Le concept de civilisation, aujourd'hui très étudié en science politique, reste largement inexploré dans sa dimension juridique. L'objectif de cette thèse est de retracer l'évolution de ce concept dans la pensée juridique à travers le mécanisme du standard de civilisation. Après avoir eu une influence significative dans la formation du droit international classique, le standard de civilisation a connu une mutation radicale au XXème siècle, notamment à la faveur de la proclamation universelle des droits de l'homme et de la diffusion des principes démocratiques. D'un mécanisme explicite de reconnaissance des États, le standard de civilisation est devenu un mécanisme implicite d'évaluation du comportement des États sur la scène internationale. Son influence se révèle en particulier à travers le rôle du discours de civilisation dans le processus de légitimation et dans le mécanisme de différenciation des États en matière de recours à la force. De l'observation de la pratique, il ressort que le standard de civilisation crée des dynamiques normatives dans l'ordre juridique international, notamment en s'articulant à certains principes juridiques aujourd'hui bien établis. / The concept of civilization, today very studied in political science, remains largely unexplored in its legal dimension. The objective of this thesis is to trace the evolution of this concept in legal thinking through the mechanism of the standard of civilization. After a significant influence in the classical international law, the standard of civilization has undergone a radical change in the twentieth century, particularly thanks to the universal proclamation of human rights and the spread of democratic principles. From an explicit mechanism of recognition of States, the standard of civilization has become an implicit mechanism for evaluating states behaviour on the international stage. His influence is revealed especially through the role of civilization discourse in the process of legitimation and the mechanism of differentiation of States in the use of force. From the observation of the practice, it appears that the standard of civilization creates normative dynamics in the international legal order, particularly in articulating with certain legal established principles.

Pariah status in international society denotes an international social hierarchy and differentiation of states caused by power differentials between state groups along the material and normative spectrums. From the late Qing era to the present day, China’s engagement with international society has largely been marked by a sharp fall from the ‘Middle Kingdom’ to a pariah, followed by a recent rise to great power status. This thesis traces and analyses China’s experience as a pariah in international society since 1839, and explains China’s responses to the normative boundaries and behavioural standards set by members of international society. To this end, this thesis addresses two themes. Theme One (Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4) provides an account of the sociological history of pariah state, on which basis it conducts an empirical study on China’s pariah past. Theme Two (Chapter 5) brings in a sociological account of status to understand the fall and rise of states (particularly that of China), and to explain state responses to the normative boundaries alongside their status change in international society. Moreover, it challenges the material-power based power transition theory on China’s rise and destiny, and argues for an alternative status-led account. In general, this thesis resonates greatly with English School theorists and social constructivists in terms of the understanding of and approach towards international relations. In a broad sense, it adopts a combined sociological and historical approach towards the study of the international, specifically that of pariah and status. The main contentions of this thesis are: first, pariah is a social, relational and historically contingent term. Pariah states are socially made through a process of rule making, rule-application, and behaviour-judging, with the rule-makers being those who are positioned at the higher ends of both material and normative power spectrums. The criteria for pariah are not fixed, but subject to change as they are conditioned by the changing international normative/material structures and dynamics among actors. Second, state status has both material and social implications in international society. It derives from the internal/domestic attributes of the state as well as the external/international. The attainment of status hinges upon material power capacity, state identity, behavioural legitimacy, and international perception thereof. Third, empirically, the fall and rise of China in international society is not merely a process of China’s material power decline and elevation relative to others, but was also accompanied by its social mobility downward and upward. China’s responses to the international normative boundaries are not purely determined by material power incentives. Instead, it is the complex interplay between the material and the social that accounts for China’s constant struggle between compliance with the standardised behavioural codes prescribed in the standard of civilisation, and attempts to contest them by inserting its own civilisational values.

