Chance events began with the Big Bang and influenced all subsequent evolutionary processes, including the genesis and evolution of biological life. The complex and versatile human brain has come to dominate the environment. Self-awareness generated the idea of spiritual identity and survival beyond death. The assumption of demi-god status gave sanctity and dignity to humans, a moral separation that justified the exploitation of other animals. But evolution has a common origin, fleshed out in the biological similarities of all mammals, including humans. Neurological and biochemical correlates suggest the omnipresence of consciousness and self-consciousness at levels that vary according to nervous system complexity. Accepting a more inclusive morality does not diminish the value of human life. It acknowledges their power to adapt to changing conditions. Human survival depends on change and human lives can only benefit from a more inclusive worldview that considers the welfare of all sentient beings and the sustainability of a shared environment. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / A brief introduction to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics is based on the Other/other. He argues that we are in an asymmetrical relationship with our neighbour that pre-destines us with ethical responsibility even before consciousness or choice. In the face-to-face encounter an infinity and alterity about our neighbour is revealed, which is irreducible to my ontological grasp and thereby compels me to respond to him. It is also through this relation that our humanity is released as our solipsistic all-for-myself becomes a being-for-the-other. Furthermore, the I is irreplaceable, thereby making each of us ethically responsible for our neighbour to the point of responsibility for his material misery. This paper introduces this stance with the aim to underscore it. A brief discussion on the priority of ethics before ontology in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas The incessant theme of Levinas’ writing over 25 years has been “Ethics as First Philosophy,” which is synonymous with “The Subject’s Ethical Responsibility for his Neighbour.” This paper is a short discussion of this theme of the origin of ethics. Levinas’ arguments on pre-original time, the Infinite, language and human corporeality by which he establishes a subjectivity that is not fundamentally determined by intentionality and self-sameness, but by the proximity of our neighbour, will be considered. For Levinas it is this relation to the Other that answers the question of the meaning of being and is also the first word of words. First Philosophy is accordingly to be found in the face-to-face which is a subordination of knowledge to a mode of meaning beyond totality.

