Cette thèse vise à analyser les aspects juridiques du rôle joué par les acteurs ayant une stratégie actionariale de court-terme (hedge funds,...) dans le cadre des offres publiques d'acquisition. Outre l'identification de ces acteurs et la description des méthodes employées, il s'agit aussi de s'interroger sur les moyens à disposition de la société cible pour se défendre et de se demander si des évolutions législatives ne seraient pas nécessaires. / The purpose of the Phd is to analyze questions raised by short-termism in takevoer bids. As a matter of fact, some shareholders only have short-terme strategies (such as Hedge funds,...) and takeover bids provide some fantastic arbitration opportunities. First, one should clearly identify these actors. Products which might be used in such situation will also have to be studied. Second, one should analyze which defence could provide the target. Third, a study of the opportunity or repealing or amending french legislation on these issues will be done.

This Dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay examines how corporate financial policies depend on the properties of future cash flows. In contrast to prior literature, we investigate the role of asymmetries in the distributionof cash flows. We document the relevance of such asymmetries for firms' payout, liquidity, and capital structure policies. Policies are more sensitive to downside volatility and the directional effect of upside variation is often opposite that of downside. Controlling for cash flow volatility,policies significantly relate to measures of skewness. Firms adopt more conservative policies (lower propensity to pay, more cash, less leverage) when cash flow news is more negatively skewed. The second essay addresses a mythical relationship between corporate payout and short-termism. Over the past 30 years, aggregate investment by US public corporations has declined, and corporate payout has increased. These facts are interpreted as evidence that public firms are plagued by short-termism and are foregoing valuable investment opportunities to support the large payouts. We find that large increases in corporate payout do not impact firm investment or innovative activities in the short run. In the long run, firms which increase their payout invest more in physical capital than control firms and that their RandD spending is comparable. Firms which increase their payout do not experience a decline in operating profitability or valuation in the long run. These conclusions hold when we restrict our attention to firms who persist in making large payouts and for those high payout firms that rely on internal funds. Our results are inconsistent with the view that unusually high payout harms the long-term viability of US firms. The evidence in the paper suggests that the high payers are from industries with declining growth opportunities but the firms themselves are expecting their high profitability and cash flow to persist. / Doctor of Philosophy / Large increases or decreases in a company’s earnings or stock returns are breathcatching. Do such large changes contain information about the company’s future performance? If so, what information do they carry? My first essay answers these questions by looking into the data. We find that extreme stock returns do carry information about firms’ long-run performance, and this information effectively predicts firms’ financial decisions including payout, cash balance, and leverage. U.S. public firms have been decreasing their capital investment and increasing their cash payout to shareholders in the past 30 years. This create a concern because these firms are supposed to support economy growth and create jobs. Some commenters would conclude that if public firms payout so much money to shareholders, they would not have enough resource to support economy growth and create jobs. We try to find evidence from the data to support or refute this argument. The data shows that firms that payout a large amount of cash to shareholders do not reduce investment relative to their otherwise similar peers, neither in the short run nor in the long run. We also find that the firms that payout high amount are from industries with declining growth opportunities but the firms themselves are expecting their high profitability and cash flow to persist.

