A consistent feature of Saul Bellow???s fiction is the protagonist???s encounter with one or more teaching figures. Dialogue with such individuals prompts the Bellovian protagonist to reject his current state of selfhood as inadequate and provokes him to re-form as a new person. The teacher figure offers a better self to which the protagonist is attracted; or, more frequently in Bellow, the protagonist is repelled by both his teacher and his own current state to form a new, previously unrepresented self. This thesis argues that Bellow???s self inherits and modifies the perfectionist philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau, in a literary reinterpretation that parallels Stanley Cavell???s philosophical revaluation of the American Transcendentalists. In Emerson and Thoreau, and in Cavell???s reading of perfectionism, the self is attracted onward only by a better representation of selfhood in another, while Bellow???s self may also be, and often is, provoked by a repellent other to inhabit a new form of selfhood. This thesis takes the evolution of selfhood in Bellow to be structured by travel. In The Adventures of Augie March, Augie???s movement between selves is impelled by conversation with teacher figures and paralleled by his unending journeys. In Herzog, Herzog???s self-transformations and travels are provoked by reading and writing, and by the ecstasy of loss revealed to him through apostrophic conversations with the dead and absent in a series of unsent and mental letters. Letter-writing, the provocation for Herzog???s self-perfection, becomes a form of travel in Herzog. This thesis further argues that Bellow???s travelling self is a critical response to two poles of modern subjectivity, structured by European mythologies of travel: Bellow???s fiction is critical, first, of a Hegelian, egoist mode of selfhood structured after the Odyssey; but equally critical of examples of Levinasian openness to the Other, patterned on Abraham???s exile. Bellow does not accept either the Odyssean or the Abrahamic mode of selfhood on its own, recognizing oppressive possibilities in both. Travelling selfhood in Bellow, initiated by conversation with others, both fuses and rereads Odyssean and Abrahamic constructs within a new, but perpetually unfinished American mode of selfperfection.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Delaware, 2007. / Principal faculty advisor: Robert E. Lyons, Dept. of Plant & Soil Sciences. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Cover title. Includes bibliographical references (leaf 158-159).

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciado en Lengua y Literatura Hispánica. / La hipótesis de trabajo estará destinada a demostrar que los sujetos en los dos cuentos a analizar se construyen bajo una permanente relación de interdependencia con el otro y lo otro, mediante diversos estados de desidentificación respecto a sí mismos, así como una identificación con ese otro que serán.

The biblical story of Saul in 1 Samuel contains evidence of a tragic vision which has two central features. First, tragic themes are introduced and developed by means of multiple repetitions or typescenes in which the subsequent account emphasizes the tragic nature of the events described in the first. Second, the development of tragic themes is facilitated by the portrayal of the deity's ambivalence in enduring two kings simultaneously, terrorizing Saul with an evil divine spirit and sending a good spirit on David. The tragic vision in the Saul narrative has been perceived by Alphonse de Lamartine, and his drama Saül: Tragédie is an attempt to dramatize the events of 1 Samuel. The significant similarities and differences in plot and characterization between Lamartine's drama and the biblical narrative draw attention to the tragic themes in the anterior text and offer a new conception of Saul's suffering in the posterior text. Lamartine has borrowed from Greek tragic form as well as 1 Samuel for thematic materials and tragic devices. The deity is off-stage, as in much Greek drama, but the characters infer divine intervention in human affairs. Thomas Hardy also became fascinated with the story of Saul and in The Mayor of Casterbridge he has structured the relationship between Henchard and Farfrae on the relationship between Saul and David. There are similarities in both plot events and in characterization, but the most significant departure from the biblical material is the absence of the deity, which colours the tragic vision very differently, and idea of the supernatural is also of great significance in the novel. Hardy's novel displays evidence of the influence of Greek tragedy in plot and in theme. Also crucial to the novel are the role of fate and the sociological theme.

