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Research has described and many clinicians have reported the anorectic patient as socially disconnected, having a disembodied sense of self, perfectionist expectations, and inadequate and shameful feelings. The more intense the internal war, the more food-focused and self-defeating behavior ensues, thwarting one's ability to receive value, self-acceptance, and love. Addressing the anorexia phenomenon, this study considered, from a sociological perspective, the dynamics of attachment and shame. On the basis of 4 propositions and using a multi-method, case-replication design, attachment and shame patterns for 5 restrictive and 5 normal eaters were compared, as determined by scores from the Parental Bonding Instrument, Inventory of Parental and Peer Attachment, Internalized Shame Scale, and personal interviews. Analysis was progressive, as propositions were tested by pattern-matching steps of rating, comparing, and interpreting recurring responses to self-report and interview questions. All anorectics reported a dominant mother, with whom 4 were over attached and struggled ambivalently for autonomy, and a quiet, inexpressive father, whom 4 considered frequently absent or unavailable. As compared to normal eaters, anorectics' trust and communication scores were lower for both parents and peers. Generally, anorectics showed markedly higher internalized shame. Findings indicated that nonoptimal parental bonding patterns were related to shame. The maternal bonding pattern of affectionless control (high protection, low care) showed the highest shame score, although affectionate constraint (high protection, high care), the most frequently found pattern, also showed a high shame level. There were polarized differences between restrictive and normal eaters, especially in regards to self-hatred, low self-esteem, and suicide ideation. Anorectics also reported more inferiority and peer alienation. Other emergent findings were noted. A modification of a self-definition/relatedness illustration was suggested, as well as a model for the development of anorexia. Social implications, treatment suggestions, and future research recommendations were also presented.

HBO's The Wire examines the relationship between institutions and individuals in American society and concludes that institutions restrict the agency of individuals, and series creator David Simon likens the power of institutions to the gods of Greek tragedy. In this project, I argue that shame culture enables institutions to have the social influence described by Simon. The paper's introduction defines the term "shame culture" and distinguishes it from "guilt culture," and I use medieval examples of shame culture to illustrate how shame functions in The Wire. This paper divides its detailed discussion of The Wire into four sections, each of which focuses on a different institution. The essay's first section explores how drug dealers and criminals use their reputations aggressively to build drug empires or simply survive, as the characters Marlo Stanfield, a drug kingpin, and Omar Little, a stickup artist, demonstrate. The second section examines Marlo and Omar's influence on young drug dealers, called corner kids in the series, and I argue that the public schools cannot prevent shame from being ingrained in these children. The third section focuses on police officers and, specifically, eventual police commissioner Cedric Daniels, and I examine how the police department's preoccupation with crime statistics reveals their dependence on shame and reputation—the police force is ineffective since they mirror in many ways the criminals they are trying to arrest. Lastly, the essay's fourth section analyzes politicians in The Wire and how Mayor Carcetti is powerless to respond to and exacerbates the city's social problems due to his need to preserve his public image. The paper concludes that social reform that grants agency to individuals in The Wire is impossible as long as shame culture shapes the various institutions depicted in the series.

This thesis is a critical study of the theme of shame in Shakespeare. The first chapter defines the senses in which shame is used. Chapter Two analyses the workings of shame in pre-renaissance literature. The argument sets aside the increasingly discredited shame-culture versus guilt-culture antithesis still often applied to classical and Christian Europe; then classical and Christian shame are compared. Chapter Three focuses on shame in the English Renaissance, with illustrations from Spenser, Marlowe, Jonson, and Milton. Attention is also paid to the cultural context, for instance, to the shaming sanctions employed by the church courts. It is argued that, paradoxically, the humanist aspirations of this period made men and women more vulnerable to shame: more aware of falling short of ideals and open to disappointment and the reproach of self and others. The fourth chapter is an introductory account of Shakespearean shame; examples are drawn from the plays and poems preceding the period of the major tragedies, circa. 1602-9. This lays the groundwork, both conceptually and in terms of Shakespeare's development, for the main part of the thesis, Part Two, which offers detailed readings of Hamlet, Othello, King Lear, Antony and Cleopatra, and Coriolanus. In Each case, a consideration of the theme of shame illuminates the text in question in new ways. For example, and exploration of shame in Hamlet uncovers a neglected spiritual dimension; and it is argued that, despite critical tradition, shame, rather than jealousy, is the key to Othello, and that Antony and Cleopatra establishes the attraction and limitation of shamelessness. The last Chapter describes Shakespeare's distinctive and ultimately Christian vision of shame. In a tail-piece it is suggested that this account of Shakespearean shame casts an intriguing light on a little-known interpretation of Shakespeare's last days by the historian E.R.C. Brinkworth.

