words, it is constituted as numerically individual matter, the first per se principle of individuation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on Feb 18, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Thesis advisor: Dr. Nathaniel DesRosiers. Includes bibliographical references.

No description available.

Dans son livre de 1927, La Structure de l’âme et l’expérience mystique, le dominicain Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931) a proposé une interprétation forte des textes de Thomas d’Aquin sur la connaissance de l’âme par elle-même, lui permettant de penser, selon une analogie de structure, une connaissance immédiate et expérimentale de Dieu. La présente thèse est un travail de vérification critique, sur l’oeuvre même de Thomas et à travers les diverses noétiques thomistes, de la valeur heuristique d’une telle interprétation. Nous dégageons d’abord la perspective métaphysique qui fut celle de Gardeil pour reconnaître dans la connaissance habituelle de l’âme humaine en tant qu’esprit (mens), une structure d’immédiate intelligibilité à soi, fondant toute perception expérimentale et actuelle de soi, mais demeurant en puissance. Nous confrontons ensuite l’herméneutique d’A. Gardeil à celle d’un autre thomiste, M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (1883-1934), qui insista au contraire, en une correspondance inédite que nous publions, sur la nécessaire médiation des actes objectifs d’intellection dans la connaissance de l’âme par elle-même. Pour comprendre ce conflit thomiste des interprétations, nous remontons alors, comme Gardeil, à l’herméneutique que Thomas proposa lui-même des réflexions trinitaires d’Augustin sur l’esprit (mens), sa connaissance (notitia) et son amour (amor). Enfin, reprenant le questionnement philosophique de D. Dubarle (1907-1987), nous examinons si l’analogie entre connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu, discernée par Gardeil chez Augustin et Thomas, permet de relever le puissant défi de Kant, et de faire place, en thomisme, à une expérience de Dieu réelle et immédiate. / In his 1927 study, The Structure of the Soul, the Dominican Ambroise Gardeil (1859-1931) delivered a powerful interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ works on the knowledge of the soul through the soul itself, thus enabling him to fathom, by structural analogy, an immediate and experimental knowledge of God. The following thesis endeavours to critically examine, through the works of Thomas and diverse thomistic noetics, the heuristic value of such an interpretation. We will first identify the metaphysical perspective that allowed Gardeil to recognize in the habitual knowledge of the human soul as mind (mens) a structure of immediate selfintelligibility, founding all experimental and actual perception of self, yet remaining in potency. We will then confront Ambroise Gardeil’s hermeneutics to those of another thomist, M.-D. Roland-Gosselin (1883-1934), who, in a previously unedited correspondence that we are publishing, insisted on the necessary mediation of objective acts of intellection in the knowledge of the soul through the soul itself. In order to understand this thomistic conflict of interpretation, like Gardeil we will rely on the hermeneutics that Thomas himself proposed on Augustine’s trinitarian considerations on the mind (mens), his knowledge (notitia) and his love (amor). Finally, drawing upon D. Dubarle’s (1907-1987) philosophical interrogation, we will examine whether the analogy between knowledge of self and knowledge of God that Gardeil detected in Augustine and Thomas, can address Kant’s compelling challenge and grant in Thomism a real and immediate experience of God.

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 88 p. : ill. (some col.), maps (some col.). Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-86).

Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Écon.--Bordeaux, 1996. / Bibliogr. p. 199-206.

In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.

O presente estudo propõe uma análise sobre o tema da usura no pensamento de São Tomás de Aquino de forma a determinar sua aplicabilidade à questão dos juros remuneratórios tal qual se apresenta hodiernamente no Direito Brasileiro. Inicialmente a concepção de Aquino é avaliada à luz da tríplice base que a compõe: a Lei Natural, segundo a qual se considera a esterilidade do dinheiro e a justiça natural; a Lei Humana, tida aqui como o Direito Romano, do qual se absorve a noção de fungibilidade do dinheiro e a conceituação dos contratos de mútuo; e a Lei Divina, tomada por São Tomás de forma a corroborar aquilo que se depreende das demais leis. Na sequencia, a problemática dos juros e da sua extrapolação usurária é avaliada no âmbito do ordenamento jurídico pátrio, tanto sob o prisma de sua evolução histórica quanto das discussões que envolvem a matéria em nossos dias. Finalmente, partindo de uma conceituação de juros e usura compatível com o pensamento do Doutor Angélico, avaliaremos o que viria a determinar o preço justo nos contratos de mútuo financeiro com vistas a estabelecer parâmetros indicativos para a limitação das taxas de juros no Direito Brasileiro, tanto nas operações praticadas no âmbito civil quanto naquelas contratadas junto ao Sistema Financeiro Nacional / This study proposes an analysis of the theme of usury in the thinking of St. Thomas Aquinas to determine its applicability to the question of compensatory interest as it is now understood under Brazilian Law. Initially Aquinass concept is evaluated in the light of its triple base: Natural Law, which considers the sterility ofmoney and natural justice; Human Law, seen here as Roman Law, from which the notion offungibility of money and the conceptualization of mutuum agreements are derived; and Divine Law, taken by St. Thomas as a means of corroborating what is deduced from the other laws.Next, the critical issues involving interest and their usurious extrapolation are evaluated in the sphere of our national legal system, from both the perspectives of its historical evolution and of the discussions that involve the subject today. And finally, beginning with an appraisal of interest and usury compatible with the thinking of the Angelic Doctor, we will evaluate what woulddetermine the just price in mutuum contracts,seeking to establish parameters for an eventual limitation ofinterest rates in Brazilian Law, both in transactions involving non-banking entities and in those contracted within the National Financial System.

Thesis (M. Div.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, Crestwood, N.Y., 2003. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 62-65).