Medical decisions should be based on good evidence. But this does not mean that health care professionals should practice evidence-based medicine. This dissertation explores how these two positions come apart, why they come apart, and what we should do about it. I begin by answering the descriptive question, what are current standards of evidence in medicine? I then provide a detailed critique of these standards. Finally, I address the more difficult normative question, how should we determine standards of evidence in medicine? In medicine, standards of evidence have been established by the pervasive evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement. Until now, these standards have not been subjected to comprehensive philosophical scrutiny. I outline and defend a theory of knowledge – a version of Helen Longino’s Critical Contextual Empiricism (CCE) – which enables me to critically evaluate EBM. My version of CCE emphasizes the critical evaluation of background assumptions. In accordance with this, I identify and critically evaluate the three substantive assumptions underlying EBM. First, I argue that medicine should not be held to the restrictive definition of science assumed by proponents of EBM. Second, I argue that epidemiological evidence should not be the only “base” of medical decisions. Third, I argue that not only is the particular hierarchy of evidence assumed by EBM unjustified, but that any attempt to hierarchically rank research methods is incoherent and unjustifiably restricts medical knowledge. Current standards of evidence divert attention from many legitimate sources of evidence. This distorts medical research and practice. In the remainder of the dissertation I propose means for improving not only current standards of medical evidence but also the process of producing and defending future standards. On the basis of four CCE norms, I argue that we have reason to protect and promote those features of the medical community that facilitate diversity, transparency, and critical interaction. Only then can we ensure that the medical community retains its ability to produce evidence that is both rigorous and relevant to practice.

Networks of communication evolve in terms of reflexive exchanges. The codification of these reflections in language, that is, at the social level, can be considered as the operating system of society. Under sociologically specifiable conditions, the discursive reconstructions can be expected to make the systems under reflection increasingly knowledge-intensive. This sociological theory of communication is founded in a tradition that includes Giddens' (1979) structuration theory, Habermas' (1981) theory of communicative action, and Luhmann's (1984) proposal to consider social systems as self-organizing. The study also elaborates on Shannon's (1948) mathematical theory of communication for the formalization and operationalization of the non-linear dynamics. The development of scientific communications can be studied using citation analysis. The exchange media at the interfaces of knowledge production provide us with the evolutionary model of a Triple Helix of university-industry-government relations. The construction of the European Information Society can then be analyzed in terms of interacting networks of communication. The issues of sustainable development and the expectation of social change are discussed in relation to the possibility of a general theory of communication.

This thesis examines what are for us two great sources or causes of error. The first arises from the influence of various cognitive biases upon our thinking, while the second emerges as a result of our wide-ranging dependence upon others for a vast amount of our beliefs about the world. Through both we can come to adopt false and harmful beliefs, a fact that naturally has both veridical and moral significance. One response is to suggest that we should increase our reliance upon experts in order to help us better acquire true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. By examining the historical, theoretical, psychological, and linguistic character of epistemic authorities and relationships, this avenue will be argued to be problematic. Scepticism in relation to epistemic authority is avoided in favour of an adoption of a critical attitude with respect to social sources of belief. The epistemology of testimony is next looked at, to see whether any lessons can be drawn from the nature of epistemic dependence to how we should epistemically approach others. Reductive versus non-reductive conceptions of the justification of testimony are explained, with the former conception being seen as naturally lending itself more to a critical treatment of social sources of belief. The question of why we should be rational at all is then examined. The positions of William K. Clifford and Karl Popper on the matter are explained, and my own views set forward. Finally, in light of the preceding groundwork, it is argued that there is a philosophical place and a social need for public education with respect to the broad epistemic situation in which we find ourselves.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). "March 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-95). Also available via the World Wide Web.

