The South African Parliament has set up a programme to inform and educate the public about Parliament and to build democracy. Our country has only recently become a democracy. Previously, people were not allowed to vote nor participate in making decisions that affected their lives. Organisations such as Parliament were not open and did not answer to the public. As a result, the majority of the people do not have the experience and the skills to participate in the new democracy. This places a major challenge on all those who are committed to developing democracy in the country. The growing democratic culture can only be built upon if the public participate in issues that affect them. This requires that people are made aware of what is happening in organisations like Parliament and understand how they can become involved. People need to know how to raise their concerns when decisions affecting them are being taken. Once decisions are made, the public should be informed about their rights and responsibilities and how to hold government accountable. In building a democratic culture, the right of individuals to hold differing political views must be promoted. Parliament, as a national representative body, has a responsibility to contribute to deepening the democracy we have achieved. To do this the public education programme that has been set up will: * inform people about what happens in Parliament and about democracy generally; * educate people about how Parliament and democracy work and about their rights and responsibilities; * motivate people to participate in democratic processes and engage with decision making bodies, especially Parliament; and’ * promote a culture of democracy and human rights. To achieve the above, the Public Education Department (PED) has been established to coordinate the implementation of the programme. The PED will undertake a number of activities including workshops, public meetings, the distribution of publications and audiovisuals. campaigns, outreach to the youth and educational tours of Parliament. In undertaking the programme. Parliament will work closely with Provincial Legislatures, Government Departments, civil society and the media. To consult with these agencies and to build support for the programme, a national conference will be held early next year. Prior to this conference, preparatory conferences will be held in each province. The provincial conferences will also design strategies for outreach to the different sectors within the province and plan for the implementation of joint activities. Parliament calls on all members of the public, organisations and the different sectors of society to become actively involved in the programme and the drive to deepen democracy in our country. Individuals and organisations requiring more information or wanting to make an input into the programme can telephone the PED on (021) 403 2460.

