This thesis addresses two important issues necessary to understand whether insider trading should be prohibited: the effects of insider trading on stock prices and the compensation to insiders for providing information and other related services. This task is accomplished by analyzing stock price changes during corporate takeovers, before and after the regulatory changes in the 1980's that were designed to reduce the level of insider trading. In this thesis, we develop an indirect measure of insider trading that shows how observable stock price movements during takeovers allow one to make inferences about changes in insider trading after regulatory changes. Specifically, we show that when inside information is partially revealed to the market, the effects of regulatory changes on insider trading can be identified by examining the price movements of stocks around takeover announcements. If, however, information is not revealed at all or is fully revealed, it is impossible to identify the effects of regulatory changes on insider trading. We also develop a segmented diffusion model to analyze price movements characterized by cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding a takeover announcement. An econometric model is developed to estimate the segmented diffusion model. Naturally, this methodology applies to the study of various events in addition to corporate takeovers and regulatory changes. We conduct empirical analysis to test three hypotheses. With regard to Hypothesis I, we find strong evidence that the tightening of insider trading regulations in the 1980's was effective and that inside information was partially revealed to the market. With regard to Hypothesis II, we find evidence that insider trading regulations have more effect on negotiated takeovers than on takeovers initiated by bidding. With regard to Hypothesis III, we find weak evidence that insiders associated with acquiring firms seek fewer but more profitable takeovers after the introduction of tighter regulations.

L'objectif de notre recherche consiste à déterminer si le particularisme des marchés financiers nécessite un aménagement de la responsabilité civile. C'est sur le marché boursier proprement dit et pour des faits générateurs spécifiques-l'information publique défectueuse et les abus de marché-que le problème se pose dans toute son acuité, dès lors que ces faits générateurs portent atteinte au marché lui-même et peuvent donc léser l'ensemble des investisseurs. La logique multilatérale des marchés boursiers s'oppose alors frontalement à celle, individuelle, de la responsabilité civile, qui en ressort profondément affectée. Le préjudice est diffus, incertain et délicat à évaluer, et la responsabilité civile est soumise à un dilemme: faut-il réparer un préjudice classique d'altération de la décision ou bien un préjudice, plus spécifique, d'altération du marché? Pour répondre à la question posée, nous avons eu recours au droit comparé. "De lege lata", c'est dans tous les États l'information publique défectueuse qui suscite l'essentiel de l'intérêt: elle fait l'objet d'aménagements variés autour de la réparation de la décision ou du cours, soit par le juge (Etats-Unis, France), soit par le législateur (Allemagne, Royaume-Uni). "De lege ferenda", nous avons opéré un choix de politique juridique restrictif consistant à n'indemniser que les investisseurs s'étant fondés sur l'information, et ce tant pour l'information publique défectueuse que pour l'intervention frauduleuse sur le marché (manipulation de cours et opération d'initié). Cette conception restrictive ne nécessite aucun aménagement de la responsabilité civile délictuelle, de sorte que le droit commun doit continuer de s'y appliquer. Le particularisme du marché boursier est finalement trop important pour espérer que la responsabilité civile, même au prix d'un aménagement, puisse y jouer un véritable rôle. Il faut accepter qu'elle n'ait en la matière qu'une place résiduelle et qu'il revienne plutôt aux responsabilités pénale et administrative de jouer pleinement leur rôle afin de dissuader et d'éviter la survenance de préjudices au détriment des investisseurs. / The aim for our research is to determine whether the specificity of financial markets requires to adapt tort law. Our study is limited to multilateral trade markets and specific faults - defective public information and market abuses. In effect, it is in this context that the problem is most acute as these faults affect the market itself and can injure all investors. The multilateral aspect of financial markets then stands in sharp contrast with the individual dimension of civil liability. There, the damage is fragmented, uncertain and difficult to assess, and liability is subject to a dilemma : should you compensate for the alteration of the decision or of the market ? To answer the question, we used comparative law. De lege lata, in all States defective public information arouses most interest: various solutions have been adopted to compensate either an alteration of the decision or of the market price, by the judge (USA, France) or by Parliament (Germany, UK). De lege ferenda, we opt for compensating only investors who relied on the information for both defective public information or fraudulent market intervention (price manipulation and insider trading). This restrictive approach does not require any adaptation for tort law, so the common law should continue to apply. The specificity of financial markets is finally too strong for civil liability to play a real role there. We must accept that it plays only a residual part on the market and insteat rely on criminal and adminitrative enforcement to deter and prevent the occurence of damage to investors.

