This thesis argues that ‘democracy’ can better be understood in terms of a conceptual diarchy of ‘isonomia’ (equal political rights) and ‘isegoria’ (equal speech rights), rather than the conventional diarchy of ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ that originated in the era of absolute monarchy. As the proposed diarchy has its origin in classical Greece, the thesis starts with a brief overview of the institutional changes in sixth-, fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy that implemented the distinction in different ways, and examines some of its dysfunctions. The particular aspect of Athenian democracy under focus is sortition – the random selection of citizens for public office – viewed in antiquity as democratic, whereas election was viewed as an aristocratic or oligarchic selection mechanism. The thesis takes issue with Bernard Manin’s claim that the ‘triumph of election’ was on account of the natural right theory of consent, arguing that sortition-based proxy representation is a better way of indicating (hypothetical) consent than preference election. The thesis then seeks to clarify the concept(s) of representation – essential to the implementation of the democratic diarchy in modern large-scale societies – and to study how the diarchy has been reincarnated in modern representative democracies, along with an examination of the pathologies thereof. Consideration is given as to what the deliberative style of assemblies selected by lot should be, alongside evaluation of the epistemic potential of cognitive diversity and the ‘wisdom of crowds’. Given the need for both isonomia and isegoria to assume a representative form in large modern states, Michael Saward’s Representative Claim is adopted as a theoretical model to extend the reach of political representation beyond elections. The thesis concludes with tentative proposals as to how the fourth-century reforms (delegation of the final lawmaking decision to randomly-selected nomothetic courts) might be used as a template for modern institutions to resolve some of the problems of mass democracy.

The addition of random selection to our arsenal of methods for selecting political officials would enhance performance against norms of representative democracy. I employ historical and analytic methods to explore the nature of sortition and its relation to political equality, rational decision-making, and legitimate representation. Sortition both expresses a democratic commitment to political equality and facilitates improved performance under this democratic norm. It can be rational to eschew reasons in the process of selecting political officials, and decision-making bodies chosen randomly can be expected to make good decisions. I also address concerns stemming from representative norms, surrounding random selection of officials, arguing that random selection can enhance the resemblance and responsiveness of representatives. Finally, I detail some possibilities for institutional arrangements that would deliver the benefits of sortition while addressing the challenges it presents. / text

The thesis deals with the historical perspective of the sortition in the period of the Athenian democracy and the Italian city republics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The thesis tries to reveal the potential of the sortition and the reasons why the sortition was used as a primary tool for choosing citizens for public offices. The objective of the thesis is to find the potential of the sortition for contemporary liberal democracy. The thesis follows two historical cases in which the sortition was viewed as a democratic (or civil) instrument that breaks personal relations and limits the power of elite groups in the society. In this sense, the sortition should help to widen the civic participation in public affairs, to provide equal and fair distribution of public offices within the society, and to prevent corruption and factionalism.

Democracy has been encountering an increasing number of critics. Whether it comes from a sympathy for autocrats, free-markets, or the more knowledgeable, this increasing democratic scepticism often takes an epistemic form. Democracy's critics argue that democratic procedures and institutions are unlikely to make good decisions or produce good outcomes in terms of justice or the common good, and should, therefore, be restricted if not completely rejected in favour of its more able alternatives. In the face of such scepticism, this thesis develops an epistemic theory of deliberative democracy. This theory has two principal aims. The first is to analyse and define the epistemic properties of deliberative democracy, and the second is to clarify the possible role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. In accordance with the first, the thesis analyses the ability of deliberative democratic institutions to make good or correct decisions in comparison to a broad range of prominent alternatives. These include traditional rivals such as autocracy and aristocracy, but also more modern and less considered alternatives such as free-markets, limited epistocracy and forms of technical calculation. Through these comparisons, it is argued that we have no good or clear epistemic reason to reject democracy. Deliberative democracy is found to be epistemically superior to many of its alternatives and epistemically equivalent to even its best competitors. The thesis, therefore, mounts a strong reply to democracy's epistemic sceptics. The analysis, however, also helps clarify which form of deliberative democracy is epistemically most valuable, pointing to the value systems approaches which give a prominent role to direct citizen deliberation. The epistemic theory of deliberative democracy also aims to clarify what role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. The thesis argues that deliberative democracy is epistemically superior to many of its rivals and no worse epistemically than even its best alternatives. This suggests that although epistemic values cannot mount a stand-alone defence of democracy, democrats would only be required to defend very weak non-epistemic values to produce a mixed justification. Far from being 'rule by the incompetent many' and therefore highly reliant on procedural values, the thesis will demonstrate that epistemic values can carry significant weight in an argument for democratic rule.