The dissertation takes as its central problem the priority and value of nonviolent and pragmatic social epistemology. Many concede the desirability of nonviolent problem solving, but quickly and unreflectively assent to violence when the imagination fails to procure viable alternatives. Moreover, the kind and quality of knowledge gained through the use of nonviolence, it is argued, is far superior to the kind and quality of knowledge gained through the use of violence. This dissertation attempts to settle the discussion of the priority and value of nonviolence as a social epistemology by arguing for, and ultimately proving with the use of rationale and empirical evidence, that pragmatic nonviolence has more social-epistemological and/or value as knowledge than the available violent alternatives. Neither modern nor post-modern violence are able to produce knowledge with quite the same staying power, lasting effects, and high quality than that which is generated through what I call "pragmatic nonviolence." Traditionally, for a variety of biased reasons, classical American pragmatism has not taken a stand for either philosophical or methodological nonviolence. This unfortunate situation will, I hope, change with the argument in this dissertation. The issue of whether or not the social-epistemological value of pragmatic nonviolence, as a philosophical movement, has the potential to steer the course of contemporary social, political, and moral pragmatism into the 21st century, has largely been settled. The discussion and analysis offered in chapter one focuses primarily on the logic of domination, violent knowing, and violent realism. Historical context is provided to situate the central problems, compare sources of knowledge, and explore the relationship between violence and knowledge. The views of Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, The United States Military Academy, Wendy Hamblet, Crispin Sartwell, Judith Bradford, and Aaron Fortune receive primary attention in chapter one. Chapter two focuses primarily on the development of a radically empirical social epistemology and theory of concept formation. I examine the roots of social epistemology and describe the problem of learning theory and concept formation through notions of habit, conduct, and struggle. The views of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Leonard Harris receive attention in this section of chapter two. I conclude this chapter by outlining concepts of peace and social justice as they demonstrate how social knowledge is created pragmatically. The views of Martin Luther King, Jr., Duane Cady, and Steven Lee receive attention in the latter section of chapter two. The analysis offered in chapter three centers on what I claim generates better knowledge: pragmatic nonviolence. The first section of chapter three describes the kind of normative epistemology I advocate and how pragmatic nonviolence offers qualitatively better knowledge than the alternatives. The views of C.S. Peirce, John Dewey, and Edgar Sheffield Brightman are considered in this section. The second section details the extent and value of uniting pragmatism and nonviolence, the need for a distinctly pragmatic conception of nonviolence, prophetic pragmatism, and American personalism. The views of Mohandas Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., Cornel West, and Randall Auxier are treated in this part. The third and fourth sections of chapter three applies the theories advanced in previous sections and chapters to demonstrate how pragmatic nonviolence generates better knowledge. The views of Myles Horton and Bob Moses are considered at length.

Orientador: Aluisio Almeida Schumacher / Banca: Rodrigo Barbosa Ribeiro / Banca: Maria da Graça Chamma Ferraz e Ferraz / Resumo: Esta dissertação possui dois objetivos fundamentais, quais sejam, analisar as condições subjetivas do progresso científico em Sociologia, por meio do conceito de obstáculo epistemológico e aplicar esse conceito a certos postulados da Sociologia de Émile Durkheim tendo como pano de fundo sua obra Da divisão do Trabalho Social (1999). Nossa ideia central é que Sociologia deve superar certos obstáculos. Tais quais, sua concepção de homem, considerado apenas em seu âmbito moral e as explicações do social pelo social. Os quais frente à atualidade de questões como as problemáticas sócio-ambientais tem se apresentado insuficientes para a formação de um novo espírito científico em Sociologia. Na medida em que desconsideram a relação do homem com a natureza / Abstract: This dissertation has two main objectives namely to analyze the subjective conditions of scientific progress in Sociology, through the concept of epistemological obstacle and apply this concept to certain postulates of the sociology of Emile Durkheim as background with his work The Division of Labor social (1999). Our central idea is that sociology must overcome certain obstacles. As such, his conception of man, considered solely in its scope moral and social explanations of the social. The front of the current which issues such as social and environmental issues has appeared insufficient for the formation of a new scientific spirit in Sociology. To the extent that disregard the relationship between man and nature / Mestre

The purpose of the study was to identify teacher perception regarding the effects of NCLB on the development of knowledge among elementary school students in two school districts in a Midwestern state. I applied a case-study design to address the research questions, with data obtained from interviews with eight experienced school teachers, who reported on the state of the cognitive development of their students. Epistemology, specifically social and virtue epistemology, served as the theoretical framework for the analysis of the data, thus filling a gap in the literature for an epistemological study of the effects of NCLB. The hypothesis for the study was that NCLB is detrimental to the development of knowledge among elementary students by placing too much emphasis on mandated standardized testing, and by limiting the curriculum to the subjects that are under the requirements for Adequate Yearly Progress (YAP). The analysis of teacher input indicates that NCLB hinders the development of knowledge among elementary school students. This is because educators are constrained by excessive testing requirements, and are thus not able to foster in their students the intellectual virtues necessary for the development of the lifelong learner, the student who is capable of and understands that learning continuous throughout one’s life. Future research is needed to link the scholarship on intellectual virtues to the education of school children, making of the virtues a central and intrinsic part of the educational effort.

