M.A. / The aim of this study was to examine how the members of Agape came to construct themselves as a healing community. An ecosystemic epistemology and social constructionism were used as a lens by which to view the events unfolding at Agape Healing Community and to illuminate how meanings, expressed through language and ritual, are negotiated and shared. Discourse analysis was used as an analytical tool to infer meaning from the participants’ speaking and to locate these discourses in the fabric that constitutes South African society.

The dissertation focuses on how to best represent the consensus and attitude dynamic of a group given the attitudes of its individuals. This is done in the Bayesian epistemology framework using pooling with imprecise probabilities, and in utility theory extending Harsanyi's aggregation theorem to characterize other directed attitudes like spite and altruism. The final part of the dissertation considers attitudes within social networks and provides explanations and simulation models for online segregation and tribalism as well as the spread of rumors through contagion. The dissertation hopes to contribute to foundational issues like that of epistemic consensus, but also to new emerging phenomena in social epistemology.

No description available.

In this thesis, I explore the issue of epistemic responsibility. I start by examining an argument against the use of critical thinking made by Michael Huemer. Huemer argues that critical thinking is not epistemically responsible, because it is not as truth conducive as credulity. Huemer instead argues that credulity should be the default approach taken by non-experts. After dissecting this argument, I go on to examine one of the critics to Huemer’s argument: David Kary. Kary argues that critical thinking and credulity are not mutually exclusive and can therefore be combined in an epistemically responsible way. Kary further argues that one must consider the social components of epistemic responsibility, and that when one does so, it is evident that truth conduciveness is not the only component of epistemic responsibility. I extend Huemer and Kary’s discussion by arguing that epistemic responsibility is even more complex. Epistemic superiority, equality and inferiority are fluid positions that change depending on context, and this must be considered when evaluating epistemic responsibility. The consequence of this approach is that a combination of critical thinking and credulity is the most responsible alternative. I end by arguing for the intellectual virtues and benefits of embracing this argument.

No description available.

No description available.

Epistemic injustices are the distinctly epistemic harms and wrongs which undermine or depreciate our capacities knowers. This dissertation develops a theory of epistemic injustice and justice which accounts for excesses in epistemic goods as a source of epistemic injustice. This is a theory of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. The dissertation can be divided into three parts: 1) motivational, 2) theoretical, 3) applications and implications. First, Chapters 1 and 2 motivate the study of epistemic injustice and epistemic overload. Chapter 1 identifies a gap in the literature on epistemic injustice concerning excesses in epistemic goods as sources of epistemic injustice while canvassing the major themes and debates of the field. Chapter 2 levels an objection to ‘proper’ epistemology, thereby providing an indirect defense of the study of epistemic injustice. Second, theoretical development occurs in are Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6. Chapter 3 initiates the argument for epistemic overload, while Chapter 4 extends the case for epistemic overload, identifying several epistemic injustices arising from excesses of understanding, credibility, and truth. Chapter 5 explains the oversights of prior theorists by developing a more descriptively adequate account of social epistemics that explains the many sites of epistemic injustice. Chapter 6 develops a two-stage contractualist theory of epistemic in/justice to explain the bad-making features of epistemic injustices and generates the duty of epistemic charity. The third part of the dissertation applies the findings of earlier chapters to contemporary practical and theoretical problems. Chapter 7 employs the contractualist reasoning of Chapter 6 to address and ameliorate problems from excesses in the uptake and circulation of hermeneutical resources and true-beliefs. Chapter 8 considers the mutual dependence relations between political phenomena and epistemic in/justice, showing that accounts of political justice depend upon or presuppose epistemic justice. Finally, Chapter 9 applies epistemic overload to the use of big data technologies in the context of predive policing algorithms. An abductive argument concludes that the introduction of the “Strategic Subjects List” as part of a Chicago policing initiative in 2013 introduced understandings which likely contributed to gun-violence in Chicago and which constitutes an epistemic overload. In sum, the dissertation shows the theoretical and practical significance of epistemic overload as epistemic injustice. / Ph. D.

