This Master’s thesis has the politics of museum in focus, as a subordinate governmental cultural policy, as a continuation of cultural reform in a time when legislation were to take place in Sweden. The aim of the study is to map out claims from museums and their responsible authorities in response to the governmental bill Ny Museipolitik. The study deem the subject area of politics of museums as a organizational field. By using the Toulmin model of argumentation several hundred claims about the works of museums and the effects on society were founds. The result could be arranged in eight different themes. In the analysis of the claims both unifying and disrupting tendencies could be observed. The themes presented in the result are: a new legislation, a new administrative authority, handling the collection, cooperation, fundings, museums and society, quality assurance and research at the museum and a round up theme called other.      One conclusion showed that the different levels of authorities in particular produced diversified needs and challenges. Some findings point out how the field are contested concerning legitimacy. There is also conclusion indicated by the claims that showed how several isomorphic tendencies were apparent. Legislation are considered to heighten the state of affairs and the increased level of ambition are welcomed. A very apparent conclusion is that a much needed reform, according to the comment letters, is that governmental grants are increased and secured over time.

[pt] A distinção entre argumentar a partir de regra, e argumentar quando não há regra, é retomada para elucidar alguns aspectos da atividade justificatória no âmbito legal. A referida distinção encontrou em Rawls um porta-voz que realçou de modo incisivo sua importância para a prática legal. Antes dele, porém, Hume, Mill, Ryle e Toulmin, entre outros, já haviam tecido considerações relevantes ao tema. A distinção serve de motivação para dividir o campo da argumentação prática, particularmente da argumentação jurídica, em duas classes, a saber, argumentos de primeira e de segunda ordem. Nos argumentos de segunda ordem, uma regra atua na forma descrita no modelo de Toulmin. Nos argumentos de primeira ordem, caracterizados pela ausência de regra, procede-se mediante ponderação de razões, substanciadas em princípios gerais, valores morais, interesses políticos, programas econômicos, considerações religiosas e pretensões corporativas. Alguns exemplos ilustram a distinção. Argumenta-se que a base lógica dessa distinção assenta-se no conceito de regra como razão excludente, no sentido estabelecido por Joseph Raz. / [en] The distinction between justify a conclusion from rule and justify it when no rule is resumed to elucidate some aspects of legal activity. This distinction found in Rawls a spokesman that incisively pointed out its importance for the legal practice. Before him, however, Hume (A Treatise of Human Nature), Mill (A System of Logic), Ryle (The Concept of Mind) and Toulmin (The Uses of Argument), among others, had already made relevant considerations to the topic. The distinction serves as motivation to split the field of argumentation practice, particularly of the legal argument, into two classes, namely, arguments of first and second order. In the arguments of second order, a rule operates in the manner described in the Toulmin model, in the arguments of the first order, characterized by the absence of rule, by weighting of reasons, substantiated on general principles, moral values, political interests, religious considerations and corporate claims. Some examples illustrate the distinction. It is argued that the logical basis of this distinction is based on the concept of rule as exclusionary reason, within the meaning established by Joseph Raz.