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Personality is a key component of characters that inhabit immersive virtual environments, such as games and virtual agent applications. In order to be distinguishable from other characters in the environment, each character should have its own personality in the form of different observable behaviour, not solely in its physical appearance or animation. Previous work in this field has mostly relied on time-consuming, handcrafted characters and static, trait-based approaches to personality. Our goal is a method to develop complex, individual personalities without handcrafting every behaviour. Unlike most implemented versions of personality theories, cognitive-social theories of personality address how personality is developed and adapts throughout childhood and over our lifetimes. Cognitive-social theories also emphasise the importance of situations in determining how we behave. From this basis, we believe that personality should be individual, adaptive, and based on context. Characters in current state-of-the-art games and virtual environments do not demonstrate all of these features without extensive handcrafting. We propose a model where personality influences both decision-making and evaluation of reward. Characters use their past experiences in the form of simple somatic markers, or gut-instinct, to make decisions; and determine rewards based on their own personal goals, rather than via external feedback. We evaluated the model by implementation of a simple game and tested it using quantitative criteria, including a purpose-designed individuality measure. Results indicate that, although characters are given the same initial personality template, it is possible to develop different personalities (in the form of behaviour) based on their unique experiences in the environment and relationships with other characters. This work shows a way forward for more automated development of personalities that are individual, context-aware and adapt to users and the environment.

The present study examines the relationship of emotional awareness to anticipatory psychophysiological markers and performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT is a computerized card game that simulates real-life decisions through uncertainty of reward or punishment. The participant’s goal is to make advantageous card choices. Anticipatory somatic markers of physiological arousal, like electrodermal activity and heart rate, have been proposed to bias decisions in the IGT. The central hypothesis is that a participant’s emotional awareness is related to their ability to make advantageous decisions through biasing psychophysiological responses. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale was used to assess each participant’s emotional awareness. Less emotional awareness was associated with enhanced performance on the IGT. However, anticipatory physiological arousal (electrodermal activity and heart rate) and emotional awareness yielded no significant relationships. Findings suggest a need for further research on cognitive models, such as the expectancy valence model, in relation to decision-making.

The present study examines the relationship of emotional awareness to anticipatory psychophysiological markers and performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). The IGT is a computerized card game that simulates real-life decisions through uncertainty of reward or punishment. The participant’s goal is to make advantageous card choices. Anticipatory somatic markers of physiological arousal, like electrodermal activity and heart rate, have been proposed to bias decisions in the IGT. The central hypothesis is that a participant’s emotional awareness is related to their ability to make advantageous decisions through biasing psychophysiological responses. The Toronto Alexithymia Scale was used to assess each participant’s emotional awareness. Less emotional awareness was associated with enhanced performance on the IGT. However, anticipatory physiological arousal (electrodermal activity and heart rate) and emotional awareness yielded no significant relationships. Findings suggest a need for further research on cognitive models, such as the expectancy valence model, in relation to decision-making.

How can we predict key decisions made by organizations in the presence of big data and on-demand information? In this dissertation we exploit a large repository of B2B real-time transactional data with service quality indicators and present evidence that organizational decision analytics apply both rational and boundedly-rational (i.e. behavioral) economic models. The dissertation’s findings demonstrate that both utility and heuristic models, respectively, play significant roles in predicting organizational decisions on churn, a key decision in this context. In the presence of a large data set the assumed rationality of organizations appears to provide accurate predictions in uncontrolled experiences and selected boundedly-rational decision rules appear to cause somatic states that make organizations more sensitive to past total qualities of service. This dissertation makes significant new contributions to the understanding of how organizations can effectively use big data to make key operational decisions. As a managerial implication, organizations must be alert to heuristics that might exacerbate the impact of total service pain on customer’s decision to churn.