As renowned scholar and researcher Sara Ahmed (2004; 2015) reminds us, emotions do things to us because they are relational. This dissertation takes aim at one emotion in particular: shame. By recognizing the similarities between us - that we all feel some degree of shame - we nonetheless inevitably arrive back at our differences: Not all feminists are bombarded with shame equally or in the same way. With a particular emphasis on the ways that shame can obstruct interpersonal relationships within the feminist movement, in this dissertation, I pay close attention to the complexly suppressed shames we encounter when stepping into solidarity with one another, mapping out how negotiating shame can come to represent feminism as a multiplicity. Drawing from shame researchers like Ahmed (2015), Brown (2006), Harris-Perry (2011), and Halberstam (2005b) and Black feminist theorists like Crenshaw (1991), hooks (1992), Lorde (1984), Alexander, (2005), Hill-Collins (2017) and many others, I ask what shame does to feminists in solidarity with one another. To try to answer this question, I rely on Black feminist theory and methodology, focusing on autoethnography as well as a critical discourse analysis of two of Octavia Butler's novels, Parable of the Sower (1993) and Parable of the Talents (1998). The following research questions guide my analysis: 1a) How is shame conceptualized in shame research? 1b) How does shame function and why? 2) How does shame hinder our interpersonal relationships with one another? 3a) What does shame do to the mind-body? and 3b) What implications does this have for feminists? Octavia Butler's fiction provides representations of shame that help us to conceptualize harms that result when feminists are affected by an excess accumulation of shame. This study hypothesizes that, to avoid being derailed by difficult emotions like shame, we must explore different conceptions of shame as essential contributions to feminist understandings of solidarity.

In this dissertation, I examine Plato and Aristotle's reasons for denying that aidôs, or a sense of shame, is a virtue. The bulk of my study is devoted to the interpretation of two key texts: Plato's Charmides and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Although both philosophers see an important role for shame in moral education, they share the view that a fully virtuous person's actions are guided not by aidôs, but by practical wisdom. In the opening chapter, I provide an overview of their conception of shame as an essentially social emotion that expresses our concern for the opinions of others. I present and give a critique of a recent theory of shame that challenges this conception. The starting point of the second chapter is a brief passage in the Charmides where Socrates examines Charmides' claim that aidôs is the same as sôphrosunê ("temperance" or "moderation"). Socrates refutes the definition by citing a single verse from Homer's Odyssey: "aidôs is no good in a needy man." In order to make sense of his dubious appeal to poetic authority, I provide a close reading of Socrates' opening narration, in which he describes his initial encounter with the beautiful young Charmides. I show that the ambivalence about aidôs expressed in the quotation is justified through Socrates' portrait of Charmides. Though admirable at this early stage of his life, Charmides' aidôs is the very thing that prevents him from challenging Socrates' argument and gaining a deeper understanding of virtue. In the third chapter, I turn to the discussion of shame in Book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly argues that aidôs is not a virtue. The two arguments of NE 4.9 have puzzled commentators. My aim is to reconstruct Aristotle's view of aidôs and show that he does in fact have good grounds for excluding it from his list of virtues. / text

95 leaves. / The area of shame, in psychology, has become increasingly popular in recent years. Despite a great richness of theoretical literature, there is, unfortunately, a dearth of actual research on shame. This study has sought to empirically investigate the relationship between shame and three compulsive behaviours, namely, alcohol dependence, drug dependence and disordered eating. Relations between shame and alcohol dependence, and shame and drug dependence have already been established in the research literature. This study sought to validate these relationships and to extend the research in the area to establish a link between shame and disordered eating. Cook's Internalised Shame Scale was used to assimilate shame, whilst Millon's Clinical Multiaxial Inventory was used to assess drug and alcohol dependence. Disordered eating was assessed by using the Eating Attitudes Test. Pearson's Product Moment Correlations were computed, and regression analyses were conducted, it was found that shame was significantly correlated with alcohol dependence, drug dependence and disordered eating, and that shame predicted 33% of the variation in alcohol dependent behaviour, 36% of the variation in drug dependent behaviour, and 30% of the variation in disordered eating. Within the methodology used it was not possible to establish causality. However, it was possible to contextualise these results within the literature, and suggest possible explanations. From within the literature on shame it was suggested that shame is linked to alcohol abuse and drug abuse as well as to disordered eating, and that the relationship is one of circular causality. Shame is consequent on these behaviours but these behaviours also attempt to reduce shame and are intended to be self soothing, and containing of the uncomfortable feelings attached to an inadequate sense of self. Limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research were examined. / AM2016

Hu, Jing. / Thesis (M.Mus.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-55). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Shame and Its Structure --- p.5 / Chapter 2.1 --- Shame: General Description --- p.5 / Chapter 2.2 --- Shame and Self-evaluations --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- Self-image --- p.14 / Chapter 2.4 --- Parallels in Early Confucian Tradition --- p.16 / Chapter 2.5 --- Knowledge of Self-evaluations and Articulation of Self-evaluations --- p.20 / Chapter 3. --- Shame in Relation to Other People --- p.24 / Chapter 3.1 --- Observers and Imaginary Observers --- p.24 / Chapter 3.2 --- Shame Brought About by Other Parties --- p.28 / Chapter 3.3 --- Exposing Shameful Affairs to the Public --- p.30 / Chapter 3.4 --- Self-evaluations in Relation to Other People --- p.31 / Chapter > 3.4.1. --- Other People in the Formulation and Revision of Self-evaluaitions --- p.31 / Chapter > 3.4.2 --- Impacts from the Community --- p.33 / Chapter > 3.4.3 --- Chi and Social Standards in Early Chinese Thought --- p.34 / Chapter 4. --- The Role of Shame --- p.36 / Chapter 4.1 --- Shame Serves to Alert One to One´ةs Deficiencies --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2 --- Positive Responses to Shame --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Direct Improvement --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Positive Responses Involving a Third Party --- p.39 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Passive Changing of Self-evaluations --- p.41 / Chapter 4.2.4 --- Revising Self-evaluations --- p.42 / Chapter 4.3 --- Responses to Chi in the Early Confucian tradition --- p.44 / Chapter 4.4 --- Scars Left by Shame --- p.46 / Chapter 4.5 --- The Destructive Effects of Shame --- p.48 / Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.49 / Reference: --- p.52