L'interdiction de l'esclavage constitue une norme fondamentale du droit international contemporain: figurant dans les principaux instruments de protection des droits de l'homme, elle est souvent citée comme l'exemple-type d'une obligation dont le respect intéresse la communauté internationale dans son ensemble et revêt un caractère impératif. La présente étude s'intéresse aux origines de cette interdiction, telle que reflétée par la pratique étatique et discutée par la doctrine, avant l'émergence d'un droit international des droits de l'homme à la suite de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Elle soutient qu'au XIXe siècle et pendant la première moitié du XXe siècle, l'affirmation d'un droit international antiesclavagiste et la définition du cadre conceptuel dans lequel celui-ci s'effectuait était étroitement dépendante de la capacité des États occidentaux de se définir eux-mêmes, par rapport au reste du monde, comme des« nations civilisées ». Nos recherches démontrent qu'une question récurrente à cette époque fut de savoir si une« nation civilisée» ayant formellement aboli l'institution esclavagiste pouvait être accusée, en tolérant ou en imposant certaines formes de travail forcé non fondées sur la reconnaissance formelle d'un droit de propriété sur des êtres humains, de s'être livrée à des actes illicites au regard du droit international antiesclavagiste. Or ce n'est finalement qu'en 1945, au terme d'une remise en cause sans précédent de la notion même de« civilisation », que les signataires du Statut de Nuremberg adoptèrent le premier instrument conventionnel y apportant une réponse positive. / The prohibition of slavery is a fundamental rule of contemporary international law. It has been incorporated into all major international human rights conventions. The International Court of Justice cited it as an international obligation in whose protection all states have a legal interest. Most international law scholars refer to it as the very example of a peremptory norm. The present study examines the origins of the international prohibition of slavery, as reflected by state practice and scholarly writings. It focuses on the period prior to the emergence of international human rights law in the aftermath of the Second World War. Its main argument is that during the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the emergence of international anti-slavery law and the definition of its conceptual framework was closely dependent on the capacity of Western states to define themselves, when compared to the rest of the world, as “civilized nations.” My research shows that a recurring question during that period was whether a “civilized nation” which had formally abolished slavery could still be accused of breaching international anti-slavery law by tolerating or exacting certain forms of forced labour not based on the recognition of property rights over human beings. It is only in 1945, after a period during which the very notion of “civilization” had largely fallen into disrepute, that the signatories of the Nuremberg Charter adopted the first treaty positively recognizing that this could indeed be the case.

This thesis develops a theory of international social closure to examine (i) the politics of membership in status groups – or, clubs – in international society and (ii) the persistence of clubs in international society. This thesis offers new concepts to improve the English School’s understanding of international society, its expansion, and its reproduction. In so doing it also addresses limitations and gaps in the IR status literature and the global governance and diplomacy literatures concerned with clubs and networks. This thesis analyses strategies of exclusion, entry, and incorporation used by actors to deny, attempt, or grant inclusion into clubs as well as the institutional contexts underpinning those clubs. Specifically, this research undertakes a study of instances of exclusion, entry, and incorporation in the context of three clubs: the Family of Civilised Nations, the Great Powers club, and G-summitry. In the first two cases, this research relies primarily on secondary sources while in the case of G-summitry it presents original empirical research gathered through archival research, interviews, and ethnographic participant observation. This thesis presents four main conclusions about the operation of closure: (i) the logics of different closure games are defined by overarching normative institutions of international society; (ii) despite a collectivist closure rule, closure in international society is predominantly individualistic; (iii) actors seeking entry tend to employ deferential entry strategies that reproduce a stratified status quo order; and (iv) incorporation promotes stratification along both functional and cultural lines. This thesis also draws three specific conclusions that run counter to much current scholarship: (i) contemporary international society is neither more open nor less hierarchical than nineteenth century international society; (ii) hierarchy is reproduced to a large degree by entry and incorporation strategies rather than exclusion strategies; and (iii) closure does not run along a ‘west versus the rest’ fault line.