Despite the voluminous literature on North-South macroeconomic interactions and the key role of terms of trade variations in growth transmission from one region to another, a significant research gap persists for two reasons. First, there has been very little empirical work on testing of the relationships between growth patterns and terms of trade movements. Second, the empirical studies dedicated to testing the Prebisch-Singer Thesis (PST) focused on testing the long-run tendency for the terms of trade of primary commodities to deteriorate and neglected the joint nature of the predictions arising out of a complete formulation of PST. This dissertation seeks to properly specify the PST, provide a generalization of it to the case of imbalanced trade, and extend it to a three-region framework through a structuralist North-South model. Multiple paths of growth divergence/convergence and terms of trade deterioration/improvement emerge depending on the structural changes influencing the income-elasticity differentials. I carry out two sets of empirical analyses. First, I use aggregate data on North-South terms of trade indices to test the presence and significance of a downward trend. Second, I use panel data analysis and rolling regressions to show the evolution of income-elasticity differentials. The results suggest that the growth rates of developing countries during the 1980s declined in both absolute and relative terms partly as a result of the downward trend in terms of trade and partly as a result of income elasticity differentials reflecting the productive and technological asymmetries between the developed and developing economies. However, these structural asymmetries have not remained constant: the results show that they changed both over time and over cross-sections of different groups of countries. In general the countries that diversified towards manufactured exports had better chances of eliminating the elasticity differentials, and thus attaining relatively higher rates of growth. The cross-country study is complemented by a comparative case study of Turkey and Malaysia. The results show that industrial and trade policies, if carefully designed and effectively implemented, can counter potential costs of external market dynamics while taking advantage of the opportunities for advancing dynamic comparative advantages.

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.

This dissertation is devoted to the analysis of various aspects of inefficiency in the political economy. It consists of four self-containing theoretical essays. The first two chapters deal with the interplay between inefficiency and commitment. Chapter 1 studies the problem of commitment in autocratic regimes and its implications for growth. Chapter 2 argues that the absence of commitment undermines the validity of the Coase theorem. The next two chapters address alternative sources of inefficiency, abstracting from commitment-related problems. Chapter 3 discusses inefficiencies arising in organizations whose members possess veto power and suggests a way of mitigating the problem. Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of demand linkages on the efficiency of lobbying for trade policy. Chapter 1. “Autocracy, Devolution and Growth” Some autocracies have sustained high economic growth for many decades; others have stagnated at low levels of production. Paradoxically, the stagnating autocracies appear to possess more natural resources and be more resistant to political change than the growing autocracies. The paper argues that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in an autocracy is largely determined by the autocrat's incentive to cling to power. The main result of the paper is that there will be private capital accumulation only if the autocrat’s benefits from political control are not too high. The reason is that, as capital accumulates and growth slows down, the autocrat faces an increasing temptation to expropriate the capitalists. Since expropriation eliminates growth, the autocrat may voluntarily refrain from expropriating if future growth is sufficiently large; otherwise, the temptation to expropriate can only be resisted through a credible commitment, that is, by devolving some political power. For autocrats with large benefits of control, for example valuable natural resource rents, devolution of power may always be unattractive. As a result, capitalists realize that they will eventually be expropriated, and capital accumulation therefore never starts. On the other hand, autocrats with small resource rents will eventually devolve power, since this commitment is necessary to sustain growth. Therefore, capitalists are willing to start accumulating despite the autocratic regime. In other words, autocracies are vulnerable to the resource curse.   Chapter 2. “The Coase Theorem Is False” (with Tore Ellingsen) The paper provides simple and robust counterexamples to the Coase Theorem. More precisely, we show that equilibrium investments in club goods can be suboptimally small despite the presence of well-defined and perfectly protected property rights and the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a club of owners will typically not exercise their right to exclude outsiders, preferring instead to exercise their right to sell access. As long as the club of owners does not have all the bargaining power in such ex post access negotiations, strategic non-membership provides a valuable free-riding opportunity. Chapter 3. “Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity” (with Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart and Guido Friebel) In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogeneous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is never executed, and under which inner organizations are equilibrium outcomes, and provide a rationale for the diversity of decision rules. Chapter 4. “Protection for Sale to Oligopolists” This paper modifies Grossman and Helpman’s "Protection for Sale" model by allowing demand linkages and oligopolistic competition. It shows that increased substitutability between products weakens interest groups’ incentives to lobby. For the case of two industries it obtains a particularly simple result: the protection of the organized industry’s product falls, whereas the protection of the unorganized industry’s product increases with product substitutability. The model suggests that empirical studies of the "Protection for Sale" may overstate the lobby groups’ desire for protection. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

