It is the aim with this paper, to research the shortcomings experienced in the appeal procedures as contained in the Engineering Profession Act ("EPA"), in order to determine whether the process should be revised or if only certain relevant sections of the EPA should be rewritten. Due to the administrative nature of certain duties of the Council as authorised by the EPA, it makes it inevitable that appeals will follow. It is therefore imperative that the procedures to appeal, must be both functional and effective. The relevant sections of the EPA as well as the appeal procedures of the Health Professions Act's will be researched, taking into account the stipulations of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act ("PAJA"). Relevant legal administrative principles and doctrines, court judgments, as well as the views of authors are also taken into account. Two major areas of concern in certain sections of the EPA have been identified: • The fact that the whole council has to decide on appeals, and • the fact that such hearings have to take place within a very limited time frame. Relevant court findings have made it clear that decisions made by authorities, have to comply with the requirements set out in the Constitution in coherence with PAJA. In conclusion, based on the Constitutional and the legal administrative requirements, it is found to be necessary to rewrite the relevant sections of the EPA, as well as the rules of appeal, as these do not make the grade at present. / Thesis (LL.M. (Public Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

It is the aim with this paper, to research the shortcomings experienced in the appeal procedures as contained in the Engineering Profession Act ("EPA"), in order to determine whether the process should be revised or if only certain relevant sections of the EPA should be rewritten. Due to the administrative nature of certain duties of the Council as authorised by the EPA, it makes it inevitable that appeals will follow. It is therefore imperative that the procedures to appeal, must be both functional and effective. The relevant sections of the EPA as well as the appeal procedures of the Health Professions Act's will be researched, taking into account the stipulations of the Constitution and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act ("PAJA"). Relevant legal administrative principles and doctrines, court judgments, as well as the views of authors are also taken into account. Two major areas of concern in certain sections of the EPA have been identified: • The fact that the whole council has to decide on appeals, and • the fact that such hearings have to take place within a very limited time frame. Relevant court findings have made it clear that decisions made by authorities, have to comply with the requirements set out in the Constitution in coherence with PAJA. In conclusion, based on the Constitutional and the legal administrative requirements, it is found to be necessary to rewrite the relevant sections of the EPA, as well as the rules of appeal, as these do not make the grade at present. / Thesis (LL.M. (Public Law))--North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus, 2009.

The constitutionality of affirmative action in terms of section 8 of Act 200 of 1993 is investigated. The study contends that in constitutional interpretation it is permissible to have recourse to ethical precepts as long as these are anchored within the four corners of the Constitution. It is contended that the •equality clause• does not prescribe equality of outcome in favour of substantive equality of opportunity. It is asserted that group-based affirmative action may justifiably be attacked as being unconstitutional; either on the basis that it infringes the nonbeneficiary's equality rights in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) or that it falls beyond the constitutional protection afforded to affirmative action in terms of section 8(3). Furthermore, group-based modalities of affirmative action may also not constitute a permissible limitation on the fundamental right to equality, if compared to an individual-based socio-economic affirmative action model. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. / Law / LL.M.

The constitutionality of affirmative action in terms of section 8 of Act 200 of 1993 is investigated. The study contends that in constitutional interpretation it is permissible to have recourse to ethical precepts as long as these are anchored within the four corners of the Constitution. It is contended that the •equality clause• does not prescribe equality of outcome in favour of substantive equality of opportunity. It is asserted that group-based affirmative action may justifiably be attacked as being unconstitutional; either on the basis that it infringes the nonbeneficiary's equality rights in terms of sections 8(1) and 8(2) or that it falls beyond the constitutional protection afforded to affirmative action in terms of section 8(3). Furthermore, group-based modalities of affirmative action may also not constitute a permissible limitation on the fundamental right to equality, if compared to an individual-based socio-economic affirmative action model. / Jurisprudence / LL. M.

Section 33(1)(b) is fraught with borrowed provisions. The end-product marries German and Canadian features. The failure of the German Constitutional Courts to interpret the "essential content of a right" precipitated the adopted infant's bumpy landing in South Africa. That the sibling still lacks identity is evidenced by our Constitutional Court's evasive and superficial treatment of the clause. Section 33(1)(a) - proportionality prong enables judges to justify their neglect of Section 33(1)(b). The opinion is expressed that Section 33(1){b) demands interpretation but to date it has been shrouded in vagueness. After all without demarcating boundaries with sufficient precision and highlighting where the State may not tread the State may trespass. Alternatively the limitable nature of human rights could become a myth as Section 33(1)(b) could be transformed into an insurmountable hurdle for the State, rendering every right absolute in practice. A workable conceptual framework proposes an inverted, porous and value imbibing solution. / Law / LL.M.