Spelling suggestions: "subject:"strategische handelspolitik"" "subject:"strategische handelspolitiek""
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Driving under the influence : strategic trade policy and market integration in the European car industry /Andera, Jan. January 2007 (has links) (PDF)
Univ., Diss.--Lund, 2007.
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State trading enterprises in a differentiated environment : the case of global malting barley markets /Dong, Fengxia. January 2003 (has links) (PDF)
Kan., Kansas State Univ., Dep. of Agricultural Economics, Diss.--Manhatten, 2003. / Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich.
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Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions and Preferential Free Trade AreasKuhn, Thomas, Pestow, Radomir, Zenker, Anja 08 January 2016 (has links) (PDF)
In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.
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Self-Enforcing Climate Coalitions and Preferential Free Trade AreasKuhn, Thomas, Pestow, Radomir, Zenker, Anja 08 January 2016 (has links)
In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.
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