This dissertation draws attention to the interaction between insurgents and the target state as the appropriate context for explaining the motivations of suicide bombers, the rationales of the organizations that support them, and the popularity in certain societies of suicide bombing. Based mainly on data collected from 88 interviews conducted in 2006 with senior leaders of six Palestinian political organizations and close relatives and friends of a 25 percent representative sample of Palestinian suicide bombers during the second intifada, it demonstrates the following: (1) During the second intifada, changes in the political opportunity structure, especially extreme state repression, were chiefly responsible for growing public support for suicide bombing, the development of organizational rationales justifying suicide bombing, and the crystallization of suicide bombers’ motivation to act. State repression produced a widespread desire for revenge at all levels of Palestinian society. (2) Cultural forces, notably the growing popularity of fundamentalist Islam and its embodiment in the political culture of certain militant organizations, were of secondary importance in causing the spread of suicide bombing. (3) Strategic calculations (“rational choice”) aimed at speeding the liberation of occupied territory were of tertiary importance in motivating suicide bombers but they figured more prominently at the level of organizational rationales. (4) While the literature often invokes creative agency, psychopathology, and material deprivation to explain the rise of suicide bombing, little or no effect was discovered for these variables.

This dissertation draws attention to the interaction between insurgents and the target state as the appropriate context for explaining the motivations of suicide bombers, the rationales of the organizations that support them, and the popularity in certain societies of suicide bombing. Based mainly on data collected from 88 interviews conducted in 2006 with senior leaders of six Palestinian political organizations and close relatives and friends of a 25 percent representative sample of Palestinian suicide bombers during the second intifada, it demonstrates the following: (1) During the second intifada, changes in the political opportunity structure, especially extreme state repression, were chiefly responsible for growing public support for suicide bombing, the development of organizational rationales justifying suicide bombing, and the crystallization of suicide bombers’ motivation to act. State repression produced a widespread desire for revenge at all levels of Palestinian society. (2) Cultural forces, notably the growing popularity of fundamentalist Islam and its embodiment in the political culture of certain militant organizations, were of secondary importance in causing the spread of suicide bombing. (3) Strategic calculations (“rational choice”) aimed at speeding the liberation of occupied territory were of tertiary importance in motivating suicide bombers but they figured more prominently at the level of organizational rationales. (4) While the literature often invokes creative agency, psychopathology, and material deprivation to explain the rise of suicide bombing, little or no effect was discovered for these variables.

Thesis (M.S. in Joint Campaign Planning and Strategy)--Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Advanced Warfighting School, 2007. / Title from title screen; viewed on July 9, 2007. "May 2007." Electronic version of original print document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 70-73).

The Boko Haram terror group has utilized more women as suicide bombers than any other group in history. While prior research has examined why this phenomenon is occurring, and what makes Boko Haram a unique terror group, the present study examines how these attacks are being perpetrated, or enacted, by the female bombers. Utilizing the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), which is the largest terrorism incident database available, the study examined the incidents of female suicide bombings perpetrated by Boko Haram. The open-sourced citations provided by the GTD were compiled and turned into a complementary qualitative dataset. Overall, there were 151 incidents of female suicide bombings by Boko Haram between 2014 and 2017, of which 102 were included in the final sample for the study. Results of content analysis indicate that there are similarities between the perpetration of suicide bombings by females and other acts of crime, violence, and terrorist acts committed by other women, but there are also distinct differences. The cultural and social constructs of the region create a unique situation for Boko Haram compared to other terrorist groups that have deployed the female suicide bombing tactic; however, these features also make it difficult to flesh out the overarching issues of coercion, victimization, and kidnapping that the group heavily relies on. Though the ways in which the suicide attacks are enacted can be examined, at this point, it is still unclear whether the young women and girls perpetrating the attacks are acting out of their own volition, high levels of coercion, or a blend of the two.

This thesis reviews the literature on “new terrorism,” to be differentiated from the “old terrorism.” The study tests two hypotheses. First, has an increase in religiously inspired terrorist groups led to an increase in terrorism's lethality? Second, does suicide bombing as a tactic explain the increased lethality of “new terrorism”? The study demonstrates three findings. First, it was found that religiously inspired terrorist groups are more lethal, though not more indiscriminate. Second, that suicide bombing has had a significant effect on the number of terrorist related fatalities. And, third, that non-religious suicide bombing is more lethal than its religious counterpart. To test these hypotheses I used Ordinary Least Squares Regression and data provided by The International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism.