L'objet de la présente thèse concerne l'étude de l'impact économique de trois modalités démocratiques, à savoir (i) l'agenda électoral, (ii) l'affiliation partisane des dirigeants en place dans un cadre de multipartisme, et (iii) les changements de gouvernance constitutionnellement définis. Afin d'introduire notre étude, nous décrivons la relation qui existe entre les modalités démocratiques et la démocratie directe d'une part et la politique budgétaire d'autre part, aux Etats-Unis sur la période 1790-2014 dans l'Introduction Générale. Dans le Chapitre 2 nous étudions l'effet authentique et potentiellement néfaste des cycles politico-budgétaires. Notre méta-analyse suggère que les dirigeants nationaux manipulent effectivement le budget dans un but de réélection mais l'ampleur du phénomène est largement exagérée par la littérature. Toutefois, le biais de publication mis en lumière s'est significativement réduit lors des 25 dernières années de recherches. Dans le Chapitre 3 nous étudions comment l'affiliation partisane des gouverneurs américains affecte le statut de pauvreté des immigrants, aux Etats-Unis, sur la période 1994-2014. Pour ce faire, nous comparons le niveau de pauvreté des immigrants dans les Etats gouvernés par les Démocrates au niveau de pauvreté des immigrants constaté dans les Etats gouvernés par les Républicains. En accord avec la littérature sur l'affiliation partisane, nous trouvons que les immigrants ont plus d'opportunités de sortir de la pauvreté sous les Démocrates que sous les Républicains. Une analyse formelle de médiation révèle que nos résultats empiriques sont médiatisés par un meilleur accès au marché du travail et possiblement de meilleures rétributions du travail, pour les immigrants. Dans le Chapitre 4 nous cherchons à vérifier l'évolution des notations souveraines lors des périodes d'inauguration des nouveaux dirigeants sur un échantillon de 18 pays d'Amérique Latine et des Caraïbes ayant des systèmes présidentiels. A partir de données de panel journalières s'étendant du 1er janvier 1994 au 31 décembre 2014, nous trouvons que les notations souveraines sont de meilleure qualité durant les périodes d'inauguration anticipées comparées aux autres périodes d'inauguration. En outre, nos résultats montrent que durant ces périodes d'inauguration anticipées, les notations sont encore meilleures lorsque le dirigeant entrant (i) est économiquement de droite, (ii) dispose d'un diplôme universitaire d'un pays de l'OCDE, (iii) a un parcours professionnel traditionnel, (iv) a une approche non populiste, et (v) dispose de marges électorales de victoire importantes. Il apparaît également un biais de genre potentiel à la faveur des nouveaux dirigeants de sexe masculin. En prenant avantage d'un modèle de durée et de régressions de Cox -- modèle à risque proportionnel, nous mettons en lumière que les périodes d'inauguration des dirigeants affectent également la probabilité instantanée de dégradation des notations souveraines. Enfin, dans la Conclusion Générale nous explorons les racines des pensées antisystèmes en Occident, puis nous discutons des avantages et inconvénients de quelques formes alternatives de démocratie, à savoir (i) la démocratie directe, (ii) le tirage au sort, et (iii) le développement participatif comme bien public. Finalement, nous explorons les controverses concernant les formes alternatives de démocratie sur l'agora virtuelle que constitue Twitter. / The aim of the present dissertation is to empirically investigate the economic impact of three democratic modalities, namely (i) the electoral agenda; (ii) the partisan affiliation of incumbents in a multipartism framework; and (iii) constitutionally defined leadership changes. To introduce the scope of the dissertation we describe the democratic modalities and direct democracy behind the U.S. fiscal policy from 1790 to 2014, in the General Introduction.In Chapter 2 we study the genuine detrimental effect of political budget cycles. Our meta-analysis suggests that national leaders do manipulate fiscal tools in order to be re-elected, but to an extent that is significantly exaggerated in the literature. The publication selection bias highlighted has nonetheless been reduced during the past 25 years of research. In Chapter 3 we investigate how governors' partisan affiliation affects the poverty status of immigrants to the U.S for the period 1994-2014. To this end, we compare the poverty outcomes of immigrants in states ruled by Democratic governors relative to the outcomes for those in states ruled by Republican governors. Consistent with the literature on partisan affiliation, we find that immigrants are more likely to get out of poverty in states with Democratic governors than states with Republican governors. A formal mediation analysis reveals that the empirical results are mediated through better access to the labor market and possibly through higher wages and labor earnings for immigrants. In Chapter 4 we assess whether sovereign credit ratings change during the inauguration periods of incoming leaders, on a sample of 18 Latin American and Caribbean countries with presidential systems. Building on a daily panel dataset covering the period from January 1, 1994 to December 31, 2014, we find that credit ratings are better during anticipated inauguration periods compared to other inauguration periods. Moreover, our results reveal that, during anticipated inauguration periods, incoming leaders with (i) an economically right-wing orientation; (ii) an OECD college degree; (iii) a traditional professional background; (iv) a non-populist approach; and (v) large electoral margins of victory are associated to even better ratings. There also appears to be a potential gender bias effect in favor of male incoming leaders. Last but not least, the quality of the credit rating also matters. In the General Conclusion we explore the roots of anti-systemism in the West, then we discuss some alternative forms of democracy, and we explore the controversies regarding the alternative forms of democracy on the virtual \emph{agora} of Twitter.