Bergman showed that systems of projections of algebras in a variety will satisfy a certain property if the variety has a near-unanimity term. The converse of this theorem was left open. This paper investigates this open question, and shows that in a locally finite variety, Bergman's Condition implies congruence modularity. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)

We define the notion of monotone operations admitted by partially ordered sets, specifically monotone near-unanimity functions and Jónsson operations. We then prove a result of McKenzie's in [8] which states that if a finite, bounded poset P admits a set of monotone Jónsson operations then it admits a set of monotone Jónsson operations for which the operations with even indices do not depend on their second variable. We next define zigzags of posets and prove various useful properties about them. Using these zigzags, we proceed carefully through Zadori's proof from [12] that a finite, bounded poset P admits a monotone near-unanimity function if and only if P admits monotone Jónsson operations.

We define the notion of monotone operations admitted by partially ordered sets, specifically monotone near-unanimity functions and Jónsson operations. We then prove a result of McKenzie's in [8] which states that if a finite, bounded poset P admits a set of monotone Jónsson operations then it admits a set of monotone Jónsson operations for which the operations with even indices do not depend on their second variable. We next define zigzags of posets and prove various useful properties about them. Using these zigzags, we proceed carefully through Zadori's proof from [12] that a finite, bounded poset P admits a monotone near-unanimity function if and only if P admits monotone Jónsson operations.

Reconstruímos a Teoria da Escolha Pública explicitando seus pressupostos sobre a natureza do objeto, do conhecimento e dos valores e sua lógica de operação, ou seja, seu método de solução de problemas. Mostramos com essa teoria que podemos entender a política como um processo de pacificação pela troca, em vez de um processo de pacificação pelo poder. Temos então novas respostas para as perguntas fundamentais da Ciência Política: Como é possível emergir a cooperação pacífica e legítima entre indivíduos? Qual é a maneira de fazer com que diferentes interesses individuais sejam reconciliados? A Teoria sugere que a política pode ser um jogo de soma positiva, evitando deseconomias constitucionais, guiando-se pelo princípio da unanimidade. Mostraremos então os desenhos constitucionais como ambientes de interação entre indivíduos e poderemos predizer que regras engendrarão cooperação ou competição. / We do a reconstruction of the Public Choice Theory explaining their assumptions about the nature of the object, knowledge and values and logic of their operation, i.e. its method of solution of problems. We show that with this theory we can understand the politics as a process of pacification through trade-offs, instead of a peace process by means of power. Proceeding in this way we obtain new answers to fundamental questions of Political Science: How can emerge a peaceful and legitimate cooperation among individuals? What is the way to conciliate different individual interests? The theory suggests that politics can be a positive-sum game, avoiding constitutional diseconomies, and must be guided by the principle of unanimity. Then we show how the constitutional designs as interaction environments for individuals and so can predict what rules make cooperation or competition.

