Shadow banks were one of the main contributors to the financial crisis of 2007-08. Due to their contribution to increase in systemic risk during the financial crisis they have been researched in the time period of the financial crisis in the USA to find the reason behind the increase in systemic risk from shadow banks. Because of the contribution to systemic risk from shadow banks post financial crisis have largely been ignored, especially in Europe.  This leads to the main research question of this paper, “Does shadow banking affect systemic risk?”  In this paper a ΔCoVaR method is used to measure the systemic risk contribution from shadow banks as well as traditional banks in the EU post financial crisis. CoVaR and VaR is also measured in order to give a better understanding of the systemic risk contribution from the banking sector.  The main results of this paper is that the variable Size which is the total assets, is the factor that increases the systemic risk contribution from traditional banks, which means that the bigger the traditional bank, the bigger their contribution to systemic risk. In the case of shadow banks the variables Total assets, movement to the market and Equity returns volatility, are the contributors to increase in systemic risk. The higher these variables are for the shadow banks, the higher is their contribution to systemic risk. The conclusion of this paper is that the increase in regulations have helped in decreasing the systemic risk contributions from shadow banks and traditional banks but it is not enough. There is a need for more regulations in order to decrease the systemic risk from the banking sector as they still affect systemic risk.

Le premier chapitre propose une théorie d'intermédiation financière, qui explique les raisons de la coexistence entre banques traditionnelles et banques de l'ombre ("shadow banks"). L'argument développé est que ces deux types de banques sont complémentaires, ce qui est dû leur interaction mutuellement bénéfique en temps de crise. Cet argument est cohérent avec certains faits stylisés de la crise financière que nous documentons. Le deuxième chapitre de cette thèse est constitué d’une exposition détaillée ainsi que d’une quantification des transferts entre différentes générations d'épargnants en assurance vie. Ces transferts donnent lieu à un partage de risque intergénérationnel, rendu possible par l'existence d'une friction de marché. Nous montrons que cette friction consiste en une compétition imparfaite entre assureurs vie. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse expose les risques de liquidité auxquels sont sujettes les compagnies d'assurance vie en France, et étudie les décisions d'investissement qui en découlent. L'approche empirique basée sur les spécificités institutionnelles de l'assurance vie - les modalités de taxation des épargnants - met en évidence la causalité du risque de liquidité sur les choix d'investissement des assureurs vie. Le quatrième chapitre étudie les conditions sous lesquelles les entreprises choisissent d’entrer sur un nouveau marché via l'acquisition d'une entreprise existante (entrée externe) plutôt qu'en utilisant leurs ressources existantes (entrée interne). Nous montrons que les entreprises qui entrent sur un nouveau marché via une acquisition sont plutôt celles dont le capital humain est a priori inadapté pour ce marché. / The first chapter presents a theory of the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks. We propose that the two bank types are complementary, because in a crisis, they interact in a mutually beneficial way. Our model is consistent with several facts from the 2007 financial crisis that we document. Chapter two provides a detailed analysis and quantification of the transfers between different generations of life insurance investors. These transfers create intergenerational risk-sharing that is enabled by a market friction. We show that this friction consists in imperfect competition among life insurers. The first chapter presents a theory of the coexistence of traditional and shadow banks. We propose that the two bank types are complementary, because in a crisis, they interact in a mutually beneficial way. Our model is consistent with several facts from the 2007 financial crisis that we document. Chapter two provides a detailed analysis and quantification of the transfers between different generations of life insurance investors. These transfers create intergenerational risk-sharing that is enabled by a market friction. We show that this friction consists in imperfect competition among life insurers. The third chapter analyzes liquidity risks in the French life insurance sector. Using institutional details on life insurance taxation in France, our empirical approach establishes a causal link between liquidity risk on the liability side of life insurers and their investment choices on the asset side. Chapter four studies firms' entry in a new market and the conditions under which a firm enters a new market by building on its existing resources (internal entry) or by acquiring a company already operating in this market (external entry). We find that firms entering a new market externally tend to be those whose human capital is not adequate for the new market.

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