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Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:29:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2008-03-07Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:35:21Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 strapasson_ba_me_bauru.pdf: 1164985 bytes, checksum: 424773843fc67023595f677feefdaa31 (MD5) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / O prestar atenção é um conceito que vem sendo estudado desde a fundação do primeiro laboratório de psicologia até hoje e é comumente entendido como um processo cognitivo que seleciona os estímulos aos quais um organismo deve responder. A Análise do Comportamento de B. F. Skinner (AC) é conhecida por negar o status casual atribuído às instâncias cognitivas, mas tem, ao mesmo tempo, que lidar com o fato dos organismos não responderem a todos os elementos presentes no mundo que os cerca. Este trabalho pretendeu avaliar as propostas interpretativas de autores da AC quanto ao fenômeno do prestar atenção. Num primeiro momento, foram avaliados os padrões de publicação de artigos sobre esse tema em periódicos da AC e foi avaliado o grau de comunicação entre as áreas de pesquisa aplicada e básica. Num segundo momento, empreendeu-se uma reconstrução conceitual do prestar atenção. Os resultados alcançados apontam uma pobre comunicação entre as pesquisas básica e aplicada, o que ganha certo apoio na reconstrução conceitual onde se sugere que as duas áreas fazem usos diferentes do termo nos textos analisados, de modo que a literatura aplicada não parece estar preocupada com o estudo de um processo psicológico básico sob o rótulo de prestar atenção. Na reconstrução conceitual indentificaram-se duas possibilidades conceituais para a expressão prestar atenção, ambas coerentes com o Behaviorismo Radical: o prestar atenção poderia ser entendido como (a) o componete comportamental encoberto precorrente que facilita/possibilita o controle de estímulos ou como (b) uma classe ampla de processos comportamentais que compreende desde a simples verificação de existência de controle de estímulos... / Paying attention is a concept which has been studied from the fundation of the first experimental psychology laboratory to today and is usually understood as cognitive process which selects stimuli that organisms must respond to B. F. Skinner's Behavior Analysis (BA) is well known for neglecting the casual status attributed to that cognitive instances, however, it needs to deal with the fact that organisms do not respond to every element of the world that surrounds it. This work intent to evaluate the interpretative proposals of BA to the paying attention concept. In a first moment, the articles publishing patterns about this subject matter in BAS journals and the degree of communication between basic and applied research fields were evatuate. In a second moment, a conceptual reconctruction of pay Attention was made. The results reached point to a poor communication between basic and applied fields, what receives some support in the conceptual reconstruction where it is suggested that the two areas use the expression diffrenty in the analised texts, in a way that the applied literature seems not to do any reference to paying attention as basic psychological process. In the conceptual reconstruction were identified two possibilities of conceptualization for pay attention, both coherent whit Radical Behaviorism: The paying attention can be understood as (a) a covert precorrent behavioral component that improve/allows the formation of stimulus control or as (b) a large class of behavioral process which includes from the simple verifcation of stimulus to observation of the emission of precorrent responses that improve/allows the formation of stimulus control, to the inference of the ocurrence of these behaviors but in a covert level. It is suggested that the second posibility is more adequate given the politic role... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)

Orientador : Sergio Goldenberg / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-18T12:45:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Lima_LuziaMaraSilva_M.pdf: 13140395 bytes, checksum: c3378e1f1a4b901b61ba520d430bf6ac (MD5) Previous issue date: 1993 / Resumo: BURRHUS FREDERIC SKINNER é, sem dúvida, um dos mais controvertidos cientistas do comportamento humano e, também sem dúvida, grande parte do preconceito à sua obra advém de interpretações falseadas de suas propostas. Na tentativa de resgatar tais propostas, apresentamos, nesta pesquisa de caráter bibliográfico, um panorama sobre a vida do autor, os principios básicos da sua Análise Funcional do Comportamento, bem como as aplicações de seu sistema explicativo no processo ensino aprendizagem, analisando detalhadamente a obra "Tecnologia do Ensino" - indiscutivelmente, o principal trabalho do autor a respeito da agência educacional. As reflexões pessoais da autoria desta dissertação apresentadas na conclusão do trabalho. Pretendemos que a presente pesquisa se torne mais uma fonte de informações àqueles que lidam com o processo ensino aprendizagem, no sentido de ajudá-Ias na compreensão dos mecanismos pelos quais se dá o comportamento do sistema educacional, e, conseqüentemente, de aula. na resolução dos problemas que enfrentam em sala de aula / Mestrado / Psicologia Educacional / Mestre em Educação