This thesis addresses two important issues necessary to understand whether insider trading should be prohibited: the effects of insider trading on stock prices and the compensation to insiders for providing information and other related services. This task is accomplished by analyzing stock price changes during corporate takeovers, before and after the regulatory changes in the 1980's that were designed to reduce the level of insider trading. In this thesis, we develop an indirect measure of insider trading that shows how observable stock price movements during takeovers allow one to make inferences about changes in insider trading after regulatory changes. Specifically, we show that when inside information is partially revealed to the market, the effects of regulatory changes on insider trading can be identified by examining the price movements of stocks around takeover announcements. If, however, information is not revealed at all or is fully revealed, it is impossible to identify the effects of regulatory changes on insider trading. We also develop a segmented diffusion model to analyze price movements characterized by cumulative abnormal returns during the period surrounding a takeover announcement. An econometric model is developed to estimate the segmented diffusion model. Naturally, this methodology applies to the study of various events in addition to corporate takeovers and regulatory changes. We conduct empirical analysis to test three hypotheses. With regard to Hypothesis I, we find strong evidence that the tightening of insider trading regulations in the 1980's was effective and that inside information was partially revealed to the market. With regard to Hypothesis II, we find evidence that insider trading regulations have more effect on negotiated takeovers than on takeovers initiated by bidding. With regard to Hypothesis III, we find weak evidence that insiders associated with acquiring firms seek fewer but more profitable takeovers after the introduction of tighter regulations. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

This paper examines the impact of reduced insider trading enforcement on the stock market using a unique and plausibly exogenous U.S. court ruling that undermines the SEC’s ability to prosecute insider trading defendants in court. Contrary to the conventional view, the study finds that the court ruling has positive effects on liquidity and stock price, consistent with the idea that stock prices become more informative when insider trading enforcement is reduced. The effects are less positive for firms with high ex-ante stock price informativeness, as the benefits of reduced insider trading enforcement are smaller for these firms. However, liquidity deteriorates in pre-earnings announcement periods after the court ruling, as investors anticipate forthcoming information and delay their trades until the announcement, due to heightened risks associated with trading against those with private information. In sum, this paper shows that the effect of reduced insider trading enforcement on liquidity and stock price could be positive overall. This study holds implications for the SEC, which aims to regulate insider trading for a fair market while also considering liquidity to maintain an efficient market.

Thesis (LLM (Mercantile Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / The research defines derivatives as private contracts, with future rights and obligations imposed on all parties, used to hedge or transfer risk, which derives value from an underlying asset price or index, which asset price or index may take on various forms. The nature of derivatives is that the instruments are intended to be risk management tools. The objectives of derivatives are either to hedge a risk, or to speculate. Derivatives may be classified by the manner in which they are traded, either over the counter (OTC) or on exchange. Alternatively, derivatives may be classified on the basis of structure and mechanisms, i.e. forwards, futures, options or swaps. Risk and risk management are defined in the third chapter with the focus on merchant banking. The nature of risk is that it is inherent in all activities. The nature of risk management is that it aims to ensure that the risks faced by the merchant bank are managed on a daily basis. The objective of risk management is to ensure that losses are minimised and the appropriate level of risk is taken in order to maximise profits. Risk may be classified as operational, operations, market, systemic, credit and legal risk. A comprehensive discussion of credit risk is presented, as it pertains to the legal risk in derivatives in a merchant bank. This includes insolvency, set-off, netting, credit derivatives and collateral. Legal risk is defined as the risk of loss primarily caused by legal unenforceability (i.e. a defective transaction, for instance a contract), legal liability (i.e. a claim) or failure to take legal steps to protect assets (e.g. intellectual property). The nature of legal risk is that it is caused by jurisdictional and other cross-border factors, inadequate documentation, the behaviour of financial institutions, a lack of internal controls, financial innovation or the inherent uncertainty of the law. The objectives of legal risk management in derivatives are to avoid the direct and indirect costs associated with legal risk materialising. This includes reputational damage. Derivatives attract specific legal risks due to the complexity of the instruments as well as the constant innovation in the market. There remains some legal uncertainty regarding derivatives in terms of gaming, wagering and gambling, as well as insurance. The relationship between risk and derivatives is that due to the complexity and constant innovation associated with derivatives, there are some inherent risks to trading in derivatives. It is therefore important to ensure that there is a vested risk management culture in the derivatives trading environment. Chapter four gives an overview of derivatives legislation in foreign jurisdictions and in South Africa. The contractual and documentation issues are discussed with reference to ad hoc agreements, master agreements and ISDA agreements. The practical implementation issues of master agreements and ad hoc agreements are also discussed. The recommendations are that legal risk management be approached in a similar manner to credit, market and other risk disciplines. A legal risk management policy needs to be developed and implemented. The second recommendation is that a derivative to manage the legal risk in derivatives be developed.