The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.

abstract: This research concentrates on the five sonatinas for piano by Walter Saul. It consists of a recording and a document providing musical analyses and performance guides to these sonatinas. The purpose of the research is to introduce Walter Saul’s five sonatinas, composed from 1998 to 2015. Walter Saul is a gifted living American composer and pianist. He has written a quantity of piano music intended for study by young performers. His five sonatinas, in traditional sonata forms, use a variety of compositional techniques, including twelve-tone rows, jazz elements, modulations, modes, scales, and contrapuntal procedures. Performers may find that the analyses in this document are useful in understanding these pieces. The guides are likewise provided to teachers and students studying these pieces. This paper consists of six chapters. It begins with an introduction in Chapter 1; Chapter 2 presents a biography of Walter Saul; Chapter 3 observes characteristics of Walter Saul’s piano music; Chapter 4 deals with background of the five sonatinas; Chapter 5 provides performance guides including simple analyses; Chapter 6 arrives at a conclusion. / Dissertation/Thesis / APPENDIX B: A RECORDING OF FIVE PIANO SONATINAS OF WALTER SAUL BY AHYEON YUN, PIANO / Doctoral Dissertation Music 2017

Made available in DSpace on 2013-08-07T18:55:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 000446385-Texto+Parcial-0.pdf: 380103 bytes, checksum: b183f9c581926e63b6421a4fd95fb3cb (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / This work intends to discuss a problem very recent in philosophy of language, namely the problem of the normativity of meaning. The fundamental locus of discussion is the position of Saul Kripke in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, whose main ingredient is the idea that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion. Several philosophers have assumed this position as a kind of pre-theoretical restriction to assess reasonable theories, discarding all those that cannot accommodate, somehow, the “restriction of Kripke”. What animates the contemporary debate about this is precisely the possibility of disposing a descriptivist and naturalistic approach of meaning, based on the claim that such approaches fail or offer a plausible explanation of the relevant sense of normativity or fail to ensure a reasonable criterion for semantic correctness. The overall goal of this work is to show that, from the position of Wittgenstein in the Philosophical Investigations, it is not necessary to assume such a restriction, since in many ways it does seem to contradict our ordinary intuitions about the notions of “meaning” and “use”. This study aims to show, in other words, that the restriction of normativity is particularly harmless to a semantic model naturalized. The general strategy would be to deny the hypothesis that meaning is an intrinsically normative notion and show that its relevant normative aspects can be immediately derived from certain basic regularities of use. / O presente trabalho pretende discutir um problema bastante recente em filosofia da linguagem, a saber: o problema da normatividade do significado. O lócus fundamental da discussão é a posição de Saul Kripke exposta em Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, cujo ingrediente principal é a ideia de que o significado é uma noção intrinsecamente normativa. Diversos filósofos têm assumido esta posição como uma espécie de restrição pré-teórica para avaliar teorias razoáveis, descartando todas aquelas que não possam acomodar, de algum modo, a “restrição de Kripke”. O que anima o debate contemporâneo a este respeito é justamente a possibilidade de inviabilizar qualquer abordagem descritivista e naturalista do significado, com base na alegação de que tais abordagens ou não conseguem oferecer uma explicação plausível do sentido relevante de normatividade ou não conseguem garantir um critério razoável de correção semântica.O objetivo geral deste trabalho é mostrar que, a partir da posição de Wittgenstein nas Investigações Filosóficas, não é absolutamente necessário assumir tal restrição, já que em múltiplos sentidos ela parece mesmo contradizer nossas intuições ordinárias a respeito das noções de “significado” e “uso”. Este trabalho pretende mostrar, em outras palavras, que a restrição de normatividade é particularmente inofensiva para um modelo de semântica naturalizada. A estratégia geral consistirá em negar a hipótese de que o significado seja uma noção intrinsecamente normativa e mostrar que seus aspectos normativos relevantes podem ser imediatamente derivados de certas regularidades básicas de uso.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Gradução em Filosofia, 2012. / Submitted by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza (jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2012-09-18T14:51:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_MaysaMariaMassimoRibeiro.PDF: 909108 bytes, checksum: ae3f93fdee1bb71ce74d516ce3fe7bd2 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza(jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2012-09-18T14:52:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_MaysaMariaMassimoRibeiro.PDF: 909108 bytes, checksum: ae3f93fdee1bb71ce74d516ce3fe7bd2 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T14:52:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2012_MaysaMariaMassimoRibeiro.PDF: 909108 bytes, checksum: ae3f93fdee1bb71ce74d516ce3fe7bd2 (MD5) / Na presente dissertação, apresenta-se, no primeiro capítulo, o