published_or_final_version / Business / Master / Master of Philosophy

Chen, Renjie. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Abstracts in English and Chinese.

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Business / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

published_or_final_version / Business / Master / Master of Philosophy

Pan Wing Wah. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-102). / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review 一 Theory and Evidence / Chapter a. --- Theory Review --- p.7 / Chapter b. --- Empirical Review --- p.42 / Chapter 3. --- Empirical Study: Part I --- p.53 / Chapter 4. --- Empirical Study: Part II --- p.73 / Chapter 5. --- Conclusion --- p.94 / Reference --- p.97

by Ho Pui Sim, Charissa, Tsui Chi Kei, Libra. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991. / Bibliography: leaves XI-XII. / Abstract --- p.i / Acknowledgements --- p.vii / List of Exhibits --- p.viii / Chapter 1 --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Financial Structure --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Hong Kong Listed Companies --- p.1 / Chapter 1.3 --- Rationale --- p.2 / Chapter 1.4 --- Financial Structure Theories --- p.3 / Chapter 1.4.1 --- Static Tradeoff Models / Chapter 1.4.2 --- Pecking Order Hypothesis / Chapter 1.4.3 --- Other Models / Chapter 1.5 --- Statement of the Problem --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- METHODOLOGY AND PRESENTATION OF RESULTS --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Methodology --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Literature Review / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Survey / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Interviews / Chapter 2.2 --- Study Constraints --- p.7 / Chapter 2.3 --- Presentation of Results --- p.7 / Chapter 3 --- FINANCIAL STRUCTURE DECISION --- p.9 / Chapter 3.1 --- Background of Respondents --- p.9 / Chapter 3.2 --- Static Tradeoff vs. Pecking Order and Other Models --- p.9 / Chapter 3.3 --- Preference for Sources of Funds --- p.10 / Chapter 3.4 --- Term to Maturity of Debts --- p.13 / Chapter 3.5 --- Organization of Financing Decision --- p.14 / Chapter 4 --- SPECIFIC FINANCIAL STRUCTURE MODELS AND PLANNING PRINCIPLES --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1 --- Specific Financial Structure Models --- p.16 / Chapter 4.2 --- Financial Planning Principles --- p.19 / Chapter 4.3 --- Perception on Market Efficiency --- p.21 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- Impact on Financing Choice / Chapter 4.4 --- Information Contents of New Stock Issues --- p.23 / Chapter 5 --- SECTORAL ANALYSIS --- p.24 / Chapter 5.1 --- Static Tradeoff vs. Pecking Order and Other Models --- p.24 / Chapter 5.2 --- Preference for Sources of Funds --- p.25 / Chapter 5.3 --- Term to Maturity of Debts --- p.27 / Chapter 5.4 --- Financial Planning Principles --- p.28 / Chapter 5.5 --- Financial Structure Models Inputs --- p.30 / Chapter 6 --- ASSET SIZE ANALYSIS --- p.33 / Chapter 6.1 --- Static Tradeoff vs. Pecking Order and Other Models --- p.33 / Chapter 6.2 --- Preference for Sources of Funds --- p.34 / Chapter 6.3 --- Term to Maturity of Debts --- p.35 / Chapter 6.4 --- Financial Planning Principles --- p.36 / Chapter 6.5 --- Financial -Structure Models Inputs --- p.38 / Chapter 7 --- FINANCING DECISIONS AND OTHER SOURCES AND USES OF FUNDS --- p.42 / Chapter 7.1 --- An Overview of Findings --- p.42 / Chapter 7.2 --- Implications of Findings --- p.42 / Chapter 7.3 --- Contrast with the Findings of Pinegar and Wilbricht --- p.43 / Chapter 7.4 --- Impact of Business Nature --- p.43 / Chapter 7.5 --- Impact of Asset Size --- p.45 / Chapter 8 --- CONCLUSION --- p.47 / Chapter 8.1 --- Objectives of the study --- p.47 / Chapter 8.2 --- Summary of findings --- p.48 / Chapter 8.2.1 --- Sectoral Analysis / Chapter 8.2.2 --- Asset Size Analysis / Chapter 8.2.3 --- Comparison between the Findings in Hong Kong and US / Chapter 8.3 --- Implications and Assessment of Findings --- p.51 / APPENDICES --- p.I / Chapter Appendix 1 --- Cover Letter / Chapter Appendix 2 --- Financial Structure Questionnaire / Chapter Appendix 3 --- Business Nature of Respondents / Chapter Appendix 4 --- Asset Size of Respondents / Chapter Appendix 5 --- Financial Structure Models Used By Respondents / Chapter Appendix 6 --- Market Efficiency Perceptions / Chapter Appendix 7 --- Events of Mispricing / Chapter Appendix 8 --- Pearson's R Correlation Between Market Efficiency Perceptions and Importance Assigned to Inputs / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.XI