Thesis (MBA (Business Management))--Stellenbosch University, 2008. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research report reviews South African and international legislation aimed at preventing insider trading and provides an overview of the successful criminal and civil proceedings taken against insiders. It highlights the possible preventative measures South African companies and legislature can take to reduce insider trading. The United States of America is one of the few countries that had successfully implemented legislation prohibiting insider trading prior to the 1990s. Most countries, including South Africa, only implemented legislation prohibiting insider trading in the late 1990s. Due to apartheid and sanctions against South Africa, the JSE has built up a legacy of being an insider's haven. The Directorate of Market Abuse has the task of transforming this legacy to restore investors' confidence in the market in order to promote economic growth. The success of the legislation is firstly measured by the knowledge the market has gained relating to insider trading since the implementation of the legislation. According to the South African market, insider trading is unethical, but 22% of the participants in the G:cnesis survey still believe that it is an acceptable practice in the South African market. South African companies therefore need to educate their employees and take preventative measures to reduce insider trading in order to erode this culture. Insider trading can only be prevented and reduced if legislation is enforced. Globally, few legal criminal proceedings have been successful, therefore legislation in most countries makes provision for civil remedies. As the burden of proof in a civil legal proceeding is only on "a balance of probabilities", civil proceedings against insiders have been successful. In South Africa, the majority of cases referred for civil legal action have been settled out of court by the alleged insider without admitting guilt to a criminal offence. The South African legislation regulating insider trading in the market is aligned with legislation globally. South Africa's future challenges are to maintain the initial success achieved in reducing insider trading. The establishment of a specific court specialising in financial crime and monitoring specific changes to legislation could increase the possibility of future success. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die projek ondersoek die Suid-Afikaanse en internasionale wetgewing teen binnehandel. Verder word die suksesvolle kriminele en siviele verrigtinge teen diegene wat hulle aan binnehandel skuldig maak onder die soeklig geplaas. Die projek beklemtoon die moontlike voorkomingsmaatreels wat Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappye en regslui kan implementeer om moontlike toekomstige binnehandel te bekamp. Die Verenigde State van Amerika is een van die min lande wat reeds voor die 1990s wetgewing teen binnehandel suksesvol geimplementeer bet. Ander lande, insluitend Suid-Afrika, het eers in die laat 1990s wetgewing teen binnehandel geproklameer. Apartheid en sanksies teen Suid-Afrika het 'n nalatenskap van vrye binnehandel op die JSE gelaat. Dit is die taak van die Direktoraat van Markmisbruik om hierdie nalatenskap uit te wis, sodat beleggersvertroue in die mark herstel kan word, wat weer tot ekonomiese groei sal lei. Een van die maatstawwe om die sukses van die wetgewing te meet, is om te bepaal hoeveel kennis die finansiele gemeenskap sedert die implementering van die nuwe wetgewing ingewin het. Volgens die finansiele gemeenskap is binnehandel oneties, maar 22% van die deelnemers aan die G:encsis-opname glo dat binnehandel wel in Suid-Afrika aanvaarbaar is. Daarom moet Suid-Afrikaanse maatskappye hulle werknemers se kennis oor binnehandel verbreed en ander voorkomende maatreels in plek stel om die kultuur van binnehandel te elimineer. Binnebandel kan slegs voorkom en verminder word indien wetgewing geimplementeer word. Relatief min kriminele sake teen binnehandel lei tot skuldigbevinding, maar plaaslike en internasionale wetgewing maak voorsiening vir siviele aksies. In 'n siviele hofsaak moet ingediende bewyse slegs na alle waarskynlikheid die skuld van die oortreder bewys, wat suksesvolle siviele vervolging moontlik maak. Die meerderheid siviele sake in Suid-Afrika word buite die bar geskik sonder dat die aangeklaagde skuld aan 'n kriminele daad erken. Die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing is in lyn met internasionale standaarde. Suid-Afrika staar verskeie uitdagings in die gesig ten opsigte van die handhawing van die huidige suksesvolle bekamping van binnehandel. Die moontlike totstandkoming van 'n spesiale hof, wat slegs finansiele verwante oortredings aanhoor en veranderings aan die wetgewing kontroleer, kan bydra tot die toekomstige sukses van die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing.