Before the acquisition of speaker-as-own-listener (SOL) where individuals demonstrate verbal governance of their own overt and covert behavior (Skinner, 1957), individuals have to have the correspondence between listening to one’s own voice and doing, which I name self-listening. Self-listening is defined as the correspondence between listening to one’s own voice and doing in two forms: listening to one’s own voice and doing in isolation, and joining of print with listening to one’s own voice after reading aloud and doing. I conducted two experiments to investigate the establishment of self-listening in children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder. I evaluated two different topographies of the target behavior: listen-to-own-voice-do (LOVD), which is defined as the correspondence between listening to one’s own voice and doing in isolation, and read-aloud-do (RAD), which is defined as the correspondence between reading aloud and doing. As Skinner (1957) explained, reading is an extension of listening. When individuals are reading, they see print, say print, and then hear themselves. For that reason, listening to one’s own voice was targeted as one dependent variable and reading aloud as a second to compare the participants’ performance on both topographies accurately, as RAD includes both a listening and a reading component, while LOVD includes a listening component only. Using a multiple probe design across participants, I analyzed the participants’ performance in the two different topographies, LOVD and RAD, across two different tasks: a drawing task and a building task. The participants had to follow written directions in RAD and spoken directions in LOVD to produce a drawing in the drawing task and a construction in the building task. The dependent variables were identical across Experiments I and II, but varied in terms of the measurement system for the building task. In Experiment I, the intervention was listener instruction and in Experiment II the intervention was listener and reader instruction, in which I utilized the learn unit (Albers & Greer, 1991) in presenting the instruction and consequating the participants’ correct and incorrect responses. The intervention in both experiments was presented in the form of a treasure hunt where the participants had to complete a 20-step treasure hunt accurately to earn a desired reinforcer. The results of both experiments showed that the dependent variables, LOVD and RAD, were established across all participants. There were limitations in Experiment I, which were addressed in Experiment II. Keywords: self-listener, self-listening, listening, following instructions, spoken instructions, written instructions, joining of print, say-do correspondence, speaker-as-own- listener, listen-do correspondence, read-do correspondence, reading comprehension, listening comprehension.

The problem of this study was to effect a comparative study of B. F. Skinner and John Dewey with respect to the development of a technology of teaching. The purposes of this study were to analyze and compare the writings of Dewey and Skinner as they relate to the development of a technology of teaching, to synthesize the findings of this analysis and comparison and direct it to the technology of teaching, and to create and enumerate new insights into the teaching phenomena. The procedures for completing the study were based upon the selection of four basic constructs which allowed a framework on which to hang a comparative study of B. F. Skinner and John Dewey as their writings related to the development of a technology of teaching. These constructs were (1) naturalism and the scientific point of view; (2) knowledge and experience; (3) evolution and control of culture; and (4) the philosophy of education as it relates to the technology of teaching. The methods used to complete the study were the analysis and synthesis of Dewey's and Skinner's writings and their relative positions to the four constructs mentioned were shown. Other authorities were also consulted in hopes that the positions of the two men might be delineated accurately. Certain selected passages of each man's writings were presented and compared hoping to show clearly the relationship between the two men's writings and how they relate to the development of a teaching technology. Any person who is concerned about education, its processes, and its outcome has an opportunity to design and thereby improve the process by the adoption of a technology of teaching as prescribed by the analysis of Dewey and Skinner, or perhaps in consequence of attempting, in light of their writings, seriously to re-think what it is we believe and do.