Here the agreement between these two Ministers comes to an abrupt end. For while Dr. Koornhof says categorically that the only honourable way in which to do this, is by developing the resources of the homelands, Mr. Froneman states equally categorically that it is no part of the white man's duty to do so. Dr. Koornhof speaks of the moral and altruistic elements in the policy of separate development. Mr. Froneman speaks in the harshest and most callous terms of millions of "surplus" Africans, who must be sent back to their homelands, no matter what awaits them there. He says that African labourers in "white" areas must not be burdened with "superfluous appendages", such as wives, children, and dependents who could not provide service. These two men are in the same Cabinet. If one has been rebuked, it was done in private. And if it was done, it was no doubt done in a semi-jocular manner — "Fronnie, old boy, we all know what you mean, but you must learn to talk prettily." These two men do not represent two irreconcilable wings of the Nationalist Party, they represent the two essential elements of the policy of separate development. And these two elements are essential to each other. Either by itself would be dangerous. Either by itself would be unacceptable. Neither Mr. Froneman nor Dr. Koornhof has reached the stage when one cannot bear to be in the same Cabinet as the other. Although each of these two elements and each of these prototypes, is essential to the other, they do not co-exist in perfect harmony. The one is a naked baas, the other is a bass clothed in soft raiment. The first thinks the second is a sissy, the second thinks the first is a barbarian. They do not say so publicly, but their newspapers do, and that is not good. In the absence of any official pronouncement we must assume that they have been told that the sissy and the barbarian are essential to one another. The sissy will get the barbarian into nice company, the barbarian will protect the sissy if the nice company turns nasty. Why is it that although the barbarian and the sissy do not co-exist in harmony, they are (in spite of the dreams of rift-seekers) essential, the one to the other? Why do the callousness and the altruism not go to civil war? The answer is that neither of them is a fundamental. They are both imposed on something that is fundamental, and that is the preservation of white supremacy (which can be more gently called self-preservation, a soft word that turns wrath in some circles). Neither the callousness nor the altruism is part of the deep monolithic core. The cracks can show, the paint can peel, the fragments can flake off, but the core remains untouched. In times of ease (such as the present), one sees and hears and reads much of the cracking and the fragmentation. In times of danger (which will come), one is conscious of the monolithic core, which is like an ironwood heart in a softwood tree. If we accept the view that Mr. Froneman and Dr. Koornhof have something deep and fundamental in common, is there therefore nothing to choose between them? Or are Dr. Koornhof and his kind, bearers of hope for the future? For Mr. Froneman and his kind certainly are not. Their dream of the total separation of the races, if one chooses to dignfiy it by the use of such a term, is a dream which must be realised at whatever cost, and the cost will be the bitterness, and inevitably the hatred, of millions of Africans towards the white masters who make such heartless use of their power. It is claimed by our rulers that such bitterness does not exist except in the imaginations of sentimentalists and agitators, and it is true that the patience of Africans appears to be infinite. It takes a train disaster to strip the mask from the smiling face. Are Dr. Koornhof and his kind, bearers of hope for the future? Like Mr. Froneman, Dr. Koornhof believes in the policy of separate development. He does not attempt to conceal that this is to be done in the interests of self- preservation. If the homelands are developed, then more and more Africans will leave "white" South Africa to return to the places from which they were driven by the need for work, money, and food. Although Dr. Koornhof did not say so, it is justifiable to infer that he believes that white South Africa will be more secure if it sheds itself of its Africans, surplus or otherwise. There will be no competition in the labour market, no crime by rootless young black men in the beautiful white suburbs, and most important of all, no night of the long knife. But Dr. Koornhof wants this transformation to be made with justice. There must be work and food and hope in the homelands, and they must be helped to achieve autonomy, political and cultural and economic. It is the economic autonomy that poses the greatest difficulty. Even if it does not mean economic independence, it should mean a healthy economic relationship with "white" South Africa. This is where Mr. Froneman parts company with Dr. Koornhof. And this is where REALITY parts company with Dr. Koornhof too. The recognition that there can he no political and cultural autonomy unless there is at least a healthy relationship with “white” South Africa, is for REALITY a recognition by its political opponents that there are moral considera' tions which transcend those of naed self-preservation. These considerations were blue-printed (inadequately) by Professor Tomlinson in the ninteen- fifties, inexplicably ignored by Dr, Verwoerd (his biographer may one day explain why), and are now, in 1969, alternately honoured and dismissed by a two-tongued Cabinet. In any case REALITY rejects the Tomlinson or any other similar blueprint. The wealth of “white” South Africa was created by all of us jointly, and it belongs to all those who created is. / Journal includes vol. 1 no. 2 to vol. 1 no. 6 ; vol 2 no. 1 to vol. 2 no. 6 and vol. 3 no. 1 to vol. 3 no. 6 / Vol. 2 no. 3 is missing

Our Constitution says that South Africa must have an independent body, called Parliament, to make the laws of the country. Parliament is made up of our political representatives who are called Members of Parliament (MPs). We choose the MPs by voting in elections. Parliament has two main parts, called the Houses of Parliament. They are the National Assembly (NA) and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP). The MPs discuss and debate the new laws and make changes to existing laws. Parliament also has many committees where they discuss the laws in detail. Members of Parliament also make sure that the government departments do their work properly. / Funded by the European Union

This the second Worker-Tenant thus sees the light in a period wherein the ruling class, having shackled the newly independent states on the border can now move swiftly to win over those sections of the black middle class or the upper sections or the black working class prepared to accept the crumbs called the NEW DISPENSATION. At the same time the workers, the creators of the wealth of this country, are being faced with new onslaughts which further erode their already miserable living standards. But it would be false to see only doom and despair. The very necessity (from the ruler’s point of view) for a NEW DEAL, the very array of self-ordained "people’s" leaders which have suddenly emerged and the very fact that many of these have been forced to borrow from the language of the workers’ movement shows that the workers remain undaunted. And it is to the successful struggle of the workers’ movement for the right to run our lives that the WORKER-TENANT would like to add its voice. / No. 2