This dissertation consists of two essays, both co-authored with Ugur Lel. The first essay (Chapter 1) examines whether high CEO pay inequality (CPI), the share of total managerial pay captured by the CEO, is an outcome of poor corporate governance, and its implications for shareholder wealth. We exploit the 2002 NYSE and NASDAQ governance reforms that mandated firms to have majority independent boards as a quasi-exogenous source of variation in the internal governance environment of firms. Results show that CPI decreases following the passage of these exchange listing regulations, but only in firms with entrenched CEOs affected by the exchange listing regulations. Firm value also increases for these firms. These results are robust to a variety of robustness checks such as a matched sample analysis and placebo tests. Overall, our results suggest that poor governance environments are associated with high managerial pay differences and consequently lower firm valuations, supporting the view that high CEO pay inequality reflects managerial entrenchment. The second essay (Chapter 2) examines whether shareholders use executive compensation channel to align managerial horizon with their investment horizon. We utilize a newly emerged empirical measure, pay duration, to measure managerial horizon. For shareholder horizon, we use the fraction of long-term institutional ownership in the firm. Results show that there is a positive association between long-term institutional ownership and CEO pay duration, suggesting that shareholder horizon is a determining factor in compensation contracts. We address reverse causality using indexer institutions. We also establish a causal link from investor horizon to CEO pay duration using institution mergers as a source of exogenous variation in investor horizon of the firm. We extend our results to hedge fund activism and document a negative relation between hedge fund activism and pay duration, which is consistent with our argument. Overall our results suggest that shareholders structure CEO pay in a way that is consistent with their investment horizon. / Ph. D. / CEOs play a crucial role in today’s financial world. They are the ultimate decision makers in companies and their goal is to maximize the shareholder wealth. Motivating the CEO to work hard and maximize shareholder wealth hinges on optimally designed compensation contracts. Shareholders delegate company directors to design these pay contracts. However, conflicts of interest between directors and CEOs, between shareholders and CEOs, and even among shareholders, affect the design of CEO pay contracts. It is important to study these conflicts of interest and their effect on CEO compensation to ensure well-functioning companies and a fair market. The objective of the first chapter is to examine whether the CEOs are overpaid when the company directors are not able to monitor the actions and decisions of the CEOs. We document that powerful and established CEOs are overpaid, both in dollar terms and relative to other managers in the company, when they are not properly monitored. We also document that regulations that aim to improve monitoring quality in companies bring CEO pay to fair levels, leading to an increase in company valuations. These findings point out the importance of regulations that improve the governance of companies. In the second chapter, we examine short-termism (or myopia) in the context of CEO pay. Basically, short-termism is any action that saves today but is costly in future. While short-term shareholders invest in companies for short periods to take advantage of temporary changes in company valuation, long-term investors invest for long periods and aim to benefit from long-term increase in company valuation. We document that the conflict of interest among shareholders with different investment periods is reflected in the design of CEO pay contracts. In particular, CEOs wait more to receive their compensation if the dominant investor type in the company has longer investment period. This finding explains how shareholders use CEO compensation to achieve wealth maximization, highlighting the power and importance of CEO pay contracts.

Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is perceived so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators. Differences in regulatory regimes as well as in the real economies have produced a large variety in the characteristics of financial sectors and of individual intermediaries. In particular, in different places and times it is possible to observe banking sectors more or less competitive, populated by credit intermediaries of different sizes and with different levels of specialization. This variety of institutions raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning financial intermediation sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies all intending to contribute in this direction. Chapter 2 Recent empirical works have found evidence consistent with larger banks having lower incentives to collect soft information and, in particular, to lend to small firms which are typically regarded as relatively opaque borrowers. Another market segment affected by relatively high levels of opaqueness is that of long-term loans and the reason is that, as emphasized in the corporate finance literature, short-term maturities are useful for the purpose of screening and monitoring investment projects. It is therefore interesting to assess whether large and small banks differ in their propensity to issue long-term loans, a type of investigation which has not been conducted yet. The reason why small and large banks might be expected to have a different propensity to issue long-term loans has to do with two notions. First, the effectiveness of a short-term maturity as a screening and monitoring device is preserved only if parties anticipate that, when payments are due, the lender will not be willing to extend the maturity, otherwise the initial short-term loan is de facto a long-term one. The problem may rise if the liquidation of insolvent firms produces lower payoffs than their refinancing: under these circumstances, as suggested by theories on renegotiation, liquidation is not implemented no matter what is written on the contract (parties can easily avoid the inefficiency that would result from liquidation, for example by simply granting a new loan). Second, at a more specific level theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability to commit to not extend thematurity decreases with bank size.1 Small banks are therefore predicted to issue shorter-term loans and to make a better selection of projects. The results are consistent with this prediction. Controlling for other characteristics of both the demand- and the supply-side as well as for the type of guarantee supplied, small banks have lower proportions of long-term loans to total loans and lower proportions of non performing loans to total loans. It should be pointed out that this