本文研究了海外背景的董事在中国上市公司中的表现和作用。本文从董事最基本的两个作用监督和指导出发，研究了海外背景的董事对于董事会治理和公司表现的各项投入和产出。研究结果表明，海外背景的董事在董事会会议的缺席记录更多，更少参与特殊委员会的工作。海外背景的董事对于高管薪酬水平的管理更弱，但在解雇表现不佳的CEO有积极的作用。在指导作用上，海外背景的董事表现得并不尽如人意。海外背景的董事并没有利用自己的海外经历为公司在海外并购业务来带好处。最后，海外背景董事占比最高的公司，托宾Q所代表的公司表现更低。这篇文章的重要性在于，这是第一篇用国内数据研究海外背景董事在公司治理和表现中的作用的文章，同时也是第一篇详细阐述不同的海外背景所具有的不同影响的文章。 / This paper discusses the presence and the roles of directors with foreign backgrounds in China’s listed companies. Starting from the two basic roles of boards, monitoring and directing, this paper examines the inputs and outputs of foreign-background directors (FBDs) on board governance and firm performance. The result shows that FBDs are associated with worse board meeting attendance records, less special committee assignments, weaker control in senior executive compensation level, but more strength in firing underperforming CEOs. In directing-related functions, FBDs does not meet the expectation that they can benefit the firm’s cross-border merger and acquisition decision by taking advantage of their foreign background knowledge. Finally, firms with higher fraction of FBDs on board are associated with poorer performance in terms of Tobin's Q. This research is significant because it is the first exploration of the functions of FBDs in listed corporations using China’s data, and the first attempt to identify the role of each different foreign background. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Xia, Keqin. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 30-34). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Foreign Background Directors and Corporate Performance: Empirical Evidence from China’s listed Companies --- p.I / ABSTRACT --- p.II / 摘要： --- p.III / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS --- p.IV / Chapter SECTION I --- : INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter SECTION II --- : LITERATURE REVIEW --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1 --- Board Functions--Monitoring and Directing --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Monitoring function & agency problem --- p.3 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Directing function --- p.6 / Chapter 2.2 --- Board Governance and Firm Performance --- p.6 / Chapter SECTION III --- : DATA AND METHODS --- p.7 / Chapter 3.1 --- Individual characteristics --- p.7 / Chapter 3.2 --- Board characteristics --- p.8 / Chapter 3.3 --- Firm characteristics --- p.10 / Chapter 3.4 --- Different foreign backgrounds --- p.10 / Chapter SECTION IV --- : EMPIRICAL RESULTS --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1 --- Board Meeting Attendance Problem and FBDs --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- Regression analysis of absence ratio --- p.14 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Regression analysis of the total absence ratio --- p.15 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- Conclusion on attendance problem and foreign backgrounds --- p.17 / Chapter 4.2 --- Probit Regression Analysis of Committee Assignments --- p.17 / Chapter 4.3 --- Regression Analysis of Senior Executives’ Compensation --- p.19 / Chapter 4.4 --- Regression Analysis of CEO Turnover Rate --- p.21 / Chapter 4.5 --- An Event Study: Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Analysis --- p.23 / Chapter 4.6 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: FBDs and ROA --- p.26 / Chapter 4.7 --- Firm Performance Regression Analysis: Tobin’s Q and FBDs --- p.28 / Chapter SECTION V --- : SUMMARY --- p.29 / REFERENCES --- p.30 / FIGURES AND TABLES --- p.35

by Ching Chi Keung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-91). / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.3 / Chapter 2. --- Literature Review --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Data --- p.17 / Chapter 4. --- Profile of IPOs in Hong Kong --- p.24 / Chapter 5. --- Methodology --- p.27 / Chapter 6. --- Results --- p.43 / Chapter 7. --- Comparison with the study in U. S --- p.57 / Chapter 8. --- Summary --- p.61 / Chapter 9. --- Tables --- p.64 / Chapter 10. --- Results of statistical test --- p.70 / Chapter 11. --- Charts --- p.72 / Chapter 12. --- Appendixes --- p.79 / Chapter 13. --- Reference --- p.89

by Cheung Ho-Wan Oswald, Kwok Tsz-Hong, Yeung Kwong-Yiu. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 37-42). / ABSTRACT --- p.I / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.II / LIST OF TABLES --- p.IV / Chapter / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter II. --- HISTORY OF CHINA SECURITIES MARKETS --- p.3 / Chapter III. --- WHY FIRMS PAY DIVIDENDS --- p.6 / The Bird-in-the-Hand Explanation --- p.6 / The Signaling Explanation --- p.7 / The Tax-Preference Explanation --- p.9 / The Agency Explanation --- p.10 / Chapter IV. --- HOW TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF DIVIDENDS TO PAY --- p.13 / Methodology --- p.14 / Data Analysis --- p.14 / Model (L3) --- p.16 / Fama and Babiak Model --- p.16 / The Percentage Adjusted Model (PAM) --- p.17 / CAR Analysis --- p.20 / Chapter V. --- COMPANY CLASSIFICATIONS --- p.22 / Chapter VI. --- CONCLUSION --- p.25 / APPENDIX --- p.26 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.37