1984 has witnessed an intensification of the world economic crisis which began 10 years ago and with it a heightening of the class struggle world-wide. So extreme has the recession become that banner headlines liken it countless times to the first capitalist crash of 1929. Not even the USA's conjunctural boom can act as any respite to its own working population or to those of the other nations linked inexorably in the Imperialist chain. In America capitalism can boast an increase in profits of up to 50% for 1984 and the truth is that this has been achieved by depressing the value of wages below the inflation rate since 1981. For Latin America, America's boom has brought nothing but greater hardship as she reels under the economic burden of increased indebtedness, exacerbated by the soaring interest rates in the USA. Caring little for traditional blood-ties America intensifies the death throes of her oldest rival - Britain. The buoyant dollar has suppressed confidence in sterling, pushing up the cost of credit and thus discouraging capitalists from investing. The threat of this ruthless business sense has expressed itself in the most tenacious struggles on the part of workers to defend their right to work. In South Africa, hopes of an export-led recovery have been shattered by greatly diminished exports from the drought striken agricultural sector, and the costly importation of heavy machinery from America and Japan where the rand finds very little in exchange. This then is the meaning of America's boom. In a period of rapidly declining capitalism, there can be no talk of a protracted boom which brings about general social upliftment, but only an intensification of the most nationalisic throat-cutting and the immiseration of large sections of the working class. / No. 4

A dissertation submitted in the Faculty of Arts, University of the Witwatersrand, in the fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts in Political Studies. Johannesburg 1997. / In 1988 the Soweto People's Delegation and the councils of Soweto, Diepmeadow and Dobsonville began to negotiate an end to the rent boycott and the crisis in the provision of services. Discussions between civic bodies and local government officials - which eventually resulted in the Soweto accord - were increasingly infonned by the slogan 'one city, one tax base'. In the wake of the accord, other parties to similarly established negotiations commonly based their approach on the 'one city' slogan. As a result, local government negotiations and the institutional arrangements that followed were increasingly infonned by this notion. [Abbreviated Abstract. Open document to view full version] / AC2017

Since the dawn of democracy in South Africa one of the challenges that has remained elusive to policy-makers has been the issue of how to redistribute the same democratic advances made at national level to more ordinary citizens at grassroots level. The concern has been how to include voices of previously marginalized communities. The immediate policy plan at local government level is entitled “participatory governance” and has been adopted by the post-apartheid national government of the ANC to limit this participatory-democratic gap. The laws and policies that constitute the body of this policy are the White Paper on Local Government adopted in 1998 and the Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 and the Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998. The Msunduzi municipality has formally adopted this policy and it is called “community participation policy”, which has yielded rather unsatisfactory results to date. Setting aside the issue of implementation for now, the present study explores the institutional design of this policy of participatory governance in Msunduzi by applying the design principles of the theory of “empowered participatory governance”. This theory attempts to understand how to build a deep democratic culture via government-community partnerships through the concept of citizens who are empowered to play such a role. The major finding of this thesis is that there are design flaws in these institutions in this municipality which require a reform of the policy itself. However, this may not be enough, as more empowered citizens are also required. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2009.