In this study, I consider the possibility of extending Hannah Arendt's critiques of conformity and behavior and her insights on thinking and moral philosophy to Christian life and culture. With Arendt, I argue that the possibility to refrain from perpetrating great evils made possible by uncritical conformity resides within the activity of thinking itself, as she defines it. Furthermore, I argue, again with Arendt, that refraining from such evils is a moral decision which finds its ultimate standard in the self. Although she culls many helpful insights from religious traditions, Arendt refrains from extending her moral philosophy into any realm in which religion is considered to be the valid standard of what constitutes moral behavior. Instead, I argue, against Arendt, that Christians can, and perhaps should, develop a more mature understanding of religion and a more "covenantal" understanding of their relationship with the divine.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-10-10T10:12:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Danllo Costa Lima.pdf: 2031270 bytes, checksum: 856f2aa658fc976e8ed18168a886628d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-10T10:12:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Danllo Costa Lima.pdf: 2031270 bytes, checksum: 856f2aa658fc976e8ed18168a886628d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-09-05 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / In Proclus, the delphic adage “gnothi seauton” reached the status of the fundamental principle of philosophy, according to two perspectives: theoretical and practical. From the theoretical point of view, and in answer to the Skeptical challenge to representative knowledge in its subject-object duality, the neoplatonic tradition carried out a considerable deepening of the philosophical reflexion on self-reflectivity or conversion to one’s self (epistrophê pros eauton), thus inaugurating a form of “turn to the subject” as philosophical method. From the practical point of view, self-knowledge constituted a true spiritual path of self-care, leading the soul from a natural and irreflected condition to a life of philosophical piety and self-transformation, culminating in the soul’s deification through union to the Divine. To this end, in the neoplatonic schools of this period, a formalization of the gradual process of the soul’s education takes place, delineating in the form of a ladder of virtues and sciences, the various levels of the path to be pursued until the soul’s ascension into the beatitude of assimilation to deity. Underlying these two perspectives is a comprehension of the core of the soul, its pure indeterminate existence (huparxis), as being deiform, in such a way that upon it depends both the possibility of true knowledge, in the form of intellectual intuition (noesis), and the possibility of beatitude, in the form of love (eros). To actualize them is the purpose of the ascesis to which the platonic philosopher dedicates himself. This dissertation aims at hypothetically reconstructing, based on Proclus, this path of self-knowledge in Late Neoplatonism, starting with an investigation upon its roots in greek religion, Plato and Plotinus / Em Proclo, a máxima délfica “gnothi seauton” alcançou o estatuto de princípio fundamental da filosofia, segundo duas perspectivas: teórica e prática. Do ponto de vista teórico, em resposta ao desafio do Ceticismo ao conhecimento representativo em sua dualidade sujeito-objeto, a tradição neoplatônica levou a cabo um considerável aprofundamento da reflexão filosófica sobre a autorreflexividade ou conversão a si mesmo (epistrophê pros eauton), inaugurando assim uma forma própria de “virada ao sujeito” como método filosófico. Do ponto de vista prático, o conhecimento de si constituía um verdadeiro caminho espiritual de cuidado de si, conduzindo a alma de uma condição natural e irrefletida para uma vida de piedade filosófica e transformação de si, culminando na deificação da alma em união ao Divino. Para este fim, há nas escolas neoplatônicas deste período uma formalização de um processo gradual de educação da alma, delineando, sob a forma de uma escada de virtudes e saberes, os vários níveis do caminho a serem percorridos por ela em sua ascensão até à bem-aventurança da assimilação à divindade. Subjacente às duas perspectivas está uma compreensão do cerne da alma, sua pura existência indeterminada (huparxis), como sendo deiforme, de modo que dele depende tanto a possibilidade do conhecimento verdadeiro, sob a forma de intuição intelectual (noesis), quanto a possibilidade da bem-aventurança, sob a forma do amor (eros). Atualizá-las é o propósito da ascese a que se dedica o filósofo platônico. Esta dissertação busca reconstruir hipoteticamente, a partir de Proclo, este caminho de autoconhecimento do Neoplatonismo Tardio, partindo de uma investigação de suas raízes na religião grega, em Platão e em Plotino

In this thesis I investigate the relationship between 'I' as principle of transcendental philosophy and its ordinary use as first-personal pronoun. This relationship is a central issue in the philosophy of J. G. Fichte. Fichte was concerned to secure the gains made by Kant's Critique against what he called the 'dogmatism of the so-called Kantians' as well as against the attack of the skeptics, by grounding philosophy in a first principle which he called 'I'. To say what Fichte means by 'I' is to give an account of his philosophy, for, according to him, nothing is to be assumed outside of this 'I'. For Fichte the dogmatism of the 'so-called Kantians' consists in the idea that even when the formal conditions of experience have been established, a non-conceptualized content needs to be given to the mind from outside in order to produce empirical knowledge. This way of conceiving empirical constraints of thought, according to Fichte, threatens the results of Kant's critical philosophy, because it is inconsistent with the theoretical spontaneity and the practical autonomy that are crucial to Kant's conception of reason. Fichte argues that adequate empirical constraints can only be deduced from within the 'I'. To do this we must radically rethink our received concept of an 'I', a rethinking which in essence has already been effectuated by Kant, and which Fichte merely wants to make explicit and bring to fruition. Adequate constraints can be seen to be generated internally, once we realize that the standpoint of the 'theoretical I' is derivative from the standpoint of the 'practical I'. A result of Fichte's emphasis on the practical aspect of reason is a heightened awareness of the concept of the individual person and its status vis-a-vis the 'I' as philosophical principle. To be consistent with his principle, and indeed to prove his point, Fichte must 'deduce' the 'I' as individual. / Fichte's repudiation of dogmatism bears striking resemblances to a contemporary reading of Kant associated with the works of P. F. Strawson and John McDowell. The crucial difference is that for these philosophers the concept of a person is taken as primitive, and hence as the starting point of philosophy. At Fichte's time this position was defended by Fichte's critic, F. H. Jacobi. In the thesis I develop a position in contrast with Fichte's idealism which I call a 'naturalism of second nature' and which I use as a conceptual foil to explicate Fichte's thinking. I argue that ultimately Fichte's project fails by his own standards, in that it fails to save what we normally mean by a moral individual. I argue that in order to conceive of adequate constraints on freedom, we need to make the concept of a person as a natural individual our point of departure.