This dissertation provides a thorough examination of the role of aeschynē (as distinct from aidōs) in Aristotle’s conception of human nature by illuminating the political and ethical implications of shame and shamelessness and the effect of these implications in his treatises. It is crucial, both to one’s own personhood and eudaimonia as well as to the existence of a just and balanced state, that aeschynē be understood and respected because of the self-evaluating ability that it maintains. The aim of this work is to show that a recognition and appreciation of aeschynē as understood in Aristotle’s conception of human nature simultaneously leads to eudaimonia and away from the dangerous state of anaeschyntia (shamelessness). Aeschynē is required in order to create a better existence both on the personal level and on the larger level of social community. The function and responsibility of aeschynē in Aristotle’s work is recognized in its full potential as a civic virtue: specifically, metriopatheia. Metriopatheia, which is aeschynē properly energized through phronesis, acts as a tool allowing one to moderate her passions. It is essential to recognize Aristotle’s use of aeschynē as metriopatheia because it sheds new light on Aristotle’s conception of human nature. The rational human soul, according to Aristotle, is always striving for full actuality. The goal of human life, like all life for Aristotle, is proper function with excellence. Aeschynē as metriopatheia is responsible for the moderation of one’s passions thus promoting aretē. Aeschynē offers insight into the opinions of those who are ethical and thus produces right reason in actions. One who is anaeschyntia cannot reach her full potentiality nor can she be a contributing member of the political community, the koinōnia.

Aim. The aim of the present research was to investigate the relationship of personality guilt- and shame-proneness to grief and psychological dysphoria following bereavement due to stillbirth or death in the newborn period. Methods. Participating parents completed self-report questionnaire measures of proneness to situational guilt and shame (Test of Self-Conscious Affect-2), chronic guilt and shame (Personal Feelings Questionnaire-2) and interpersonal guilt (Interpersonal Guilt Questionnaire-67), grief (Perinatal Grief Scale-33) and psychological dysphoria (General Health Questionnaire-28) one month (�early�, N = 158) and 13 months (�late�, N = 149) after a perinatal death. Results. Women compared with men self-reported more intense grief, anxiety and depression one month after the death, but there were no significant sex differences in grief or psychological dysphoria one year later. Hierarchical multiple regression analyses showed that composite shame (situational and chronic) explained a small but statistically significant proportion of the variance in early total grief (adjusted R 2 = .09) and anxiety (adjusted R 2 = .07) in women, and early total grief (adjusted R 2 = .19), anxiety (adjusted R 2 = .13) and depression (adjusted R 2 = .10) in men. Composite guilt (situational, chronic and interpersonal) controlled for shame did not make a significant further contribution to the variance in early total grief, anxiety or depression in either sex. Composite shame explained not only significant but meaningful proportions of the variance in late grief (adjusted R2=.27), anxiety (adjusted R2=.21) and depression (adjusted R2=.27) in women, and late grief (adjusted R2= .56),anxiety (adjusted R 2= .30) and depression (adjusted R2= .51) in men. Composite guilt controlled for shame made significant further contributions to the variancein late grief (∆R 2 = .21), anxiety (∆R 2 = .16) and depression (∆R 2 = .25) in women, and late grief (∆R 2 = .11) in men. Shame and guilt together explained a substantial proportion of the variance in late grief (adjusted R2= .45), anxiety (adjusted R2= .33) and depression (adjusted R2= .49) in women, and late grief (adjusted R2= .64), anxiety (adjusted R2= .35) and depression (adjusted R2= .56) in men. Situational shame, chronic guilt and survivor guilt made positive unique contributions to the variance in late grief in women. Chronic shame and survivor guilt made unique contributions to the variance in late grief in men. Situational guilt made a significant unique negatively valenced contribution to the variance in late grief in women. Early composite shame, but not guilt, predicted late grief, anxiety and depression in men. Early composite shame and/or guilt did not predict late grief, anxiety or depression in women. Conclusion. Personality proneness to shame was more relevant to late grief, anxiety and depression in men than in women, but survivor guilt was equally important to late grief in both sexes. Chronic guilt and functional situational guilt were pertinent to late grief, anxiety and depression in women, but not in men. Personality shame- and guilt-proneness have important relationships with parental grief after perinatal death that have not hitherto been recognised.