No description available.

Depuis sa création la monnaie a été l’objet de nombreuses évolutions. Ces dernières années ont vu l’apparition de cryptomonnaies et de projets de monnaie issus de personnes privées. Ces évolutions ont poussé les États à réagir, se sentant alors menacés dans ce qui constitue un élément majeur de leur pouvoir : la monnaie et son contrôle. Comment les États ont-t-ils réagi à cette menace ? Dans ce mémoire, la monnaie officielle sera étudiée à travers les deux unités qui la composent : l’unité de paiement et l’unité de valeur. Ces deux unités se retrouvent dans les cryptomonnaies stables ainsi que dans les projets de monnaie numérique de banque centrale, leur encadrement juridique sera étudié à travers le prisme de la législation canadienne et européenne. Le projet européen de monnaie numérique de banque centrale étant plus développé que le projet canadien, une attention particulière lui sera portée. Les États ont utilisé leur pouvoir législatif pour faire entrer les cryptomonnaies stables dans les systèmes préexistants, il peut s’agir du marché des valeurs mobilières ou du marché bancaire. Les États utilisent les règles de ces marchés pour encadrer ces innovations et les empêcher de se développer hors du sentier que le droit leur a tracé. La régulation ne permet pas d’endiguer suffisamment le phénomène des monnaies privées car elle ne propose pas d’alternative crédible. Les États ont donc mis en place des projets de monnaies numériques de banques centrales afin de créer cette alternative. / Since its creation, currency has been the subject of numerous evolutions. Recent years have seen the emergence of cryptocurrencies and currency projects from private individuals. These developments compelled states to react, feeling threatened in what constitutes a major element of their power: the currency and its control. How have states reacted to this threat? In this dissertation, official money will be studied through the two units that compose it: the unit of payment and the unit of value. These two units are found in stable cryptocurrencies as well as in central bank digital currency projects, their legal framework will be studied here through the prism of Canadian and European legislation. Since the European central bank digital currency project is more developed than the Canadian one, a special focus will be brought to it. States have used their legislative power to bring stable cryptocurrencies into pre-existing systems, through the securities market or the banking market. States use the rules of these markets to regulate these innovations and prevent them from developing outside the path that the law has paved for them. The various digital currency projects of central banks create an alternative to private currencies. They are the other answer to the concerns created by these new innovations.

by Hui Lok Yee Connie. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 92-95). / ABSTRACT --- p.iv / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT --- p.v / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.vi / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Objectives of Securities Regulations --- p.3 / Regulatory Framework of the Hong Kong Securities Market --- p.5 / Objectives of This Study --- p.6 / Methodology --- p.7 / Chapter II. --- DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS --- p.8 / Development of Securities (Disclosure of Interests) Ordinance in HK --- p.8 / Disclosure of Interests in Shares --- p.9 / Commentary --- p.17 / Recommendations --- p.23 / Chapter III. --- INSIDER DEALING --- p.29 / Development of Securities (Insider Dealing) Ordinance in HK --- p.29 / Overview of the Supervision of Insider Dealing Activitiesin Hong Kong and Singapore --- p.30 / Circumstances of Insider Dealing --- p.32 / Consequences of Insider Dealing --- p.36 / Case Studies --- p.39 / Commentary --- p.51 / Recommendations --- p.55 / Chapter IV. --- CONCLUSION --- p.60 / APPENDICE --- p.63 / Appendix 1 --- p.64 / Appendix 2 --- p.68 / Appendix 3 --- p.72 / Appendix 4 --- p.76 / Appendix 5 --- p.77 / Appendix 6 --- p.85 / Appendix 7 --- p.90 / Appendix 8 --- p.91 / Appendix 9 --- p.92 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.93