本論文的目的在於研究匯率波動與對外直接投資(foreign direct investment, FDI)時點的關係。本論文採用實質選擇權分析法(real options approach)由理論面重新檢視這個議題，並利用實際資料驗證理論的正確性。本論文在文獻上的貢獻在於證明：在探討匯率波動與FDI關係時有必要考慮廠商投資動機的差異性。 為了說明不同投資動機對這個議題的重要性，本論文考慮四種不同對外直接投資的型態，分別為市場導向型(market-seeking)、回銷導向型(reverse- importing) 、替代出口型(export-substituting)及躍過反傾銷稅型(antidumping- dumping)。首先，我們延伸Dixit-Pindyck的實質選擇權模型，證明匯率波動提高會使市場導向型及回銷導向型的廠商延後投資，但對於風險趨避程度夠高的替代出口型廠商而言，匯率波動提高則會使其提前投資。此外，我們證明地主國貨幣升值對市場導向型廠商的FDI有利，但對回銷導向及替代出口型廠商的FDI則有不利影響。 其次，我們分別使用台商至中國大陸投資的產業資料及廠商資料進行實證。樣本期間涵蓋1987年至2002年。實證結果發現，新台幣兌人民幣實質匯率及其波動度與兩岸相對工資等因素對台商至中國大陸投資時點皆有顯著的影響，而且這些實證結果皆與前述理論預期相符。這些結果顯示，匯率波動對FDI之影響方向與投資動機息息相關。在進行實證研究時若忽略了這項因素，實證結果可能會產生加總偏誤(aggregation bias)。 最後，本論文建立一個不完全競爭下的實質選擇權模型，分別探討匯率波動如何影響出口廠商的傾銷行為及其躍過反傾銷稅的對外直接投資 (antidumping-　jumping FDI)，並分析進口國採取反傾銷政策的福利效果。我們發現匯率波動對廠商以低於內銷價格傾銷(price dumping)至出口市場的影響有不對稱(asymmetry)現象。此外，若政府採取反傾銷政策，可能刺激出口廠商採行躍過反傾銷稅的FDI。惟若出口廠商採行躍過反傾銷稅的FDI，不僅進口國國內廠商受到傷害，其社會福利也可能下降。此結論與過去策略性貿易政策文獻之看法大相逕庭。 / This thesis theoretically and empirically examines the relationship between exchange rate movements and the timing of foreign direct investment (FDI). A real options approach is adopted. This thesis contributes to the literature in illustrating the importance to consider the diversity of investing motives when examining the relationship between exchange rate movements and foreign direct investment. To show the importance of the diversity of the motives in investigating this issue, four different types of FDI are discussed in this thesis: market-seeking FDI, reverse-importing FDI, export-substituting FDI, and antidumping-jumping FDI. We first extend Dixit-Pindyck’s real options model to show that while an increase in exchange rate volatility tends to delay the FDI activities of a market-seeking firm and a reverse-importing firm, it might accelerate the FDI activity of an export-substituting firm if the firm’s degree of risk aversion is high enough. In addition, it is also shown that while the depreciation of a host country’s currency tends to stimulate FDI activities of reverse-importing firms and export-substituting firms, the depreciation tends to deter FDI activity for market-seeking firms. With the industry-panel data and the firm-level data on Taiwan’s outward FDI into mainland China over the period 1987-2002, our empirical findings indicate that the exchange rate level and its volatility in addition to the relative wage rate have had a significant impact on Taiwanese firms’ outward FDI into China. In general, the empirical results are consistent with the prediction of the theory. These results reveal that the relationship between exchange rate movements and FDI is crucially dependent on the motives of the investing firms. Without considering this fact in an empirical model, the testing results might suffer from aggregations bias. Furthermore, this thesis sets up a real options model with imperfect competition to analyze how exchange rate movements affect dumping occurrence and antidumping-　jumping FDI as well as the social welfare of importing country. We consider the price dumping case and find that the effect of exchange rate movements on the probability of dumping occurrence seems asymmetric. In addition, if a government adopts an AD policy, it is shown that this policy might induce exporting firms to undertake AD-jumping FDI. Finally, we find that, if an AD policy induces exporting firms to undertake AD-jumping FDI, the policy might have a negative impact on the profits of local firms and the social welfare of the importing country as well, which is contrary to the prediction of the earlier literature on strategic trade policy.

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of self-enforcing climate coalitions linked to the issue of a free trade agreement. As a framework, a strategic trade model is used in which countries may discourage greenhouse gas emissions by means of an import tariff on dirty goods. In addition, countries can set an emissions cap being effective on a permit market. Our main focus, however, is on the utilization of terms of trade privileges provided to members of a preferential free trade area. We propose evidence for that the welfare gains of trade liberalization are strongly promoting the formation of climate coalitions. In the parametrical simulation of the model, global emissions as well as climate change damages are found significantly reduced compared to the BAU scenario while global welfare is found significantly higher.

The master thesis is devoted to a nontraditional, however, in the todays world to a very current topic, arms industry and its support. The thesis connects the theoretical concept of the strategic trade policy (defined by P. Krugman or J. Brander) to its practical interpretation and application in the defence and security industry. The first chapter explains the strategic trade policy using the Brander Spencer analysis. The topic of the second chapter is strategic industries and this chapter answers the question whether the defence and security industry is a strategic industry or not. The third chapter analyses the possibilities of the support of DSI and compares approaches of different EU member states. The last chapter is devoted to the solution of this problem. The main contribution of this thesis is a new interpretation of the strategic trade policy, analysis of the importance of the defence and security industry and its support and suggestion of practical measures for Czech companies and for the Czech Ministry of Defence.