Advertising has been playing an important role in Marketing for a long time. An effective advertising can help the business to promote their brand and convey the product information to the target consumer successfully. In addition, there are some advantages of advertising haven¡¦t been discovered yet. The purpose of this study is to combine ¡§Marketing¡¨ with ¡§Finance¡¨ to explore the influence of marketing strategies on finance by discussing the relationship between advertising, customer satisfaction and shareholder value. The empirical study finds two important elements influencing on the shareholder value. First, advertising can create the intangible assets such as goodwill and reputation and transform those intangible assets into the cash flow to the business, and then increase the shareholder value. Second, according to the past study asserting that there are positive relationship between the customer satisfaction and shareholder value, this study also gets the positive and significant result. This study applied the LISREL model to verify the relationship between advertising, customer satisfaction and shareholder value through the process of direct and indirect effect on shareholder value. We find that the indirect effect of advertising is significant because the advertising increases shareholder value indirectly by increasing the customer satisfaction. The findings of this study can help the business manager to realize the interactions between ¡§Marketing¡¨ and ¡§Finance¡¨ and to make strategic decision to maximum the shareholder value by noticing that the role of marketing is as important as the financial performance.

<p>A takeover announcement does not necessarily mean good news for stockholders of the acquiring firm. In fact, for a majority of takeovers it means losses in share prices. Motives that can explain this trend are agency and hubris. This thesis is an event study of 28 acquir-ing firms in Sweden between the years 1997-2005, and the purpose is set to see whether stock prices are affected or not. This has been done by the help of the market model. The empirical results show that the takeovers are on average value decreasing operations which indicate that agency and hubris are the primary motives even though one can not for cer-tain exclude synergy.</p>

Mannheim, Universität, Thesis (doctoral), 2001.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität St. Gallen, 1997.

Undersökningen tog avstamp i att den svenska bostadsmarknaden påvisar grundläggande strukturella problem samtidigt som svenska fastighetsföretag uppvisar goda ekonomiska resultat. För att angripa det övergripande problemet genomfördes en fallstudie där syftet var att skapa en djupare förståelse för hur ett framstående fastighetsbolag förhåller sig till olika intressenter. Undersökningen avser att besvara följande frågeställningar: -  Hur förhåller sig Fastighetsföretaget till olika intressenter på bostadsmarknaden? -  Hur kan förhållningssättet förstås utifrån ett teoretiskt perspektiv? För att nå fram till ett resultat användes fyra teorier för att analysera undersökningens data som härstammar från intervjuer och företagets senaste årsredovisning. Resultatet påvisar att Fastighetsbolagets relation till ägarna var överordnad andra intressenter. Ägarnas krav på avkastning var det mål som var prioriterat även om det fanns en syn att nyckelintressenternas mål och ägarnas intressen var positivt korrelerade. De teorier som användes i undersökningen bidrog alla till att förklara olika fenomen inom Fastighetsföretagets verksamhet. Däremot hade en teoribildning det största förklaringsvärdet för Fastighetsföretagets förhållningssätt och stöddes framför allt av att ägarnas finansiella mål var överordnat andra intressenters mål och synen på andra intressenters mål som instrument för uppfyllande av det finansiella målet på lång sikt.

At the crossroads of insolvency and securities law lies the question as to whether defrauded shareholders should rank equally with unsecured creditors in cases involving fraudulent or misleading behaviour. Important questions arise at this juncture concerning the efficiency, certainty, transparency and fairness of the treatment of such claims in insolvency situations. In Sons of Gwalia Ltd (admin apptd) v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1, the High Court chose not to apply a rule said to be germane to insolvency cases involving fraudulent or misleading conduct inducing share purchase known as the rule in Houldsworth??s Case. The ??rule?? said to have been developed in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 had up until the High Court??s decision been used to interpret legislative provisions concerning shareholder claims, resulting in problematic determinations in the context of modern developed markets. While it is submitted the High Court was justified in choosing not to apply the rule in Houldsworth??s Case and thus allowing shareholders to claim as unsecured creditors, the rule may still prove good law in certain cases. Indeed, the referral of the High Court??s decision to the Corporations and Markets Advisory Committee for review may result in legislative change which reverts to the traditional treatment of shareholders in such circumstances. Accordingly this dissertation engages in a doctrinal analysis of historical precedent on defrauded shareholder claims in the UK and Australia to demonstrate that the decision in Houldsworth and subsequent interpretation and application of the ??rule?? therein suffer from deep flaws, and have been productive of relative injustice. It is argued that it is necessary to put the current uncertainty surrounding the applicability of Houldsworth in Australia beyond doubt through legislative abrogation of the rule in Houldsworth??s Case. As the result of such abrogation would represent a significant policy shift in Australian corporate law, the merits and difficulties of the resulting position will be addressed by this dissertation. It will be argued that a policy of shareholder parity with unsecured creditors best meets the goals of insolvency and securities law regimes while contributing to the sustainability of a fair and efficient market, and investor participation in it.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

This dissertation examines the identity of new controlling shareholders in partial corporate control transactions and its influence on firm performance and corporate policies in an international context. In a transfer of partial corporate control, the identity of controlling shareholder changs, thereby facilitating an event study of corporate changes resulted from controlling shareholder turnover. The dissertation comprises of three empirical research projects to address two questions: Firstly, does the identity of a new controlling shareholder in a partial control transfer matter to firm value? Secondly, how does new controlling shareholder identity explain the differences of firm performance and corporate policies in the long run? The equity block transactions in listed firms from around the world announced between 1996 and 2005 are filtered to arrive at the final sample of 215 corporate control transfers through private negotiation. This hand-collected dataset allows the dissertation to contribute to the existing literature on ownership concentration by introducing the identity of controlling shareholder into the theoretical framework and investigating its significance in an international context. It is argued that firm value, long-term performance and corporate policies can be influenced by the identity of new controlling shareholders because different controlling shareholders have distinct incentives, skills and styles. This dissertation finds that individual investor controlled firms outperform those controlled by corporate investors in both short-term abnormal returns and long-term performance after a control transfer; and that the sample firms controlled by individual and corporate investors adopt different policies of investment and financial leverage. The evidence presented here shows that individual controlling shareholders are better motivated to monitor managers and improve operational efficiency. Partial corporate control activities have important governance effects and controlling shareholder heterogeneity is a significant contributing factor to firm performance and decision making.

Zugl.: Leipzig, Handelshochsch., Habil.-Schr., 2001

Univ., Diss.--Oestrich-Winkel, 2004.