paradoxo do cético de Wittgenstein que, segundo Kripke, seria o problema fundamental das Investigações Filosóficas, e estabelece que nenhum curso de ação pode ser determinado por uma regra, pois não se pode garantir que o aprendizado de uma regra no passado pode determinar o comportamento consoante a mesma regra no futuro. Posteriormente, apresenta-se o que seria, para Kripke, a solução ao paradoxo, que reside no argumento contrário à linguagem privada, passando pela mudança no pensamento de Wittgenstein, a partir da comparação entre suas obras Tractatus e Investigações Filosóficas. Nas Investigações, Wittgenstein teria rejeitado a visão realista do Tractatus de que a forma de explicação da significação advém da declaração das condições de verdade de uma frase, substituindo-a por uma visão que salienta mais o papel normativo da linguagem. Nesse sentido, destaca-se o conceito de condição de justificação, introduzido por Kripke em substituição às condições de verdade na declaração da veracidade ou falsidade de uma frase. Sob esse cenário, a solução ao paradoxo seria indagar quais circunstâncias efetivamente permitem a emissão de afirmações e qual o papel prático que essa permissão exerce. A justificação da obediência a uma regra só seria possível se considerado o contexto no qual tal regra e a pessoa que irá obedecer-lhe estão inseridas, ou, segundo Wittgenstein, uma regra só terá conteúdo substantivo se considerada dentro de seu jogo de linguagem, daí a não possibilidade de se seguir uma regra “privadamente”. No segundo capítulo do trabalho, apresentam-se posicionamentos contrários e favoráveis à interpretação dada por Kripke ao pensamento de Wittgenstein, visando à realização de um confronto de argumentos, que culmina, no terceiro capítulo do trabalho, com a conclusão pela correção da interpretação de Kripke, particularmente no que tange à mudança na filosofia da linguagem de Wittgenstein do Tractatus para as Investigações Filosóficas, como uma mudança de condições de verdade para condições de justificação ou de assertibilidade. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The present work introduces, in its first chapter, Wittgenstein’s skeptical paradox, which is, according to Kripke, the fundamental problem of Philosophical Investigations, and establishes that no course of action could be determined by a rule, because we cannot assure that the learning of a rule in the past can determine any behavior according to the same rule in the future. Later, this work presents what Kripke believes is the solution to the paradox, which lies in the argument against the private language, and represents a change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from his work in the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations. In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein rejected the realistic view present in the Tractatus, which advocated a truth-conditional conception of meaning, and substituted for a view that gives more emphasis to the normative role of language. In this context, Kripke introduces the concept of justification conditions, substituting the concept of truth conditions in the role of declaring the truth or falsity of a sentence. Thus, the solution to the skeptical paradox is to see what circumstances actually license assertions and what role this license actually plays. The justification for following a rule is only possible within the context which the rule and the person who will follow it belong, or, according to Wittgenstein, a rule only has substantive content if considered inside its language game, therefore, it is not possible to follow a rule “privately”. In the second chapter of this work, we present positions pro and against Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgensten’s philosophy, aiming a confrontation of arguments, which reach to the conclusion, in the third chapter. Thereby, the conclusion of this work is that Kripke is correct in his interpretation of Wittgensten’s philosophy, particularly regarding the change in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, as a change from truth conditions to assertability or justification conditions.

Has the theory of direct reference for general terms ontological consequences or requirements? It has normally been said that general terms should be conceived as rigid designators of natural classes”, but this is a very vague expression. What is a natural class” here? Is it a universal? Is it a class of resembling objects or tropes? It is argued that the theory of direct reference functions better in connection with an ontology of universals. The semantic model actually requires certain type of successful cognitive relation with the referent and it is difficult to explain how such a successful connection could be obtained if there are no universal properties, but only perfect resemblance classes of objects or tropes. / ¿Hay consecuencias o requerimientos ontológicos que puedan desprendersede la teoría de la referencia directa? Se ha dicho frecuentemente quelos términos generales deben ser concebidos como designadores rígidos de clasesnaturales”, pero esta es una expresión demasiado vaga. ¿Qué es aquí una clasenatural”? ¿Es un universal? ¿Una clase de objetos o tropos semejantes entre sí?Se argumenta que la teoría de la referencia directa funciona mejor en conexióncon una ontología de universales. El modelo semántico, en efecto, requiere ciertotipo de relación cognitiva exitosa con el referente, y es difícil explicar cómo podríadarse esa conexión exitosa si no hay propiedades universales, sino solo clasesde objetos o tropos perfectamente semejantes.