does not imply that small banks are necessarily more efficient since short-term maturities also have costs; in particular, short-term maturities can interfere with the incentives of good types by inducing short-termism (the inflation of shortterm results at the expenses of total profitability). Moreover, beyond the ability to commit other supply-side features are shown to be relevant in the determination of the maturity, at least with specific classes borrowers. In particular, the findings are also consistent with the presence of economies of scale in lending at long maturities to firms in more technical and innovative industries. Since providing the right incentives to high quality entrepreneurs and to firms in innovative sectors is more likely to be a priority in more advanced countries, a policy implication is that these economies need more the presence of large credit institutions and the more so if venture capital and stock market are of limited size. Chapter 3 As already emphasized, theories on renegotiation suggest that the ability of banks to commit to a given course of action is an important factor for efficiency and that such ability depends on observable characteristics, like bank size. An important aspect which has not been analyzed in the theoretical literature is the effect that competition among banks exert on their ability to commit. The theoretical model presented in chapter 3 tries to provide an answer to this question. More specifically, the model studies the effects of competition among banks when these are subject to dynamic commitment problems which may result in excess refinancing of insolvent borrowers (soft budget constraint) as well as in excess termination of profitable ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). The building assumption is that, because of priority schemes and relationship lending, competition is harsher for new lending than for lending to ongoing projects. The main conclusion is that there exists a trade-off between the benefits that competition brings by disciplining low quality borrowers and the costs implied by worsening the incentives of good ones. The model also allows to look at the effects of competition on stability. This is done in two ways by looking at the extent to which competition interferes with the procyclicality of the banking sector and by studying if competition may eliminate or add inefficient equilibria. The main policy implication is that the optimal level of competition of a banking system is positively related to the quality of the underlying economy. If taken together, the results of chapters 2 and 3 also provide a theory about local or regional banks which is not based on any aprioristic assumption about the technology of these type of intermediaries. As long as these institutions can be seen as banks with a relatively high market power and a relatively small size (they are often important players at a local level although of limited size), both chapters 2 and 3 suggest that these intermediaries can more easily commit to a tough stance at the refinancing stage, with positive effects on their ability to screen out bad projects but with negative effects on their ability to incentivize good types and to fund more technical and innovative firms. In other words, these institutions might promote growth at earlier stages of development, although they are not sufficient to address the incentive issues of more advanced economies. Interestingly, this interpretation of the role of local banks is totally distinct from the traditional one which is based on the aprioristic assumption that these banks are good in doing relationship lending. Chapter 4 Conflicts of interest of economic institutions carrying out a variety of functions are considered a widespread phenomenon severely limiting the efficiency that can be achieved. These worries are often taken as justification for regulations imposing transparency requirements or tougher measures like separation of functions. At the same time, contract theory suggests that the effects of opportunistic behavior can be limited by adopting appropriate incentive schemes. The third study, chapter 4, tries to understand from a theoretical point of view to what extent the use of incentive schemes can address the distortions posed by the presence of conflicts of interest. The universal bank is regarded as a (common) agent serving different clients with potentially conflicting interests: for example, it may buy assets on behalf of investors and sell assets on behalf of issuing firms. The clients offer incentive schemes to the bank and they behave non-cooperatively. The bank decides a level of effort and, when firewalls are absent, a level of collusion, modelled as a costly and unproductive redistribution of wealth among the clients (for example, the banks can at no cost sell the securities it is underwriting to the funds it manages and can do so at the price it likes). Firewalls are defined as all legal or economic devices imposing a real separation of functions and therefore preventing the bank from colluding as specified above. The main conclusion is that in the absence of firewalls the equilibrium incentive schemes are steeper. This means that the equilibrium level of effort is higher and may compensate the (ex post) inefficiency of collusion. In other words, not only appropriate incentive schemes can eliminate the distortions posed by conflicts of interest but, at least in principle, their presence may even be necessary for efficiency (this happens if effort is a public good for the two principals so that the allocation without firewalls is characterized by under-provision of effort). At the same time, the allocation without firewalls is shown to be the least efficient in the presence of one naive player who does not recognize the existence of the conflict of interest. As long as transparency requirements can be considered tools to improve market participants’ sophistication, these results suggest why and how this type of regulation can work. Moreover, the model allows to draw conclusions about the desirability of tougher regulation prescribing a more or less neat separation of functions. With sophisticated economic agents, who can address the distortions posed by conflicts of interest by choosing appropriate incentive schemes, separation of functions is unnecessary or even detrimental for efficiency. On the other hand, more or less powerful firewalls are desirable if market participants are not considered sufficiently sophisticated to be able to react to the presence of conflicts of interest and if transparency requirements cannot increase their sophistication. In few words, the optimal regulation of conflicts of interest is softer in situations involving professionals who are more likely to realize and to react by choosing an appropriate incentive scheme or, more generally, for institutions operating in advanced economies where the average level of market participants sophistication is higher.