Submitted by Cleide Dantas (cleidedantas@ufpa.br) on 2014-05-14T13:11:47Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SkinnerUsoControle.pdf: 670113 bytes, checksum: 3807dae454ae5714aa1565de2cac8635 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Rosa Silva (arosa@ufpa.br) on 2014-09-12T16:41:01Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SkinnerUsoControle.pdf: 670113 bytes, checksum: 3807dae454ae5714aa1565de2cac8635 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-09-12T16:41:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 23898 bytes, checksum: e363e809996cf46ada20da1accfcd9c7 (MD5) Dissertacao_SkinnerUsoControle.pdf: 670113 bytes, checksum: 3807dae454ae5714aa1565de2cac8635 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) é frequentemente citado como apresentando um posicionamento contrário ao uso de controle aversivo. Entretanto, em determinados momentos, o autor apresentaria uma postura mais flexível quanto ao uso deste tipo de controle comportamental, aceitando sua utilização em determinados contextos. O presente trabalho teve como objetivo identificar e analisar em quais momentos Skinner prescreve ou adverte o uso do controle aversivo. Um estudo histórico-conceitual foi feito, no qual oito obras (Skinner 1938/1991; 1948/1975; 1953/1989; 1968/1972; 1969/1980; 1971; 1974/2006; 1989) foram analisadas conforme as categorias: 1) a definição de controle aversivo e conceitos envolvidos; 2) os aspectos positivos do controle aversivo e prescrições; e 3) os aspectos negativos do controle aversivo e proibições. Não foi possível encontrar uma definição específica de controle aversivo, constatou-se que em determinados momentos Skinner justifica o uso deste tipo de controle, mas não o prescreve genericamente. / B.F. Skinner (1904-1990) is frequently cited as having a contrary position on the use of aversive control. However, in certain passages Skinner presents a more flexible opinion about the use of this type of behavioral control. The purpose of the present study was identifying and analyzing the passages where Skinner prescribes or warns about such use. A historical-conceptual study was conducted involving eight Skinner works (Skinner 1938/1991, 1948/1975, 1953/1989, 1968/1972, 1969/1980, 1971, 1974/2006, 1989), analyzed according to the following categories: 1) the definition of aversive control and concepts involved; 2) the positive aspects of aversive control and prescribing; and 3) the negative aspects of aversive control and prohibitions. It wasn’t possible to find a specific definition of aversive control and it was observed that at certain moments Skinner justifies the use of aversive control, but does not prescribe it in general.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:25:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-12-16Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:53:23Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 alves_dz_me_mar.pdf: 953969 bytes, checksum: 976e357b345098e9424e02053aa842d0 (MD5) / O presente trabalho pretende delinear uma possível interpretação do behaviorismo radical como teoria da mente, o que significa, em outros termos, contextualizá-lo no âmbito da filosofia da mente. Para tanto, primeiramente apresentaremos as principais teorias que figuram na filosofia da mente contemporânea, incluindo suas teses centrais e seus respectivos problemas. Em seguida, trataremos dos fundamentos do behaviorismo radical enquanto filosofia da ciência e enquanto teoria do comportamento. Esses dois passos servirão ao propósito de estabelecer os parâmetros da discussão subseqüente entre behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente. Nesse sentido, o primeiro problema que pretendemos responder é: o que é a mente? Trata-se de um problema conceitual que envolve o mapeamento dos fenômenos normalmente caracterizados como mentais. Veremos que, para o behaviorismo radical, a mente é comportamento. Já o segundo problema que pretendemos responder é: qual a natureza da mente? – problema que, no contexto do behaviorismo radical, deve ser substituído pelo seguinte: qual a natureza do comportamento? Discorrer sobre a natureza de um fenômeno implica investigar quais são as características essenciais à sua existência. Trata-se, portanto, de um problema ontológico. Sugeriremos que as características essenciais para a existência do comportamento podem ser contempladas pelo posicionamento metafísico denominado relacionismo substancial. Em tempo, além dessas duas questões principais, discorreremos ao longo do trabalho sobre diversos problemas levantados pelas teorias da mente contemporâneas, tais como o problema da subjetividade, o problema do fisicalismo, o problema dos limites da ciência, o problema mente-corpo, o problema da causalidade mental, o problema do significado, o problema do reducionismo, o problema das qualidades das experiências, o problema do conhecimento... / The aim of this work is to delineate a possible interpretation of radical behaviorism as a theory of mind. That means putting radical behaviorism in the context of philosophy of mind. To do so, firstly we will present the main theories of contemporary philosophy of mind, including its central thesis and its respective problems. Next, we will present the principles of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science and as a theory of behavior. Those steps will serve to establish the parameters for subsequent discussion between radical behaviorism and the problems of philosophy of mind. The first problem with which we pretend to deal is the conceptual problem of mind: what is mind? As we will see, for radical behaviorism the mind is behavior. The second problem with which we pretend to deal is the ontological problem of mind: what is the nature of mind? In the radical behaviorist context, the question must be substituted by this: what is the nature of behavior? Discussions about the nature of things demands investigating what characteristics are essential to its existence. We will suggest that the essential characteristics of the existence of behavior can be contemplated by the metaphysical view denominated substantial relationism. Moreover, in addition to our two principal problems, we will discuss through this work several problems of philosophy of mind, such as the problem of subjectivity, the problem of physicalism, the problem of science limits, the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, the problem of meaning, the problem of reductionism, the problem of qualitative character of experiences, the problem of privileged knowledge, the problem of qualia, and others. In the end, we hope that this work may represent a step toward the construction of a radical behaviorist theory of mind