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Recipe for the Future is a toolkit for change-making through speculative design and food. It is a guide for a workshop to help participants imagine what the future of food could look like. It introduces the method of speculative cooking, where speculative objects and food-related future scans allow the imagination of a different world, a different future. This tool is used to allow minds to let go of the constraints of the present reality and see how else things could be. Question the social imaginaries and understand that it is not the only way we can live. As a future scenario is created, the engagement with the complexities of sustainability and climate change is unavoidable.

The work is a collection of poems entitled The Sometime Joy, comprising a mix of poems completed before and during my studies at UNT. The manuscript is my second completed full-length work after my first manuscript, the unpublished Night, Translated. The Sometime Joy shares many of the same themes with its predecessor, although stylistically the more recent work hews much more strongly toward the infusion of speculative and fantastical elements (just one example being the apocalyptic poem "Petal Storm"). The speculative components of the collection allow me to express and utilize the full range of my imagination, to use poetry to explore alternate existences and to create allegories, such as the "Market" series of poems, where capitalism is embodied as a chimerical beast that would fit in a horror film. The collection functions as my exploration of the intersections between folklore and pop culture, a series of meditations on the strangeness of human perspectives and how the relation between perceiver and the perceived alloys and transforms both. The collection also delves into horrific subjects varying from serried monsters (wendigos, the capitalist system, J. Edgar Hoover), the apocalypse, and the capacity of mundane humans to be cruel to each other, but also affirms the same imagination's potential to delight and sooth or poke fun. One of the central themes is embodiment and the human body and its components, seen through the "organ" sequence of poems that explore various human organs, as well as poems like the Market poems or "Hereby, Dragons" where concepts or abstractions are incarnated and embodied. Overall, the collection functions as an example of a contemporary poetry collection with an eclectic stylistic range and multiple linked sequences within the different sections.

In the thesis I explain why an immanent approach in philosophy means taking contingency to be "irreducible". I show why Deleuze and Guattari believe this to be the case and why they think Hegel fails to do this. I then go on to show in what way Hegel incorporates contingency into his system and how he also creates his own sense of "necessity" that emerges from the systematic treatment of contingent concepts. In this way I show how Hegel can respond to the demand for immanence made by Deleuze and Guattari. I suggest that freedom, for Hegel, consists in the systematic treatment of contingency in our lives and in our thinking.

The principal aim of this thesis is to mobilize the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger in order to recuperate an understanding of life as it is concretely known and experienced in the immediacy of its actual being-lived-out, or simply, to develop a distinctly Heideggerian conception of primordial phenomenal life.

This thesis seeks to make a contribution to the history of modern continental philosophy by establishing a structural link between the thoughts of Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. I argue that this link lies in the question of truth: both thinkers criticise the traditional concept of truth as objectivity. However, they both find in the existence of this very concept a problem that its rejection alone does not solve. What is it in our natural axistence that gave rise to the notion of truth? It is this questioning which I call the "question of truth". I locate three ways in which the question of truth informs Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty's thoughts. Firstly, both thinkers propose a genealogy of the concept of "truth," one in which they suggest that our natural existence is structured in a pre-objective way: existing means making implicit truthclaims. Further, they each explain the appearance of our belief in truth in terms of a radicalisation of this implicit attribution of truth (Chapters I and IV). Secondly, both thinkers seek to recover the pre-objective ground from which truth as an erroneous concept arose. They propose strikingly similar methods to do so (Chapters II and V). This ground, once uncovered, must be examined. This investigation leads both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty to ontological considerations. They both ask how we must conceive of a Being whose structure allows for the existence of the belief in truth, or as I argue, error. As a conclusion, I suggest that both thinkers' investigations of the question of truth lead them to conceive of Being in a similar way, as the process of self-falsification by which indeterminate Being presents itself as determinate (Chapters III and VI).