Taking a sociological perspective on the market for corporate control this thesis calls into question financial capitalism with its preference for clear shareholder-value governance of the corporation. The institutional setting chosen to show this is Sweden, with its particularly shareholder friendly governance regime and its very active takeover market. To this is added three longitudinal case studies of cross-border hostile takeover processes during the sixth takeover wave in Europe. These reveal that the success of cross-border hostile bids has little to do with the theory of the market for corporate control, as a market where contests enable “good managers” to win over “bad managers”, with the overarching goal of enhancing wealth creation for society at large. Instead the most successful actors on a market for corporate control are those who best understand that market’s power dynamics – including the use of regulatory and moral arbitrage between different national frameworks and the leveraging of short-termism of institutional investors. The case studies are then analyzed in relation to the revised Swedish takeover rules of 2009. This shows that the revision did not address the problems detected, focusing instead on enhancing deal making and further limiting the board’s ability to work for long term value creation. As a whole this thesis calls for a development of a theory of a market for corporate control that in a more sustainable way will enable board of directors to focus on the corporation as value accretive entity. Sophie Nachemson-Ekwall has conducted her PhD work at the Stockholm School of Economics and is today a researcher
at the Center for Management and Organization at the Stockholm School of Economics Institute for Research (SIR). She has a background as a prize winning financial journalist for over 20 years and has co-authored three books about delicate issues in large Swedish corporations. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2012</p>

In the first essay I examine the cash policies of female-led firms. Recent research finds that female CEOs eschew riskier corporate policies, but it makes contradicting claims whether this is due to risk aversion. Benchmarking risk aversion by the management of firms’ cash, I find that female CEOs are risk averse relative to male CEOs. Specifically, they hold significantly (18%) more cash, even for the same level of dividend payout as male CEOs. Further, they have significantly higher speed of adjustment for cash deficits, are more likely to use excess cash to increase dividends, but are equally likely to use it to increase investment. Collectively, these results indicate that greater risk aversion in the general female population continues beyond the glass ceiling and likely influences female CEOs’ corporate policies. Nonetheless, cash held by female CEOs has greater marginal value, suggesting a dividend-clientele effect. In the second essay I examine the impact of CEO gender on compensation keeping in view the corporate outcomes that they beget. Risk aversion may influence CEOs’ intertemporal choices and effort regarding short-term and long-term corporate activities. Given that females are more risk averse, I examine whether there are gender-based differences in short- and long-term corporate outcomes and whether these lead to gender-based disparity in CEO compensation. I find that female CEOs have significantly (10%) superior performance on short-term firm outcomes, but inferior (24%) performance on long-term outcomes, relative to male CEOs. However, for a given level of short-term (long-term) performance female CEOs obtain relatively more (less) short-term (short-term and long-term) compensation. The end result is that there is no difference in the total compensation between male and female CEOs. This suggests that female CEOs are well rewarded for their short-termism, enough to make up for their relative underperformance on long-term goals.