Como cientistas escolhem teorias? O objetivo de nossa tese é entender a resposta de Thomas Kuhn a este problema clássico da filosofia da ciência. Ao retirar o problema da escolha de teorias do campo metodológico e transportá-lo para o campo sociológico, Kuhn expõe os fundamentos de uma abordagem sociológica do desenvolvimento científico. Como tantos outros filósofos, Kuhn defende que teorias científicas são escolhidas a partir de valores epistêmicos critérios como precisão, consistência, abrangência, simplicidade e fecundidade. Segundo ele, porém, estes valores estão sujeitos a interpretações distintas: cientistas podem concordar quanto ao que se deve esperar de uma teoria, mas, em função de históricos pessoais e profissionais particulares, podem discordar em relação a qual delas melhor manifesta essas características. Mas se os cientistas aplicam os valores de maneiras distintas, em que sentido estes valores ditariam as suas escolhas? E, principalmente, como seria possível, dada a variabilidade dos valores, o consenso em uma comunidade de cientistas? A resposta de Kuhn, inaugurando sua abordagem sociológica, é a de que o acordo entre os membros da comunidade seria gerado por uma série de mecanismos sociais. Em primeiro lugar, a pedagogia e o treinamento dos cientistas, que tornaria as avaliações dos cientistas mais parecidas. Depois, a teoria de onda: a produção de novas evidências e argumentos responsáveis por convencer os adeptos de teorias rivais. Por último, a reestruturação da comunidade: a exclusão de membros resistentes e a divisão da comunidade em disciplinas distintas. A fim de esclarecer a natureza desta sociologia, discutiremos dois conjuntos de temas relacionados: os tipos de explicações de crença: racional e causal; e os níveis explicativos desta sociologia: indivíduos, comunidades e grupos. A última parte de nossa tese consiste em uma tentativa de sistematizar um modelo de explicação sociológica da dinâmica das controvérsias científicas, assim como apontar alguns caminhos para uma pesquisa empírica direcionada a estes tópicos. / How do scientists choose theories? The aim of our thesis is to understand Thomas Kuhn\'s answer to this classic problem in Philosophy of Science. By removing the theory-choice problem from the methodological field and transporting it to the sociological field, Kuhn sets out the foundations of a sociological approach to scientific development. Like so many other philosophers, Kuhn argues that scientific theories are chosen based on epistemic values criteria such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. However, these values are, according to him, subject to different interpretations: scientists may agree on what to expect from a theory, but depending on particular personal and professional histories, they may disagree as to which theory best expresses these characteristics. But if scientists apply values in different ways, in which sense would these values dictate scientists choices? And, especially, how could a consensus in a community of scientists be achieved, given the variability of values? Kuhn\'s answer, inaugurating his sociological approach, is that agreement among community members would be generated by a series of social mechanisms. First, the pedagogy and training of scientists, which make scientists appraisals more similar. Secondly, the wave-theory: the production of new evidence and arguments that convince the followers of rival theories. Finally, the restructuring of the community: the exclusion of resistant members and the division of the community into distinct disciplines. In order to clarify the nature of this sociology, we will discuss two sets of related themes: the types of explanations of belief: rational and causal; and the explanatory levels of this sociology: individuals, communities and groups. The last part of our thesis consists of an attempt to systematize a model of sociological explanation for the dynamics of scientific controversies, as well as to point out the ways to an empirical research directed to these topics.

Este trabalho é uma primeira etapa da elaboração de um conjunto conceitual que tem por objetivo fornecer uma explicação sociológica para o fenômeno do conhecimento. O ponto de partida é a reconstrução de uma possível explicação presente na sociologia de Max Weber para o fenômeno em questão. Parto da suposição que os trabalhos de Weber indiretamente explicariam-no, dado que a teoria da ação e da racionalização suscitariam inevitáveis problemas epistemológicos. Não obstante, essas duas teorias endereçariam respostas parciais aos dois problemas básicos sobre o conhecimento, a saber, o que é o conhecimento? e como o conhecimento é desenvolvido? Para respondê-las integralmente, seria necessário encontrar um fenômeno que conjugasse a teoria da ação social com a teoria da racionalização. Minha principal hipótese é que este seria o no processo de intelectualização. Com isso, a parte central deste trabalho refere- se à reconstrução do processo de intelectualização e sua solução prévia para o conhecimento. Ao esgotar todas as possibilidades de explicação, utilizo os trabalhos de Hermann Lotze e Gottlob Frege como auxiliares na compreensão e resolução de noções subjacentes ao problema do conhecimento, como as noções de sentido, significado, verdade, interpretação e intersubjetividade. Ao final, chego a uma conclusão que tenta acoplar uma teoria da linguagem sobre a explicação do conhecimento produzida pela reconstrução dos trabalhos de Weber / This study is a first stage of drafting a conceptual framework that aims to provide a sociological explanation for the phenomenon of knowledge. The starting point is the reconstruction of a possible explanation for knowledge grounded on Max Weber\'s Sociology. As a starting point, we assume that Weber\'s work indirectly explains the phenomenon of knowledge, since the theory of action and rationalization would raise inevitable epistemological problems. Nevertheless, these two theories would only address partial answers to two basic problems about knowledge, namely, what is knowledge? and how knowledge is developed? In order to answer completely such questions it would require a phenomenon that combines the theory of social action with the theory of rationalization. Our main hypothesis is that the process of intellectualization is the phenomenon would best combine both theories. Thus, the central part of this study refers to the reconstruction of the process of intellectualization and its prior solution to the knowledge. When all possibilities were exhausted, we used some works of Hermann Lotze and Gottlob Frege in order to assist the comprehension and solve some knowledge\'s underlying notions, such as meaning, sense, truth, interpretation, and intersubjectivity. In the conclusion, we attempt to attach a theory of language on the explanation of knowledge produced by the reconstruction of Weber\'s writings

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 170-190).