This dissertation seeks to substantiate the thesis that Nietzsche's physiological thinking constitutes a radicalisation of Kantian critique. To this end it attempts to mark out some of the salient points of the latter project and to examine the ways in which it falls short of its own potential radicality. In chapters one and two the categories of relation - in which Kant articulates his theory of the temporal connection of phenomena explicitly - are traced through the Analytic and Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason and are read against the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding which implicitly contains another theory of time. Since the Critique of the Teleological Faculty of Tudgerment complements Kant's theory of the temporal cohesion of phenomena, the third chapter offers a reading of it under the aspect of its relation to the wider project of critique. Chapter four draws together the multiple strands around which Kantian critique can be shown to mutate into Nietzsche's philosophical physiology and the theory of temporality implicit in it. Finally, Nietzschean physiology is presented in terms of his thinking of the becoming of matter, in terms of the will to power as eternal recurrence.

Heidegger perceives a naivety at the heart of Greek metaphysics to which he believes philosophy has remained prey throughout its history. This consists in having taken the understanding of being appropriate to the activity and experience of production [ποίησις] as the basis for understanding being in general. What such a interpretation lacks above all is a conception of human being as that which, distinct from the work, engages in productive activity. Only if such a conception were secured in contradistinction to the understanding of being derived from the work could, in Heidegger's view, ontology itself be placed on firm footing. By way of a response, Heidegger undertook a critical appropriation of Aristotle's practical philosophy and of the concept of πραξις in particular. This was to provide the basis of an account of Dasein. However, the outcome of the appropriation was problematic in two respects. First, Aristotle's own presentation of πραξις as the horizonal structure of teleological activity is dogged by incoherencies arising precisely from the influence exerted on the language of metaphysics by the experience of ποίησις. Indeed, the extent of this influence renders the language of metaphysics intrinsically ill-suited to the articulation of πραξις. Heidegger's appropriation of the figure of the end-in-itself must therefore be accompanied by an attempt to wrest it from the dominant conceptual structures of production. Second, insofar as the terms in which Heidegger couches the ontological determination of Dasein are taken from the language of practical philosophy, there arises a formal parallel between the transcendence of Dasein and possible structures of activity. Such a parallel invites the supposition that Dasein's transcendence may be enacted or accomplished in its comportment in and towards the world. Although I shall be concerned primarily with the first of these problems, the second remains a constant consideration and recurs explicitly at several junctures. Drawing on Heidegger's reading of Metaphysics Θ, I argue that he sought to secure an ontological interpretation of χίνησις, δύναμις and ένέργεια from which the influence of production had been displaced. Specifically, this hinges on the idea of finite appropriation as the essence of δύναμις. In addition, Heidegger emphasises the way in which each potentiality is related to the manner of its accomplishment. As an activity that is an end in itself, πραξις, is therefore understood as an activity of finite appropriation whose end is the very movement of appropriation itself. As such, it constitutes a repetition of the essence of δύναμις and of the transcendence of Dasein insofar as it is understood to be constituted by δύναμις.

Included is a collection of speculative fiction by author Nicholas Becher that incorporates research from Cherokee folklore as well as experimental perspectives of place and tone. / Includes bibliography. / Thesis (M.F.A.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2018. / FAU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Collection

The aim of this work is to defend substance dualism by defeating two of its paramount potential defeaters. I will argue that a substance dualist position, neo-Thomistic hylomorphism, provides a solution to the causal pairing problem and a good explanation of neural correlates of consciousness. After an introductory first chapter, I'll explicate dualism's dominant potential defeaters in the next three chapters. Chapter 2 will clarify what neural correlates of consciousness are and the objection to dualism based on neural correlates. The following two chapters will distinguish and elucidate dualism's principal problem regarding mental causation, which I'll argue is the causal pairing problem. The fifth chapter will introduce and explain neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. Chapter 6 will apply neo-Thomistic hylomorphism to the causal pairing problem, providing a solution that appeals to a fundamental tenet of neo-Thomistic hylomorphism. In Chapter 7 I'll apply the view and an Aristotelian powers ontology to construct a model of neural correlates of consciousness that's intended to explain such correlations. The final chapter will offer a conclusion and briefly discuss relevant future research.