xii, 310 p. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / Nostalgia is the longing for a lost, and often substantially reimagined, time or place. Commonly regarded as a conservative impulse available for exploitation by hegemonic forces, nostalgia can also be a source of social questioning and creative inspiration. This dissertation examines the ways in which nostalgic longing imports images and ideas from memory into present discourse and infuses works of art with complication, contradiction, and ambiguity. In the early 1960s, emboldened by Nikita Khrushchev's cultural Thaw, many Soviet filmmakers engaged both personal and social memory to craft challenging reflections of and responses to their times. These filmmakers reengaged the sundered spirit of the 1920s avant-garde and reimagined the nation's artistic and spiritual heritage; they captured the passing moments of contemporary history in a way that animated the permanent, productive, and sometimes stormy dialogue between the present and the persistent past. Mikhail Kalatozov's I Am Cuba (1964), Andrei Tarkovsky's Andrei Rublev (1966, released 1971), and Marlen Khutsiev's Ilich's Gate (1961, released with changes in 1965 as I Am Twenty ) were planned in the anxious years surrounding Khrushchev's fall, and the films mark a high point of Thaw-era cinematic audacity. Each film is epic in scope; each deploys temporal longing to generate narrative ambiguity and dialogue between historical epochs. The films are haunted by ghosts; they challenge the hegemony of the "now" by insisting on the phantom presence of a thousand "thens"; they refurbish old dreams and question contemporary assumptions. The Thaw permitted the intrusion of private memory into public history, and the past became a zone for exploration rather than justification. Easy answers became harder to come by, but the profusion of questions and suggestions created a brief silver age for Soviet cinema. For us, these films offer an extraordinary glimpse into creative life during one of the great, unsung social transitions of the 20th century and reveal the crucial contribution of individual memory in the artistic quest for formal diversity, spiritual inspiration, and ethical living. / Committee in Charge: Dr. H. Leslie Steeves, Chair; Dr. Biswarup Sen; Dr. Julianne Newton; Dr. Jenifer Presto

This dissertation seeks to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the political pressure group the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), which formed in 1976. The group's establishment, attainment of credibility, and influence in critical national security debates during the late 1970s has not yet been given sufficient attention. The Committee on the Present Danger has often been interpreted as a disingenuous propaganda group that dishonestly compiled an alarmist message to deceive politicians and journalists of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. However, the dissertation argues that the Committee's alarmism was genuine. The fact that CPD board members themselves became so fearful of the Soviet threat is the most striking aspect of the group's first four years of operation, and is the primary focus of this study. An examination of the group's formation and activities from 1976 to 1980 permits a more sophisticated appreciation of the group's goals, the promotion of its views, and the effects of its campaign on national security debates during this period. The dissertation adopts a chronological approach that recognises the creeping alarmism of the CPD over these years: warning of the dangers of détente gave way to prophesising an imminent Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Keeping the CPD as the focus of study in this period permits one to argue that the Committee's members, as a private citizens' group without government oversight and a shared worst-case methodology for assessing national security risks, sincerely came to believe in the veracity of their analysis of imminent Soviet military expansion. Committee experts generated and publicised a number of metrics that purported to demonstrate a military imbalance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Over time, and seemingly confirmed by alleged Soviet global aggression, the Committee came to believe that their worst-case estimates reflected reality.

No description available.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1979 B77 / Master of Arts

The present study focuses on the activity of the Young Communist League (Komsomol) to promote the communist project during the so-called Thaw period in the Soviet Union (1953-1964). The term ‘communist project’ describes the complex temporal triangle in which the relevance of the present was rooted in its relationship to the heroic past and the bright future. Young people were supposed to emulate the heroism of previous generations while fighting remnants of the undesired past. This was presented as a precondition for achieving the communist future. The structure of this study reflects the chronology of the communist project. It analyzes the rhetoric used by the Young Communist League to promote the communist project and explores the strategies used to mobilize youth for building communism. The first chapter focuses on the organizational structure of the Komsomol and assesses its readiness for this task. Despite attempts to strengthen horizontal communication and control, streamline administration and reorganize its structure, the Komsomol remained hierarchal and bureaucratic. The second chapter explores the promotion of past heroism in rituals, social practices and the use of public space. The third chapter is also concerned with the past; it describes the Komsomol’s fight against ‘remnants of the past’, primarily religion and deviant behaviour such as hooliganism, heavy drinking and laziness. The final chapter focuses on the Komsomol’s attempts during the Thaw to bring about the future: its efforts in the economy, moral, political and cultural education, and the realm of leisure.