Sur fond d’incertitude radicale, les entrepreneurs ne peuvent s’en remettre à un calcul précis de rentabilité. Pour les anticipations d’investissement, ils ont recours à leurs esprits animaux, c’est-à-dire un jugement analogique instinctif sur le futur associé à une décision émotionnelle automatique par rapport à lui en fonction de motivations. La notion remonte à l’Antiquité. Elle était synonyme d’influx nerveux. Si l’on interroge les neurosciences d’aujourd’hui, ce sont les marqueurs somatiques qui l’éclairent. Nos émotions servent à arrêter la réflexion, restreindre l’espace des possibles et valoriser certaines options. Elles contribuent à l’intelligence de nos décisions. C’est l’excès, de cognition ou d’émotion, qui est à éviter. Les émotions servent également à réviser ou renforcer nos croyances. Par leur mouvement propre, elles peuvent créer des cycles, ce que nous proposons d’appeler « le paradoxe de la confiance ». Une confiance élevée prépare le terrain de la chute future. À l’inverse, une confiance basse met peu à peu en place les conditions du retournement de conjoncture. Notre travail propose une analyse du raisonnement inductif en économie, à l’origine de l’élaboration de scénarios anticipatifs. Le capital culturel et symbolique semble également orienter les esprits animaux. Notre enquête empirique établit l’existence d’un lien entre capital culturel et prise de risque. Elle dessine aussi une typologie des esprits animaux à même de saisir l’hétérogénéité des entrepreneurs. 11 familles sont dégagées, en fonction de leurs motivations, émotions, capitaux culturels, comportements d’investissement et scénarios anticipatifs privilégiés. / In a background of fundamental uncertainty, entrepreneurs cannot rely on a precise calculus of profitability. For their investment expectations, they have to lean on their animal spirits, that is an analogical, instinctive judgment about the future associated with an automatic emotional decision under the guidance of motivations. The notion traces back to the Ancient times. She was then synonymous with “nerve impulse”. Nowadays, if one probes neuroscience, it appears that somatic markers could shed some light on them. Emotions are useful to stop thoughts, restrict the states of nature and value certain options. They contribute to the intelligence of decisions. It is the excess, be it of cognition or emotion, that is detrimental. Emotions also serve to update or strengthen our beliefs. By their own momentum, they can create cycles, which I propose to dub “the confidence paradox”. When confidence is high, the terrain for the future fall is being prepared. Conversely, when it is low, little by little the conditions for a reversal are being staged. Our work proposes an analysis of inductive reasoning responsible for the elaboration of anticipative scripts. Cultural and symbolic capital also appears to come into play. Our empirical inquiry establishes a link between cultural capital and risk-taking. It outlines as well a clustering of animal spirits so as to grasp the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs. 11 different sorts are outlined and sorted by their motivations, emotions, cultural capital, investment behaviors and preferred anticipative scripts.

One of the factors significantly influencing our daily decisions is the so-called cognitive depletion.The theory of cognitive depletion postulates the existence of a limited mental resource that is necessary for self-regulation. If the resource is diminished by a task involving self-control, achievement in subsequent self-control task will be impaired. This project examines the effect of cognitive depletion on decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task designed to simulate real-life decision making involving gains and losses. Further, a possible effect of moderating factors that could be affected by cognitive depletion and consequently influence decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task -- risk preference and impulsivity -- is investigated. Dual-process theories postulate there are two systems involved in decision-making: faster, intuitive, emotional System 1 and slower, deliberative, rational System 2. It was found that cognitive depletion leads to enhancement of System 1. As advantageous decisions in the Iowa Gambling Task are closely related to emotional reactions -- domain of System 1 -- it was hypothesized that cognitive depletion will lead to not worse, or possibly even better results in depleted subjects. A controlled laboratory experiment was conducted involving 39 subjects in total. No difference was found in average desicions of depleted and non-depleted subjects in the Iowa Gambling Task, supporting the hypothesis. Further, short-term increase in impulsivity caused by cognitive depletion was very probably moderating choices in the IGT, leading to worse overall performance. Regarding risk preferences, we found that non-depleted subjects were generally more risk seeking in losses context, while depleted subjects exhibited rather loss aversion. This change in risk behaviors due to cognitive depletion very probably did not mediate choices in the Iowa Gambling Task.