This dissertation is devoted to the analysis of various aspects of inefficiency in the political economy. It consists of four self-containing theoretical essays. The first two chapters deal with the interplay between inefficiency and commitment. Chapter 1 studies the problem of commitment in autocratic regimes and its implications for growth. Chapter 2 argues that the absence of commitment undermines the validity of the Coase theorem. The next two chapters address alternative sources of inefficiency, abstracting from commitment-related problems. Chapter 3 discusses inefficiencies arising in organizations whose members possess veto power and suggests a way of mitigating the problem. Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of demand linkages on the efficiency of lobbying for trade policy. Chapter 1. “Autocracy, Devolution and Growth” Some autocracies have sustained high economic growth for many decades; others have stagnated at low levels of production. Paradoxically, the stagnating autocracies appear to possess more natural resources and be more resistant to political change than the growing autocracies. The paper argues that the scope for capital accumulation and growth in an autocracy is largely determined by the autocrat's incentive to cling to power. The main result of the paper is that there will be private capital accumulation only if the autocrat’s benefits from political control are not too high. The reason is that, as capital accumulates and growth slows down, the autocrat faces an increasing temptation to expropriate the capitalists. Since expropriation eliminates growth, the autocrat may voluntarily refrain from expropriating if future growth is sufficiently large; otherwise, the temptation to expropriate can only be resisted through a credible commitment, that is, by devolving some political power. For autocrats with large benefits of control, for example valuable natural resource rents, devolution of power may always be unattractive. As a result, capitalists realize that they will eventually be expropriated, and capital accumulation therefore never starts. On the other hand, autocrats with small resource rents will eventually devolve power, since this commitment is necessary to sustain growth. Therefore, capitalists are willing to start accumulating despite the autocratic regime. In other words, autocracies are vulnerable to the resource curse.   Chapter 2. “The Coase Theorem Is False” (with Tore Ellingsen) The paper provides simple and robust counterexamples to the Coase Theorem. More precisely, we show that equilibrium investments in club goods can be suboptimally small despite the presence of well-defined and perfectly protected property rights and the absence of transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The reason is that, in equilibrium, a club of owners will typically not exercise their right to exclude outsiders, preferring instead to exercise their right to sell access. As long as the club of owners does not have all the bargaining power in such ex post access negotiations, strategic non-membership provides a valuable free-riding opportunity. Chapter 3. “Club-in-the-Club: Reform under Unanimity” (with Erik Berglöf, Mike Burkart and Guido Friebel) In many organizations, decisions are taken by unanimity. We analyze a model of an organization in which members with heterogeneous productivity privately contribute to a common good. Under unanimity, the least efficient member imposes her preferred effort choice on the entire organization. In the presence of externalities and an incomplete charter, the threat of forming an “inner organization” can undermine the veto power of the less efficient members and coerce them to exert more effort. We identify the conditions under which the threat of forming an inner organization is never executed, and under which inner organizations are equilibrium outcomes, and provide a rationale for the diversity of decision rules. Chapter 4. “Protection for Sale to Oligopolists” This paper modifies Grossman and Helpman’s "Protection for Sale" model by allowing demand linkages and oligopolistic competition. It shows that increased substitutability between products weakens interest groups’ incentives to lobby. For the case of two industries it obtains a particularly simple result: the protection of the organized industry’s product falls, whereas the protection of the unorganized industry’s product increases with product substitutability. The model suggests that empirical studies of the "Protection for Sale" may overstate the lobby groups’ desire for protection. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2006

La tesis estudia la evolución de la estructura de propiedad de compañías y de sus efectos sobre resultados económicos reales. El capítulo 1 proporciona un análisis empírico de la privatización en Rusia en los años 90. Se utilizan datos de 530 empresas industriales rusas para estimar los factores implicados en la decisión de privatizar una empresa, en la selección entre diversas opciones de privatización, en la distribución inicial de la propiedad que resulta, y en su evolución posterior. El capítulo 2 estudia los efectos de diferencias de intereses entre accionistas sobre decisiones de inversión y el mercado de acciones en un modelo simple. Suponiendo que los mercados financieros son incompletos, la distribución inicial de la propiedad, la riqueza y las preferencias de los propietarios afectan a su nivel preferido de inversión. Las decisiones sobre la inversión son tomadas por mayoría. Dos extensiones, la protección de accionistas de minoría y ventajas privadas del control, permiten un análisis del papel de las instituciones del gobierno corporativo en las decisiones de inversión y estructura de propiedad. Las predicciones del modelo para la evolución de la estructura de propiedad son coherentes con las observaciones empíricas en el capítulo 1. / The thesis studies the evolution of the ownership structure of companies and its effects on real economic outcomes. Chapter 1 provides an empirical analysis of the large-scale privatization in Russia in the 1990s. A comprehensive data set of 530 Russian manufacturing firms is used to estimate determinants of the decision to privatize a firm, of the choice among different options of privatization, the resulting initial ownership distribution, and its further evolution. Chapter 2 studies the effects of conflicting interests of shareholders on investment decisions and share trade in a simple model. In a setting with incomplete financial markets, the wealth, initial stake and preferences of owners affect their preferred level of investment. Decisions on investment are taken by majority. Two extensions, a protection for minority shareholders and private benefits of control, allow us to analyze the impact of corporate governance arrangements on investment decisions and ownership structure. The model predictions for the evolution of ownership are in line with the empirical observations in chapter 1.