In March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). By 1985 relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba had been in existence for over 25 years and were extremely close in both ideological and trade terms. Soon after coming to power, Gorbachev implemented the policies of perestroika and glasnost while Fidel Castro introduced the campaign for rectification of errors in Cuba. There were great differences in these campaigns since the Cuban one was much more ideologically driven than its Soviet counterparts. This study is an examination of the period from March 1985 to the end of 1991. This is done in three broad areas: official Soviet policy towards Cuba; the unofficial Soviet policy towards Cuba (an examination of academics and social/political commentators work on Cuba) and the Cuban perception and reaction to the events in the Soviet Union. This study also attempts to establish whether a rethinking, with the benefit of hindsight, has taken place in the years since 1991. In 1985 official and unofficial Soviet policy towards Cuba were identical but as the Gorbachev period continued this began to change. Official policy began to become contradictory in style since Moscow started "veiled" attacks against aspects of its relationship with Cuba while at the same time still defended the island in the face of continuing US hostility. Moscow also stated that the differences in Soviet and Cuban policies were because each campaign was designed for conditions specific to each country but that both had the same goal: the improvement of socialism. Although official policy became more outspoken, at no point during the Gorbachev era did it call for the termination of relations with Cuba. Unofficial Soviet policy started to change as the effects of glasnost permeated Soviet society. This became noticeable from 1987 onwards and reached the point that an open debate on the relationship was taking place. By 1991 unofficial policy was vastly different from the official Soviet line towards Cuba. The Cuban government also stated that the programmes were for situations specific to each country but that both had the same goal, that being the improvement of socialism. The unofficial Cuban line mirrored the official one but by 1990 this started to change as it started to criticise Soviet policies. In 1991 the Cuban government also started to do this. Due to the difficult situation in the socialist world the Cuban government from 1989 had been trying to increase its hard currency markets. A general re-thinking with the benefit of hindsight has not taken place on either side but an examination of participants' memoirs is still a valuable study to conduct. Although it offers very little new evidence for this period it does, however, give more credence to the events that took place between March 1985 and December 1991.

No description available.

The Communist Party's control of Soviet literature gradually evolved from the 1920s and reached its height in the 1940s. The amount of control exerted over Soviet literature reflected the strengthening power of the Communist Party. Sources used in this thesis include speeches, articles, and resolutions of leaders in the Communist Party, novels produced by Soviet authors from the 1920s through the 1940s, and analyses of leading critics of Soviet literature and Soviet history. The thesis is structured around the political and literary developments during the periods of 1917-1924, 1924-1932, 1932-1941, and 1946-1949. The conclusion is that the Communist Party seized control of Soviet literature to disseminate Party policy, minimize dissent, and produce propaganda, not to provide an outlet for creative talent.

In examining the military atmosphere of the Soviet Army the author will attempt to get the feeling of the life of the junior officers and enlisted men. The topics covered will include training, army regulations, military law, Party influence and control within the army, career potential, pay, retirement, daily routine, promotions, induction, terms of service, medical facilities, Post Exchanges, and professional schooling available to officers and men, only to list a few. No work will be done on tactics, techniques, or weapons of the Soviet Army.

Soviet-Third World relations during the Cold War are still not clearly understood. Largely based on previously unused primary material, this study aims to fill this gap in knowledge by emphasising the interplay between domestic, local, regional, and global dimensions in analysing Moscow’s involvement in the Horn of Africa. By offering a detailed examination of Soviet involvement in Somalia and Ethiopia during the Cold War, this thesis aims to shed light on the factors, shaping Moscow’s policies in the area. While it does not lay any claim of representativeness for other Third World regions, this thesis aims to highlight the intricate interplay between ideology and realpolitik in the making of Soviet foreign policy. Additionally, it tries to determine to what extent the ‘local pull,’ exerted by both Addis Ababa and Mogadishu, as well as by Soviet and other Bloc diplomats, informed the Kremlin’s policy in the area. This thesis shows that the two main strands of Moscow’s foreign policy, the pragmatic statist line and the ideological Cominternist approach, were not in conflict with one another. Instead, they were amalgamated into a flexible tactical approach, designed to maximise Soviet influence by whatever means available, along the path of least resistance. Another strand in the argument is interwoven with the pericentric framework for the study of the Cold War. While accepting recent interpretations of superpower-Third World relations, this research develops a more nuanced account of the centre-periphery interaction. The act of local engagement was Moscow’s initiative, in accord with its wider geo-political plans. Once engaged, the local actors proved instrumental in informing the Kremlin’s exercise of maintaining a presence. As with its entry, Moscow’s disengagement was predicated on strategic considerations. The period of perestroika, assigned the Third World lower priority in the Kremlin’s global agenda, engendering a withdrawal from the Horn.