The purpose of this study was to determine the impact of Senate Bill 351 on public school finance equity in Texas and to provide information to those concerned with the financing of schools in this state. Data provided by the Texas Education Agency were used to determine differences in expenditures per student and local tax rates before and after the implementation of Senate Bill 351.

Doctor of Education / Department of Educational Leadership / David Thompson / This present study extended the longitudinal perspective begun by DeBacker (2002) and Jordan (2012) and, when considered wholly, provides insights into the educational experiences offered by districts in the state of Kansas from the years 1992 through 2017, as well as the impacts that changes to school funding had on those experiences. This study assessed selected fiscal and pupil performance variables and examined the impacts that changes to school funding had on those variables, paying close attention to the shift from per pupil funding under the School District Finance and Quality Performance Act (SDFQPA) of 1992 to block grant funding under the Classroom Learning Assuring Student Success (CLASS) Act from 2015 to 2017. In the first phase of this study, Kansas school districts were ordered from wealthiest to poorest based on their assessed valuation per pupil for 2001. To narrow the study population and to ensure that longitudinal analysis could occur, districts that had closed or consolidated by 2016 were removed. For the remaining districts, decile analysis was applied to the population by ranking all 289 school districts from wealthiest to poorest based on 2001 assessed valuation per pupil (AVPP) and by further dividing the population in to ten equal parts (i.e. each decile representing 10% of the population). The population was again narrowed to the representative sample of 112 school districts, with Decile 10 representing the wealthiest 10% of districts, Decile 1 representing the poorest 10%, and Deciles 5 and 6 representing the average wealth districts found in the middle (each representing 10% of the population respectively). This process was repeated for 2011, 2014, and 2016. For this study, 2001 and 2016 served as the bookend years, as DeBacker (2002) had done (1992 – 2001) and Jordan (2012) had repeated (2002 – 2012). Establishing the beginning year as 2001 ensured overlap of years examined by both previous studies and extending through the most recent year of audited data, i.e., 2016. Once the study population was established, data analysis was conducted in two phases. First, fiscal and pupil performance data were analyzed to provide insight into overall health of each district during the years 2001- 2016. Second, survey and interview data were collected and analyzed to glean insights from district leaders for contextual perspective of the impacts that changes to school funding had on districts and their leaders, paying close attention to the years of block grant funding under CLASS. The present study resulted in a critical examination of fiscal and pupil performance variables and the impact that changes to school finance in Kansas had on the educational experience of Kansas pupils.

The purpose of this study was twofold. The first purpose was to determine the extent to which the 14 two-year institutions of the Tennessee Board of Regents system expended funds in functional categories equal to the amount of funds provided by the appropriations funding formula for the same functional categories. The second purpose was to determine the extent to which the 14 two-year institutions expended funds for direct instructional purposes for each academic program equal to the amount of funds provided by the appropriations funding formula for direct teaching purposes for each academic program. Using an archival research design, appropriations funding data and actual expenditure data were collected for the period 1990-91 through 1996-97 relative to the first purpose. Data for only the years 1995-96 and 1996-97 were used for the second purpose. For each of the two purposes studied, the data were adjusted to reflect comparable funding and expenditure data. The final evaluation involved a comparison of the percentage of funding expended by function and by college for the first purpose and the percentage of funding expended by academic program and by college for the second purpose. The evaluation of the percentage of funding expended by function revealed that most colleges and the system as a whole expended approximately 90% or more of the funding for the function for which funds were allocated by the appropriations formula. This level was determined to be positive, because some funding is typically set aside for transfers to plant funds for renewals and replacements. The evaluation of the percentage of funding expended for direct teaching purposes revealed that most colleges and the system as a whole expended approximately 60% or less of the funding for direct teaching purposes. This is permissible according to the policies of the TBR and THEC. The funding formula for direct teaching is based on enrollment and an average full-time faculty salary amount. However, most colleges use part-time faculty to teach a portion of its student-credit-hours; thus, excess funds accrue from this area and are available for use in other areas. Based on the findings of this study, two recommendations are offered. A review of the funding formula with regards to potentially needed modifications is recommended for the specific functions in which either substantially more or less than 100.0% of the funding was expended. Additionally, a formal analysis of the proportion of student-credit-hour enrollment taught by part-time faculty should be made to assist in determining if the funding formula calculation for direct teaching activities should include an element for the proportion of student-credit-hours taught by part-time faculty.

This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending. Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.

This thesis explores the political economy aspects of the provision of local public goods by higher levels of government. Chapter 1 focuses on local public goods as instruments for special interest politics at the supra-local level, with an emphasis on public infrastructure. To capture the implications of long-run relationships between political parties and their loyal supporters, I set out a dynamic probabilistic voting model which predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run `machine politics' considerations with the more immediate concern to win over swing voters. To assess the empirical relevance of both forces, I analyse rich data on road spending from a panel of electoral districts in Québec. Empirical results exploiting the province's linguistic fragmentation provide robust evidence that partisan loyalty is a key driver of the geographic allocation of spending. Chapter 2 proposes a theoretical framework to analyse the coexistence of multiple tiers of government in local public good provision. I study the effects of such partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good. The model predicts that the net effect of a departure from complete centralization (or decentralization) balances the benefits of vertical complementarity against the loss of accountability following from imperfect information and detrimental vertical interactions. Chapter 3 investigates the impact of partial decentralization on local electoral accountability in the context of California's school finance system. I exploit the peculiarities California's school finance system and the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 to estimate the extent to which politicians are punished or rewarded for observed policy outcomes, and how this channel is affected by the degree of centralization. Results show that voters are responsive to differences in dropout rates and pupil-teacher ratios, and that incumbents are less likely to be reelected when a district's degree of centralization is high. Increased federal involvement after 2001 is associated with sharper local electoral accountability.

The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between resource allocation practices in specific categorical functions and student performance in reading and math. This study utilized quantitative research methods to study the effects of spending and performance over four years of analysis. Quantitative data was acquired utilizing information from the Texas Education Agency. The data was collected from 81 campuses and represented over 1,500 students. The study's outcomes reported that little or no correlation could be found between inputs (dollars spent in three categories) and outputs (student results in reading and math). However, subgroup analysis revealed that students from non- low socioeconomic (SES) households started out higher than their low SES counterparts, and low SES students performed worse over time in both reading and math. Math results decreased more dramatically than reading indicating a need for school-level training in data analysis to ensure that limited dollars are spent appropriately. The study recommends that principals and school administrators be especially knowledgeable in critical data analysis skills. The study further recommends that state policy-makers invest more heavily in early math instruction. In addition, the current study found that student achievement, in low-SES students, especially in mathematics is very alarming. Low SES students are starting out behind the non low-SES counterparts and perform progressively worse over time. State policy makers must address these concerns.

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