Reconstruímos a Teoria da Escolha Pública explicitando seus pressupostos sobre a natureza do objeto, do conhecimento e dos valores e sua lógica de operação, ou seja, seu método de solução de problemas. Mostramos com essa teoria que podemos entender a política como um processo de pacificação pela troca, em vez de um processo de pacificação pelo poder. Temos então novas respostas para as perguntas fundamentais da Ciência Política: Como é possível emergir a cooperação pacífica e legítima entre indivíduos? Qual é a maneira de fazer com que diferentes interesses individuais sejam reconciliados? A Teoria sugere que a política pode ser um jogo de soma positiva, evitando deseconomias constitucionais, guiando-se pelo princípio da unanimidade. Mostraremos então os desenhos constitucionais como ambientes de interação entre indivíduos e poderemos predizer que regras engendrarão cooperação ou competição. / We do a reconstruction of the Public Choice Theory explaining their assumptions about the nature of the object, knowledge and values and logic of their operation, i.e. its method of solution of problems. We show that with this theory we can understand the politics as a process of pacification through trade-offs, instead of a peace process by means of power. Proceeding in this way we obtain new answers to fundamental questions of Political Science: How can emerge a peaceful and legitimate cooperation among individuals? What is the way to conciliate different individual interests? The theory suggests that politics can be a positive-sum game, avoiding constitutional diseconomies, and must be guided by the principle of unanimity. Then we show how the constitutional designs as interaction environments for individuals and so can predict what rules make cooperation or competition.

From a quantitative survey that found that 93% were unanimous for appeal judgments in contesting the application registration feature in elective office appeal of action and appeal against the degree of expedition five Regional Electoral Courts (TRE) from different regions of Brazil, is sought in this dissertation identify the reason so many trials unanimously. Drawing on primary sources (constitutions, laws, decrees and resolutions - notably the internal regulations of various courts) and secondary (theses, books and articles), the answer is searching the history and organization of the Electoral Court and the composition of the TRE; the institutional role of the courts; the collegiality effectively applied and the specific characteristics of the electoral courts of second instance. The theoretical framework chosen was the Communicative Action Theory of Habermas. It discusses the advantages of collegial judgment and whether collegiality is a rule or a constitutional principle. The paradigm of collegiate judgment of the Federal Supreme Court and the doctrine of unanimity are studied. In the end, it is concluded that the causes are: a) the result conditioning the institutional role of the courts - to ensure the law - which takes the judges naturally differ little; b) the absence of a specific moment of the debate collegial, apart from the time of harvest of the votes; c) the short tenure of judges and the little time devoted to electoral judiciary in the face of the accumulation of another jurisdiction or law and, finally, d) the fact that the judges vote on the confidence of the Rapporteur, pressed by the conditions indicated in items "b" and "c", characterizing progress in the implementation of communicative action in the weak sense theorized by Habermas. / Partindo de uma pesquisa quantitativa que identificou que foram unânimes 93% dos julgamentos de recurso em impugnação a registro de candidatura, recurso em ação de impugnação de mandato eletivo e recurso contra a expedição de diploma em cinco Tribunais Regionais Eleitorais (TREs) de diferentes regiões do Brasil, procurou-se na presente dissertação identificar qual a razão de tantos julgamentos por unanimidade. Valendo-se de fontes primárias (constituições, leis, decretos e resoluções – notadamente as de regimento interno de vários tribunais) e secundárias (teses, livros e artigos), busca-se a resposta pesquisando a história e organização da Justiça Eleitoral e a composição dos TREs; a função institucional dos tribunais; a colegialidade efetivamente aplicada e as características específicas das cortes eleitorais de segunda instância. O marco teórico escolhido foi a Teoria do Agir Comunicativo de Habermas. Discute-se as vantagens do julgamento colegiado e se a colegialidade é uma regra ou um princípio constitucional. Estuda-se o paradigma de julgamento colegiado do Supremo Tribunal Federal e a visão da doutrina sobre a unanimidade. Ao final, conclui-se que as causas são: a) o condicionamento decorrente da função institucional dos tribunais – garantir a ordem jurídica – que leva os juízes a naturalmente divergirem pouco; b) a inexistência de um momento específico de debate pelo colegiado, apartado do momento da colheita dos votos; c) o mandato curto dos juízes e o pouco tempo que dedicam à judicatura eleitoral em face da acumulação de outra jurisdição ou da advocacia e, por fim d) o fato de os juízes votarem na confiança do Relator, premidos pelas condicionantes indicadas nos itens “b” e “c”, situação caracterizadora da aplicação do agir comunicativo no sentido fraco teorizado por Habermas.