A striking feature of twentieth-century Western cultural history was a preoccupation with silence. This thesis is a survey of the phenomenon across a broad range of literary and theoretical discourses actively engaged in the period in exploring and exploiting silence's expressive and philosophical potential. Its focus, and unifying principle, is the dynamic resourcefulness of the motif-the diversity of its uses and significations. The meaning of silence shifts according to its context and the discourse deploying it. By analysing an array of novels and theoretical formulations-by writers as diverse as James, Chopin, Conrad, H. D., Forster, Lawrence, Faulkner, and Wittgenstein, Benjamin, Blanchot, Hassan, Macherey, Irigaray, Spivak, Derrida-the mobility of silence as a construct is exposed. Silence is identified in the fiction of the period 1900-1950, and its implications are assessed in the light of the various ways in which its uses were understood and interpreted by twentieth-century theorists. Theory provides a heuristic device for the comprehension of the fiction selected for scrutiny whilst further highlighting the extent of the past century's dedication to the motif. Fiction and theory are regarded as two different manifestations of a fascination with silence: fiction dramatizes a commitment to the motif which comes to be formally registered in theoretical discourse as the century progresses. After an introductory chapter outlining the expanse of the phenomenon to be studied, the thesis is divided into two parts illustrating the discrete implications attaching to the motif: 'Social Silences' and 'Ontological Silences'. The project questions whether the multiplicity of silence's usage may work to depotentiate its signifying power; in particular, whether its role in abstract 'ontological' formulations diminishes its force for emancipatory 'social' discourses. In conclusion, by means of the synchronic organization of the thesis, silence's import is shown to lie in its resourcefulness rather than in any intrinsic characteristic it might be thought to possess.

This thesis examines some of the contested meanings of what it is to be a self, person and individual. The law of obligations sets the context for this examination. One of the important aspects of contemporary feminist philosophy has been its move beyond highlighting inconsistencies in political and legal theory, in which theoretical frameworks can be shown to rely upon an ambiguous treatment of women. The feminist theorists whose work is considered use these theoretical weaknesses as a point of departure to propose different conceptual frameworks. I start by analysing contemporary work on the self from within both philosophy of science and feminist metaphysics to draw out common approaches from these diverse positions. These themes are then discussed in the context of the law. I then critically examine the concept of legal personhood in the work of Drucilla Cornell and her proposals for the amendment of tort law. This is juxtaposed with an analysis of the practical operation of tort law by adapting François Ewald's work on risk and insurance to English law. I concentrate on women's ambiguous position with regard to both risk and to the image of the individual that is the subject of Ewald's critique. This is followed by an examination of the changing position of women with regard to 'possessive individualism', 'self-ownership' or 'property in the person' in relation to contract law and social contract theory. There are a number of different social contracts discussed in the thesis: Cornell's reworking of John Rawls and the stories of Thomas Hobbes and of Carole Pateman. The final 'social contract' to be discussed is that of 'new contractualism', the employment of contract as a technique of government. I argue that Pateman's critique of possessive individualism continues to be relevant at a time when the breadwinner/housewife model has broken down.

This thesis will be asking questions about the underlying structure of Kant, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche's thoughts on atheism and agnosticism. It will begin with the work of the mature Kant, explaining how his epistemology, as articulated in the Critique of Pure Reason, treated the question of the sense experience of God and then how his theory of biblical hermeneutics treated the question of divine revelation through scripture, before examining Kant's moral proof of God, finding it not to be successful. I next move to a consideration of the atheistic philosophy of Arthur Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer's chief argument against God will be seen to be an argument from exclusion, although significant difficulties will be seen to beset Schopenhauer's endeavour. He will also be seen to shape a moral philosophy which he then turns against God. This argument will be examined in some detail and it too, despite appearances, will be seen to be essentially metaphysical. Since Schopenhauer's moral philosophy is intrinsically metaphysical in this way, his moral objective to God has to be construed as relying upon the prior introduction of an element of his atheistic metaphysics and to that extent is to be considered an expression of, rather than an argument for, atheism. Nietzsche elaborates a metapsychological and physiological analysis of the type of person inclined towards believing in the claims of the monotheistic tradition, demonstrating how theism is connected with the yearning of escape and for the moralisation of the socially unaccountable. After investigating the Nietzschean approach to religion and atheism, I will however, conclude that Nietzsche only achieves some of his aims; and further, that those of his aims which are achieved themselves rely on certain specific empirical assumptions which are in any case problematic.

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This dissertation’s contribution consists in providing a novel interpretation of the role time plays in Kant’s transcendental idealism. A significant part of Kant scholarship on the Critiques tends to assume that time, as understood in transcendental philosophy, is solely a formal property of intuition. This assumption has led several commentators to overlook a fundamental feature of transcendental idealism, namely, that in being the most basic form of intuition time is, also, a provider of content in and for experience. In looking attentively at such feature this dissertation shows that time is the activity of the self that grounds the possibility of objectivity and explores the philosophical implications of such an interpretation. In the first Chapter I conduct a comprehensive survey of relevant literature and show that it is impossible to separate general metaphysics from transcendental logic in the context of Kant’s transcendental philosophy without making serious philosophical sacrifices. I then argue, in the second Chapter, that time is not merely a formal property of intuition but is, rather, the fundamental form of intuition and that, even if space is in no way reducible to, or derivable from it, time has nonetheless primacy over space on both logical and ontological grounds. From this I argue that by time, or self-affection, Kant understands the activity of subjectivity that brings about the possibility of relating to objects through the power of imagination. In the third Chapter, I show that such relation is not left wholly undetermined and that, instead, it occurs in accordance with the layout presented by Kant in the Table of Judgments, the Table of Pure Concepts of the Understanding, the Schemata and, importantly, in the System of Principles of the Understanding. I show that only an interpretation that acknowledges the systematicity found in the Analytic section of the Critique of Pure Reason can justify the distinction drawn by Kant between the mathematical and the dynamical and conclude, from that, that time does indeed provide a specific content in and for experience to be found in the Schematism doctrine. Finally, in the fourth Chapter I broaden the philosophical scope and inquire as to whether Kant has the theoretical means to articulate something like an uncategorized schema or time-determination. I conclude that, although in the Critical period Kant can do so only problematically, in the post-Critical period there are means to do so categorically: system, as such, is a time-determination for which the understanding lacks a pure concept.