This thesis provides an analysis of changes apparent in the ideology and style of the Inkatha Freedom Party'si politics since April 1994. The IFP's first three years in power under the new dispensation, as a member of the Government of National Unity and the majority party in KwaZulu-Natal, have witnessed a significant shift away from the militant Zulu nationalism and confrontational tactics that characterised the party from the mid-1980s. Zulu nationalism has been abandoned in favour of a broader appeal, while the brinkmanship employed during negotiations in the early 1990s, the walkouts and threats of violent resistance, have been largely absent in the post-election period. Confrontation since 1994, and especially since 1996, has gradually given way to more accommodatory and cooperative relations with the political opposition, on both the national and provincial levels of government. To understand why this shift has occurred, it is necessary to examine the nature of Zulu nationalism as espoused by Inkatha. It is my assertion that Inkatha employed Zulu nationalism in an attempt to preserve its institutionalised power base in the KwaZulu-Natal region and exercise a voice on the national level. Nationalist rhetoric became increasingly prevalent as violence escalated in the late 1980s, and peaked in the uncertainty of the political transition as the IFP faced marginalisation on South Africa's emerging politicalstage. Zulu nationalism acted as the rallying call for party faithful to resist the challenge of the United Democratic Front!African National Congress in the 1980s, and provided justification for Inkatha's confrontational approach and demands for Zulu self-determination in the early 1990s. Indeed, Inkatha's brand of Zulu nationalism has always been about 1 advancing the party interest, rather than defending the integrity of the divided and warring ,J Zulu people. It is in this light that the post-1994 shift in ideological emphasis must be understood. The April 1994 general election ushered in a new era in South African politics, in which the IFP found its role radically altered. From playing the part of spoiler on the outskirts of formal political structures it now had to adjust to its status as the majority party in the provincial legislature, with Buthelezi in a prominent role in the national cabinet. Under these conditions, the party's interests were advanced by the establishment of a smootWy run provincial administration, under which its regional power could be consolidated. Thus, the new political order created a space for the IFP within the democratic system in which its credibility rested on its ability to govern the province effectively. Further, under these conditions, confrontation was not only less attractive as a means of achieving party objectives, it was also less effective and feasible. This the IFP learnt the hard way, in terms of its disastrous constitution-making experience. Its boycott of negotiations at the national level merely served to deprive the IFP of a role in drawing up the country's final constitution, while a belligerent approach at the provincial level prevented the realisation of a compromise agreement. The IFP was forced to accept that its majority in the provincial legislature was insufficient to allow it to rule unilaterally in the province. The loss of therKing's political allegiance, coupled with election results which revealed strong support for the ANC among urban Zulus while the IFP's support was largely confined to traditionalist rural communities, undermined the party's claims to represent the Zulu nation. Furthermore, the gradual return of law and order in the province diminished the IFP's capacity to resort to militarism, thus taking some of the bite out of a confrontational strategy. In brief, the IFP was both pulled and pushed into the new order, and hence to some extent, a new ideology and political style. By 1996 the Zulu nationalism and belligerence that had characterised the party since the mid-1980s had been replaced with a liberal-conservative platform that sought resonance with the urban electorate, coupled with efforts to improve cooperative relations with the political opposition in the interests of provincial stability. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 1998.

The end of the cold war resulted in much optimism in Africa that political and economic problems would be minimised. In line with this optimism a number of countries undertook political and economic reforms. These developments are the reason why I chose the topic of democratic consolidation. There has been a growing interest in the democratisation prospects of these 'fragile states'. The question is, would they succeed in establishing necessary institutions to support democratic norms? In the literature there are diverse opinions, some point to political elites as the main stumbling block to democratic consolidation. They argue that there are no incentives to pursue a democratic path. Modernisation theory has placed more emphasis on economic development as a prerequisite to political stability. As a result some people argue that poor countries have limited chances to consolidate their democracy. This paper focuses upon the prospects of democratic consolidation in South Africa. The study has two main themes that are closely interlinked. The relationship between economic development and political development will be examined as will the positioning and ability of ruling elite to facilitate or impede democratic consolidation. What is argued is that institutions are in place to guarantee democratic consolidation. What is required now is a robust civil and political society to safeguard this democracy. This dissertation concludes by arguing that citizens are the key to democratic consolidation, they can guard their won freedom if they feel that it is threatened. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Natal, Durban, 1999.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1996.