This thesis is about the contemporary challenges facing herbal medicine. Specifically it concerns the difficulties faced by Australian herbalists in their attempts to maintain authority over the knowledge base of their craft and a connection with traditional understandings of the uses of plant medicines, while at the same time engaging with biomedicine and the broader Australian healthcare system. It contributes to the study of the nascent field of qualitative studies in contemporary western herbal medicine by making three main arguments.Firstly, Australian herbal medicine is characterised by its origins as a European colonial practice and its history of professional marginalisation during most of the 20th century. Secondly herbal practitioners have been unable to capitalise significantly on a surge of public popularity in the closing years of the 20th century which brought with it the interest of industry, the scrutiny of regulators and the renewed attention of biomedicine. Herbalists continue to struggle for recognition in the face of these more powerful interests. Thirdly it is argued that herbalists are attempting to gain legitimacy and acceptance as a healthcare profession through a process of underpinning their knowledge base with science, which is replacing their traditional philosophical basis. This has the effect of weakening the ability of herbalists to maintain their identity as an independent profession and makes its knowledge base vulnerable to appropriation by other healthcare professions.Gross’ model of the cultural location of traditions in contemporary societies is used to clarify the situation of herbalists and to identify problems consequent to the political choices they have made or which have been forced upon them. Gross suggests that traditions which place themselves close to power have difficulty in maintaining their own character and integrity, but that other cultural locations are also problematic and limit full participation in society. vi It is argued that there are compelling reasons to move beyond Gross’ analysis and to find ways to strengthen the independence of the herbal profession. Given the financial problems facing the current healthcare system in Australia and the looming ecological challenges, radical changes to the current system are required. The central concepts of herbal practice, in particular vitalism and holism, lead to approaches to healthcare which are potentially both costeffective and ecologically sustainable. A robust and independent profession of western herbalists, with their philosophy articulated and restored, could provide a valuable and sustainable contribution to Australian healthcare.

We rely on science and other organized forms of inquiry to answer cardinal questions on issues varying from global warming and public health to the political economy. In my thesis, which is in the intersection of philosophy of science, social epistemology, and science and technology studies, I develop a social theory of knowledge that can help us tell when our beliefs and theories on such matters amount to knowledge, as opposed to mere opinion, speculation, or educated guess. The first two chapters discuss relevant shortcomings of mainstream analytic epistemology and the sociology of knowledge, respectively. Mainstream epistemology regards individuals, rather than communities, as the ‎bearers of knowledge or justified belief. In Chapter 1, I argue that typically, only an epistemic community can collectively possess sufficient justification required for knowledge. In Chapter 2, I present a case study in computer science that militates against the sociological understating of knowledge as mere interest-based agreement. I argue that social interests alone cannot explain the unfolding of the events in this case. Rather, we must assume that knowledge is irreducible to social dynamics and interests. In Chapter 3, I begin my positive analysis of the social conditions for knowledge. I explore the question of when a consensus is knowledge based. I argue that a consensus is knowledge based when knowledge is the best explanation of the consensus. I identify three conditions – social diversity, apparent consilience of evidence, and meta agreement, for knowledge being the best explanation of a consensus. In Chapter 4, I illustrate my argument by analyzing the recent controversy about the safety of the drug Bendectin. I argue that the consensus in this case was not knowledge based, and hence the deference to consensus to resolve this dispute was unjustified. In chapter 5, I develop a new theory of the logical relations between evidence and social values. I identify three roles social values play in evidential reasoning and justification: They influence the trust we extend to testimony, the threshold values we require for accepting evidence, and the process of combining different sorts of evidence.

In this thesis I searched for an Underground Man in Nietzsche and Marx. My search depends on an epistemological ascertainment. Kant&rsquo / s argument that the human mind cannot achieve knowledge of the thing-in-itself lies in the background of my thesis. I think that this argument is connected with the origins of modern philosophy. My thesis is concentrated on the 19th century. I perceived that with Kant&rsquo / s argument the fact that we can know this world within a subjective framework is emphasized especially in this century. The emphasis on a subjective framework is grounded on Kant&rsquo / s philosophy. This emphasis has a significant role in the epistemological arguments of Nietzsche and Marx. They also insist on the role of subjective contribution in knowledge. However their attitude towards epistemology is different from Kantian philosophy in that they emphasize social, historical and economical conditions. Thus, I call attention to the fact that they transpose epistemology into a social and historical context. My conception of the Underground Man is born in this social context. My thesis aims at making room for an analysis of the Underground Man who is conceived in opposition to the Kantian understanding of the subject, in the context of are Nietzsche&rsquo / s and Marx&rsquo / s social and epistemological analyses.