Non-governmental organizations play an increasingly important role in society today. The purpose of this study was to investigate the characteristics, difficulties, and possibilities for NGOs working with social welfare in China. This paper presents data by using qualitative method and analyzes it with the social ecological perspective. The results of this study show that top-down NGOs like the one studied in this paper are experimental organizations which are established according to China's social environment in order to undertake the welfare services ordered by the government. In this way the government legalizes the working of NGOs. However, the result is that, on the one hand, NGOs help government to promote the quality of public services, and on the other, relying on the government becames an obstruction of NGOs development.

published_or_final_version / Public Administration / Master / Master of Public Administration

Thesis (M. P. A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

The current Internet presents a high barrier to entry for new service providers, due to its inability to accommodate new protocols and technologies, and lack of competition among the network providers. Recently, network virtualization has gained considerable attention as a possible solution, as it enables multiple networks to concurrently run over a shared substrate. It allows for deploying diverse network protocols and technologies customized for specific networked services and applications. Moreover, any party can take on the role of a network provider by simply offering his virtual network infrastructure to customers, increasing competition in the market. However, the first challenge in realizing a fair and competitive market in a virtual network environment is to have a service negotiation and contracting mechanism in place, that will allow (i) multiple infrastructure providers to participate in a fair and faithful competition, and (ii) a service provider to negotiate the price and quality of service with the providers. In this thesis, we present V-Mart, an open market model and enabling framework for automated service negotiation and contracting in a virtual network environment. To the infrastructure providers, V-Mart fosters an open and fair competition realized by a two stage auction. The V-Mart auction model ensures that bidders (infrastructure providers) bid truthfully, have the flexibility to apply diverse pricing policies, and still gain profit from hosting customers’ virtual resources. To the service providers, V-Mart offers virtual network partitioning algorithms that allow them to divide their virtual networks among competing infrastructure providers while minimizing the total cost. V-Mart offers two types of algorithms to suit different market scenarios. The algorithms not only consider virtual resource hosting price but also the service provider’s preference for resource co-location and the high cost of inter-provider communication. Through extensive simulation experiments we show the efficiency and effectiveness of the algorithms under various market conditions.

The current Internet presents a high barrier to entry for new service providers, due to its inability to accommodate new protocols and technologies, and lack of competition among the network providers. Recently, network virtualization has gained considerable attention as a possible solution, as it enables multiple networks to concurrently run over a shared substrate. It allows for deploying diverse network protocols and technologies customized for specific networked services and applications. Moreover, any party can take on the role of a network provider by simply offering his virtual network infrastructure to customers, increasing competition in the market. However, the first challenge in realizing a fair and competitive market in a virtual network environment is to have a service negotiation and contracting mechanism in place, that will allow (i) multiple infrastructure providers to participate in a fair and faithful competition, and (ii) a service provider to negotiate the price and quality of service with the providers. In this thesis, we present V-Mart, an open market model and enabling framework for automated service negotiation and contracting in a virtual network environment. To the infrastructure providers, V-Mart fosters an open and fair competition realized by a two stage auction. The V-Mart auction model ensures that bidders (infrastructure providers) bid truthfully, have the flexibility to apply diverse pricing policies, and still gain profit from hosting customers’ virtual resources. To the service providers, V-Mart offers virtual network partitioning algorithms that allow them to divide their virtual networks among competing infrastructure providers while minimizing the total cost. V-Mart offers two types of algorithms to suit different market scenarios. The algorithms not only consider virtual resource hosting price but also the service provider’s preference for resource co-location and the high cost of inter-provider communication. Through extensive simulation experiments we show the efficiency and effectiveness of the algorithms under various market conditions.

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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2008. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 154-162).

This dissertation consists of four separate papers. Paper 1: Will Privatization Reduce Costs? I develop a model of public sector contracting. In this model, an agent can put effort into increasing the quality of a service or reducing costs. Being residual claimants, private owners have stronger incentives to cut costs than public employees. However, if quality cannot be perfectly measured, providing a private firm with incentives to improve quality forces the owner of the firm to bear risk. As a result, private firms will always be cheaper for low levels of quality but might be more expensive for high levels of quality. Paper 2: When Does Privatization Reduce Costs and Improve Quality? Theory and Evidence from Service Contracting I develop and test a model of service contracting in residential youth care. I find that private facilities have lower per-day cost of treatment for low levels of quality, but higher per-day cost for high levels of quality. Though public facilities generally have a higher level of quality, private facilities are relatively better at treating troublesome teenagers. Treatment periods are much longer under private provision, implying that the average total cost of treatment is twice as high in the private sector. Paper 3: Identity and Redistribution (co-author Robert Östling) This paper models the interaction between individuals' identity choices and redistribution. Both redistributive polices and identity choices are endogenous, and there might be multiple equilibria. The model is applied to ethnicity and social class. Paper 4: Political Polarization and Economic Performance (co-author Robert Östling) We study the effect of political polarization on economic performance using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. We find that politically polarized countries are poorer and have smaller and inferior governments. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2007 viii, s. 3-9: sammanfattning, s. 13-203: 4 uppsatser</p>

Submitted by Ana Maria Fiscina Sampaio (fiscina@bahia.fiocruz.br) on 2013-12-03T17:54:38Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rui Manuel Laranjeira Terceirizaçao ... 2012.pdf: 1564442 bytes, checksum: d70b40790a1fd1bf4e8adf7218792c91 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-12-03T17:54:38Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rui Manuel Laranjeira Terceirizaçao ... 2012.pdf: 1564442 bytes, checksum: d70b40790a1fd1bf4e8adf7218792c91 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Universidade Federal da Bahia. Escola de Administração. Salvador, BA, Brasil / A difusão da terceirização de projetos de desenvolvimento de software nas organizações acarretou em dúvidas com relação a quais projetos podem ser terceirizados e quais devem ser desenvolvidos com equipe interna, pois os projetos críticos devem responder a vários requisitos, como: garantia de sigilo, qualidade, prazo, dentre outros, e que também podem não ser totalmente atendidos com a terceirização. O presente trabalho se posiciona neste cenário e nas diferentes formas de se trabalhar a terceirização nas organizações, mais especificamente na área de desenvolvimento de software, tendo como objetivo identificar como este processo de terceirização de TI influencia na utilização dos modelos de contratação de serviços. Foi realizado um estudo de caso envolvendo uma das Unidades da FIOCRUZ. A coleta de dados foi realizada com o gerente de TI da Unidade pesquisada, através de entrevista semiestruturada e com os restantes membros da equipe de desenvolvimento através de um questionário online. De acordo com os resultados obtidos, verificou-se que um processo de terceirização de desenvolvimento de software mais bem estruturado pode influenciar na utilização de um modelo de contratação mais avançado. Ao longo das etapas que compõem o processo de terceirização, observaram-se algumas características que podem exercer de forma mais clara essa influência, como: os objetivos a serem alcançados através da terceirização, os critérios utilizados na escolha do fornecedor, a forma de transição dos serviços e a utilização de métodos de gerenciamento. Constatou-se que a utilização de um modelo de contratação também poderá influenciar a forma como o processo de terceirização é desenvolvido, exigindo ou não uma maior formalização e organização.