The central hypothesis of this study is that terrorist organizations choose to use females as suicide bombers not only as tactical innovation but also to “signal” or send a message to various audiences. In order to meet the research objectives of this study, two terrorist organizations—the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the Chechen Separatists or those individuals associated with the Chechen Resistance—are examined in detail from their inception through 2013 using a structured focused comparison methodology. Evidence is found to support both of the studies’ main hypotheses. First, female suicide bombers are used by terrorist organizations because they are a 1) tactical advantage, and 2) to “signal” or send a message to various audiences. Their “entertainment” or shock value maximizes the psychological punch intended for delivery to a variety of audiences. These two reasons are not mutually exclusive but are colored by contextual considerations unique to each case. While deliberation was given to a variety of socio-political factors unique to each organization—such as popular support for suicide attacks perpetrated by females, indication of rival terrorist organizations, counterterrorism and political events that may have affected the terrorist organizations’ preference for females—insight into the operational characteristics surrounding individual suicide attacks was central in highlighting patterns in the organizational use of female suicide bombers. Those patterns are consistent across both cases and suggest that when females’ use is explained by the tactical innovation model, they are used overwhelmingly in suicide attacks where getting closer to intended targets—usually defined as security and political targets—matter. In contrast, suicide attacks explained by the signaling model are characterized by their novelty usually representing a deviation from terrorist organizations’ operational norms—deemed operational suicide attack anomalies in this study—characterized many times as “only” suicide attacks, “firsts [of that kind of],” or the most spectacular suicide attacks carried out by the organization.

Suicide terrorism is characterized by the willingness of physically and psychologically war-trained individuals to die while destroying or attempting to annihilate enemy targets in furtherance of certain political or social objectives. Rooted in the historical, social, and psychological dimensions of international terrorism, suicide terrorism is neither a unique nor a new phenomenon. Its recent resurgence and the extensive media coverage it has received account for the misleading uniqueness of this violent, complex, and adaptive form of terrorism. This qualitative study examines the definitional and rhetorical processes by which suicide terrorism is socially constructed. Using a social constructionist theoretical framework coupled with a symbolic interactionist approach, this multi-case study effectively moves the analysis of suicide bombings beyond essentialist debates on asymmetrical warfare or terrorism and into a more nuanced appreciation of cultural meaning and human interaction. Hence this case study emphasizes how the interpretive understanding of suicide terrorism is associated with a biased representation of events and their alleged causes that is conditioned by deliberate attempts to stigmatize ideological enemies, manipulate public perceptions, and promote certain political interests. The primary research question is: How are socio-political processes, bureaucratic imperatives, and media structures involved in the social construction of suicide terrorism? Secondary research questions focus on determining how suicide terrorism is (a) a political weapon, (b) a communication tool, and (c) a politicized issue that fits into a moral panic framework. Methods used to conduct the analysis include in-depth interviews (phenomenological and elite interviewing) and document analysis (general document review and historical review). Findings highlight the interactions between suicide bombers (as contemporary folk devils), the news and entertainment media, the public, and agents of social control (politicians, lawmakers, law enforcement, and action groups), and their respective roles in the social construction of suicide terrorism. The limitations of the study, its significant theoretical and practical implications, as well as suggestions for future research are discussed.

L’objectif de ce mémoire est d’analyser les impacts et l’efficacité de la politique d’assassinats ciblés d’Israël dans le cadre du conflit israélo-palestinien. Pour ce faire, trois angles d’approches sont utilisés; militaire, légale et politique. Pour cette raison, l’hypothèse de départ soutient que la politique compromet la résolution du conflit et se divise en trois sections. Tout d’abord, les assassinats ciblés nuisent au règlement du conflit car ils engendrent un cycle de représailles contre Israël. Deuxièmement, ils représentent une violation du droit international ainsi que du droit national israélien. Finalement, ils sont un sérieux obstacle à la résolution politique du conflit dû au climat de violence et de méfiance qu’ils instaurent. Dans la conclusion, il est retenu que, bien que la politique d’assassinats ciblés ne soit pas efficace pour lutter contre les organisations terroristes, elle n’engendre cependant pas d’effet contreproductif de cycle de violence. Dans un second temps, la politique va à l’encontre de lois internationales mais elle peut cependant être justifiée par certains articles issus de ces mêmes textes alors que la Cour suprême israélienne a reconnu que certaines opérations pouvaient s’avérées légales. Troisièmement, elle nuit bel et bien à la résolution politique du conflit israélopalestinien en exacerbant les tensions de par le climat qu’elle instaure. Finalement, les nombreux impacts de celle-ci sur le conflit n’en font pas une politique efficace. / This goal of this thesis is to analyse the impact and effectiveness of the Israeli targeted killing policy within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To this end, three different approaches will be used; military, legal and political. Our hypothesis supports that the policy impedes the resolution to the conflict and is divided into three sections. First of all, Israeli targeted killings impede the conflict resolution because they, in turn, generate retaliations against Israel. Secondly it is a clear violation of international rights, including those of the Israelis. Finally, the policy is a serious obstacle to the settlement of the conflict due to the violent and distrustful atmosphere it arouses. In the conclusion, it is said that, although the policy does not prove to be an effective measure to fight terrorism, neither does it create an escalating cycle of violence. Secondly, the policy is a violation of the international legal system; however it can still be justified by some of the articles present in the same law texts. The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that some of the operations could be legal. Thirdly, it is effectively detrimental to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict because the ambiance it creates exacerbates tensions. In conclusion, the myriad of impacts the policy has on the conflict make it ineffective.