This thesis examines responses to the problem of stock market short-termism ('SMST'). SMST is defined as investors preferring short-term financial returns over potentially more profitable longer-term investment opportunities. Such short-termism may result in serious real-world consequences. Company executives appear to respond to short-term pressures in ways that jeopardize the long-term sustainability of listed companies negatively impacting investors and other stakeholders including employees, customers and the community at large. This thesis provides an original contribution to the academic literature via an in-depth examination of all significant regulatory and financial industry efforts meant to reform SMST in major capital markets after the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. I hypothesize that the extensive discussion of the SMST issue has generated substantial reforms. Based on an analysis of the implemented reforms, I reveal that the anticipated surge of SMST reform has not occurred. I then explore why the widespread SMST discussion has not resulted in greater reform efforts. This examination reveals the complex nature of the SMST problem and the evidentiary issues inherent in viably identifying and measuring the harms of SMST. However, I determine that there is probable cause for concern justifying SMST reform measures. Further, I conclude that SMST issues arise because investors are biased towards short-term returns when calculating risk. This bias is evident in share pricing, meaning that share prices are not a reliable indicator of fundamental corporate value. Based on this conclusion, an original dual pathway for SMST reform is proposed. This dual pathway indicates that SMST reform measures must either: (1) reduce the actual or perceived excessive discounting of future returns by investors (i.e. make share prices better reflective of long-term value); or (2) cut-off the transmission mechanisms of SMST into the listed company (i.e. sever the link between share prices and corporate decision-making). Assessing the reforms against this dual pathway reveals that few of the reforms are conceptually effective. Of the few reforms that are conceptually effective, most are relatively 'light' touch. A 'light' touch approach may not be problematic, however, as such measures are easier to implement than 'hard' law. In the case of regulatory reforms, a 'light' touch approach provides scope for flexibility to minimize the many potential harms associated with 'hard' law measures. Consequently, this thesis concludes that SMST reform is more likely to occur if reformers pursue a 'lighter' touch approach meant to reduce excessive discounting of future returns and 'nudge' capital markets away from their harmful short-termism focus.

Unterlassen die Vorstände deutscher Unternehmen wirtschaftlich sinnvolle Investitionen, um einer auf Quartalszahlen fokussierten Financial Community befriedigende Ergebnisse präsentieren zu können? In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die Frage nach der Existenz von solch kurzfristigem Verhalten, bezeichnet als Managermyopie bzw. Managerial Myopia, sowie den Einflussfaktoren auf dieses Verhalten gestellt. Zur Beantwortung wurden eine postalische, anonymisierte Fragebogenumfrage unter den Finanzvorständen der CDAX-Unternehmen mit einer Rücklaufquote von 21% sowie teilstrukturierte Interviews durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse liefern deutliche Hinweise auf die Existenz von kurzfristigem Verhalten. Die Faktoren Kapitalmarktdruck, Unternehmensgröße und Fremdkapitalquote besitzen einen statistisch messbaren Einfluss auf kurzfristiges Verhalten. Die Untersuchung liefert direkte Erkenntnisse über Kapitalmarktdruck, das tatsächlich ausgeübte Maß von kurzfristigem Verhalten und die aktuelle Debatte über die verpflichtende Einführung von Quartalsberichterstattung.

