Flygvapnets specialoperationsförband produceras i den konventionella delen av Försvarsmakten vilket innebär högre krav på byråkrati och styrning uppifrån i dess utvecklingsprocesser än okonventionella organisationer. Detta innebär att snabb operativ innovation, som är en framgångsfaktor inom specialoperationer, försvåras. Studiens syfte är att genom en kvalitativ intervjustudie utreda hur en specialoperationsenhet som utvecklas, utbildas och utrustas i en konventionell organisation ges förutsättningar till innovation till stöd för specialoperationer. Till stöd används bland annat Spulaks teori om kreativitet och innovation för specialförband. Studien visar att det går att genomföra snabb innovation nerifrån och upp under förutsättning att det finns en koherent uppdrags- och riskuppfattning samt om det råder en organisationskultur som uppmuntrar till kreativitet och innovation. Snabb anpassning kan även ske uppifrån och ner genom närhet till beslutsfattare som skapar förutsättning för att prioritet kan möjliggöra att resurser frigörs. Ett anpassat regelverk, decentraliserad ledning och förståelse för uppdraget är andra avgörande faktorer som skapar förutsättningar till snabb innovation. För att kunna uppnå detta krävs även en tydlig styrning från central nivå för att undvika att specialoperationsförbandens behov fastnar i försvarsgrenskonkurrens. / The Swedish Air Force's special operations forces is produced in the conventional part of the Armed Forces, which means higher demands on bureaucracy and control from higher hierarchy in its development processes than unconventional organizations. This means that rapid operational innovation, which is a success factor in special operations, is hampered. The purpose of the study is through a qualitative interview study to investigate how a special operations unit that is developed, trained and equipped in a conventional organization is given the conditions for innovation in support of special operations. Spulak's theory of creativity and innovation for special operations forces, alongside with other research, is used as a theoretical framework. The result show that it is possible to implement rapid innovation from the bottom up, provided that there is a coherent view of the mission and risks and whether there is an organizational culture that encourages creativity and innovation. Rapid adaptation can also take place from the top down through proximity to decision-makers, which creates the conditions for priority to enable resources to be allocated. An adapted regulatory framework, decentralized command and understanding of the mission are other decisive factors that create the conditions for rapid innovation. In order to be able to achieve this, a clear guidence from the central level is also required to avoid the requirements of the special operations forces getting caught up in intraservice competition.

One of the least explored areas in the field of military science pertains to preparations for resistance against occupation, known as Stay-Behind operations. This study examines the potential benefits that Stay-Behind operations could bring in the High North, which is identified as a weak area by NATO. Drawing on Colin Gray's theoretical framework on the strategic utility of special operations, the study analyzes the contributions of Stay-Behind activities. The study demonstrates the potential for achieving certain advantages in economy of force and the creation of operational flexibility through prearranged Stay-Behind operations during peacetime. Additionally, it highlights the challenge posed by the lack of an open academic discussion due to the subject's confidentiality, which could hinder the planning and implementation of Stay-Behind operations. Furthermore, the study identifies the need for clearer coordination and unified command in combat operations within occupied areas to counteract direct and/or indirect fragmentation of resources.