So, King Pui. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 49-52). / Abstracts in English and Chinese; appendix II, III also in Chinese. / Cover Page --- p.1 / Abstract --- p.2 / Chinese Version --- p.3 / Acknowledgements --- p.4 / Contents --- p.5 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 2. --- Definition and basic idea of Cumulative Voting --- p.9 / Chapter 3. --- Literature Review --- p.11 / Chapter 4. --- History and Development --- p.12 / Chapter 4.1. --- Around the world --- p.12 / Chapter 4.2. --- Cumulative voting in listed companies in China --- p.13 / Chapter 5. --- Hypothesis --- p.15 / Chapter 5.1. --- Nature of cumulative voting --- p.15 / Chapter 5.2 --- Relationship of corporate governance mechanism and tunneling in signaling the effect of cumulative voting --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2.1. --- Ownership characteristics --- p.18 / Chapter 5.2.2. --- Activeness of minority shareholders --- p.20 / Chapter 5.2.3. --- Legal framework --- p.21 / Chapter 5.2.4. --- Ownership nature --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.5. --- Board of directors and supervisors --- p.22 / Chapter 5.2.6. --- Compensations of top executives --- p.23 / Chapter 6. --- Methodology --- p.24 / Chapter 6.1. --- Cumulative voting in the election of the board of director --- p.24 / Chapter 6.2. --- Ownership concentration and characteristics --- p.24 / Chapter 6.3. --- Legal framework --- p.25 / Chapter 6.4. --- Firm Operation Policy --- p.25 / Chapter 6.5. --- Ownership Nature --- p.25 / Chapter 6.6. --- Board of directors and supervisors --- p.26 / Chapter 6.7. --- Top Executives' compensations --- p.27 / Chapter 6.8. --- Operating performance --- p.27 / Chapter 6.9. --- Industry sectors --- p.28 / Chapter 6.10. --- Market firm value --- p.28 / Chapter 6.11. --- Event study approach --- p.29 / Chapter 6.12. --- Matched Propensity Scores Approach --- p.32 / Chapter 6.13. --- Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities --- p.34 / Chapter 6.14. --- Difference in differences approach --- p.35 / Chapter 7. --- Data --- p.39 / Chapter 7.1. --- Sources of Data --- p.39 / Chapter 7.2. --- Cumulative voting announcements and firm characteristics --- p.39 / Chapter 8. --- Empirical Results --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1. --- Short-term market response --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1.1. --- Event study --- p.40 / Chapter 8.1.2. --- Univariate test --- p.41 / Chapter 8.1.3. --- Multivate OLS regressions --- p.42 / Chapter 8.2. --- Long-term impact --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2.1. --- Matched Propensity Scores --- p.43 / Chapter 8.2.2. --- Top Executives' Pay-Performance Sensitivities --- p.44 / Chapter 8.2.3. --- Univariate test --- p.45 / Chapter 8.2.4. --- Difference in Differences regressions --- p.46 / Chapter 9. --- Conclusions --- p.47 / References --- p.49 / Table 1: Descriptive statistics for firms announcing the implementation of cumulative voting in the election of board of directors --- p.53 / Table 2: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.54 / Table 3: Descriptive statistics for annual shareholders' meetings from 2002-2008 --- p.56 / Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors announcements --- p.56 / Table 5: Abnormal returns for an event study of the information content of implementation of cumulative voting in election of board of directors announcements --- p.57 / Table 6: Descriptive statistics for firm characteristics --- p.57 / "Table 7: Mean comparison between above median/ ´ب´ب 1"" group and below median/ ""0"" group using t-test" --- p.59 / Table 8: OLS regression --- p.60 / Table 9: First stage Logistic Model --- p.62 / Table 10: Top Executives Pay-Performance sensitivities for salary and inside stock ownership --- p.64 / Table 11: Mean comparison between cumulative voting and straight voting group using t-test --- p.65 / Table 12: Difference in differences regressions (Corporate governance) --- p.66 / Table 13: Difference in differences regressions (Operating performance) --- p.67 / Table 14: Difference in differences regressions (Market firm value) --- p.68 / Appendix I --- p.68 / Appendix II --- p.71 / Appendix III --- p.72