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de LLM en droit" / Le présent mémoire analyse le phénomène des prises de contrôle inversée (PCI). Cette technique permet à une société privée de se faire acquérir par une société publique coté en Bourse. Elle obtient de cette dernière, en contrepartie, un nombre si important de ses actions qu'à la suite de la transaction, la société privée contrôle la société publique qui vient légalement de l'acheter. D'où la prise de contrôle dite inversée. Le but de l'opération consiste pour la société privée à devenir publique rapidement, et ce, à coûts moindres, comparativement à un appel public traditionnel. La société privée profite ainsi de son nouveau statut pour se financer par un appel public à l'épargne publique par le biais de la Bourse. La piètre réputation associée à ce genre de transactions est due à la cupidité de quelques entrepreneurs peu scrupuleux qui ont comme objectif d'empocher un profit rapide au détriment du public investisseur. Avec comme résultat que ce type de transaction suscite, à juste titre, la méfiance des autorités réglementaires. Le dilemme peut donc être posé en ces termes: compte tenu de l'importance économique des PME en termes de création de richesse au pays, doit-on restreindre l'usage de la PCI au nom du principe de la protection des épargnants? En somme, la liberté commerciale doit-elle céder le pas à des craintes de nature réglementaire? Nous concluons que malgré ces craintes très réelles, la PCI, majoritairement utilisée par la PME, doit être maintenue et qu'en termes de politique réglementaire, les autorités devraient favoriser l'emploi par ces jeunes sociétés du programme de financement « Société de Capital de Démarrage» (SCD) mis en place par la Bourse de Croissance rsx. Malgré ses défauts évidents, ce programme doit être amélioré afin de promouvoir une PCI plus efficace, et ce, à l'intérieur du programme Sco. À cet égard, la SCD pourrait bénéficier de la crédibilité ainsi que de l'expertise indéniable de la Bourse de Croissance en matière de financement de jeunes entreprises. Idéalement, la SCD serait améliorée au point où elle rendrait la PCI, hors ce programme, inutile. En ce sens, la liberté commerciale de faire des PCI serait préservée, tout en assurant la protection du public investisseur. / This thesis endeavours to analyse the phenomenon of the reverse takeover (RTO). This technique allows a private company to be acquired by a public entity whose stock is listed on an exchange. The former obtains from the latter such an important part of its stock that following the completion of the transaction, the private company controls the public company which has just acquired it. The takeover is therefore deemed reversed. The purpose of the transaction from the private entity perspective is to gain the status and privilege associated with being a publicly listed company faster and at a fraction of the cost that would otherwise be the case with a traditional public offering. Thereafter the private company uses its newly acquired public status to tap the capital markets via the stock exchange. The poor reputation generally associated with this kind of transaction is in a large measure due to the greed of a few scam artists whose main motive is a quick profit at the expense of the investing public. The result of this situation is that the RTO is viewed with considerable scepticism by the regulatory authorities. The dilemma may therefore be set in the following terms: taking into consideration the economic importance of the small and medium business (SME) as a creator of wealth in the economy, should the competent authorities limit the use of the RTO in the name of investor protection. In other words, should the commercial freedom to use the RTO in order to finance SME take a back seat to regulatory concerns. We conclude that although the serious concerns levelled by the regulators are very real, the RTO which is used primarily by SME should be maintained. It is further argued that regulatory authorities should promote as a matter of policy the RTO sponsored by the Capital Pool Company (CPC) program provided for by TSX Venture. We find that this program should be upgraded to allow for a more efficient RTO under the rules of the CPC. In this regard, the program would gain from the credibility and the undeniable expertise of the TSX Venture in the realm of financing young and emerging companies. Therefore, ideally, this program would be improved to the point where it would render the RTO pursued out of the program useless. If this were the case, we conclude that commercial freedom would be preserved, while concurrently maintaining protection for investors and upholding the integrity of capital markets.