Cette thèse contient trois études sur le fonctionnement des banques.<p>Le premier Chapitre analyse empiriquement comment la capacité d’offrir des emprunts à long terme est influencée par la dimension des intermédiaires financiers.<p>Le deuxième Chapitre analyse, avec un model théorique caractérisé par la présence de soft-budget constraint, ratchet effect et short-termism, comment la pression compétitive influence la capacité des banque de financer le firmes ayant des projets de bonne qualité.<p>Le troisième Chapitre examine, avec un model théorique du type moral hazard common agency, le conflits d'intérêts des banques universelles.<p><p>Financial intermediaries are recognized to promote the efficiency of resource allocation by mitigating problems of incentives, asymmetric information and contract incompleteness. The role played by financial intermediaries is considered so crucial that these institutions have received all over the world the greatest attention of regulators.<p>Across and within banking sectors it is possible to observe a wide variety of intermediaries. Banks may differ in their size, market power and degree of specialization. This variety raises interesting questions about the features of a well functioning banking sector. These questions have inspired an important body of economic literature which, however, is still inconclusive in many aspects. This dissertation includes three studies intending to contribute in this direction.<p>Chapter 1 will empirically study the willingness of smaller and larger lenders to grant long-term loans which, as credit to SME's, constitute an opaque segment of the credit market. Chapter 2 analyzes, with a theoretical model, the effects of competition on the efficiency of the banking sector when this is characterized by dynamic commitment issues which brings to excessive refinancing of bad quality investments (so called soft-budget constraint) or excessive termination of good ones (ratchet effect and short-termism). Chapter 3 presents a model to investigate to what extent the distortions posed by conflicts of interest in universal banks can be addressed through the provision of appropriate incentive schemes by the different categories of clients. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Unterlassen die Vorstände deutscher Unternehmen wirtschaftlich sinnvolle Investitionen, um einer auf Quartalszahlen fokussierten Financial Community befriedigende Ergebnisse präsentieren zu können? In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird die Frage nach der Existenz von solch kurzfristigem Verhalten, bezeichnet als Managermyopie bzw. Managerial Myopia, sowie den Einflussfaktoren auf dieses Verhalten gestellt. Zur Beantwortung wurden eine postalische, anonymisierte Fragebogenumfrage unter den Finanzvorständen der CDAX-Unternehmen mit einer Rücklaufquote von 21% sowie teilstrukturierte Interviews durchgeführt. Die Ergebnisse liefern deutliche Hinweise auf die Existenz von kurzfristigem Verhalten. Die Faktoren Kapitalmarktdruck, Unternehmensgröße und Fremdkapitalquote besitzen einen statistisch messbaren Einfluss auf kurzfristiges Verhalten. Die Untersuchung liefert direkte Erkenntnisse über Kapitalmarktdruck, das tatsächlich ausgeübte Maß von kurzfristigem Verhalten und die aktuelle Debatte über die verpflichtende Einführung von Quartalsberichterstattung.:INHALTSVERZEICHNIS I ABKÜRZUNGSVERZEICHNIS IV ABBILDUNGSVERZEICHNIS VI TABELLENVERZEICHNIS VII I. EINLEITUNG 1 1. HINTERGRUND 1 2. PROBLEMSTELLUNG, RELEVANZ UND NEUIGKEITSGRAD DER ARBEIT 3 3. AUFBAU DER ARBEIT 5 II. GRUNDLAGEN 7 1. MANAGERMYOPIE: BEGRIFFSBESTIMMUNG 7 2. AUSPRÄGUNGSFORMEN VON MANAGERMYOPIE 11 2.1. Aufwendungsmyopie 12 2.1.1. Forschung und Entwicklung 13 2.1.2. Werbung 14 2.1.3. Personalentwicklung 16 2.1.4. Sonstige Ausprägungsformen von Aufwendungsmyopie 17 2.2. Ertragsmyopie 17 2.2.1. Preiserhöhungen 18 2.2.2. Preissenkungen 19 2.2.3. Markenerweiterungen 22 2.2.4. Nutzung neuer Distributionskanäle 23 III. LITERATURÜBERBLICK 26 