xv, 103 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / While research has extensively documented the inter- and intra-personal consequences of perspective taking, less is known about the mechanisms that underlie this process. Recent research has explored self-other overlap as a mediator of perspective taking on various pro-social outcomes, such as helping and decreased stereotyping. Results have been mixed, perhaps due to the use of different methodologies and scales that actually measure different facets of self-other overlap. This dissertation investigates the structure of self-other overlap and examines how perspective taking may affect only certain facets of self-other overlap, as well as the direction in which this overlap occurs. To test the conceptual equivalence of different overlap measures, in Study 1, participants completed several previously used measures of overlap for two targets: their best friend and an acquaintance. Factor analyses revealed two distinct factors of self-other overlap-- perceived closeness and attribute overlap --although small variations emerged depending on target. These two factors had unique associations with several relationship quality and individual difference measures. Study 2 extended these results by manipulating perspective taking with a stranger. Results replicated the same factor structure from Study 1, and found that perspective taking had different effects on the two factors. Study 3 examined whether or not perspective taking affected the direction of self-other overlap by changing one's attitudes and beliefs to become more like the other person. Results supported a model in which perceived closeness predicted belief change toward the target person, even after accounting for other related consequences of perspective taking such as empathy and positive attitudes. Together, these results suggest that self-other overlap is a multi-dimensional construct associated with different psychological responses. These results are discussed in connection with the relationship between self-other overlap and perspective taking and how this may lead to "self-expansion." / Committee in charge: Sara Hodges, Chairperson, Psychology; Sanjay Srivastava, Member, Psychology; Marjorie Taylor, Member, Psychology; John Lysaker, Outside Member, Philosophy

Chance events began with the Big Bang and influenced all subsequent evolutionary processes, including the genesis and evolution of biological life. The complex and versatile human brain has come to dominate the environment. Self-awareness generated the idea of spiritual identity and survival beyond death. The assumption of demi-god status gave sanctity and dignity to humans, a moral separation that justified the exploitation of other animals. But evolution has a common origin, fleshed out in the biological similarities of all mammals, including humans. Neurological and biochemical correlates suggest the omnipresence of consciousness and self-consciousness at levels that vary according to nervous system complexity. Accepting a more inclusive morality does not diminish the value of human life. It acknowledges their power to adapt to changing conditions. Human survival depends on change and human lives can only benefit from a more inclusive worldview that considers the welfare of all sentient beings and the sustainability of a shared environment. / Philosophy and Systematic Theology / M.A. (Philosophy)

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

What do religions do and how do they do it? In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Émile Durkheim claims that religions are “grounded in and express the real” and center upon a set of ritualized practices that enact and embody in a distinctively intense and potentially transformative form the truth regarding the constitutive relations in which we stand to one another. With the help of Heidegger’s account in “The Origin of the Work of Art” of the way in which works of art work, along with Kierkegaard’s relational account of the health and sickness of the self in The Sickness Unto Death, I attempt in this dissertation to develop an improved version of the basic Durkheimian picture. The central claim is that religious practices are in the game of cultivating and actively integrating the fundamental relationships upon which our being as persons in a most radical and literal sense depends. Where successful, the heightened modes of relationality enacted in such practices transform us into more active, vital, and unalienated agents capable of tackling the concrete normative situations in which we lead our lives. For these reasons, I argue that religious practices aren’t going and shouldn’t go anywhere. If anything, we have grounds for leaning into them more if we hope to develop the existential resources to tackle the various forms of relational breakdown that constitute the true ground of the problem of “disenchantment” and with which our alienated, lonely, and unjust world is saturated.

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