Evidence based medicine (EBM) offers an established framework for the generation, interpretation, and utilisation of information in medicine and the health sciences. Central to the practice of EBM is, I argue, the notion of causation. This thesis makes an original contribution to the philosophy of EBM through a unique identification of a causal theory in EBM, and then by demonstrating a reconceptualised theory of causation better suited to evidence based person centred care. PART 1 of this thesis demonstrates that a very specific idea of causation can be witnessed within the structure of EBM. This idea is typically Humean. Through a consideration of the structure and textual narrative of EBM, it is proposed that the framework substantiates central and canonical claims. These claims relate to the core activity of EBM being the informing of clinical decision-making through the transference of causal claims from prioritised research methods. I argue that a Humean notion of causation is problematic for the central and canonical claims, thereby presenting a paradox – EBM is structured to inform clinical decision-making about causation but is inhibited from doing so by the way this very structure conceptualises causation. In PART 2 I argue for a reconceptualisation of causation that offers some solutions to the problems identified in PART 1. This theory relates to a dispositionalist ontology and takes causes to be derived from properties of an individual and as being things that merely tend towards an effect. Causes are seen as complex and context-sensitive, and whereby a traditional Humean account sees these factors as challenges to its epistemological reading, causal dispositionalism takes them as its starting point. To present this theory, desiderata are developed from existing narratives on EBM and elements of the theory set against these. In conclusion, I argue that if medicine and health care desire a framework of practice that is both evidence based and person centred, its causal theory must be reconceptualised. Causal dispositionalism offers an encouraging reconceptualisation.

In this thesis I show how the challenges of producing a philosophy of history responsive to the negativity of the world benefits from working through the difficulties of G. W. F. Hegel’s systematic philosophy. By revealing the powerful and intricate ways that Hegel gives an illegitimate primacy to thought (or the concept) we can better appreciate the obstacles that face a philosophy which places new emphasis on the nonconceptual whilst recognising the genuine role of the concept. In the first half of this thesis I reconstruct the important criticisms levelled at Hegel by F. W. J. Schelling and Theodor W. Adorno. I argue that both their criticisms illuminate our understanding of the metaphysical status of Hegel’s thought and expose the surreptitious means by which Hegel overextends the concept. The value of Adorno’s and Schelling’s reading of Hegel is also due to the fact that they do not cast aside Hegel’s ambitions as mere fantasy. Rather, they provide important insight into the goals philosophy should be striving towards—even if we cannot be as confident as Hegel in their imminent achievement. In the second half I reconstruct Schelling’s and Adorno’s philosophies of history in light of their criticisms of Hegel. The core problem addressed is how unwarranted optimism – entailed by the idealistic operation in Hegel’s theoretical philosophy – is to be eschewed whilst also avoiding a lapse into unwarranted pessimism. I argue that, while both Schelling and Adorno make important advances in this direction, Adorno’s philosophy of history is better able to make sense of both the prevalence of unfreedom in history and the ways in which we can respond to this situation.

This thesis explores the discursive environment in which the ‘interdisciplinary self’ is constructed. Interdisciplinarity is part of research policy agendas across the globe; however, there are competing and contrasting discourses about its value. On the one hand, interdisciplinarity is meant to foster innovation and to address contemporary world problems; on the other hand, it represents an intellectual and a professional risk for those who engage in it. Interdisciplinarity has become a research topic in itself, but scholars have not engaged with contemporary literature on ‘the self’ and on expertise. This limits our understanding of the individuals who engage in interdisciplinary research and how they deal with their intellectual and professional challenges. This thesis aims to fill this gap by reviewing literature on expertise and analysing 27 semi-structured interviews with researchers and administrators from a large research-oriented British university. The analysis draws on an approach that focuses on how ‘the self’ is constructed in discourse and biographical narrative, taking up but also resisting widely established meanings (e.g. what is an expert, what is worthwhile professionally, etc.). The analysis identifies in particular four ‘ideological dilemmas’ that the interviewees struggle with in their arguments about their background, their skills, and the value of their careers; namely the dilemmas of ‘openness and rigour’, ‘individualism and collectivism’, ‘disciplinary tolerance and expert prejudice’, and ‘effort and reward’. These dilemmas suggest that the ‘interdisciplinary self’ is performatively and discursively constructed in a rhetorical context in which no position can remain untroubled. Therefore associating interdisciplinary individuals with idealised traits, personalities and ‘virtues’ is not so adequate. It is suggested that ‘interdisciplinary expertise’ consists of the skills of managing these dilemmas, which may be partially but not permanently solved.

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