1. EINORDNUNG DER MANAGERMYOPIE-LITERATUR INNERHALB DER CORPORATE-FINANCE-LITERATUR 26 2. EINORDNUNG DER MANAGERMYOPIE-LITERATUR INNERHALB DER ACCOUNTING-LITERATUR 33 2.1. Einordnung der Managermyopie-Literatur innerhalb der angloamerikanischen Accounting-Literatur 33 2.2. Einordnung der Managermyopie-Literatur innerhalb der deutschen Accounting-Literatur 35 3. „ANECDOTAL EVIDENCE“ 37 4. THEORETISCHE ARBEITEN 42 5. EMPIRISCHE ARBEITEN 53 5.1. Analysen von Aufwendungen 53 5.2. Analysen von Kapitalaufnahmen 58 5.3. Umfragen und Experimente 62 5.4. Sonstige 64 6. ZUSAMMENFASSENDE WÜRDIGUNG DES VORHANDENEN MATERIALS 69 6.1. Würdigung des vorhandenen theoretischen Materials 69 6.2. Würdigung des vorhandenen empirischen Materials 71 IV. METHODIK 74 1. FRAGESTELLUNGEN UND HYPOTHESEN 74 1.1. Fragestellungen 75 1.1.1. Existenz von Managermyopie in deutschen Unternehmen 76 1.1.2. Existenz von Kapitalmarktdruck auf deutsche Unternehmen 79 1.2. Hypothesen 80 1.2.1. Kapitalmarktdruck 81 1.2.2. Berichtsfrequenz 82 1.2.3. Strategische Langfristinvestoren 84 1.2.4. Fremdfinanzierung 85 1.2.5. Unternehmensgröße 86 1.2.6. Industriezugehörigkeit 87 2. DURCHFÜHRUNG DER UNTERSUCHUNG 88 2.1. Methode der Datenerhebung 88 2.1.1. Begründung der Methode der Datenerhebung 88 2.1.2. Einordnung des gewählten Untersuchungsdesigns 91 2.2. Durchführung der Fragebogenumfrage 93 2.2.1. Untersuchungsobjekte, angestrebte Grundgesamtheit und Beobachtungsobjekte 93 2.2.2. Auswahlgesamtheit 94 2.2.3. Fragebogenentwicklung 95 2.2.4. Versendung und Rücklauf der Fragebögen, Inferenzpopulation 96 2.3. Durchführung der Interviewserie 98 2.4. Operationalisierung der verwendeten Variablen 99 2.4.1. Operationalisierung von Managermyopie 99 2.4.2. Operationalisierung von Kapitalmarktdruck 103 2.4.3. Operationalisierung der demographischen Variablen 104 3. BESCHREIBUNG DER INFERENZPOPULATION DER FRAGEBOGENUMFRAGE 107 3.1. Eigenschaften der an der Fragebogenumfrage teilnehmenden Unternehmen 107 3.2. Verzerrungen der Inferenzpopulation 109 3.2.1. Analyse des Coverage-Bias 109 3.2.2. Analyse des Non-Response-Bias 110 3.2.3. Analyse des Social-Desirability-Bias 114 3.2.4. Analyse des Informant-Bias 117 3.2.5. Analyse der Verzerrung durch Mißverständnis 118 4. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG DER METHODIK 119 V. ERGEBNISSE 122 1. DESKRIPTIVE ANALYSE 122 1.1. Existenz von Managermyopie in deutschen Unternehmen 122 1.2. Existenz von Aufwendungsmyopie in deutschen Unternehmen 124 1.3. Existenz verschiedener Ausprägungen von Aufwendungsmyopie in deutschen Unternehmen 126 1.4. Existenz von Ertragsmyopie in deutschen Unternehmen 128 1.5. Existenz verschiedener Ausprägungen von Ertragsmyopie in deutschen Unternehmen 129 1.6. Existenz von Kapitalmarktdruck in deutschen Unternehmen 131 2. INFERENZSTATISTISCHE ANALYSE 133 2.1. Kapitalmarktdruck und Managermyopie 133 2.2. Berichtsfrequenz und Kapitalmarktdruck 137 2.3. Berichtsfrequenz und Managermyopie 139 2.4. Strategische Langfristinvestoren und Kapitalmarktdruck 140 2.5. Strategische Langfristinvestoren und Managermyopie 141 2.6. Fremdkapitalquote und Kapitalmarktdruck 142 2.7. Fremdkapitalquote und Managermyopie 144 2.8. Unternehmensgröße und Kapitalmarktdruck 145 2.9. Unternehmensgröße und Managermyopie 147 2.10. Industriezugehörigkeit und Kapitalmarktdruck 148 2.11. Industriezugehörigkeit und Managermyopie 152 VI. DISKUSSION UND AUSBLICK 156 1. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG UND DISKUSSION DER ERGEBNISSE 156 2. FAZIT 162 3. LIMITATIONEN DER VORLIEGENDEN ARBEIT 163 4. STÄRKEN DER VORLIEGENDEN ARBEIT 164 5. ZUKÜNFTIGE FORSCHUNG 165 6. AUSBLICK 167 ANHANG 1: DAS MODELL VON STEIN (1989) 170 ANHANG 2: FRAGEBOGEN 174 ANHANG 3: BEGLEITSCHREIBEN DEUTSCHE BÖRSE AG 176 ANHANG 4: ANTWORTEN DER FRAGEBOGENUMFRAGE 177 ANHANG 5: INTERVIEW-LEITFADEN 178 LITERATURVERZEICHNIS 180 VERZEICHNIS DER ZITIERTEN ZEITUNGSARTIKEL 199 VERZEICHNIS DER ZITIERTEN GESETZE UND VERORDNUNGEN 200